

Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development
Cooperation

Special Evaluation Office of the Belgian Development Cooperation

Evaluation of the core funding policy of the international partner organisations of the Belgian development cooperation



**Draft Final Report
Volume II – Annexes**

March 2021

The evaluation has been conducted by ADE (www.ade.eu) and has benefited from the support of a reference group in Brussels. The Special Evaluation Office ensured that the evaluation complied with the terms of reference.

The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view and do not necessarily reflect the position of the PFS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation

Contents

Annex B – Terms of references	5
Annex B – Bibliography	7
Annex C – List of stakeholders interviewed	19
Annex D – Evaluation Matrix	25
Annex E – Additional tables and figures	31
Annex F – Mandates & key objectives of Belgium’s 15 partner organisations ..	43
Annex G – Belgium’s 15 partner organisations in Belgium’s partner countries	47
Annex H – Relevant Belgian policies and laws	49

List of tables

Table 1: Key multilateral assets for implementing the 2030 Agenda	38
Table 2: Instruments of earmarked funding in the UNDS and MDBs.....	39
Table 3: Donor comparisons along key dimensions of analysis	40
Table 4: Funding data for selected UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies	41
Table 5: Match between the priorities of Belgian Development Cooperation and the sectoral and thematic priorities of Belgium’s 15 partner organisations.....	46
Table 6: Presence of Belgium’s partner organisations in Belgium’s partner countries....	48

Liste of Figures

Figure 1: Volume of DGD ODA flows to multilateral organisations, by type of aid (2008-2019)	32
Figure 2: Distribution of DGD ODA flows to multilateral organisations (excluding Humanitarian aid)	33
Figure 3: DGD ODA flows to Belgium’s 15 international partner organisations (in 2015) by type of aid, 2008-2019	34
Figure 4: Distribution of DGD ODA flows to UN system (excluding humanitarian aid), by type of aid (2008-2019).....	35
Figure 5: Number of institutions receiving funding from the DGD, by type of ODA and institutions	35
Figure 6: Evolution of the average budget by agreement by type of aid, 2008-2019	37
Figure 7: Evolution of voluntary funding to the UNDS	42

Annex A – Terms of references



KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

Federal Public Service

**Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Trade and
Development Cooperation**

**Open procedure for the evaluation of
the core funding policy of the
international partner organisations of
the Belgian development cooperation**

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**SPECIFICATIONS
No. S4/2020/02**

Table of contents

- A. GENERAL PROVISIONS..... 1
 - A1. Object and nature of the contract 1
 - A2. Duration of the agreement..... 1
 - A3. Contracting Authority 1
 - A4. Additional information 2
 - A5. Submission of tenders..... 2
 - A6. Leading official..... 3
 - A7. Description of services to be performed 3
 - A8. Documents applicable to the contract..... 3
 - A9. Tenders 4
 - A10. Prices..... 4
 - A11. Selection – Regularity of tenders – Award criteria 5
 - A12. Guarantee10
 - A13. Modification during the performance of the contract11
 - A14. Performance of the services14
 - A15. Monitoring and steering15
 - A16. Invoicing and payment.....16
 - A17. Liability of the contractor17
 - A18. Protection of personal data and privacy17
 - A19. Disputes.....20
- B. TECHNICAL PRESCRIPTIONS21
 - B1. Institutional context.....21
 - B2. Motives22
 - B3. Objective and expected results.....24
 - B4. Scope and sample25
 - B5. Evaluation questions.....26
 - B6. Methodology27
 - B7. Process28
 - B8. Output and planning30
 - B9. Roles and responsibilities.....31
 - B10. Tender requirements.....33
- C. ANNEXES35
 - C1. Information sheet.....35
 - C2. TENDER FORM38

B. TECHNICAL PRESCRIPTIONS

Introduction. This section contains the terms of reference of the evaluation of the Belgian policy of core funding of the international partner organisations of multilateral cooperation – the subject of the present specifications – with a focus on the UN development system.

Stakeholders. The terms of reference for the evaluation were developed in consultation with several actors involved. These actors will also be involved in the further course of the evaluation. These are the Cabinet of the Minister for Development Cooperation, various directorates and services within the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGD: D0, D0.1, D1, D2, D2.1, D2.5, D5, MD8; DGM: M0.1.1, M2, M3) and the permanent representations to the international partner organisations and the diplomatic posts in the Belgian partner countries.

B1. Institutional context

International partner organisations before 2009. In accordance with Article 9 of the Law on Belgian development cooperation, a first list of international partner organisations of the multilateral cooperation was established by the Royal Decree of 27 April 2000 setting out the international partner organisations of multilateral cooperation. This list was amended a first time by the Royal Decree of 2 April 2003 setting out the international partner organisations of multilateral cooperation, and a second time by the Royal Decree of 9 May 2008 setting out the international partner organisations of multilateral cooperation.

Core funding policy from 2009. In 2009, Belgium took the unilateral decision to earmark its voluntary contributions to international partner organisations mainly for the general and non-earmarked resources of these organisations. This method of funding is internationally known as 'core funding'. At the same time, specific projects (earmarked funding) were reduced to a minimum.

This new policy was clearly mentioned for the first time in the general policy note of the Minister for Development Cooperation for 2009: "From 2009 onwards, Belgium will resolutely opt for a simplification of cooperation with multilateral organisations, in line with the Paris Declaration and the principles of "Good Humanitarian Donorship". In this context, Belgium will endeavour to (...) limit its earmarked funding only to programmes implemented at regional or national level by a multilateral partner organisation, at the request of the partner country. (...) In addition, the government will pursue its objective of a minimum level of 1.55% participation for core funding in all development organisations. "

International announcement. Although the decision had already been applied to funding to UNDP, UNIFEM, UNICEF, UNEP and other specialised agencies since the start of 2009, it was announced internationally on 15 July 2009 during the summer session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) held in Geneva from 6 to 30 July.

The "New Belgian funding policy for more effective multilateral aid" was detailed on 4 August 2009 on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, justifying the policy change as follows: "According to Belgium, the multilateral institutions are now too often dictated by donor preferences and priorities. No less than 70% of organisations' activities are subject to this. The organisation itself decides on only 30% of its resources. This creates an increased workload and causes some institutions to deal with issues that do not fit into their mission and for which they have no expertise. Transaction costs also strongly increase in this way, to the detriment of the ultimate stakeholders of the projects. Core

funding must counteract these undesirable effects." Moreover, the exemplary role played by Belgium is pointed out. The Belgian message received a great deal of support in Geneva, including from donors such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, as well as the UN agencies, which expressed the hope that Belgium's example would be followed by other donor countries.

Draft law and policy note. On 29 April 2010, a 'draft law amending the Law of 25 May 1999 on Belgian international cooperation', aimed at modernising this law, was tabled in the Chamber. The new policy on the funding of voluntary contributions to international organisations is clearly mentioned in Article 23: "Voluntary contributions in the framework of multilateral cooperation are intended for the general and non-earmarked resources of the partner organisations concerned, with the exception of any delegated cooperation. Voluntary contributions shall be the subject of a multiannual agreement with the partner organisations."

Due to the resignation of the government, this draft law lapsed on 7 May 2010. This did not prevent the new funding policy from being incorporated in the policy note on multilateral development cooperation of March 2011. In particular, this note states that the "Belgian development cooperation:

- will continue to support and encourage multilateral cooperation at the international level out of conviction of the many advantages offered by this specific aid channel;
- will actively collaborate in defining and guiding the multilateral aid architecture;
- will fully mobilise multilateral cooperation towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the European Consensus on Development".

Article 23 of the Law on Development Cooperation of 19 March 2013 incorporates most of the provisions of Article 9 of the Law of 1999 and adds in Article 24: "Voluntary contributions within the framework of multilateral cooperation are intended primarily for the general and non-earmarked resources of the partner organisations concerned." The word "primarily" refers to certain contributions that remain earmarked, such as contributions to organisations participating in a programme of the Belgian Fund for Food Security (which has since been repealed), contributions to humanitarian aid and contributions allocated for delegated cooperation.

International partner organisations after 2009. The list of international partner organisations has been amended one more time by the Royal Decree of 12 June 2012 setting out the international partner organisations of multilateral cooperation. The list was amended for a last time by the Royal Decree of 29 May 2015 setting out the partners in multilateral cooperation. The following 15 organisations were selected: FAO, ILO, WHO, IOM, UNDP, UN Women, OHCHR, GFATM, UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNEP, CGIAR, World Bank Group, IMF.

B2. Motives

Special Evaluation Office. In recent years, the Special Evaluation Office (SEO) has focused more explicitly on policy-oriented and strategic evaluations. The broad consultation organised by the SEO in 2016 revealed an explicit interest in an evaluation of the Belgian multilateral development policy, and more specifically of the policy of core funding. This part of the Belgian development policy has not yet been evaluated directly by the SEO.

Belgian multilateral development policy. Belgium profiles itself as an advocate of effective multilateralism. International partner organisations receive more than a third of the Belgian Official Development Assistance via DGD. The explicit choice for a policy of core funding of the international partner organisations, whereby contributions are

primarily intended for the general resources of these organisations, was implemented more than a decade ago (see also B1. Institutional context) and allows for a targeted evaluation.

Multilateral funding. In a multilateral context, Belgium supports the UN reform efforts. Specifically, Belgium is working towards more coordinated, more effective and efficient, less earmarked and more predictable multilateral funding. These objectives are part of the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) resolutions of 2012 and 2016, and will also be part of the new QCPR exercise planned for 2020. In the context of a UN system that is as efficient and effective as possible in support of Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), they are also the explicit focus of the UN Funding Compact (2019). It is a shared responsibility. International organisations also need to take steps towards a more balanced and results-oriented funding framework.

Noteworthy in recent developments and documents is that not only new light is shed on the incentive for core funding, but that it has also been partly called into question by some international organisations and donors. It is argued that pure core funding should be expanded to include soft earmarking (through thematic, sector-specific and/or joint mechanisms, among others), as a form of earmarked funding that seeks to minimise negative aspects. This form of high quality funding has been cited as the ideal third way.

Belgian policy core funding. In 2009, Belgium adopted a policy of core funding of the international partner organisations for multilateral cooperation (see also B1. Institutional context). This policy was adopted in a context of increasing non-core funding of international organisations by donors. The expectation was that the principled choice of core funding would benefit both partner organisations (more autonomy, greater share of general resources, higher funding predictability, stronger results-oriented management, less fragmented operation, lower transaction costs and less reporting obligations) and Belgium (more effective, more integrated and less fragmented multilateral cooperation, greater visibility, greater influence on decision-making within the partner organisations, lower transaction costs).


The policy was enshrined in the Law on Development Cooperation (2013, Art. 24) and was concretely translated through the basic allocation 14 54 31 35.40.02 ("Voluntary multi-year contributions to the international partner organisations of multilateral cooperation"). Virtually all voluntary contributions of a structural nature to the fifteen international partner organisations³ are funded from this basic allocation. Framework arrangements were signed with these organisations in 2016 and a financial commitment for four years (2017-2020) was concluded in 2017.⁴ This implies that in 2020 – in parallel with the implementation of this evaluation, and contingent on the interim and final results – a new multi-annual funding of international partner organisations will be prepared.

It is important to note that the policy choice for core funding is not tantamount to banning earmarked funding. In practice, several organisations – not only the fifteen partner organisations that are the subject of basic allocation 14 54 31 35.40.02 for that matter, but also other international partner organisations – continue to receive substantial earmarked contributions in addition to contributions to general resources (see Fig. 1, SEO Annual Report 2019).

³ The following organisations are involved: FAO, ILO, WHO, IOM, UNDP, UN Women, OHCHR, GFATM, UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNEP, CGIAR, GPE, and IMF.

⁴ It should be noted that the framework arrangements do not follow the planning and budget cycles of the partner organisations.

Fig. 1. Funding (DGD) of international partner organisations (BA 14 54 31 35.40.02)



B3. Objective and expected results

Policy and strategic evaluation. The evaluation aims to provide independent and substantiated evaluation results and recommendations on the policy of core funding of international partner organisations, on which policy and administration can rely in the strategic determination and implementation of the new multi-annual funding of international partner organisations (2021-2024).

Objective. The objective of the evaluation is to analyse the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the Belgian policy of core funding of the international partner organisations. It should provide an answer to the question to what extent and in what way the applied policy has contributed to the expected policy results in this respect, both on the Belgian side and on the side of the partner organisations (see above, B2. Motives. Belgian core funding policy).

Specific attention will be paid to how DGD has implemented the policy of core funding through distinct instruments and mechanisms (framework arrangements, bilateral consultations, contribution to decision-making within partner organisations, field monitoring of non-earmarked contributions, etc.), and what strategic recommendations can be made to define and deploy such instruments and mechanisms more efficiently and effectively in the future.

A formative, not summative evaluation. The objective of the evaluation is not to evaluate the organisational and developmental effectiveness of Belgium-funded international partner organisations. To this end, reference is made both to the evaluations carried out by the partner organisations' evaluation services and to the external assessments carried out via the MOPAN network. This network provides access to information on the organisational and development effectiveness of various international organisations, including those that receive significant financial contributions from Belgium.

B3.2. Expected results

The evaluation will produce the following results:

- **R1.** Mapping of the Belgian ODA contributions – with a focus on various forms of funding, ranging from pure core funding to tightly earmarked funding – to the entire range of international partner organisations⁵; more broadly linked to an international benchmarking exercise
- **R2.** Findings and conclusions regarding the Belgian adoption of a policy of core funding, and the relevance of this choice, both in the context of Belgian development policy and in the broader international framework of multilateral development cooperation
- **R3.** Findings and conclusions regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the Belgian policy of core funding
- **R4.** Recommendations addressed to both policy and administration, with specific attention to the framework arrangements and additional instruments and mechanisms for supporting, influencing and following up international partner organisations

B4. Scope and sample

B4.1. Scope of the evaluation

Policy. The evaluation focuses on one specific aspect of Belgian multilateral development policy, namely core funding of international partner organisations. Other aspects, such as the Belgian concentration policy, will only be analysed insofar as a clear link can be established with the policy of core funding.

Organisations. The focus is primarily on the fifteen international partner organisations funded through basic allocation 14 54 31 35.40.02, and more specifically on the UN development organisations. International organisations receiving funding for humanitarian aid will be the subject of a future evaluation of humanitarian aid. The European channel and the World Bank Group are also outside the scope of this evaluation. Finally, delegated cooperation and former cooperation in the context of the Belgian Fund for Food Security through international organisations also fall outside the scope of this evaluation.

Period: 2008-2019. This period allows analysing the evolution of contributions from the year preceding the core funding decision to the present day. This period also includes part of the current multiannual funding of international partner organisations (2017-2020) through basic allocation 14 54 31 35.40.02.

B4.2. Sample of organisations

Sample. During the study and field phase, a sample of four UN organisations will be further analysed: United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

These organisations have been selected on the basis of the following criteria:

- Differences in UN organisation nature and mandates: funds and programmes, specialised agencies, technical and political bodies; normative, executive

⁵ In addition to the fifteen partner organisations linked to basic allocation 14 54 31 35.40.02, the entire range of international partner organisations also includes other organisations that receive Belgian funding within the framework of multilateral cooperation.

- Differences in the configuration and ratio of contributions: assessed contributions, voluntary non-earmarked contributions, voluntary earmarked contributions
- Differences in size of the organisation and of Belgian funding

B5. Evaluation questions

The evaluation will provide an overall answer to the following central evaluation questions. The questions for each evaluation criterion can be further adjusted or supplemented on the basis of a reasoned proposal by the evaluators.

B5.1. Central evaluation questions

EQ 1. How relevant was the Belgian policy choice, both in the framework of the Belgian development policy and in the broader framework of multilateral development cooperation?

EQ 2. To what extent has the Belgian policy of core funding been applied consistently, and has the translation into practice contributed to expected but possibly undesirable results, both on the Belgian side and on the side of the partner organisations?

EQ 3. In what way has the Belgian policy of core funding led to results? By means of which instruments and mechanisms was the policy put into practice by DGD?

Expected recommendations. The answers to these three questions, and the resulting conclusions, should lead to targeted priority recommendations for defining and deploying the framework arrangements and additional instruments and mechanisms for supporting, influencing and monitoring international partner organisations more efficiently and effectively in the future. The recommendations will in particular also pertain to the way in which DGD organises and adapts the monitoring of international partner organisations (cf. new system of field monitoring, bilateral consultations 2.0), and to possible additional measures.

B5.2. Questions per evaluation criterion

Relevance

- Multilateralism has undergone several changes over the past decade – and therefore also changes in financing needs. What influence did these changes have on the relevance of the Belgian choice for core funding?
- According to which criteria does the Belgian development cooperation allocate core funding to the various partner organisations? Are there internationally agreed (formal or informal) criteria among like-minded donors? Are these criteria sufficiently known by the partner organisations so that they can adapt to them?
- To what extent are the choices regarding core funding adapted to the diverse nature and mandates of partner organisations and coherent with the objectives of Belgian development cooperation? How can a policy of core funding be reconciled with the setting of a limited number of policy priorities around which to exert influence on the partner organisations? To what extent is the policy of core funding genuinely encouraged by the partner organisations themselves?
- How relevant is a policy of pure core funding? Has earmarked funding, and soft earmarking in particular, also proved to be a qualitative addition to core funding under certain conditions?

Effectiveness

- Has the policy of core funding, and its translation through basic allocation 14 54 31 35.40.02, contributed to a more effective, more integrated and less fragmented Belgian multilateral cooperation?
- To what extent was Belgium able to influence the policies of the partner organisations (in terms of strategy, policy choices, efficiency and effectiveness, particularly in the field) both bilaterally and multilaterally – and in line with Belgian development policy?
- What is the influence of a core funding policy on donor visibility? Have changes in the multilateral funding context affected this visibility?
- Are identified policy outcomes mainly the result of a policy of core funding, or of a wider combination of formal and informal mechanisms of support and influence of partner organisations (e.g. Belgians active in partner organisations)?
- Are the measures taken by Belgium as a donor sufficient to improve the follow-up of partner organisations or do additional measures need to be taken?

Efficiency

- What resources (financial contributions, staff, partnerships) does the Belgian development cooperation deploy for the implementation of the policy of core funding?
- Has the Belgian policy contributed to a reduction in transaction costs, both on the Belgian side and on the side of the partner organisations?
- Has Belgian policy contributed to a higher predictability of resources, to less fragmentation and to more efficiency in partner organisations? What are the findings in partner organisations that receive both core and non-core funding?
- What is the impact of the lack of synchronisation between the Belgian budget and planning cycle (2017-2020) and that of the partner organisations?

Coherence

- How coherent is the Belgian policy of core funding applied, and how are deviations justified or explained? How is coherence ensured?
- To what extent do the policies and practices of other donors influence the relevance, results and efficiency of the Belgian policy of core funding? What is the influence on partner organisations that receive substantial earmarked funding from other donors?
- Has the Belgian policy of core funding been able to convince other donors to make similar policy choices? Is there sufficient critical mass and unity among the donors, also within the Utstein group, to promote a policy of core funding more strongly towards other donors? To what extent does the UN Funding Compact (see above, B2. Motives. Multilateral funding) really offer a framework to promote more core funding and to meet the expectations of Belgium and other donors in terms of accountability and visibility? What influence can be expected from the 1% levy in this respect?

B6. Methodology

The proposed methodology will have to credibly demonstrate how the evaluators will work to achieve the evaluation objectives, answer the evaluation questions and provide

results that are useful and meet the quality standards for the evaluation of development cooperation as defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee.

The proposed methodology is an essential element in the evaluation of tenders. It must contain at least the following elements:

- **Preliminary analysis of evaluability.** The evaluation of the policy results of core funding of international partner organisations is less evident from a methodological point of view, as these contributions are difficult to trace directly to development results in the field. There are also methodological limitations to measuring whether or not a policy of core funding has increased influence. The evaluability analysis will underscore the main conditions and limitations that the evaluation will face in achieving the objectives and answering the evaluation questions. Evaluators should also indicate how they intend to address the evaluation problems they identify.
- **General theoretical/methodological approach.** The evaluators will propose their approach, taking into account the time and resource constraints imposed by these specifications.
- **Evaluation framework.** This framework comprises the evaluation questions and their elaboration into sub-questions, judgement criteria, resources and sources of information. It is a tool for carrying out the evaluation questions, and therefore does not replace the general theoretical/methodological approach that should guide this evaluation.
- **Methods of data collection and analysis.** A description is given of the methods that will be used to collect and analyse the necessary data. The methods must be coherent with the broader methodological approach and adapted to the nature of the desired data in order to answer the various evaluation questions. The contribution, relevance, complementarity and necessity of each method must be described in a focused and clear way, without lapsing into generic and known descriptions.

B7. Process

This section presents a roadmap for the conduct of the evaluation. However, the evaluators are free to make deviant proposals for the course of the evaluation, as long as this does not affect the expected outputs of the evaluation, as set out below.

Given the formative nature of the evaluation, the evaluation will be organised in a sufficiently participatory manner, both in Belgium and during the field missions. For certain moments of consultation and reflection, the reference group may be extended to include other actors involved in the sector (see further, B9. Roles and responsibilities).

Start-up phase

During a kick-off meeting with the evaluators, methodology, approach and time schedule, as proposed in the technical bid, are discussed and proposals for possible adjustments are made.

On the basis of the discussion, the evaluators will draw up a detailed **methodological note**, in which the evaluation framework, which will be used to answer the evaluation questions, will be further elaborated, including the final evaluation questions. The transmission of documentation will also be set during the meeting.

This phase is completed with a first meeting of the reference group (see also below, B9. Roles and responsibilities). The methodological note must be approved by DBE before the next phase can start.

Study phase

At the beginning of the evaluation, a document study and an interview round will take place in Brussels. During this phase, all relevant information regarding the elements within the scope of the evaluation (see above) is collected and (preliminary) hypotheses are formulated, which will be tested during the further course of the evaluation, and in particular during the field phases. The following aspects are analysed for the entire range of partner organisations: Belgian and other donor contributions (see above: R1), understanding and importance of core funding, instruments and mechanisms relating to bilateral and multilateral dialogue and policy influencing.

At the end of this phase, the evaluators provide a **study report**. In addition to a reasoned proposal for the planned visit to a partner country of the Belgian development cooperation (see field phase II), this study report contains the organisational approach for the various field missions, with an indicative clarification of the planning, the persons to be interviewed and the interview guides. In addition, the report explains how the quality of the evaluation will be ensured in its various aspects (data collection, analysis, exchange of information, etc.).

This phase is concluded with a meeting of the reference group. The study report must be approved by DBE before the next phase can start.

Field phase I

During this phase, the Belgian support to the four selected UN organisations (UNFPA, UNDP, WHO, OHCHR) will be analysed on the basis of field visits to New York and Geneva. At the end of each field visit, the provisional findings are discussed during a restitution meeting with the diplomatic post and other actors involved.

For each of the field missions, the evaluators shall reserve the necessary time for the evaluation to be carried out in a participatory manner and for data to be collected and subjected to an initial analysis and, if necessary, for additional data to be collected.

At the end of this phase, the evaluators will produce an **interim report** with preliminary findings and conclusions. This report will be presented and discussed at a meeting of the reference group in Brussels.

Field phase II, final analysis and restitution

The final phase includes a second field mission, the further analysis and triangulation of the collected data and findings – in the light of the evaluation objective and the evaluation questions – and leads to a **final report** with findings, conclusions and recommendations (see above, R3 and R4), and to the restitution of the results.

During this second field phase, the Belgian support to the four selected UN organisations (UNFPA, UNDP, WHO, OHCHR) will be analysed on the basis of a field mission in a partner country of the Belgian development cooperation (to be determined during the study phase) in which these organisations are active and are subject of the new system of field monitoring of unidentified funding. At the end of this field mission, the provisional findings are discussed during a restitution meeting with the diplomatic post and other actors involved.

The draft final report will be presented and discussed at a meeting of the reference group, whereby comments can be made and final adjustments to the report can be requested. On this basis, the final report will be drawn up, whereby the evaluators are free to take the comments into account or not. If they choose not to take certain comments into account, they will have to justify their choice. This justification, together with the comments, will be annexed to the final report.

In addition to this discussion of the final report, two restitution meetings are also planned for two audiences: (i) the DGD Strategic Committee; and (ii) a wider audience of

stakeholders. It is explicitly requested that two days and the necessary resources be allocated for this purpose in the tender.

B8. Output and planning

B8.1. Expected Output

Evaluation products. According to the time schedule agreed during the start-up phase of the evaluation, the evaluators will provide the following reports, both in a modifiable (word) and in a non-modifiable electronic version (pdf):

- methodological note
- study report
- interim report
- final report

All documents are drawn up in English. The final report shall contain a summary in English, French and Dutch. The summary will explain and substantiate the main conclusions and recommendations. The text must be able to be read and understood by a wide audience.

The methodological note and study report each have a maximum of 40 pages. The interim report has a maximum of 80 pages. The final report shall be between 40 and 60 pages. The summaries have a maximum of 5 pages. Annexes are not included in these numbers.

The final report shall have the following structure:

- summary
- introduction
- methodology
- findings
- conclusions
- recommendations

Quality requirements. The quality of the reports will be assessed on the basis of a quality grid. The findings, conclusions and recommendations are linked in a logical and substantiated way. The conclusions and recommendations should be able to be used optimally by the actors directly involved in the evaluation. This means that they are limited in number and drawn up with a view to a management response. The recommendations should also be sufficiently realistic. They may contain several strategic avenues, and clarify any associated risks.

The reports are written in an easily readable and correct language, which is also comprehensible to readers who are not experts in the subject. Translations of the summary are expected to be done by a professional translator and proofread by a member of the evaluation team with a knowledge of the mother tongue (C2 level of the European reference framework).

At the start of the assignment, the evaluators will receive instructions on the layout of the evaluation products. These instructions must be followed conscientiously and shall lead to print-ready electronic files.

Presentation of results. After submitting the methodological note, the study report, the interim report and the preliminary final report, the evaluators report – in English – to the reference group.

The reports submitted for discussion must be received by DBE at the latest seven working days before the date of the meeting. The presentations will be submitted, for approval and possible adjustment, to DBE at the latest three working days before the start of the meeting.

B8.2. Indicative planning

The evaluation should provide timely interim and final results that can be used in the definition and implementation of the new multi-annual funding of the international partner organisations. For this reason, it is essential that the evaluators make a correct and adequate assessment of the effort required and the number of working days per evaluator and per stage of the evaluation, field missions in particular.

The planning below is indicative. A **flexible application, to be approved by DBE after mutual agreement, is possible in case of force majeure due to the global Coronavirus outbreak** (Covid-19).

	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Publication procedure	■	■	■							
Awarding of contract			■							
Start phase / Methodological note				■						
Study phase / Study report				■	■					
Field phase I / Interim report						■	■			
Field phase II / Final analysis / Final report								■	■	
Restitution										■

B9. Roles and responsibilities

Evaluation team

Overall, the evaluation team must meet the following requirements:

- expertise and experience in evaluation of multilateral development cooperation; experience in evaluation of one or more organisations that are part of the sample for further analysis (UNFPA, UNDP, WHO, OHCHR) is considered an asset
- expertise and experience in evaluation methodology
- knowledge of the Belgian development cooperation
- good mastery of English, French and Dutch

Required language skills. The team leader must have knowledge of English at the mother tongue level (C2 level of the European reference framework). For a good understanding of the documents drawn up by the Belgian administration, at least one member of the evaluation team must master French and Dutch, respectively, at mother tongue level (C2 level of the European reference framework). If the team leader does not have a good mastery of French or Dutch, he is at least assisted by a co-team leader who has this mastery of languages.

Composition. Gender balance in the team is encouraged. It is also requested to involve a local evaluator as a full member of the evaluation team in the field mission in the partner country of Belgian development cooperation (yet to be determined).

Constructive attitude. The SEO is of the opinion that the use of an evaluation partly depends on the process of the evaluation process and the level of participation of the various stakeholders involved. The team which carries out the evaluation plays an important role in this respect. It is therefore expected that the evaluators present themselves in a manner which promotes the goodwill of the stakeholders involved with

regard to this evaluation. This means, among other things, that the evaluation team should present itself constructively with regard to the remarks of the SEO and the reference group, that they should pay sufficient attention at all times (and therefore not just during meetings, but also during interviews) to communication in the language or languages which is/are acceptable for the stakeholders involved, and that they should ensure that presentations and reports are designed in a clear manner. Moreover, it is requested that the evaluation team act proactively and with punctuality, and that it limits as much as possible the additional burden that the evaluation process may cause for all parties involved.

SEO – Leading official

The SEO is charged with the government contract and with the administrative framework. The service represents the contracting authority and appoints the leading official for the evaluation. In this capacity, the leading official will control the conformity of the evaluation (based on the legal framework and the specifications), but also the quality of the procedure and the results of the evaluation.

The leading official will manage the entire evaluation process, from beginning to end. Thereby:

- he is responsible for the public procurement procedure (drafting of the specifications, awarding of the contract, scheduling of the invoices, etc.);
- he guarantees the conformity and coherence of the evaluation procedure, from the terms of reference to the publication of the final report and its distribution;
- he coordinates and directs the activity of the various stakeholders (reference group and evaluation team); he prepares the meetings and leads them, he produces the minutes, handles possible conflicts, etc.;
- he supervises and verifies the quality of the work in the various phases (he makes sure, among other things, that the conclusions have a robust methodological and evidence-based foundation);
- he guarantees the proper execution of the evaluation (he facilitates, among other things, the work of the evaluators and their access to information sources);
- he guarantees the independence of the evaluators and makes sure that the remarks and advice of the parties involved are taken into account (remarks and advice which are not taken into account will be the subject of a substantiated response from the evaluators);
- he approves both the various interim reports and the final report (and the final payment for services rendered) on the basis of an evaluation grid;
- he organises the dissemination of the evaluation results and requests a management response; he also organises the restitution meetings.

The SEO, representing the contracting authority, is solely responsible for managing ('steering') the evaluation process.

Actors involved

The actors involved are individuals, groups or organisations with direct or indirect responsibilities and/or interests within the evaluation process (project, programme, sector, country, ...).⁶ They are consulted at certain points during the evaluation to give their opinion on the terms of reference and the output of the evaluation. In some cases, their cooperation is requested in the collection of data and in the organisation of field missions. They may also be heard by the evaluators without the presence of DBE or

⁶ In accordance with this definition, DBE is not an actor involved.

other relevant actors. In addition, some of the actors involved may be part of the reference group. Whoever is finally selected or invited to participate in the reference group is the competence of the SEO.

Reference group

The SEO sets up a reference group consisting of the various actors involved in the evaluation and possibly also independent experts. DBE chairs the reference group and is also responsible for the overall supervision of the evaluation assignment and for the final approval of the evaluation output.

The reference group will meet at least four times: on the basis of (i) the methodological note, (ii) the study report, (iii) the interim report, and (iv) the draft final report.

The reference group shall monitor the quality, credibility and usefulness of the evaluation. It shall provide comments and advice – based on the collective knowledge available – both on the proposed methodological approach and on the findings, conclusions and recommendations resulting from the evaluation.

More concretely, the role of the reference group is to ask critical questions regarding the course of the evaluation and the various reports submitted. The reference group can also offer routes to assist the evaluators in their evaluation. The reference group discusses the methodological note, the interim report and the draft final report and makes comments on them. If necessary, the reference group completes or corrects the information provided by the evaluators. The evaluators are expected to take these comments into account and, if not, to justify why.

B10. Tender requirements

It is requested that tenderers submit a concise tender – comprising both a technical and financial bid.

Financial bid. The financial bid shall include an estimate of the cost, with expenditure headings per evaluation phase, per evaluator and per field mission. The technical bid shall include four sections: (i) a description of the proposed methodological approach and how the evaluation team interprets the terms of reference of the evaluation, (ii) a description of the practical approach of the evaluation and of the division of tasks within the evaluation team, (iii) the expertise and experience of the team leader, and (iv) the expertise and experience of the team members.

When drawing up the financial bid, explicit account is taken of the fact that it is only at the start of the evaluation that a partner country of the Belgian Development Cooperation will be selected for a field mission. In other words, the estimated cost must take account of the fact that, depending on the final selection, the field missions can take place in each of the partner countries, regardless of the possible differences in costs (international travel, local travel, accommodation, etc.).

Technical bid. The section on methodology and understanding of the reference terms clarifies how the evaluation team intends to provide an answer to the evaluation questions and expectations. It is not necessary to repeat what is written in the terms of reference. A deviating interpretation of the reference terms with regard to the objectives and the expected output is not allowed: it is allowed though to formulate an own approach and methodology to formulate an answer to the questions and expectations that emerge from the terms of reference. The tender should above all clarify the evaluation team's view on the evaluation context, objectives and questions, but also on its own mandate and added value within the framework of the evaluation. More specifically, it will be explained how the evaluation team understands the evaluation questions – and, if necessary, wishes to supplement or adjust them – and what exactly is the methodological approach the evaluation team proposes in order to answer the evaluation questions in a reliable, credible and useful manner.

In the section on the practical methodology and organisation of the evaluation, at least the following aspects shall be described:

- the time schedule and work plan;
- a correct and adequate estimate of the duration of the field missions;
- the number of working days per evaluator and per evaluation phase, with a detailed overview of the specific tasks of each evaluator;
- the use of quality control at the various stages of evaluation
- the coherence of the approach (role of the team leader, of the other team members, logistical support, quality control, etc.)
- the language and gender balance within the team;
- the dealing with possible conflicts of interest.

The technical bid should clearly describe who will take on exactly which tasks within the evaluation team. This holds for both international evaluators and the local evaluator (see field phase II). Given the importance of a coherent task division and coordination of the team members, the role and availability of the team leader shall also be explained in detail.

The estimated total number of working days for the international evaluators is between 155 and 165. The estimated number of working days for the local evaluator is between 10 and 15.

Tender assessment. The technical bid shall be assessed on the basis of the following criteria and weightings (for a total of 70%, see also A11.3):

- proposal of methodology, methodological understanding and understanding of the terms of reference (20%)
- practical approach of the evaluation per phase and mutual task division (15%)
- expertise and experience of the team leader (20%)
 - o as team leader (including the required language skills)
 - o regarding the evaluation of multilateral development cooperation
 - o regarding evaluation methodology
- expertise and experience of the team members (15%)
 - o regarding the evaluation of multilateral development cooperation
 - o regarding the Belgian development cooperation
 - o regarding language skills
 - o regarding evaluation methodology

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Annex C – List of stakeholders interviewed

This annex presents the list of people interviewed as part of this evaluation. It presents (i) first those interviewed during the inception, start-up and Field Phase I; and (ii) second those additional persons interviewed during Field Phase II.

List of Stakeholders interviewed during the inception, start-up and Field Phase I

Belgium

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
DGD	Director General	Male	Brussels, Belgium
DGD	Director - D2 Thematic Directorate	Female	Brussels, Belgium
DGD	Head of unit - D2.3 Social development/ D2.5 Building Society	Female	Brussels, Belgium
DGD	Head of Unit - D2.1 UN System	Male	Brussels, Belgium
DGD	Attaché - Special Evaluation Office (SEO)	Male	Brussels, Belgium
DGD	Attaché – D4.2 Data Management and Transparency	Male	Brussels, Belgium
DGD	Former Special Advisor for Multilateral Policy	Male	Brussels, Belgium
DGD	Counsellor - Special Evaluation Office (SEO)	Male	Brussels, Belgium
Ministry of Development Cooperation	Deputy Chief of Staff under former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Development Cooperation	Male	Brussels, Belgium
Permanent Representation of Belgium to the United Nations in Geneva	Deputy Permanent Representative - Head of the Human Rights section	Male	Geneva, Switzerland
Permanent representation of Belgium to the OECD and UNESCO	Counsellor	Female	Paris, France
Permanent Representation of Belgium to the United Nations in Geneva	Counsellor	Male	Geneva, Switzerland
DGD	UN Coordinator - D2.1 UN System	Male	Brussels, Belgium

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
DGD	Head of unit - D0.1 Results	Male	Brussels, Belgium
Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations in New York	Minister-Counsellor	Male	New York, United States
DGD	Change manager - D0	Male	Brussels, Belgium
DGD	Desk officer OHCHR – D2.5	Male	Brussels, Belgium
DGD	Desk Officer WHO - D2.3	Male	Brussels, Belgium
Cabinet of the Minister of Development Cooperation	Advisor - Multilateral Cooperation, Human Rights and Climate and Environment	Male	Brussels, Belgium
Cabinet of the Minister of Development Cooperation	Advisor – D1	Male	Brussels, Belgium
DGM	Director - M2 (UN)	Male	Brussels, Belgium
DGD	Desk Officer UNEP – MD8	Female	Brussels, Belgium
Enabel	Coordinator Institutional Relations	Female	Brussels, Belgium
Enabel	Strategy and Organizational Development Manager	Male	Brussels, Belgium
DGD	Desk Officer UNFPA (retired – will respond to interview questions in writing)	Female	Brussels, Belgium
Enabel	Country Portfolio Manager	Male	Brussels, Belgium

UN Agencies

UNDP

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
UNDP	Director / UN Secretary General Representative	Female	Brussels, Belgium
UNDP	Programme Specialist	Male	Brussels, Belgium
UNDP	Partnership Specialist - Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy (BERA)	Female	New York, United States
UNDP	Director Partnerships Group - Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy (BERA)	Male	New York, United States

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
UNDP	Assistant Secretary-General, Assistant Administrator and Director of the Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy (BERA)	Female	New York, United States
UNDP	Strategy and Innovation Specialist	Male	New York, United States
UNDP	Special Advisor, Strategic Planning, and Innovation	Male	New York, United States
UNDP	Corporate Strategy Advisor	Male	New York, United States
UNDP	Deputy Chief Finance Officer	Male	New York, United States

WHO

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
WHO	Representative to the European Region	Female	Brussels, Belgium
WHO	Executive Director of the Regional Director's Office	Male	Copenhagen, Denmark
WHO	Director of Business Operations	Male	Copenhagen, Denmark
WHO	Director Resource Mobilization	Male	Copenhagen, Denmark
WHO	Executive Director for External Relations and Governance	Female	Geneva, Switzerland
WHO	Technical Officer - Coordinated Resource Mobilization, External Relations & Governance Division (EXR/CRM)	Male	Geneva, Switzerland

UNFPA

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
UNFPA	Director of Brussels Office	Female	Brussels, Belgium
UNFPA	Chief - Resource Mobilisation office	Male	New York, United Nations
UNFPA	Director, Division of Communications and Strategic Partnerships (DCS)	Male	New York, United Nations
UNFPA	Regional Director, Eastern Europe and Central Asia Regional Office	Female	New York, United Nations
UNFPA	Resource Mobilization Specialist, Division of Communications and Strategic Partnerships	Female	New York, United Nations
UNFPA	Chief, Policy, Strategic Information and Planning Branch, Policy and Strategy Division (PSD)	Male	New York, United Nations

OHCHR

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
OHCHR	Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	Female	Geneva, Switzerland
OHCHR	Evaluation officer	Male	Geneva, Switzerland
OHCHR	Donor and External Relations Officer	Male	Geneva, Switzerland
OHCHR	Donor and External Relations Officer	Male	Geneva, Switzerland
OHCHR	Chief or Resource Mobilization and External Relations	Female	Geneva, Switzerland
OHCHR	Chief, Policy, Planning and M&E	Female	Geneva, Switzerland
OHCHR	Chief - Sustainable Development Section, Development and Economic, Social Issues Branch	Female	Geneva, Switzerland

Other stakeholders**Civil Society Organisations**

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
Vétérinaires Sans Frontières (VSF)	Project Manager	Male	Uganda
Vétérinaires Sans Frontières (VSF)	Institutional Partnership Officer	Female	Brussels, Belgium
11.11.11	Policy officer Development Cooperation	Male	Brussels, Belgium
VVOB – Education for Development	Director	Male	Brussels, Belgium
Fédération des ONG francophones et germanophones	Coordinator	Male	Brussels, Belgium
Centre national de coopération au développement	Research Officer Development Cooperation - Central Africa	Female	Brussels, Belgium

List of Stakeholders interviewed during Field Phase II**Belgium**

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
Embassy of Belgium to Uganda and South Sudan	Deputy Head of Mission / Head of Cooperation	Male	Kampala, Uganda
Embassy of Belgium to Uganda and South Sudan	Programme Officer	Female	Kampala, Uganda
Embassy of Belgium to Uganda and South Sudan	First Secretary, Political and Economic affairs	Male	Kampala, Uganda
Embassy of Belgium to Uganda and South Sudan	Deputy Attaché Development Cooperation	Female	Kampala, Uganda
Embassy of Belgium to Uganda and South Sudan	First Secretary, Deputy Head of Cooperation	Male	Kampala, Uganda
Consulate General of Belgium in Jerusalem	Head of Cooperation	Female	Jerusalem, Israel

UN Agencies

UNDP

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
UNDP	Resident Representative to Uganda	Female	Kampala, Uganda
UNDP	Special Representative of the Administrator UNDP's Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People	Female	Palestine
UNDP	Resident Representative Niger	Female	Niamey, Niger
UNDP	Programme Officer	Male	Niamey, Niger
UNDP	Deputy Resident Representative DRC	Male	Kinshasa, DRC

WHO

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
WHO	Head of Mission /Country Representative Office in Nigeria	Male	Abuja, Nigeria

UNFPA

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
UNFPA	Country Representative to Uganda	Male	Kampala, Uganda
UNFPA	Country Representative to Morocco	Male	Rabat, Morocco
UNFPA	Country Representative to Rwanda	Male	Kigali, Rwanda

OHCHR

Organisation	Position/Affiliation	Gender	City/Country base
OHCHR	Representative	Male	Conakry, Guinea
OHCHR	OHCHR Director in the DRC	Male	Kinshasa, DRC
OHCHR	Head of Uganda office	Male	Kampala, Uganda

Annex D – Evaluation Matrix

This annex presents the detailed Evaluation Matrix which guided the evaluation work.

EQ1 Relevance - internal

EQ 1 : To what extent was the Belgian choice to adopt a policy of core funding of international partner organisations for multilateral cooperation relevant in the framework of the Belgian development cooperation?
Belgium is a strong advocate of effective multilateralism; international partner organisations currently receive more than a third of the Belgian Official Development Assistance via DGD. In this context, Belgium has been supporting the UN Reforms at the levels of the Security Council (of which Belgium is currently a member), the UN Secretariat and specialized agencies in terms of accountability, transparency and funding practices. More specifically in the framework of this evaluation, Belgium has aimed at contributing to more coordinated, effective and efficient, less earmarked and more predictable multilateral funding. Aspects which can help to judge the internal relevance of this policy are detailed below.
JC1.1 : The Belgian core funding policy has relied on criteria which reflected appropriate geographical, sector and thematic priorities
Indicators : <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Criteria (list) used by the Belgian development cooperation to allocate core funding to the various partner organisations• Degree of consistency of these criteria with internationally agreed (formal or informal) criteria among like-minded donors (such as the Utstein group, see EQ7)• Degree of knowledge of these criteria by the partner organisations so that they can adapt to them• Degree of coherence with the legal framework on development cooperation• List suggestions for improvement
JC1.2 : The choices regarding core funding have been adapted to the capacities (mandates, resources) of the Belgian policy instruments; these have been appropriately selected for the task
Indicators : <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Degree of adequacy of mandates and resources of instruments, as indicated by mapping• Degree of coverage and synergies (or gaps) between instruments indicated by mapping• List suggestions for improvement
JC1.3 : The choices regarding core funding have been in line with the objectives of Belgian development cooperation
Indicators : <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Level of alignment with key international development goals, notably support to the Agenda for Sustainable Development (17 SDGs)• Level of coherence with Belgium's development priorities Level of coherence with Belgium's geographical focus on sub-Saharan Africa (West, Sahel, Central/ Great Lakes)

- Level of flexibility for adjusting to changes in Belgian development cooperation objectives, notably in relation to COVID-19

EQ2 Relevance - external

EQ 2 : To what extent was the Belgian choice to adopt a policy of core funding of international partner organisations for multilateral cooperation relevant in the broader framework of multilateral development cooperation?

The 2009 policy of core funding of the international partner organisations for multilateral cooperation was adopted in a context of increasing non-core funding and strong earmarking by donors. To operationalise the policy, Belgium has signed in 2016 a series of Framework arrangements with 15 specialized UN agencies, which became cooperation partners: FAO, ILO, WHO, IOM, UNDP, UN Women, OHCHR, GFATM, UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNEP, CGIAR, GPE, and IMF. These arrangements include overall management and strategic set ups. These elements have been translated in the two judgment criteria below.

JC2.1 : The choices regarding core funding have been adapted to the diverse nature and mandates of partner organisations; the weaknesses of a "One-Size-Fits-All" approach have been duly considered.

Indicators :

- Level of similarity or specific adaptation to partners (list) of Framework arrangements
- Discussions and exchanges about adequacy of arrangements and needs for specific provisions, per partner organization
- Timeliness and quality of response to requests for adaptations
- The extent to which the four selected United Nations agencies were able to quickly re-purpose existing core funds to respond to the Covid-19 crisis
- List suggestions for improvement

JC2.2 : Belgian choice(s) for core funding have been relevant – and responsive to trends and changes in multilateralism over the past decade

Indicators :

- Trends towards earmarking over the period (list events, actors, decisions, dates, budgets)
- Degree of adequacy and timeliness of responses by Belgium to new trends over the period (list decisions)
- Efforts towards flexible, predictable funding of the multilateral system
- List suggestions for improvement

EQ3 Effectiveness - Belgium

EQ 3 : To what extent and how did the Belgian policy of core funding contributed to a more streamlined Belgian multilateral cooperation, and to the visibility of Belgium as a donor and its credibility as a partner in multilateralism?

The 2009 policy of core funding was based on the assumption that Belgian multilateral cooperation would benefit from it by becoming more effective, more integrated and less fragmented, would achieve greater visibility, greater influence on decision-making within the partner organisations, and (see efficiency below) would ultimately benefit from lower transaction costs by streamlining both its cooperation instruments and its range of partners. The evaluation will be using the above expectations as indicators in several criteria to assess the levels of internal effectiveness and efficiency.

JC3.1 : The core funding policy, and its translation through basic allocation 14 54 31 35.40.02, have contributed to a more streamlined and improved Belgian multilateral cooperation

Indicators :

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level to which the Belgian multilateral cooperation has become more effective by applying the policy (degree of achievement off expected results) • Level to which the Belgian multilateral cooperation has become more integrated and less fragmented by applying the policy (examples of synergies) • List enabling and limiting factors • List suggestions for improvement
JC3.2 : The core funding policy has led to greater visibility of Belgium as a donor
<p>Indicators</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Degree to which the Belgian multilateral cooperation has achieved greater visibility by applying the policy: overall visibility, specific visibility by some instruments, joint visibility published by the partners, examples of presence in the media • Degree to which core funding policy has an impact on donor visibility (annual reports by Belgium, from partners) compared to visibility achieved by (soft) earmarking for other donors • List enabling and limiting factors • List suggestions for improvement
JC3.3 : The application of the Belgian policy of core funding contributed to increased credibility of Belgium as a partner in multilateralism (see also EQ7 – Utstein Group)
<p>Indicators</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evolution over the period of the position of Belgium in the Aid Transparency Index (in particular among transparent bilateral donors) • Degree of credibility of Belgium at UN level (General Assembly, Security Council), and role of the policy in this situation

EQ4 Effectiveness – International policies and action

EQ 4 : To what extent and how has the Belgian policy of core funding contributed to strengthen international policies and results, and to do so in line with Belgian development objectives?
<p>The 2009 policy of core funding was also based on the assumption that the policy would benefit to the partner organisations by providing them with more autonomy, a greater share of general resources, higher funding predictability, stronger results-oriented management, less fragmented operation, lower transaction costs and less reporting obligations. The evaluation will be using the above expectations as indicators to assess the levels of external effectiveness, taking into account the challenges of levels of contribution, which are less readily assessed in core funding (which goes into a “common pot”) than with earmarked funding. The latter is preferred by some donors for precisely this reason – on top of pursuing their own agendas. This EQ will also address possibly undesirable results for partner organisations of Belgium’s core funding policy.</p>
JC4.1 : The core funding policy has enabled to influence the direction, policies and strategies of the partner organisations both bilaterally and multilaterally, and in line with Belgian development objectives and policies
<p>Indicators :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level to which (% contribution) the Belgian core funding has been able to promote more integrated and less fragmented strategies (bilateral and multilateral) at the level of the partner organisations (UNFPA, UNDP, WHO, OHCHR), and in line with Belgian development policies and objectives • List of derived examples of synergies among agencies (vs competition, see EQ5) • Level to which and how the Belgian core funding policy has achieved greater influence on decision-making of the partner organisations (list: mechanisms, approaches used) • Degree to which observed outcomes in partners’ policies are the results of other mechanisms (list: external factors, other donors, internal influence...)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Degree to which additional core funding measures (list suggestions: budget, coordination, M&E) may be needed to further influence partner policies in an appropriate manner • List of enabling and limiting factors • List of suggestions for improvement
<p>JC4.2 : Comprehensive studies and analyses report contribution of core funding to improved effectiveness, as well as enabling or limiting factors.</p>
<p>Indicators :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Degree of improvement in effectiveness between 2012 and 2016 for the 15 agencies supported by Belgium, owing to core funding • Degree of improvement in (core) funding between 2012 and 2016 for the 15 agencies owing to core funding
<p>JC4.3 : Earmarked funding, and soft earmarking in particular, has proved to be a qualitative addition to core funding for (some of) the partners, under certain conditions</p>
<p>Indicators</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reported results of soft earmarking measures (more easily visible?) • The extent to which Covid 19 earmarked funding has complemented the re-purposing of existing core funds under the Covid-19 response • Level of synergies of soft earmarking measures with core funding to support the policy objectives • List enabling and limiting factors • List suggestions for improvement

EQ5 Effectiveness – UN reforms & efficiency

<p>EQ 5 : To what extent has the Belgian policy of core funding been able to promote UN reforms and improved efficiency and cost-effectiveness within the partner organisations?</p>
<p>External efficiency can be assessed from several aspects, which are included in the judgment criteria below: application of UN reforms – including the end of counterproductive competition for funding and visibility between agencies, reduction in transaction costs, and predictable funding. As for effectiveness, the challenge of assessing contribution of the Belgian policy is likely to be strong in the context of (often opaque) core funding.</p>
<p>JC5.1 : The core funding policy has contributed to UN reforms in terms of strengthened management, accounting for results, and transparent reporting at the level of partner organisations. If not, why not? What are the enabling and limiting factors?</p>
<p>Indicators :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution of core funding (by Belgium / Utstein group) to strengthened management (criteria to be defined) among partner organisations over the period (proven cases; estimates; counterfactual) • Contribution of core funding (by Belgium / Utstein group) to more accounting for results (focus on outcomes and not outputs in reports) among partner organisations over the period • Contribution of core funding (by Belgium / Utstein group) to more transparent reporting (quality of annual reports, focus on results, honest SWOT analysis, visibility of donors) among partner organisations over the period • List examples of good and bad practices in competition (for funding, visibility, other rationales) between partner agencies – see also EQ4 • List enabling and limiting factors • List suggestions for improvement
<p>JC5.2 : The core funding policy has contributed to a reduction in transaction costs for the partner organisations</p>

<p>Indicators :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Levels of transaction costs over the period per year, per partner organisation • Contribution of changes in transaction costs to application of Belgian policy (if possible) or overall core funding by Utstein group • List enabling and limiting factors • List suggestions for improvement
<p>JC5.3 : The core funding policy contributed to a higher predictability of resources for partner organisations</p>
<p>Indicators :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison of core funding needs by each partner organization, with predictable core funding levels by Belgium, the Utstein group and other donors, per year • Level of synchronisation between the Belgian budget and planning cycle (2017-2020) and that of the partner organisations • List positive benefits, stated by each partner organisation • List stated effects of core funding gaps, and mitigation strategies
<p>JC5.4 : Lack of synchronisation between the Belgian budget and planning cycle (2017-2020) and that of the partner organisations did not affect reaching core funding policy objectives. How did it otherwise?</p>
<p>Indicators :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison between dates and duration of budget planning cycles, for Belgium and partner organisations; list discrepancies / gaps • Contribution of discrepancies/ gaps on efficiency (proven cases; estimates; etc.) • List enabling and limiting factors • List suggestions for improvement

EQ6 Efficiency and Coherence - internal

<p>EQ 6 : To what extent has the Belgian policy of core funding been applied consistently, and has this contributed to lower transaction costs for Belgian development actors?</p>
<p>As discussed above about effectiveness, an assumption of the policy concerned the fact that the Belgian multilateral cooperation instruments which participate in this core funding approach would also benefit from lower transaction costs. Preconditions for this achievement would be consistency. This EQ will furthermore assess the effect of the lack of synchronization of funding cycles.</p>
<p>JC6.1 : The policy of core funding has been applied consistently by Belgian cooperation actors over the period 2008-2019; if not, why not? What have been the enabling and limiting factors?</p>
<p>Indicators :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dates and amounts provided by Belgium for core funding of partner organisations • List discrepancies in regular funding and reasons (lessons learnt)
<p>JC6.2 : The core funding policy has contributed to a reduction in transaction costs of Belgian cooperation actors. If not, why not? Was it different among instruments?</p>
<p>Indicators :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Levels of transaction costs over the period per year, per instrument and overall • Degree to which changes in transaction costs have been linked to policy application (streamlining /synergies of cooperation instruments, streamlining of cooperation partners) • List enabling and limiting factors • List suggestions for improvement

EQ7 Coherence - external

EQ 7 : To what extent has the Belgian core funding policy been coherent with key global mechanisms that aim at supporting core funding?

Under this criterion, overall coherence is assessed through 3 global mechanisms (the Utstein group, UN QCPR and UN Funding Compact), to avoid redundancies with other aspects of coherence which are assessed under the angles of relevance and effectiveness. The Utstein group has gathered since 1999 some like-minded donors (there are currently 9 states in the group: Belgium, Canada, Germany, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, UK, Sweden and Switzerland). Among its core themes, the group aims at strengthening the funding of sustainable development to achieve the SDGs, while facing other donors with strong earmarking approaches (see EQ2). The Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) of the UN operational system is a process by which the General Assembly reviews since 2008 the coherence, effectiveness and funding of the 27 UN development programmes, funds, and specialised agencies. The Funding Compact was set up in 2019 to enhance transparency and accountability of spending in the UN development system.

JC7.1 : The Utstein group of donors who apply core funding has increased and has created a sufficient critical mass to promote more coherence among donors

Indicators :

- Increasing membership of the Utstein group after inclusion of Belgium, and stated reasons
- Proactive initiatives of Belgium among the Utstein group, and reported satisfaction by other members
- Numbers and share of total budget contribution of Utstein group donors in the core funding of partner organisations (compared to overall figures)

JC7.2 : Comprehensive studies and analyses report contribution of core funding to improved coherence, as well as enabling or limiting factors.

Indicators :

- Degree of improvement in coherence between 2012 and 2016 for the 15 agencies owing to core funding

JC7.3 : The UN Funding Compact has offered (as expected) a framework to promote more core funding and to meet the expectations of Belgium and other donors in terms of accountability and visibility. If not, why not?

Indicators :


- Degree of coherence of Funding Compact with Belgian policy
- Degree of impact of UN Funding Compact indicators: 30% core target, 10% pooled funds, 6% thematic funds

Annex E – Additional tables and figures

This annex provides a list of additional tables and figure that complement the analysis developed in the core report. The additional tables and figures are organized by evaluation questions (EQ) to which they relate, namely EQ6 on internal efficiency and coherence and EQ7 on the coherence of Belgian core funding policy with global mechanisms and other donors' practices.


Additional Figures and Tables related to EQ6:

Figure 1: Volume of DGD ODA flows to multilateral organisations, by type of aid (2008-2019)



Between 2008–2019, the share of DGD ODA flows to core funding remained relatively stable at around 85 percent, but its composition changed with voluntary core funding becoming more important. Overall, the share of assessed contributions (excluding humanitarian assistance) decreased from 76 percent of DGD ODA flows to multilaterals in 2008 to 54 percent in 2019. Part of this evolution can be attributed to extending the payment schedule from three to nine years for World Bank assessed contributions, which decreased yearly payments and artificially raised the share of voluntary contributions. Over the same period, the share of voluntary core contributions increased from 9 percent to 35 percent (corresponding to 39 percent of core funding contributions from the DGD). The share of ODA flows to “soft” or “quality” earmarked also doubled over the same period (Figure 2) when humanitarian assistance is not factored in. The evolution is very similar when focusing on the 15 partner organisations selected in 2015 (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Distribution of DGD ODA flows to multilateral organisations (excluding Humanitarian aid)





Source: ADE’s calculation based on Prisma database

The increasing share of voluntary core funding and decreasing contributions to earmarked funding is more pronounced when the analysis focuses on UN system organisations and other multilateral institutions (i.e. excluding IFIs, the EU institutions and humanitarian assistance). The changes are not very remarkable when looking at total DGD ODA to multilateral institutions due to the large -albeit declining- proportion of funding allocated to assessed contributions. Figure 13 (in the main report) presents the breakdown of the different types of ODA flows to multilateral institutions over time. The analysis shows that the share of DGD ODA flows allocated to core funding increased between 2008–2019. Humanitarian assistance represents a large (and increasing) share of DGD budget to multilateral institutions and is excluded from the analysis (Figure 1 in Annex E).¹ The share of voluntary core funding to UN institutions increased substantially over the period, from 39 percent in 2008 to 75 percent in 2019. During the same period, DGD all but stopped allocating funds to “tight” earmarking as the share decreased from 34 percent in 2008 to only 2 percent in 2019. “Soft” or “quality” earmarking (thematic and basket funds) to UN partners were allocated a higher proportion of the available budget (from 4 percent in 2008 to 9 percent in 2019) although its use remained limited.


¹ Around 31 percent of DGD ODA flows to multilateral institutions were allocated to humanitarian assistance in 2008, increasing to 50 percent in 2019.

Figure 3: DGD ODA flows to Belgium’s 15 international partner organisations (in 2015) by type of aid, 2008-2019



Source: ADE’s calculations based on Prisma database


Figure 4: Distribution of DGD ODA flows to UN system (excluding humanitarian aid), by type of aid (2008-2019)




Source: ADE's calculations based on Prisma database

Figure 5: Number of institutions receiving funding from the DGD, by type of ODA and institutions


Any core funding (voluntary or assessed)



Earmarked contributions




Assessed core funding



Source: ADE’s calculations based on Prisma database

The evolution of the average budget per agreement also reflects the effect of core funding on transaction costs. The average budget per voluntary core funding agreement is always higher than for other types of ODA and has increased from around EUR 3 million in 2008 to EUR 7 million in 2019, with a maximum of around EUR 9 million in 2014 (Figure 9). By contrast, the average size of agreements for “tight” earmarking ranges from EUR 0.2 million in 2008 to a maximum of EUR 0.6 million in 2016. “Soft” earmarking agreements are also relatively large, ranging from 0.6 million in 2008 to 3.5 million in 2017, with an outlier in 2015 when Belgium contributed to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). This shows that voluntary core funding agreements contributed to efficiency by allowing the management of larger amounts of resources and the difference with other types of agreements increased over the period under review.

Figure 6: Evolution of the average budget by agreement by type of aid, 2008-2019



Source: ADE's calculations based on Prisma database

Additional Tables and Figures related to EQ7: on earmarking in the Multilateral Development System

Table 1: Key multilateral assets for implementing the 2030 Agenda

<p>Political legitimacy and neutrality</p>	<p>The broad membership, unique mandates and multilateral governance allows organisations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – to convene stakeholders at the national, regional and global levels to help further implementation, raise ambitions and link-up different levels – to assist governments as credible partners, also by taking a more long-term perspective – to improve data quality; monitor and measure progress towards SDGs – to advocate for the 2030 Agenda, including for human rights and other multilaterally agreed norms – to address sensitive issues, act in “difficult” situations, and on challenges with global or cross-border dimensions – to push the universal agenda (instead of a North-South development project)
<p>Economies of scale to address global challenges</p>	<p>The pooling of resources allows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – greater orders of magnitude in terms of volume of funding and geographic reach for development solutions at scale – opportunities to leverage and mobilise additional resources and expertise, for both national implementation but also GPGs and cross-cutting topics – shared risks for innovative approaches
<p>Experience, expertise and knowledge</p>	<p>The longstanding development work, broad thematic responsibilities and extensive country presence allows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – a deep knowledge of developing countries’ economic and social conditions to better anchor and direct support and act quickly in case of emergencies – the formulation of integrated policy responses by harnessing the expertise of the whole organisation – addressing global thematic issues that cut across countries – the advancement of/advancing global and regional debates on common implementation challenges and solutions

Source: German Development Institute (2020), Earmarking in the Multilateral Development System: Many Shades of Grey, p. 16

Table 2: Instruments of earmarked funding in the UNDS and MDBs

<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Examples of earmarked funding arrangements</i>
Multilateral development banks	
Trust funds	Funds to 1) support the work programme of the MDBs, including advisory services and analytics, and 2) finance projects and technical assistance (TA) in recipient countries
Financial intermediary funds	Funds to support global development initiatives and partnerships focussing on the provision of global public goods
(Bilateral) co-financing arrangements	Joint or parallel financing of projects in recipient countries with various forms of division of labour between bilateral agencies and MDBs, often on the basis of framework agreements
United Nations Development System	
Inter-agency pooled funds (several donors, several agencies)	Global funds, joint programmes, humanitarian country-based funds, One UN Funds
Single agency thematic funds (several donors, agency-specific)	Thematic funds, funding windows, UN-donor partnership funds, other ad hoc agency-specific trust funds, rapid response/ emergency funds, Innovation Funds
Project and programme funding (one or several donors)	Single- and multi-donor projects, funding to agency programmes or parts thereof at country, regional or global level
Local resources (one donor, typically one agency)	Programme and project funding by developing countries, for implementation in their own countries

Source: German Development Institute (2020), Earmarking in the Multilateral Development System: Many Shades of Grey, p. 40

Table 3: Donor comparisons along key dimensions of analysis

	Germany	Sweden	United Kingdom	European Union
Decision-making context	Foreign Office, BMZ, BMU, and various line ministries	Sida Country offices	DFID Country offices	DEVCO and other Directorates Divided responsibilities between Brussels and delegations
Motives for earmarking	Scaling-up of thematic initiatives Implementation capacities of multilateral partners Quick disbursement of funds in crisis situations Shaping work programme of multilaterals	Reinforcing particular thematic priorities Scale and efficiency of multilaterals as implementing partners Engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states	Support for specific countries and themes Implementation capacities of multilateral partners Enables engagement with governments in difficult country contexts	Political commitment to multilateralism Profit from political neutrality of multilaterals Take advantage of scale and efficiency of multilaterals Response to capacity constraints
Administrative challenges	Fragmentation of decision-making across ministries leads to different approaches to engagement Lack of consolidated overview or strategy Efficiency questions regarding delegation of management to GIZ and KfW	Achieving consistency in approach to engagement between MFA and Sida and HQ and field level Maintaining visibility of contributions in face of narrow approach of other donors	Alignment of HQ and country-level engagement with multilaterals Maintaining an overview of the extent of earmarking practice and its consequences for donor priorities	Lack of explicit criteria for funding decisions Absence of consolidated overview of funds Ensuring administrative capacities are available on donor side to manage funding Harmonisation of reporting requirements


Source: German Development Institute (2020), Earmarking in the Multilateral Development System: Many Shades of Grey, p. 40

Table 4: Funding data for selected UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies

	Total	Core	Earmarked	% earmarked
WFP	6,064	401	5,663	93%
UNODC	375	35	341	91%
UN OCHA	1,032	106	926	90%
UN-HABITAT	153	16	137	89%
UNDP	4,840	655	4,184	86%
WHO	3,166	549	2,617	83%
UNHCR	4,163	751	3,411	82%
UNICEF	6,372	1,227	5,145	81%
FAO	1,071	249	822	77%
UNIDO	331	81	249	75%
UNEP	767	200	566	74%
UNFPA	1,038	350	688	66%
UN Women	354	151	202	57%
OHCHR	125	54	71	57%
UNESCO	429	196	233	54%
ILO	507	232	274	54%
UNRWA	1,135	587	548	48%
IFAD	409	306	103	25%
UNAIDS	221	173	48	22%
Source: Authors, based on UN Secretary-General (2019b)				

Source: German Development Institute (2020), Earmarking in the Multilateral Development System: Many Shades of Grey, p. 112

Figure 7: Evolution of voluntary funding to the UNDS



Source: German Development Institute (2020), Earmarking in the Multilateral Development System: Many Shades of Grey, p. 111

Annex F – Mandates and key objectives of Belgium’s 15 partner organisations

This Annex presents (i) first the mandates and key objectives of the 15 international organisations partner of the multilateral cooperation selected by the Royal Decree of 29 May 2015, and (ii) second, in a table, the overall match between Belgium’s sectoral and thematic priorities, the SDGs and the selected organisations.

The mandates and key objectives of the 15 partners are the following:

- The **Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research** (CGIAR) is a strategic partnership framework of countries and donors, international and regional organizations, and private foundations that support a network of international research centres which, in turn, collaborate with national agricultural research systems, civil society organizations, and private sector organizations. The CGIAR consists of 64 members from the public and private sectors, both developing and industrialized countries, and four co-sponsors (FAO, WB, UNDP and UNEP).
- The mandate of the UN’s **Food and Agriculture Organization** (FAO) is to combat hunger and poverty by assisting member countries to define and implement agricultural policy aimed at increasing agricultural and food production through knowledge transfer, institutional reform, and sustainable development. The FAO has both a normative task (knowledge and information centre in the field of agriculture and food, neutral platform for discussion and negotiation of international agreements and treaties) and an operational one (technical assistance and knowledge transfer in the field of agriculture and food security, including emergency aid).
- The **Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria** (GFATM) is a foundation under Swiss law and a public-private partnership independent of the UN system. It was created in January 2002 and functions as a financial instrument to quickly provide additional resources to deal with emergencies. It is not as an implementation instrument.
- The **International Labour Organization** (ILO) has a mandate to contribute to the establishment of lasting peace by promoting social justice and—through international action—improve working conditions and living standards and promote economic and social stability. ILO is a three-pronged organization: it brings together governments, workers, and employers to recommend international minimum standards and draft international labour conventions on topics such as human rights, freedom of association, wages, and minimum age for employment. The ILO also provides extensive technical assistance to member states.
- The **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) principal mandate is to cover the full range of macroeconomic and financial sector policies that bear on global stability. Regarding development assistance, the IMF is committed to support the SDGs within the scope of its mandate, notably by providing financial support for low-income developing countries (and notably for countries affected by the COVID-19 pandemic), by providing debt service relief, and technical assistance notably to boost domestic revenue mobilisation in view of supporting spending in five key sectors: education, health,

water and sanitation, roads and electricity. The IMF also provides targeted support for fragile and conflict states.

- The **International Organization for Migration** (IOM) has a technical and operational mandate to provide migration related services to ensure orderly and humane migration movements, to promote international cooperation in the field of migration, to contribute to finding practical solutions to migration problems, and provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in need.
- The mandate of the **Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights** (OHCHR) is to protect and promote human rights and prevent violations of these rights. The High Commissioner reports directly to the UN Secretary-General. The implementation of the OHCHR mandate has three main dimensions: normative activity, supervision, and implementation on the ground. The OHCHR provides support to various UN human rights bodies in carrying out their standard-setting activities and their supervisory duties.
- The **Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS** (UNAIDS) aim to achieve universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care, and support. UNAIDS hopes to unite the efforts of the UN system, civil society, national governments, the private sector, global institutions, and people living with and most affected by HIV. This objective is implemented through advocacy, the mobilization of political, technical, scientific and financial resources, the empowerment of 'agents of change' and the support to inclusive country leaderships for sustainable responses that are integrated with national health and development efforts.
- The **UN Development Programme** (UNDP) helps countries mobilize and use international aid effectively. UNDP's mandate is to contribute to the eradication of poverty, and the reduction of inequalities and exclusion. It has a role to monitor and catalyse, through the annual publication of the Human Development Report. This report focuses the global debate on key development issues, providing new measurement tools, innovative analysis, and policy proposals.
- The **UN Environment Program** (UNEP) is the highest environmental authority within the UN system. It guides international environmental policies and actions with scientific knowledge.
- The **UN Population Fund** (UNFPA) specializes in sexual and reproductive rights. It strives to ensure that pregnancies are desired, that young people can protect themselves against HIV, and that women and girls are treated with respect. The Fund also helps protect vulnerable groups from violence and discrimination.
- The **UN Children's Fund** (UNICEF) is responsible for defending the rights of children, helping to meet their basic needs, and fostering their full development. UNICEF is based on the Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted in 1989 and works to ensure that children's rights are part of a social ethic and an international code of conduct for children.
- The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) merged in 2011 with other entities to form **UN Women**. The agency pursues four main objectives: (1) reduce female poverty; (2) eliminate violence against women; (3) stop the spread of HIV/AIDS in the female population; and (4) achieve gender equality within the framework of democratic governance in times of peace and in times of war.
- The goal of **World Health Organization** (WHO) is to promote health and enable all peoples to achieve the highest possible standard of health. The term health is defined by the organization as "a state of physical, mental and social well-being and not just the absence of disease". The Constitution of WHO assigns two main functions: 1i) to direct and co-ordinate work of an international character in the field of health; and (2) ensure technical cooperation for health among Member States.

- The **World Bank Group** has two main goals, end poverty and boost shared prosperity. It usually refers to two legally and financially distinct institutions: IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, created in 1946) and IDA (International Development Association, created in 1960). In the case of Belgium, additional initiatives with specific mandates are also included as partners such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Global Partnerships for Education (GPE), the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), the African Development Fund (ADF), etc.

The **table** below shows the overall match between Belgium's sectoral and thematic priorities, the SDGs and the selected organisations. UNDP has a broad mandate and a cross-cutting approach across all SDGs, we tried to capture it under the thematic priority 'Consolidation of society'.

Table 5: Match between the priorities of Belgian Development Cooperation and the sectoral and thematic priorities of 15 partner organisations

Priorities Development Cooperation (2013 Law)	SDGs	CGIAR	FAO	GFATM	ILO	IMF	IOM	OHCHR	UNAIDS	UNDP	UNEP	UNFPA	UNICEF	UN Women	WHO	World Bank Group
Sectoral priorities																
Health, SRHR, HIV	3			X					X			X	X		X	X
Education, training	4									X			X			X
Food security	2	X	X													X
Infrastructure	9					X										X
Conflicts, fragility, democratic governance, rule of law.	Cross-cutting in all SDGs					X	X	X		X				X		X
Thematic priorities																
Human rights including children's rights	Cross-cutting in all SDGs				X		X	X		X		X	X	X		
Decent, sustainable work, inclusive economy	8				X					X				X		X
Consolidation of society	Cross-cutting SDGs				X	X		X		X			X	X	X	X
Cross-cutting themes																
Gender equality	5		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Environment, climate action	13	X	X							X	X					X

Source: ADE

Annex G – Presence of Belgium’s 15 international partner organisations in Belgium’s partner countries

This Annex illustrates the presence of the 15 international partner organisations selected in 2015 in Belgium’s partner countries . We observe that:

- Eight out of 15 partner organisations are present in **all Belgium’s partner countries** (i.e. FAO, ILO, IOM, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WB and WHO). In addition, two agencies (IMF and UNAIDS) are present in all but one partner countries. Overall, there is a strong presence of the partner organisations in the African partner countries.
- IOM has a regional approach, following migration routes, with regional offices in Senegal, Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa from which they cover all Belgium’s partner countries. IOM has also country offices in all Belgium partner countries except in Benin for which the field presence is ensured by the regional office in Senegal.
- IMF does not have country offices but resident country representatives in almost all of Belgium’s partner countries (except in Burundi).
- GFATM works through “country coordination mechanisms” in all the countries, but does not have country offices.
- Three agencies have a presence in some of the countries only: UN Women (9 countries), OHCHR (6 countries) and the CGIAR (4 countries).
- UNEP is present in only one of Belgium’s partner countries, in Tanzania. UNEP works mainly through regional offices in close coordination with other UN agencies such as UNDP.

The field presence of the partner organisations **matches closely** to the geographical focus of Belgium’s development cooperation.

Table 6: Presence of Belgium's partner organisations in Belgium's partner countries

	CGIAR	FAO	GFATM	ILO	IMF ²	IOM	OHCHR	UNAIDS	UNDP	UNEP	UNFPA	UNICEF	UN Women	World Bank Group	WHO
Benin		X		X	X	X		X	X		X	X		X	X
Burkina Faso		X		X	X	X		X	X		X	X		X	X
Burundi		X		X		X	X ³	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
DRC	X	X		X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Guinea		X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X
Mali		X		X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Mozambique		X		X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Niger		X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X
Rwanda	X	X		X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Senegal		X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X
Tanzania	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Uganda	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Morocco		X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Palestine		X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X

Source: ADE

² IMF does not have country offices in these countries but resident representatives.

³ OHCHR's country office in Burundi is now closed but was functioning during the 2014-2019 period covered by this evaluation and, hence, included in the table.

Annex H – Relevant Belgian policies and laws

This annex illustrates the translation of the Core Funding decisions into the law on Belgian International Cooperation.

The General Policy Note of 18/11/2009 from the Chamber of representatives agreed in its chapter 3.4 ("multilateral cooperation") that "since 2009, the funding policy in relation to multilateral development organisations has been profoundly changed: multilateral volunteer contributions now go to the general operating resources of an organization and will therefore benefit the essential tasks of multilateral organizations. Belgian development cooperation thus contributes resolutely in the fight against the proliferation of projects and earmarked programs whose donors have charged these organizations over the past decade. Earmarked contributions will remain in the future limited to delegated cooperation programmes, in other words, the programmes whose realization is carried out by a multilateral organisation at the request of a partner country. This measure results in in addition in a significant reduction of transaction costs, which allows Belgium to use as efficiently as possible the means available, and organizations to intervene faster and more efficiently where the needs are the greatest".

From a legal perspective, on 29 April 2010 the Chamber of Representatives published its comments regarding a 'draft law amending the Law of 25 May 1999 on Belgian international cooperation'. The new policy on the funding of voluntary contributions to international organisations was mentioned in Article 23: "Voluntary contributions in the framework of multilateral cooperation are intended for the general and non-earmarked resources of the partner organisations concerned, with the exception of any delegated cooperation. Voluntary contributions shall be the subject of a multiannual agreement with the partner organisations." The comments on Art 23 pointed to the fact that "in line with the Paris Declaration on aid efficiency, Belgium opts for the concentration of voluntary contributions on general resources of organizations and refrains from dividing contributions between many "earmarked" projects. Thanks to this arrangement, Belgium resolutely contributes to the simplification of multilateral cooperation. Earmarked contributions nevertheless remain possible within the framework of delegated cooperation as defined in the new article 32".

Due to the resignation of the government, this draft law lapsed on 7 May 2010. This did not prevent the new funding policy from being incorporated in the Policy Note on multilateral development cooperation of March 2011. In particular, this Note stated that the Belgian development cooperation will:

- continue to support and encourage multilateral cooperation at the international level out of conviction of the many advantages offered by this specific aid channel;
- actively collaborate in defining and guiding the multilateral aid architecture;
- fully mobilise multilateral cooperation towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the European Consensus on Development".

The Core Funding decision was finally translated in the new Law on the Belgian Development Cooperation of 19 March 2013, which has been published in the 'Moniteur Belge' n°119 of 12/04/2013. Relevance of the decisions with the Law can be found in particular in the following articles of the Law.

- Chap 2 art 3 (“objectives”) mentions the UN: the Belgian Development Cooperation aims in general at sustainable human development and undertakes, to achieve this objective, actions that contribute to sustainable and inclusive economic growth for an improvement of the living conditions of the population in developing countries, and at their socio-economic and socio-cultural development, in order to eradicate poverty, exclusion and inequalities. In this context, the Belgian Development Cooperation also aims at capacity building of partners in development at all levels. This cooperation is consistent with the United Nations development goals.
- Chap 3 art 8 also outlines the principle of coherence and the synergies between concerned Belgian institutions: “in order to ensure the effectiveness of Belgian Development Cooperation and achieve its general objectives, maximum consistency is sought between the different areas of Belgian policy related to development. Political actions for mutual reinforcement within the different government departments and public institutions are encouraged with a view to creating synergies aimed at achieving the development objectives approved by Belgium”.
- Art 9 and 10 mention again the UN, as well as art 13. (art 9): “Belgian Development Cooperation adheres to the United Nations principles, declarations and conventions concerning development and environment as well as human rights in all their dimensions. It contributes to the respect and implementation of the commitments of Belgium, including the quantitative objective of 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) for public aid to development.
- Art 10 : “In view of the effectiveness of aid, the Belgian Development Cooperation aims to strengthen the democratic ownership of the partners, the alignment with their policies, procedures and management systems, harmonization with other donors, results-oriented management, mutual accountability, better predictability of resources, and focuses on a limited number of countries, themes and sectors”.
- Art. 13. § 1. The Belgian Development Cooperation seeks synergies, coordination and complementarities between the different actors referred to in Article 2, 5 °, 6 ° and 7 °, in order to achieve maximum efficiency of the means used. § 2. The Belgian Development Cooperation promotes harmonization with the cooperation of the European Union and multilateral organisations ».
- Most relevant however is Art 24: “voluntary contributions within the framework of multilateral cooperation are intended mainly for general and unaffected means of the concerned partner organisations. Voluntary contributions are recorded in a multi-year agreement concluded with partner organisations”.
- Furthermore Article 23 of the Law incorporates most of the provisions of Article 9 of the Law of 1999 and adds in Article 24: “Voluntary contributions within the framework of multilateral cooperation are intended primarily for the general and non-earmarked resources of the partner organisations concerned.”⁴
- Finally, Art 25 outlines that “The Belgian Development Cooperation also grants compulsory contributions to multilateral organizations of which the Belgian State is a member and whose general objectives are consistent with those of the Belgian Development Cooperation referred to in Chapter 2. A compulsory contribution is based on a distribution key approved by the competent bodies of the international organization”.

⁴ It should be noted that the word “primarily” refers to certain contributions that remain earmarked, such as contributions to organisations participating in a programme of the Belgian Fund for Food Security (which has since been repealed), contributions to humanitarian aid and contributions allocated for delegated cooperation.