NATO is 75 years old – 8 QUESTIONS

NATO is celebrating its 75th anniversary amidst a tense situation. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in particular has reshaped geopolitical relations. In eight questions, we explore recent developments within the political-military alliance.

In May 2021, we published an interview with Belgium's Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO at that time. Since then, the world has changed completely. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, in particular, has shaken the geopolitical balance of power. Countries such as Sweden and Finland, which at the time showed no interest in NATO membership, are now members.

NATO is therefore celebrating its 75th anniversary amidst a tense situation. In eight questions, we explore how the political-military alliance is adapting to the new circumstances.
 

1. What is NATO's position towards Russian aggression in Ukraine?
2. What specific threats are posed by Russia increasingly beating the war drum?
3. What is NATO doing to prepare for the growing threat from Russia?
4. Besides Russia, what are the main threats at present?
5. What has changed in the position towards China since 2021?
6. What does Finland and Sweden's membership mean for NATO?
7. Are other memberships on the cards?
8. The war in Ukraine has increased pressure on member countries to spend 2% of their GDP on defence. How feasible is this? What is Belgium doing?

1. What is NATO's position towards Russian aggression in Ukraine?

NATO supports Ukraine but also wants to avoid a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. How can it do this? By devoting its activities to disengagement and defence (see question 3). At the same time, NATO is providing political support and practical assistance to Ukraine.

• Political support
  
  From the outbreak of the war, NATO explicitly expressed its support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In 2023, the NATO-Ukraine Council was established: a forum for political dialogue, joint decisions on issues of common interest and consultations in case of crisis.
   
• Practical support

  The current support builds on the partnership created in the 1990s, which intensified from 2014 following the Russian annexation of Crimea. The aim is to strengthen Ukraine's security and defence sector. Currently, NATO's practical support involves military but non-lethal support. Its message – both to Ukraine and Russia – is, "We're in this for the long haul."

  In the short term, the support covers the immediate needs of the Ukrainian armed forces: winter uniforms for the soldiers, generators, clearing mines, medical equipment, etc. In the medium and long term, the support flows to the reconstruction and modernisation of Ukraine's defence and security sector. Work is also ongoing to ensure smooth coordination with NATO (doctrine, equipment, public procurement, etc.).
   

2. What specific threats are posed by Russia increasingly beating the war drum?

The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflict in Donbas were an initial wake-up call for the alliance. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was the real game-changer: this was not simply yet another territorial conflict between 2 neighbouring countries, but an invasion of a sovereign nation by a permanent member of the UN Security Council with the intention of occupying the entire territory, overthrowing the regime, installing a puppet regime and destroying the Ukrainian language and culture.

Moreover, this invasion is an attack on the international order we have built since World War II. It constitutes a confrontation between, on the one hand, a model based on rules and agreements, on individual rights and freedoms, on principles such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and the right of each country to choose its own path, and, on the other hand, a model based on the right to use coercion and intimidation to impose its will, the right to spheres of influence, the right to control its neighbours and dictate what they may think and do. This is our new reality from now on and it concerns us all.

It can never be ruled out that Putin may at some point become overconfident or miscalculate, for example, as a result of successes in Ukraine or statements made by some Western politicians. Similar 'military operations' elsewhere are then possible, posing a permanent threat to Russia's other neighbours. This permanent instability will undoubtedly impact the global economy and trade.

Above all, it would be a breakdown of the rules-based world order. Indeed, it would give the impression that aggression pays in getting your way and that international law may be violated without serious or lasting consequences. It may encourage other authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the world to follow the same path.

But the threat to the alliance is also real: It is often said that the chances of Russia attacking NATO are extremely low. At present, a large-scale military attack is rather unlikely, but hybrid and cyber attacks are becoming more common and are also aiming at targets in our country.

Therefore, we cannot remain complacent or indifferent. Even if we believe there are few indications of real aggression, we can never be certain, since it is notoriously difficult to read Russia's intentions. Also in February 2022, many refused to believe – despite the signs – that Putin would go so far as to invade Ukraine, but it happened anyway.

Finally, it would be wrong to believe that a conflict with Russia would take place only on the eastern flank of the alliance. After all, any action there will involve pushing at critical points elsewhere, such as the supply of reinforcements from across the Atlantic via roads, railways, ports and airports in Western Europe, as well as the consultation and command bodies in our country. 

3. What is NATO doing to prepare for the growing threat from Russia?

Deterrence and defence of NATO territory and the citizens of the Allies are again the focus today. The principle is, "si vis pacem, para bellum" (if you want peace, prepare for war). After all, deterring or discouraging is ultimately better than defending, and defending is better than having to recapture and rebuild.

NATO will also once again be in a position to conduct high-intensity warfare against adversaries who match us (peer adversaries), in order to defend NATO territory and our citizens if necessary. Very specifically, in an Article 5 scenario – "an armed attack against one or more of the member countries shall be considered an attack against them all" – we must be able to send reinforcements and conduct combat operations at short notice. NATO realises this through:

• An impressive deterrent system through a reinforced presence on the eastern flank (land, air, sea);
• A new generation of overarching military concepts and plans for deterrence and defence. To carry them out, NATO needs troops and capabilities in all five domains: land, sea, air, space and cyber. The Allies should provide these troops and capabilities;
• Initiatives aimed at innovation and maintaining NATO's technological edge, with increased cross-fertilisation between government, private sector and academia (see question 4);
• Measures to increase the production capacity of our defence industry to meet the need for stocks and ammunition – both our own and of Ukraine;
• Efforts to increase our society's resilience to external disruptions, to protect against cyber attacks and hybrid warfare, and to protect our critical infrastructure and underwater infrastructure. Reducing our vulnerability is obviously important for the civilian domain, but also to ensure that the civilian domain is ready to support the military if needed. This is both a collective and individual obligation for the Allies, and requires a whole-of-government approach.

4. Besides Russia, what are the main threats at present?

The Madrid Summit (June 2022) adopted NATO's Strategic Concept. This basic political document sets the course for the next decade, in response to the changed security context. It confirms the three core tasks of the alliance:

• Deterrence (or discouragement) and defence;
• Crisis prevention and management;
• Cooperative security.

Deterrence and collective defence of NATO territory and populations will once again take centre stage. The Strategic Concept also identifies the two most significant threats to NATO: Russia is the most significant direct threat, while terrorism is regarded as the most immediate asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens.

Other challenges include sexual violence as a weapon, cybersecurity, climate change, space, China's role and influence, and emerging disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum technology.

NATO uses a '360-degree approach', this means closely monitoring all geopolitical tensions and armed or hybrid conflicts. The guiding principle is, "What potentially poses a threat or challenge to our collective security and stability?" Thus, NATO is not only closely following the war on its eastern flank, but is also keeps a close eye on developments on its southern flank (Middle East, African continent) in addition to those in its immediate neighbourhood (Western Balkans, Black Sea region). Furthermore, it is monitoring new alliances between regimes that do not share its values and goals.

5. What has changed in the position towards China since 2021?

China is not considered a direct threat but a challenge to the Allies. NATO also has no intention whatsoever of allowing Asian countries to join the alliance.

However, China is not hesitating to launch hybrid, cyber operations and disinformation campaigns against NATO countries. Beijing also controls key sectors and raw materials and is strongly committed to developing new technologies. Moreover, China's support for Russia – especially in the context of the war against Ukraine – remains a primary concern.

In doing so, Beijing is driven by its ambition to become a military superpower combined with territorial claims. This is accompanied by a complete lack of transparency around capabilities, military doctrine and strategy while the line between military and civilian industry remains very blurred. Therefore, China is presenting the Alliance with a series of challenges, which are being handled carefully.

NATO is also wary of undermining the rules-based world order and Chinese attempts to bend standards and norms within international organisations to its will, while agreements and rules that everyone abides by ensure predictability, a level playing field and thus stability.

In response to this, NATO is monitoring developments in and around China and analysing their potential impact on the Alliance, which includes, for example, the risk of an arms race in the region or globally, of nuclear proliferation, the risk to freedom of navigation and economic dependence, or the impact of Chinese control of our critical infrastructure in the event of war.

It is also focusing on investment in technology, not only to gain a technological upper hand, but also to guard ethical values such as the responsible use of new technologies.

The 32 Allies also work closely with its four Indo-Pacific partners: Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, since, in our globalised world, our security is increasingly intertwined. What is more, the four partners are on the same page as NATO on Ukraine – namely regarding support and sanctions – and have a wealth of experience with the Indo-Pacific region.

However, in the interest of transparency and increasing mutual trust, NATO is doing all this without closing the lines of communication with Beijing. To this end, regular staff-to-staff contact takes place between NATO officials and China.

6. What does Finland and Sweden's membership mean for NATO?

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden decided to apply for NATO membership after decades of neutrality. The accession of Finland and Sweden has great benefits for NATO.

Both countries have high-calibre armed forces with a high degree of readiness, a strong defence industry and sound experience in resilience of society. They also have a thorough knowledge of the High North, a region essential to the defence of the Alliance.

An added benefit is that it will become easier to access and supply the Baltic states, while the Baltic Sea will become a kind of 'inland sea' for NATO, which puts pressure on Russia, including through the nearby exclave of Kaliningrad or even St Petersburg.

Moreover, the High North is of growing geopolitical and economic importance. Global warming will soon make the Arctic Ocean navigable for several months of the year for military as well as merchant ships. Shipping time from Europe to Asia will be significantly reduced through this passage, while resources below the North Pole will become easier to access.
 

7. Are other memberships on the cards?

Ukraine and Georgia have been asking to join NATO for years now. Kyiv submitted a formal application for accession immediately after Russia's annexation of four Ukrainian regions in the autumn of 2022. NATO's doors are effectively open to Ukraine and in 2023 the accession procedure was made less stringent. However, the country will still be required to implement a series of reforms, including in the area of fighting corruption or democratic control over the armed forces.

In any case, an invitation to join only comes both when the Allies agree that the conditions are met and when the situation allows it. For now, there is no specific date or path to entry.

8. The war in Ukraine has increased pressure on member countries to spend 2% of their GDP on defence. How feasible is this? What is Belgium doing?

Belgium must assume its share of responsibility under the burden sharing among the 32 Allies; this burden sharing is expressed in Cash, Capabilities and Contributions. Due to the new geopolitical context, the bar was set at a minimum of 2%.

Belgian authorities are aware of the problem. Several investment plans have been adopted in recent years: 9.2 billion euros and 11 billion euros have been committed to the purchase of strategic military equipment during the last two government terms.

The course set by Belgium determines that our country will spend 1.54% of its GDP on defence in 2030, eventually reaching 2% in 2035. This means Belgium is not doing it fast enough and is being firmly held to account by NATO authorities and the other Allies.

This 2% of GDP is the measure by which a country demonstrates the political will to take its share of the burden, but it is first and foremost the prerequisite for fulfilling the capability targets imposed on us by NATO. It is asking us for more fighter jets, a third frigate or arming our drones. What we don’t do, other Allies would have to do. This is not normal.

Indeed, the new geopolitical reality forces us to have the necessary military capabilities, not only for conflict prevention and management and military cooperation – as in the post-Cold War period – but also to restore NATO's ability to defend NATO territory in an Article 5 scenario.

The latter has profound implications – both quantitative and qualitative – for the military instrument of the individual Allies, and certainly for that of Belgium. We need to play hard catch-up to rebuild high-end capabilities that have been saved away since 1989: combat units that are ready, trained, adequately manned and equipped with equipment, stocks and ammunition. Moreover, we also need to be able to move units quickly to the zone of action. All this is in order to conduct operations on land, at sea, in the air, in space and in the cyber domain.

Thus, an increased input in our Defence is essential. Peace and security do not come for free and they are the basic prerequisite for all other aspects of our society. In a sense, defence is to a nation what health is to a person.

Belgium, incidentally, is a staunch defender of multilateralism (= solving international problems through international organisations as much as possible). It has joined a collective security architecture partly based on this commitment as a founding member of NATO. From this perspective, 'our' populations, 'our' territories, and 'our' prosperity are protected.

If one country does not fulfil its share of responsibility, a piece in that wall of protection is missing, and we impose a risk on our Allies. For that matter, Belgium is the eighth largest economy within the EU, with a GDP of about 550 billion euros. We are one of the world's most open economies and thus particularly dependent on international stability for our prosperity. Therefore, investing in defence is investing in our prosperity.