

# Evaluation Belgian Humanitarian Assistance, 2002-2006

## Volume II – Country Reports

Client: Special Evaluation Service of Development Cooperation, Federal Public Service Foreign  
Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation

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**DR Congo**

**Pakistan**

**Burundi**



# Evaluation Belgian Humanitarian Assistance, 2002-2006

## Country Report DR Congo

Client: Special Evaluation Service of Development Cooperation, Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation

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Rotterdam, 27 November 2007





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## Preface

The Special Evaluation Service S0.4 has commissioned an evaluation of Belgian humanitarian assistance during the period 2002-2006. This evaluation is carried out by ECORYS. The framework for this evaluation is laid down in the general TOR, and has been described in more detail in the 'Methodological Note' (phase 1 of the evaluation). The second phase consisted of a policy analysis and an analysis of the various budget lines and institutions in Brussels. The third phase will consist primarily of four field visits: two to the DRC, one to Burundi and one to Pakistan. This document contains the report of the field visit in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the quality of the humanitarian interventions that have been financially supported by the Federal Government of Belgium. The evaluation will shed light on those factors that contributed to or reduced the quality of the humanitarian interventions supported by the Belgian Government, and make suggestions that will support the Government to improve its humanitarian programme and increase the added value.

The assessment of humanitarian activities supported by the Belgian Government in the DRC is an important part of the evaluation, as the DRC is the largest receiver of Belgian humanitarian aid. The evaluation is the first of three field evaluations and the working methods and findings provide a framework for the other two evaluations that will follow.

More background information on Belgian humanitarian assistance policies and strategies, organisations and processes, and the various budget lines can be found in the syntheses report of the evaluation the Belgian Humanitarian Assistance.

The team would like to thank the staff of the Belgian Embassy for the warm reception, openness and support given to the mission. It also expresses its thanks to the staff of the many organisations and projects interviewed during the visits to Kinshasa, North and South Kivu.









# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Framework

Since its independence, the DRC is the most important partner of Belgian international assistance. Bilateral assistance was interrupted at the end of the 1990s, but has been restored and intensified since the installation of the interim Government in 2002. The humanitarian assistance is part of a large, broad and varied package of political, economic, social and scientific cooperation and assistance that involves a wide range of different actors, such as the BTC, universities, NGOs, et cetera<sup>1</sup>.

## 1.2 Scope and Methodology

The third phase of the evaluation includes four field visits: to the DRC (twice), Burundi and Pakistan. For each of the visits specific terms of reference are elaborated<sup>2</sup>.

The ‘Methodological Note’ points out that during the field phase the humanitarian assistance will be approached from the perspective of the beneficiaries. The importance of the assistance to the beneficiaries is the starting point of the studies in this phase, and, from this perspective, the other links in the chain (the organisations and mechanisms that deliver the aid, and the role of the Embassy and the FPS. In management of the assistance) are studied.

The ‘Methodological Note’<sup>3</sup> presents the evaluation criteria to be used for assessment of the design and implementation of the interventions. The following criteria have to be taken into account at project level:

- **relevance** of the project: responsiveness to needs, relation to local coping strategies, alignment with Belgian national and local government policies and efforts (among others, the ones related to gender);
- **connectedness** with the overall development efforts of Belgian and other organisations, and with national opportunities and perspectives;
- **effectiveness and impact:** extent of realisation of objectives, effects, coordination at implementation level, coverage;
- **efficiency** in terms of timeliness of the assistance, implementation on time within budget.

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<sup>1</sup> See for the total funding and organisations involved see Annex ... ; ODA\_BE\_DR Congo

<sup>2</sup> For the TOR DR Congo see Annex 1.

<sup>3</sup> For detailed research questions and indicators see the Methodological Note, 30 November 2006.

At programme level the following criteria are assessed:

- **coherence:** relation to the peace building and conflict prevention initiatives, among others, of the Belgian Government;
- **coordination.**

In the evaluation of humanitarian activities in the DRC, activities funded by four of the five ‘humanitarian budget lines’ that are part of the evaluation are included: ‘Emergency’, ‘Food Aid’, ‘Multilateral Cooperation’ and ‘Transition’<sup>4</sup>.

It is important to mention that the project analyses are not project evaluations. The visits and dossier studies provide, in combination with other information sources, the information base to formulate findings in relation to the research questions and defined indicators<sup>5</sup>. Observations on individual projects, mentioned in the report, are only used to illustrate the points made. They are not evaluative statements on individual activities, unless specifically mentioned.

### 1.3 Data Collection Methods

#### *Document study*

To prepare the fieldwork the team studied available documentation<sup>6</sup>, such as:

- Belgian country plans and policy documents;
- CAP, CHAPs and draft CAF of the DRC from 2002-2007;
- monitoring reports of the staff of D.2.1;
- the evaluation reports of the Pooled Fund;
- dossiers of the projects that were to be visited and other relevant project dossiers;
- the recent Dutch evaluation study of humanitarian assistance to the Great Lakes Region, of the UNHCR (by ECHO/USAID), the evaluation of the ECHO programme in the DRC.<sup>7</sup>

#### *Interviews and focal groups*

The document and dossier study was complemented by individual interviews in Belgium and Kinshasa and during the field visit in North and South Kivu. These individual interviews generally provided useful information. Group discussions with beneficiaries were envisaged as an important data collection method in the field. This was not so for the group discussions. With the first group discussions in South Kivu it became obvious that after many years of life in the refugee camps, many visits of aid of workers and many projects, the population used group discussions to essentially provide information that best served their interests and was not a reliable reflection of the reality. This was often also true for individual interviews with beneficiaries, but in these interviews the information could be crosschecked with control questions and direct observations more easily. As far as possible, within the limited time available, also the method of in-depth interviews was used.

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<sup>4</sup> See Terms of Reference of the Evaluation.

<sup>5</sup> The collected information has been entered in a standard form in project assessments. A project assessment form has been made of all projects included in the sample.

<sup>6</sup> See Annex 2, Documentation.

<sup>7</sup> For documentation see Annex

### *Direct observation*

The team used the time available to visit as many project sites as possible (16 in North and South Kivu and Kinshasa) to assess the quality of the information provided in the reports, and to balance this information with their own observations and information from interviews. To avoid biased information the team visited a number of sites without prior preparation and participation of implementing organisations.

### *Limitations*

- The choice to visit a large number to obtain an as complete as possible overview of the Belgium funded activities in the DRC, had an effect on the depth of the information collection. The project visits were necessarily short, and the information obtained on specific activities is consequently limited and superficial.
- The team therefore heavily depended on progress reports and a limited number of final reports. These reports often mainly contained information on activities and outputs realised; information on the effects of the assistance was scarce. Of all the projects only one project<sup>8</sup> had been externally evaluated, of one project an external monitoring report was available, and one programme was included in a recent evaluation by donors<sup>9</sup>.
- Not all project dossiers were complete.
- Management of financial data (allocations, expenses, et cetera.) of programmes and projects was not carried out centrally. Unfortunately, data from different sources did not always match.

## 1.4 Planning

### *Preparation phase*

In this phase the dossiers were selected and studied and a preparative workshop was organised in Brussels.

### *Second phase*

From the 3<sup>rd</sup> to the 10<sup>th</sup> of February 2007 Mr Adriaan Ferf, Mrs Anneke Slob and Mr Vital Mayele met in Kinshasa with:

- The Belgian Embassy (political, development and humanitarian staff);
- The Humanitarian Coordinator;
- Humanitarian donors: USAID (involved in the GHD pilot with Belgium), DIFID and the Netherlands, and ECHO;
- Implementing organisations: ICRC, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO and Belgian NGOs involved in Belgian humanitarian assistance, such as Caritas, MSF and Memisa;
- BTC;
- Various resource persons.

It was not possible to meet with the national authorities because of the nomination of the new Government in the same week. During this period the focus at project level was on

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<sup>8</sup> An excellent external evaluation of the *Programme de rehabilitation des familles retournees en territoires de Masisi et Rutshuru au Nord- Kivu implemented by World Relief/ Tearfund*; January 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Report of Joint European Commission-US Government Humanitarian Assessment Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2007.

the transition budget line with visits to: the independent elections coordination commission, the harbour of Kinshasa and the Hospital Mama Yemo.

From the 13<sup>th</sup> to the 29<sup>th</sup> of April 2007 Mr Adriaan Ferf and Mr Vital Mayele visited 13 programmes and projects and met with various local authorities, international and local organisations and resource persons in North and South Kivu. The visits focused on projects of the emergency, food aid and multilateral budget lines in relation to the evaluation of humanitarian assistance in the eastern provinces and other Belgian interventions in this area.

The evaluation team has benefited from the discussion of the draft report in the reference group meeting on June 18<sup>th</sup> 2007 and a number of written comments on the draft report. The observations and critical notes guided the writing of the final version of the report.

## 1.5 Programmes and Projects

The dossiers of 26 programmes and projects were analysed, 16 of which were visited (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 Programmes and projects visited

Programme or Project Title	Sector	Agency	Budget Line	Budget
1- Appui a la sécurité alimentaire d'environ 75.000 ménages agricoles affectes par les conflits a l'Est de la RDC (2005)	Food security	FAO	Food Aid	1.700.000
2- Renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire de 116.300 ménages des zones sensibles (2006)	Food security	FAO	Food Aid	2.000.000
3- Aide alimentaire d'urgence sur l'allocation (2003)	Food aid	WFP	Food Aid	1.100.000
4 - Rehabilitation IDPs in Masisi and Rutshuru (2003)	Food security	Solidarite Protestante / WorldRelief	Emergency	312.000
5- Réhabilitation des infrastructures scolaires au Nord Kivu (2003)	Education	Solidarite Protestante / WorldRelief	Emergency	160.000
6- Water & sanitation in Goma after the volcano eruption (2002)	Water and Sanitation	Oxfam Solidarite /Oxfam UK	Emergency	162.000
7- Rehabilitation de la zone Santé de Bukavu (2004)	Health	Louvain Development	Emergency	658.000
8- Appui a la rehabilitation de la zone Santé Rural Sud de Bukavu (2006)	Health	Louvain Development	Emergency	400.000
9- Reinstallation & Rehabilitation Fizi and Uvira (2004)	Food security, shelter, education	Solidarite Protestante /Tearfund UK	Emergency	820.000
10- Integrated operational strategy of UNHCR in the DRC 2006	Return of Refugees	UNHCR	Multilateral Organisations	1.400.000

Programme or Project Title	Sector	Agency	Budget Line	Budget
11- Appui à la réinstallation des personnes déplacées et réfugiées au Sud Kivu (2006)	Food security	Oxfam Belgique	Emergency	400.000
12- 16- Strategic Stocks 2002/2003/2004/2005/ 2006	Health	Memisa	Emergency	
17- Aide à la réhabilitation de structures sanitaires de la zone Ruzizi (Sud Kivu) (2006)	Health	Cebumac	Transition	267.000
18- Rehabilitation of the General Provincial Hospital Mama Yemo in Kinshasa	Health	BTC	Transition	1.000.000
19 and 20- Rehabilitation of the Port of Kinshasa 2005 and 2006	Infrastructure	Port of Brussels	Transition	200.000 and 2.000.000
21- Elections RDC (2005 and 2006)	Others	UNDP	Transition	500.000 and 500.000

The following organisations that were not included in the programme and project visits were visited and senior staff interviewed in Belgium, Kinshasa, North and South Kivu:

Table 1.2 Programmes and projects included in the dossier study

Programme or Project Title	Sector	Agency	Budget Line	Budget
22- Pont de Niamba (2004 and 2006)		BTC	Transition	66.000 and 1.400.000
23- Rehabilitation of the Port of Matadi (2005 and 2006)	Infrastructure	Port of Antwerp	Transition	200.000 and 300.000
24- Project BNB et Banque Congloese; Creation of the conditions of a stable monetary climate (2006)	Others	National Bank of Belgium	Transition	1.480.000
25- S'entendre sur les rives des lacs (2006)	Others	Pax Christy Vlanderen	Conflict Prevention	96.000

## 1.6 The Team

In Kinshasa the team consisted of Adriaan Ferf (team leader), Anneke Slob and Vital Mayele. The fieldwork in North and South Kivu was carried out by Adriaan Ferf and Vital Mayele.



## 2 Background to Belgian Humanitarian Assistance in the DRC

### 2.1 Evolution of the Crisis Situation

#### 2.1.1 DRC

The situation in the DRC in the period under review is to be understood in the context of the decline of the economy and the national state functions during the Mobutu regime, the demise of the Mobutu regime in 1997, the onset of a regionalised conflict on and around the country between 1996 and 2002, when a peace agreement was finally signed, and an initial political and economic recovery process.

After several secessionist conflicts during the post-independence period and a long period of corruption and mismanagement under President Mobutu, the DRC entered a state of quasi collapse in the 1990s. National income per capita had dropped from 380 US\$ in 1960 to 224 US\$ in 1990, export had collapsed, value added per agricultural worker in the sector in 1990 was reduced to two-thirds of its 1960 level, transport networks had become dysfunctional, public administration functions and public functions of state institutions had nearly ceased to operate, law and order could hardly be maintained and violence increased with looting by the national army in 1991 and 1993<sup>10</sup>. In the mid-nineties the population had fallen back on subsistence production and was dependent on religious and private organisations for basic services, such as education and health.

The Rwanda refugee crisis, which had started in 1994 and ended dramatically with the consolidation of the RPF government in Rwanda, left the DRC with large numbers of rebel troops opposed to the new Rwandan Government and a substantial residual refugee population. Fuelled further by the desire of various external forces to control the territory and extensive natural resources of the DRC, a first conflict in 1997 with the involvement of seven foreign countries and a number of militias, and a second conflict between 1998 and 2003 took place inside the DRC, during which a reported 3.65 million people died and many more were displaced<sup>11</sup>.

The peace agreement in 2002 allowed for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and a complex transitional arrangement. The transition process from 2002-2006 has been supported by a large UN peace keeping mission and force (MONUC), the donor community and the Comité International d’Acompagnement de la Transition (CIAT),

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<sup>10</sup> Draft Country Assistance Framework DRC Joint Chapters, 2007, Point 9.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

composed of representatives of the UN Security Council, MONUC, the EU, the AU and concerned countries, Belgium among others. The political process during the transition period was relatively smooth. During 2005 and 2006 the political climate in the country remained largely stable. In 2006 national legislative and presidential elections were held successively and, for the first time in 45 years, the Congolese people have chosen their president and representatives at various levels of government freely and democratically.

The political advancement, the presence of MONUC, the 'brassage' process of combatants of rebel groups and the unification of the army have facilitated the gradual improvement of the security situation since 2002.

With improvement of the security situation, previously isolated parts of the country with urgent needs became accessible to humanitarian assistance and this allowed the free movement of goods and people with positive effects on the survival rate and the humanitarian situation. Internally displaced people and outflows of refugees to neighbouring countries increasingly returned to their homesteads. Refugees also started to return from abroad, though the UNHCR advised against it<sup>12</sup>. In 2005 and 2006, 82.000<sup>13</sup> refugees of the 493.000 refugees repatriated<sup>14</sup>. Especially in the provinces of North and South Kivu many refugees returned spontaneously from camps in Tanzania in preparation for the voters' registration and general elections<sup>15</sup>.

The improved security situation also reversed the trend of economic decline. After decennia of negative economic growth, the economy started to grow again in 2002; annual economic growth is estimated at 5 per cent. The recovery was mainly concentrated in a few sectors, such as construction, agro business and telecommunications, while an initial recovery of the mining sector and foreign investments could be observed (although an impressive growth rate, it will take a continuous economic growth at the present level until 2060 to reach 1960 GDP per capita)<sup>16</sup>.

The improvements of the security situation, however, came on slowly with many setbacks throughout the country. The eastern and some areas in the northern part of the country remain especially volatile and insecure. There were continuous flare-ups of fighting, particularly in 2005 and 2006, between the integrated brigades of the FARDC (Force Armée de RD Congo) that operated with logistical support of MONUC and the renegade troops of the former RCD Goma, Mai-Mai, other rebel fractions and foreign fighters who remained active in the eastern provinces. In 2005 the town of Bukavu in South Kivu was occupied by rebel groups and renegade troops (the group de Laurent Kindu) and in 2006 Goma came under heavy attack.

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<sup>12</sup> "In this environment, beneficiaries are more exposed to rape, extortion, massive and extensive human rights violations. This is the situation we are bringing refugees into. For these reasons UNHCR has not yet been able to enter into promoting repatriation, but facilitates those who express eagerness to return, despite information that is provided through mass information campaigns." Integrated Operational Strategy of UNHCR in the DRC for 2006-2007, page 2.

<sup>13</sup> Of which 30 per cent were assisted in 2005 and 70 per cent in 2006 or, in other words, 40.000 of the 82.000 received assistance; OCHA October 2006.

<sup>14</sup> Simultaneously DRC houses large numbers of refugees from neighbouring countries (120.000 from Angola, app. 80.000 from Rwanda and 20.000 from Burundi). Integrated Operational Strategy of UNHCR in the DRC for 2006-2007, page 19/20.

<sup>15</sup> Integrated Operational Strategy of UNHCR in the DRC for 2006-2007, page 12.

<sup>16</sup> Draft Country Assistance Framework DRC Joint Chapters, 2007.



Especially in these eastern parts the humanitarian crisis continued with exactions and widespread human rights violations (including killings, rape, sexual exploitation, looting, illegal taxation and general harassment of the civilian population); impunity by armed groups against the civilian population continued. Even during the first quarter of 2006, over 11.000 cases of sexual violence were reported<sup>17</sup>, likely only the tip of the iceberg. Not all of the violations were related to the armed conflicts, as many of these crimes were perpetuated by the military and police, the lack of regular payments and a unified command structure being two of the major causes of such behaviour<sup>18</sup>.

Decades of mismanagement and conflict have left the DRC, one of the most richly-endowed African countries, physically and socially devastated and have seen its fall to the bottom 10 countries of the Human Development Index to place 167. The national income per capita had dropped to 120 US\$ per year in 1995 or a mere 0.30 US\$ per day for 80 per cent of the population<sup>19</sup>. The population had to fall back on subsistence production and the contribution of agriculture to GDP fell from US\$ 3.4 billion in 1990 to US\$ 2.5 billion in 2003<sup>20</sup>. A large share of the rural population had lost their (already limited) pre-war assets, such as basic tools, seeds and small animals, and had not been able to replace them and restart their activities.

Malnutrition affected over 75 per cent of the population (with an average dietary energy supply of 1.500 kcal/day, far below the FAO-recommended 2.500 kcal/day)<sup>21</sup>. A nutritional study by the NGFO in South Kivu in 2006 revealed a severe malnutrition rate of 12.8 per cent, which is well above the threshold of 5 to 10 per cent demanded of nutritional care programmes<sup>22</sup>.

Life expectancy had dropped to 43 years. Illnesses that can easily be prevented and treated such as malaria, diarrhoea and acute respiratory ailments continue to be the greatest causes of death, with HIV a growing threat with an overall infection rate of 4.2 per cent in 2006. The mortality rate of children under 5 was 124 per 1.000 births and, as such, higher than in emergency situations of other humanitarian crises. The infant mortality rate was 990 per 100.000 live births nationally and 1.800 in the eastern parts of the country<sup>23</sup>.

There was a general shortage of potable water due to lack of protected water sources and latrines, as well as overpopulation of dwellings. Only 46 per cent of the population (29% in rural areas) has access to drinkable water.

The conflict has impacted on education through displacements, recruitment of children into armed groups, deteriorating school infrastructure (occupation of schools by the army and other groups), death and departure of teachers, while, on the other hand, because of widespread general poverty large groups of the population cannot afford the school fees

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<sup>17</sup> OCHA Humanitarian Action Plan 2007; page 12.

<sup>18</sup> OCHA Humanitarian Action Plan 2007; page 10; Integrated Operational Strategy of UNHCR in the DRC for 2006-2007; p 2.

<sup>19</sup> Derived for the 2006 PRSP document quoted in Integrated Operational Strategy of UNHCR in the DRC for 2006-2007, p 3.

<sup>20</sup> Draft Country Assistance Framework, Draft Growth Paper, 2006, page 6.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> OCHA, Humanitarian Action Plan 2007, page 12.

<sup>23</sup> WHO, 2006.

that support the education system. School enrolment rates stood at 50 per cent with significant disparities related to gender and social environment; schooling rates for girls and in rural areas are significantly lower.

Roads, bridges and communication systems were severely damaged or destroyed making economic activities almost impossible in many areas (out of the 10 provincial capitals only one can be reached by land from Kinshasa, three from abroad, while the others can only be reached by air or several week long river journeys) and making any humanitarian and rehabilitation efforts extremely complex and often costly.

Part of the impact of the conflict was not directly visible, but nonetheless devastating. The large-scale displacements, violence and human rights abuses, as well as impoverishment, have caused tremendous psychological suffering and deterioration of the social fabric, breaking up families and other solidarity networks. As a result safety nets were no longer functioning effectively, and social networks, which are key for economic recovery, were also severely disrupted.

Because of the continuous flaring up of violence many communities were forced to flee their homes often more than once. “At the beginning of 2006, armed confrontations as well as other types of violence resulted in the displacement of some 500.000 persons, mostly women and children”<sup>24</sup>. At the end of 2006 1.1 million people were still displaced, 40 per cent or 667.380 of which in North Kivu and 12 per cent or 195.000 in South Kivu<sup>25</sup>.

As more than 90 per cent of the IDPs were living with host families, whose meagre resources had been stretched to the point of impoverishment, or were self-settled, these displacements put an enormous pressure even on communities not directly affected by the conflicts<sup>26</sup>.

Though, since 2002, significant progress has been made with respect to the political process, security and economy the situation is still very vulnerable. There are areas still controlled by rebel groups, among others, in North and South Kivu, which are not, or only with difficulties, accessible to humanitarian action. These areas are also potential battlefields for confrontations between these groups and the army, ongoing conflicts and violence, while there is a large potential for renewed conflicts in volatile areas where local ‘strong men’ and elites, army commanders and militias profit from the insecurity; impunity, unpaid soldiers and delays in reintegration of former combatants threaten to destabilize communities<sup>27</sup>. Even at the end of 2006 the international humanitarian community still characterised the situation as: “emerging from crisis and moving towards a certain stability<sup>28</sup>” with “a potential for renewed conflict in many volatile communities<sup>29</sup>”.

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<sup>24</sup> OCHA, Humanitarian Action Plan, 2007, page 11.

<sup>25</sup> Integrated Operational Strategy of UNHCR in the DRC for 2006-2007, pages 6-7.

<sup>26</sup> Draft Country Assistance Framework, Annex 5, Points 1 and 2.

<sup>27</sup> Draft Country Assistance Framework, Annex 1, Point 3.

<sup>28</sup> OCHA, Humanitarian Action Plan, 2007, page 9.

<sup>29</sup> Draft Country Assistance Framework DRC, 2007, Annex 5, Point 3.

### 2.1.2 North and South Kivu

Although security also improved in the eastern part of the country, levels of insecurity, crime, violence and fighting were, as already mentioned, still very high in the Kivu Provinces. The majority of the IDPs in the country were living in both provinces. Parts of North and South Kivu remained under rebel control and were difficult to access or completely inaccessible. The insecurity had significant impacts on poverty (while in 1997 60-70 per cent of the population could afford health services, this was reduced to 10 per cent in 2003<sup>30</sup>), health and nutritional status ('Selon l'Inspection Provinciale de Sante du Sud Kivu, 80 per cent de la population consomme un seul repas pour jour<sup>31</sup>), educational records, et cetera. In 2002 eastern Congo was also affected by several natural disasters, such as the eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano that destroyed a third of Goma town, severe flooding, and the avalanche in the town of Uvira.

The general description, however true, overlooks differences in time and location. Areas showing extreme insecurity during certain periods were rather stable during others and showed clear signs of recovery, while other areas that were considered relatively safe became instable and were abandoned by the civilian population. During the evaluation of the Netherlands humanitarian programme, the rural areas south of Uvira were still nearly de-populated while the Rutshuru area in North Kivu was lively. During the fieldwork for this evaluation however, the roads in South Kivu were crowded, villages being rebuild, markets lively and not only stocked with the most essential goods, while the situation around Rutshuru was extremely tense with large new flows of refugees seeking safety near MONUC camps.

The events in South and North Kivu since 2002 re-emphasize that a long and complex conflict cannot easily progress from emergency to rehabilitation, to reconstruction and finally development.

## 2.2 The International Response to the Crisis

### 2.2.1 Volume of total ODA funds

Mismanagement of the country caused a significant reduction in international aid flows to the DRC in the 1980s (annual average ODA 773 million US\$) and 1990s (annual average ODA 318 million US\$<sup>32</sup>) with the international community concentrating on the political process instead. Since the Lusaka ceasefire agreement in 1999 and the installation of the transitional Government in 2002 aid flows have increased. Significant funds were made available to the UN peace keeping force MONUC, national debt reduction, disarmament of rebel groups and their integration in the FARDC, disarmament of child soldiers and their re-integration into society, structural (mainly social) development programmes and

<sup>30</sup> Appui a la réhabilitation de 4 zones de santé rurales du Sud Kivu, page 9, Louvain de Développement, 2006.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> OECD-DAC Aid at a Glance Statistics by Region, Table 2.2.3.

emergency support. The DRC became, in absolute terms, the largest aid receiver in Africa (average 2002-2004)<sup>33</sup>.

Tabel 2.1 ODA DR Congo in million US\$

2002	2003	2004	2005
267	4799	1123	763

Source: OECD-DAC Statistics .

The fast increase in 2003 was related to the main international debt relief in that year.

The distribution of the ODA DRC in 2004 was as follows:

Table 2.2 Distribution of ODA DR Congo in 2004

Debt relief	General Aid	Social	Productive	Emergency
41%	11%	34%	3%	10%

OECD-DAC Aid at a Glance Statistics by Region, Table 2.4.2

As the following overview indicates, Belgium was the second largest bi-lateral donor to the DRC.

In 2005 the main donors were<sup>34</sup>:

IDA	354 Million US\$
EC	232 Million US\$
Japan	214 Million US\$
<u>Belgium</u>	212 Million US\$
UK	189 Million US\$
USA	166 Million US\$

## 2.2.2 International humanitarian assistance

In the period from 2002 to 2006, OCHA presented a Consolidated Appeal to the international community each year (later also called Humanitarian Action Plan or HAP) to meet the humanitarian needs. International humanitarian contributions increased from 80 million US\$ in 2002<sup>35</sup> (or only 1.5 US\$ per person) to 128 million US\$ in 2005 and 325 million US\$ in 2006<sup>36</sup>.

The very low share of humanitarian assistance in ODA in the period under review is remarkable for a country that experienced what is considered one of the most severe humanitarian crises. It remained far behind worldwide averages. In 2002 the humanitarian assistance counted for 7 per cent<sup>37</sup> of ODA, well below the international average of 9 per cent. The relative position of humanitarian funding level decreased to 7 per cent of ODA, even further below the international average of 14 per cent.

<sup>33</sup> ODA-DAC AID statistics at a glance, 2006.

<sup>34</sup> ODA-DAC AID statistics at a Glance, 2006.

<sup>35</sup> Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2003 (as per 1st October).

<sup>36</sup> As per November 2006, Humanitarian Action Plan 2007.

<sup>37</sup> See OECD-DAC Table 1: from Global Humanitarian Assistance 2006 Development Initiatives 2006, page 7.

The main donors to the HAP DRC 2006 were<sup>38</sup>:

Great Britain	18.9%
EC	16.5%
USA	13.4%
CERF	11.4%
Carry- over	9.9%
Netherlands	5.1%
Japan	3.6%
Sweden	3.6%
<u>Belgium</u>	3.4%

The main sectors of humanitarian aid were food security (27%), health (23%), early recovery (18%), protection (8%), and coordination/rapid response mechanisms (6%).

## 2.3 The Institutional Context of Humanitarian Assistance

### 2.3.1 Main actors

Literally hundreds of organisations are involved in the organisation and implementation of humanitarian assistance in the DRC: donors, the UN family, bilateral organisations, international NGOs, and local NGOs. As national government institutions were neither in a position nor had the resources to provide humanitarian assistance to the population, and the National Government was extremely weak in the period under review, humanitarian orientation and planning were largely determined by the international humanitarian community, with the donor organisations in an important position, and implemented by international and local NGOs and bilateral agencies.

The highest authority in the institutional context of humanitarian assistance is the UN representative in his role as Humanitarian Coordinator. He combines the final responsibility for peace keeping (Head of MONUC), with the coordination of humanitarian assistance (Head of OCHA) and development assistance (Head of UNDP), and chairs the DRC Pooled Fund. Within the humanitarian community there is a high level of appreciation for the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator.

The main multilateral and bilateral international donors have been mentioned above. The passive National Government, not providing direction to the humanitarian efforts, and the 100 per cent external funding of humanitarian assistance put the donor organisations in a very important position. With the international humanitarian organisations, particularly the specialised UN organisations, the bi- and multilateral donors played an active role in humanitarian networks and mechanisms (i.e. participated directly, e.g. in the Pooled Fund Board) and had a large influence on humanitarian priorities through funding decisions.

OCHA, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations, is formally charged with field coordination of the activities of the many humanitarian

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<sup>38</sup> HAP DRC 2007 Table II.

agencies, the organisation of the process of needs assessments, consolidated appeals and the development of humanitarian policies. OCHA has a central office in Kinshasa and a number of offices in conflict areas. During the period under review, as security improved, the role of OCHA was taken over by UNDP or the Civil Affairs section of MONUC, and OCHA closed many of its offices in northwest and central Congo. Simultaneously, it intensified its presence in east Congo, in the provinces of North and South Kivu (e.g. Goma, Bukavu, Uvira Baraka), Kantanga and the district of Ituri.

There are numerous actors involved in humanitarian assistance and OCHA prepares overviews of the actors in each region. The volume and variety of actors has become very visible, e.g. along the road from Uvira to Baraka (South Kivu) where a number of billboards announce the projects of different implementing agencies and (their) donors in each village; at a crossing with a small side road four boards can be found easily.

There are other UN agencies playing important roles in coordination. UNICEF coordinates five of the ten clusters (water, nutrition, education on food items and emergency shelter, emergency data and communication), co-manages the Rapid Response and PEAR mechanisms (the first for support to IDPs and the second for returnees), and implements activities in a range of areas. WFP, FAO, UNHCR and WHO all coordinate at least one cluster each.

The UN agencies combine the coordination role with an implementation role; they implement large-scale programmes and projects. Whereas they have to stand above the different parties involved in a sector in sector coordination, they are simultaneously competing for the same donor funds. This becomes especially complex in the in the process of prioritisation of projects for the Pooled Fund.

The UN agencies have a country office in Kinshasa and a network of local offices throughout the country. The strength in the regions varies, partly depending on specific needs (e.g. UNHCR is very well represented in South Kivu and less well represented in North Kivu as many returning refugees come from South Kivu, while UNICEF and WFP are very well represented in North Kivu as most displacements are concentrated in this region) as well as circumstantial reasons (FAO is very well represented in North Kivu as the regional office is located in Goma, and less well represented in South Kivu where they only maintain 'antennas'). The UN agencies contract implementation out to partner organisations, international and national NGOs and, to a minor extent, to local authorities.

The International Red Cross maintains an independent position in the DRC and implements a large programme, among others related to distribution of relief items, health, programmes for victims of sexual violence, water and sanitation, family reunion, distribution, protection (negotiations with rebel groups, prisoners) and support to local Red Cross organisations.

Civil society groups, which include local development organisations as well as denominational groups, play an important role in Congolese community life, certainly in

the eastern provinces, such as North and South Kivu<sup>39</sup>. Especially the Catholic and Protestant churches have extensive networks throughout the country and deliver most social services, such as health and education, on behalf of the state. These networks maintain close links with the affected population and continue providing support when other humanitarian groups leave. They play an important role in emergency response, subcontracted by or in partnership with international NGOs and UN organisations either directly funded or by foreign donors<sup>40</sup>. There are large numbers of more local NGOs that have been in existence for a long time or were established more recently. They have established national and regional networks and are often contracted by international UN organisations and NGOs for implementation of their activities. Approximately 100 different local NGOs participate in the national and regional humanitarian coordination meeting for NGOs and in clusters meetings. Within the humanitarian sector local NGOs are mainly involved in implementation and consultation, they are hardly involved in strategy formulation and they are 'not around the table when the decisions are made and the money is allocated'<sup>41</sup>.

The international NGO community is large and diverse in the DRC. Over 60 small, medium and large international NGOs participate in the national and regional coordination meetings. All major international NGOs have a presence in the DRC with activities in all sectors, e.g. WVI US in nutrition, agriculture and education; IRC US in primary health care and child soldiers; Oxfam UK in water and sanitation; MSF- Holland and France in health; et cetera. Two large international NGOs represent the NGO community in the Pooled Fund Board, and in 18 regional clusters they co-chair the cluster meetings with an UN representative. At regional level the larger NGOs participate in the OCHA central regional coordination meeting with the UN organisations.

For various reasons, among others their limited capacities and position in the conflicts, the national and local authorities play a minimal role in the process of orientation and coordination of humanitarian assistance. In hardly any of the many strategy documents of OCHA, the UN organisations, et cetera. available to the evaluation, reference is made to coordination with the national government<sup>42</sup>. Within the cluster system the local authorities have a minimal role: they are represented as a member like any of the humanitarian organisations. At the operational level the role of the local authorities varies, some organisations cooperate closely with local authorities and structures, others less.

### 2.3.2 Coordination mechanisms

Coordination of activities in a country as big as Europe with hundreds of organisations involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance (in North Kivu alone the 73 NGOs and 11 UN agencies and programmes are providing health services<sup>43</sup>) constitutes a major

<sup>39</sup> ALNAP; Consultation with and participation by beneficiaries and affected populations in the process of planning, managing, monitoring and evaluating humanitarian action, DRC, 2003.

<sup>40</sup> Examples of strong denominational groups with a large capacity are CARITAS in North Kivu and BDOM in South Kivu.

<sup>41</sup> Interview Oswald Musoni, Caritas Development North Kivu.

<sup>42</sup> With the exception of the HAP 2007, where coordination with the government is mentioned on page 77.

<sup>43</sup> OCHA (Humanitarian) Action Plan 2006, Mid Term Review, page 8.



challenge that requires an enormous effort, an elaborate structure and significant resources.

The main structures and tools for coordination in the DRC are:

- OCHA is the central humanitarian coordination body. It assists the Humanitarian Coordinator; manages information on needs; on 'who does what where'; prepares the annual funding requests; chairs coordination meetings at various levels; and advocates humanitarian issues. It has its HQ in Kinshasa and (9) local offices in the main conflict areas (e.g. in the province of South Kivu: in Bukavu, Uvira and Baraka. Goma, Beni and Lumbashi).
- The Consolidated Appeals (CAPs, later called CHAPS or HAPs) evolved from a mere project list in 2002 to a document that provides more analysis, strategic orientation and objectives, goals with activities within national and provincial tables<sup>44</sup>.
- The Clusters: To strengthen quality and partnership of humanitarian response in all sectors or areas of activity; to achieve more strategic responses and better prioritisation of available resources by clarifying the division of labour among organizations, better defining the roles and responsibilities of humanitarian organizations within the sectors; and providing the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) with both a first point of call and a provider of last resort in all key sectors or areas of activity a new mechanism, the sectoral coordination meetings were substituted by the cluster system in 2006. In the DRC there are 10 clusters at national and regional level. All national clusters are chaired by UN agencies (UNICEF [co-] chairs five out of the 10). At regional level a few large international NGOs co-chair the cluster meetings. The clusters play an essential role in the elaboration of the CHAPs.
- The Pooled Fund, established in 2005, is a new financing mechanisms at national level. Common funds are introduced e.g. in Somalia, Ethiopia and the DRC. These funds are governed by joint UN agency/NGO committees and any project proposal needs approval at cluster level before being presented at regional and national level. Final decisions are taken by the Humanitarian Coordinator advised by the Pooled Fund Board, in which UN organisations, three donors and two INGOs are represented. The UNDP is administering the Fund and is expected to monitor the performance of funded activities<sup>45</sup>. The Pooled Fund in the DRC became the single largest source of funding for humanitarian activities in 2006<sup>46</sup>.

There have also been new financing mechanisms introduced at national level, e.g. in Somalia, Ethiopia and the DRC. Somalia and Ethiopia have (ERF) and the DRC has a common fund (also called a Pooled Fund). These funds are governed by joint UN agency/NGO committees, and fund allocations are disbursed under the authority of the HC. Ethiopia and the DRC are gradually moving towards joint governance structures of these funds and the CERF. In contrast to the CERF, UN agencies and NGOs have access

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<sup>44</sup> Though still far from perfect; see Memo: Commentaires de Donateurs sur la première version du Plan d'Action Humanitaire en OCHA et Réponse de OCHA, Octobre en Novembre 2006 and the OCHA, Evaluation and Studies Section, CERF, Interim Review, final report, 2007.

<sup>45</sup> The monitoring function was unsatisfactorily performed by the PNUD in 2006 (see Evaluation of the Pooled Fund by the Humanitarian Policy Group and Oxfam International).

<sup>46</sup> The UK, Netherlands and Sweden contributed 90 per cent in 2006. A total funding of 10-20 million US\$ was initially foreseen. However, in 2006 the Pool Fund received 88 million US\$.



to these funds. In reality access for NGOs in the initial year was close to zero but is improving and, e.g., the third round in the DRC was exclusively reserved for NGOs.

- The Rapid Response Mechanism (consisting of Rapid Response Teams and a Rapid Response Fund): through the RRP, managed by UNICEF and OCHA, needs of newly emerging crises are identified within 48 hours, first response is provided through NGO partners, and the impact is monitored and evaluated. A similar system is being developed for the coordination of assistance to returning IDPs, but was not yet in place during the period under review.

The development of the CAP to CHAP and to HAP in 2007 reflects the change in content. This development was appreciated by the Belgian Embassy who wrote in 2006: “The Action Plan constitutes an excellent basis for thinking on concepts of crisis, chronic crisis, humanitarian needs, development, criteria for priority setting. It is a unique and very interesting compilation of humanitarian activities allowing a deep going analysis. The quality of the dialogue and the capacity of the donors to assess crisis needs have improved”<sup>47</sup>. This is not the conclusion of the matter and at the end of 2006 the donor community, stimulated by the Belgian Embassy, stressed in a critical note to the Humanitarian Coordinator the importance of further improvements of the HAP 2007, among others with regard to its strategic value and insufficient monitoring opportunities.

The UN reform, the cluster system and Pooled Fund are very recent establishments and still have to develop fully. It is too early to assess their capacities to effectively coordinate and improve humanitarian assistance. The rapid success of the Pooled Fund<sup>48</sup> contributed to its shortcomings in the first year, such as the lack of monitoring of results and limited space for NGOs<sup>49</sup>. The Pooled Fund has, because of its importance for many of the humanitarian actors as a source of funding, certainly stimulated functioning of the cluster system. Experience to date shows that the effectiveness of the clusters in coordinating depends on circumstances, competences and personalities. These differ from region to region. It is obvious that the numbers of organisations in a cluster, and their capacities, impact on the functioning of the cluster; the number of organisations involved in a sector differs enormously (e.g. over 80 organisation are involved in the provision of health services in North Kivu) and the capacities of the UN agencies vary between regions. In some regions an agency can be well represented, while in others it is not (see 2.3.1). Very important is the competence of the cluster leadership. This varies greatly: while good and impartial leadership is provided in one cluster, in another meetings are badly organised<sup>50</sup> and institutional interests of the chair play a role in or even dominate discussions.

However, the general opinion is positive and it is felt that coordination in recent years has improved. Consequently, it is now better known ‘who does what where and when’; there are less overlaps and attending to the same target group at various times; priority setting

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<sup>47</sup> Belgian Embassy, Note for Discussion, Good Humanitarian Donorship, February 2006, page 4.

<sup>48</sup> Instead of the expected 10 -20 million, donors contributed over 80 million US\$ in the first year.

<sup>49</sup> See Oxfam: Discussion Paper, Impact of Humanitarian Reform Mechanisms in the DRC, January 2007; Centre on International Cooperation/Human Policy Group, Common funds for Humanitarian Action in Sudan and the DRC: Monitoring and Evaluation Study, 2006.

<sup>50</sup> In a cluster in South Kivu standard practices, such as prior formulation of agenda, starting on time, minutes with key information and decisions were not followed.

with respect to areas of intervention has improved; and joint responses in immediate crisis situations are better and more rapidly organised. The cluster system does not succeed in addressing more complex coordination issues, such as coordination of intervention policies. Providing free health care to affected communities, as is the strategy of many health agencies, or paid health care, as is the strategy of others; providing free entrants or on a semi-loan base; paying cash for work, food for work or work as a community contribution are some of the unresolved differences in approaches, often observed in the same or neighbouring areas in this evaluation.

At local level, parallel to the humanitarian coordination mechanisms, the local authorities maintained their mechanisms to plan and coordinate their work with other parties, e.g. monthly coordination meetings of the Inspector of Agriculture in North Kivu or the Inspector of Health in South Kivu. Depending on personalities, these coordination structures created links with the humanitarian coordination structures to synchronise their strategies and activities with those of the humanitarian community. But, as far as could be observed, more often than not both systems did not remain well connected.

Coordination with structural development assistance. With the increased security in the country, the importance of a coordinated approach to development increased as well. The UN, World Bank, EC and other main donors, such as Belgium, Canada, France, decided to harmonise their financial and strategic assistance to the DRC in 2006 and to produce a joint Country Assistance Framework<sup>51</sup>. The CAF follows the structure of the PRSP presented in July 2006 to ensure coherence between both documents. In the period of transition, which might take several years, there are parallel coordination mechanisms; parallel implementation of the Humanitarian Action Plan and the Country Assistance Framework will be a reality and adequate links between humanitarian and reconstruction activities are necessary. The Human Coordinator, with the responsibility of humanitarian activities coordination and as Head of the PNUD, has the task to see to streamlining intervention strategies and avoiding overlaps<sup>52</sup>.

### 2.3.3 Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)

The DRC was selected as one of the GHD pilot countries. The pilot aimed at encompassing the GHD principles in the field. Emphasis was placed on working through the UN processes to avoid overlap or duplication, on promoting the role of the UN in providing leadership and coordination to the humanitarian efforts, and on harmonising donor practices around the CAP/CHAP. The pilot was chaired by the US and Belgium<sup>53</sup>. The pilot had a difficult start and the objectives were not clear to the participating countries; some (among them the US) felt that most objectives of the GHD could only be realised by HQ and not much could be done at country level<sup>54</sup>. The initial plan to organise a seminar on the issue of transition from a humanitarian to a development situation did not materialise because of other initiatives with the same chairmanship in the same

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<sup>51</sup> The CAF succeeds the UNDAF 2003-2005, there was no UNDAF 2006.

<sup>52</sup> See OCHA Humanitarian Action Plan 2007, page 35; and the draft Country Assistance Framework documents 2006.

<sup>53</sup> Handed over in 2007 to the Netherlands.

<sup>54</sup> Interview USAID in Kinshasa, February 2007.

period<sup>55</sup> and the start-up activities of the Pooled Fund<sup>56</sup>. The GHD members participated in the elaboration of humanitarian strategies and clarified their intentions. The DAC peer review concluded that the GHD pilot had contributed to improve the prioritisation within the CHAP 2006<sup>57</sup>.

Positive outcomes of the pilot mentioned in various documents and interviews were the support given to the full participation of NGOs in the Action Plan for 2007; some donors announcing contributions earlier than in previous years; increased consultation between UN agencies and between UN agencies and NGOs; strengthened position of NGOs in the clusters; improved coordination at national, regional and local levels; improved quality of the dialogue between humanitarian coordinators and donors<sup>58</sup>; the Pooled Fund. The donor community stressed the continuity and quality of the dialogue between donors, improved donor coordination<sup>59</sup> and harmonisation of positions with regard to the UN system<sup>60</sup> as perhaps the most important achievements<sup>61</sup>.

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<sup>55</sup> The fragile states analysis, see internal 'Note for discussion on GHD' from the Belgian Embassy, February 2006.

<sup>56</sup> Interview Belgium Embassy Kinshasa February 2007.

<sup>57</sup> DAC-OECD Peer Review of Belgium-OECD 2005, Annex C, page 85.

<sup>58</sup> OCHA Humanitarian Action Plan 2007, page 32.

<sup>59</sup> Interviews with representatives of donor organisations in Kinshasa.

<sup>60</sup> See, among others, the joint critical letter of the Humanitarian Action Plan 2007.

<sup>61</sup> GHD, Note for discussion, Embassy, February 2006, page 3.



## 3 Overview of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance

### 3.1 Belgian Development Cooperation in the DRC

#### 3.1.1 Introduction

The DRC is the flagship of Belgian cooperation; it receives the largest flow of Belgian assistance in amounts that have been rising steadily since 2002. Having decided to continue and augment its support, Belgium seeks to position itself as a leader among the bilateral donors in terms of both volume of aid and level of political dialogue with the Congolese authorities. This was supported by a weekly meeting of cabinet ministers in Brussels to oversee internal coordination of diplomatic, military and cooperation activities, and by regular high level visits to the DRC<sup>62</sup>. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Development Cooperation and various other ministers visited the DRC regularly, which impacted on the project portfolio<sup>63</sup>.

#### 3.1.2 Strategies

From 2002 to mid-2006, Belgian humanitarian assistance was not governed by an overall humanitarian policy framework. Such a framework was only elaborated and approved mid-2006. According to this 'Plan Directeur d'Assistance Humanitaire Belge', the Great Lakes area is the concentration area for humanitarian assistance and the strategies closely follow the GHD principles. As the plan was only approved in 2006, it did not impact on decision making on humanitarian activities during the evaluation period.

Orientation for the cooperation between Belgium and the DRC was provided by the Country Strategy Plan, 2002<sup>64</sup>. The objectives defined in the plan are to support stabilisation of the country, consolidation of peace, and poverty reduction. It takes a dual approach: intervening in areas under government control, where security and development prospects were more secured, and intervening in the eastern part of the country, where the humanitarian crisis persists.

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<sup>62</sup> DECD-DAC Peer Review, Annex D page 95.

<sup>63</sup> Various interviews, zedingsverslag D2.1.1 mei 2005, project documentation.

<sup>64</sup> Strategynota Democratische Republiek Congo, December 2002.

In the short term the cooperation strategy focuses on:

- Continuation and broadening the field of humanitarian activities to include those groups most heavily victimised by the crisis (especially women and children) and, more particularly, the territories ravaged by war in order to facilitate access to conflict zones and to symbolise the territorial integrity of the DRC; support for implementing the various aspects of the Lusaka, Luanda and Pretoria Peace Accords; and consolidation of peace, including specific support for civil society...
- Supporting establishment of a workable, transparent and accountable state apparatus; respect for human rights; economic recovery; employment generation; and fiscal reform.
- Strengthening cooperation in the social sectors; combating poverty (health, education, agriculture, et cetera.), especially with respect to social changes such as DDRRR (disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement) and the problems of child soldiers; de-mining; social reintegration for victims; rehabilitation of health systems; support for agriculture production and rural development; revival of the educational system...
- Support for local or community development initiatives to stimulate efforts to revitalise the socio-economic fabric and thereby contribute to poverty reduction.

As part of the long-term strategy of cooperation, when peace is established, Belgium intends to work within the sectoral programmes proposed by the DRC in its priority areas of cooperation. These priorities will also be defined by the (interim) PRSP; they relate to improving living conditions; reducing poverty; promoting peace and good governance; stabilisation and pro-poor growth; and community cohesion<sup>65</sup>.

The importance of the Country Strategic Plan in the planning of and decision making on humanitarian activities is not clear. The evaluation did not find any reference to the plan in the documentation studied<sup>66</sup>.

During the period under review, all instruments of Belgian cooperation were applied with the emphasis on general development cooperation, such as technical cooperation and scholarships, NGO programme funding, et cetera. (see below). In implementation project orientation dominated, while trying to shift to a more structural approach that support re-enforcement of national institutions<sup>67</sup>.

### 3.1.3 Volume of Belgian development assistance

The bilateral cooperation that had started after independence was discontinued in 1990. Though not all ties were discontinued (e.g. funding of NGOs and collaborative programmes with universities continued), the assistance dropped steeply to approximately 10 million Euro in 1996 and fluctuated between 20 and 30 million in the years thereafter. Relations were gradually restored during the initial phases of the peace process. At the turn of the century, the DRC again became a partner country within the framework of the

<sup>65</sup> Peer Review of Belgium- OECD 2005, Annex D page 88-89 From 2002 Strategy Paper.

<sup>66</sup> Neither in interviews nor project proposals or assessments was reference made to this document.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

bilateral cooperation programme, the Embassy was reinforced with development attachés and BTC opened an office in the DRC.

Belgian assistance flowed through four main channels:

- direct bilateral cooperation, main sectors: health, education, basic infrastructure, food security and social development;
- indirect bilateral cooperation through co-financing of projects, primarily provided by (over 35) Belgian NGOs governed by 5-year agreements (2003-2007), and partnerships between Belgian and Congolese universities;
- financing of programmes of multilateral organisations on a national or regional basis, such as ICRC, OCHA, UNHCR;
- special interventions covering humanitarian assistance through multilateral organisations and Belgian NGOs including emergency, rehabilitation, transition and food aid, as well as conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy;
- to these channels can be added specific allocation mechanisms, such as the Belgian Survival Fund, direct funding of local NGOs, as well as the cooperation assistance by the Walloon and the Flemish Regions and twinning arrangements of municipalities.

Table 3.1 ODA Belgium 2002-2006

Department	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>DGOS</b>					
Governmental cooperation	9.8	13.5	34.9 <sup>68</sup>	35.4 <sup>69</sup>	
Non-governmental cooperation	17.5	21.1	17.7	19.9	
Multilateral cooperation	5.6	5.8	13.2	12.6	
Survival Fund	.5	1.9	3.6	2.1	
Others		.1	.3	.1	
<b>Total DGOS</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>69.7</b>	<b>70.3</b>	
<b>Foreign Affairs (excl. DGOS)</b>					
Emergency NGO			2.9	1.4	
Emergency multilateral			1.8	1.6	
Conflict prevention/preventive diplomacy	3.1	?	3.6	7.8	
Other			.7	.4	
<b>Total Foreign Affairs</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>?</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>11.2</b>	
<b>Other Sources</b>					
Debt Relief		644.4	130.1	30.5	
Other FPSs and decentralised ODs, Flemish and Wallonian Region	2.6	2.8	3.0	9.2	
Others		3.9	1.6	.8	
<b>Total Others</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>651.1</b>	<b>134.8</b>	<b>40.6</b>	
<b>Total ODA</b>	<b>39.8</b>	<b>693.6</b>	<b>213.5</b>	<b>122.1</b>	

Website: DGOS; DGCD. Bel/NL/Partnerlanden/Congo; ODA Belgische overheidshulp Congo Dem.Rep. Kinshasa.

<sup>68</sup> Including contribution to debt relief: 13.6 million Euro.

<sup>69</sup> Including contribution to debt relief: 19.6 million Euro.

In the period 2002-2006 Belgium has also supported a range of multilateral (regional) programmes and trust funds that were of direct importance to the humanitarian situation in the DRC, such as:

- World Bank managed regional Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP);
- regional programme for demobilising armed groups;
- UN managed preparation of the presidential and legislative elections;
- UNDP light arm control programme;
- World Bank, preparation of the DRC PRSP.

Structural development activities were not concentrated on specific regions or areas, e.g. where security had been fully established. Also, within the areas where emergency and immediate rehabilitation was concentrated, because of the continuation of the humanitarian crises (mainly the east), projects implemented were funded through the structural development budget, e.g. water and sanitation in South Kivu.

## 3.2 Overview of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance per Budget Line

### 3.2.1 Humanitarian assistance in 2002-2006

Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide an overview of humanitarian assistance to the DRC from 2002 to 2006 and its relative share in the Belgian ODA.

Table 3.2 Belgian humanitarian assistance 2002-2006 in million Euro

2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2002-2006
9.6	8.4	16.3	9.8	23.2 <sup>70</sup>	67.3

Various sources.

Table 3.3 Belgian humanitarian assistance 2002-2006 as percentage of ODA, excluding debt relief <sup>71</sup>

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Humanitarian assistance	9.6	8.4	16.3	9.8	23.2
ODA excl. debt relief	39.2	49.2	69.5	72.0	
%	25%	17%	23%	14%	

Various sources.

The relative share of humanitarian assistance in relation to other development cooperation (excluding debt relief) declined from approximately 25 per cent in 2002 to 14 per cent in 2005.

The humanitarian assistance was mainly provided under 4 budget lines: Emergency, Food Aid, Transition, and Multilateral Organisations.

<sup>70</sup> Budgeted for 2006.

<sup>71</sup> ODA excl. debt relief is calculated on the basis Website DGOS; DGCD. Bel/NL/Partnerlanden/Congo; ODA Belgische overheids hulp Cong Dem.Rep. Kinshasa.



### 3.2.2 Emergency assistance

Under the budget line Emergency 49 projects were funded from 2002-2006 (end November).

Table 3.4 Belgian Emergency Assistance 2002-2006 in million Euro

Sector	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2002-2006
Food and Food Security		.3		.5	.9	1.7
Health	3.1	2.3	3.0	2.1	2.5	12.9
Education	.7	.2	.1		.4	1.3
W&S	.2	.4				0.6
Other	1.6	1.1	2.3	1.4	2.2	8.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>

Data supplied by the FPS.

The category 'other' includes Non Food Relief Goods, among others the six Strategic Stocks Projects of Memisa (mainly but not exclusively medicines) from 2002-2006.

#### *Portfolio*

The activities funded under this budget line cover the whole range from immediate emergency response, such as Strategic Stocks Projects of Humanitarian Goods (2002-2006); transport of returnees; pest outbreak campaigns; short-term rehabilitation, such as the various support to returning refugees projects; rehabilitation of W&S after the Volcano Eruption in Goma; to reconstruction, such as several school building projects and a hospital rehabilitation, and humanitarian projects that touch on structural development, such as the HIV/Sida project in North and South Kivu and the health rehabilitation projects in South Kivu.

#### *Regional distribution*

Out of the 49 projects funded under this budget line 32 were concentrated in the eastern provinces of the country. Most of the other projects had national objectives, such as the Strategic Stocks. Only a few projects, often related to refugees from neighbouring countries within the DRC, were implemented in the rest of the country.

### 3.2.3 Food Aid

The Food Aid budget funded WFP food distribution activities (food item support to IDPs, malnourished persons -mainly children and their caretakers-, primary schoolchildren, re-integrating child soldiers and returning refugees and IDPs); to a limited extent BTC (food distribution in Kinshasa); food security activities of the FAO (distribution of entrants for agriculture, livestock, fisheries, seeds, hoes, nets, small animals, et cetera., seed and manioc multiplication, bas-fond development, access roads and information distribution) to increase food supply and improve food security.

Table 3.5. Belgian humanitarian Food Aid DRC 2002-2006 in million Euro

2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2002-2006
2.5	2.9	3.7	5.3	4.0	18.3

Data supplied by the FPS

#### *Portfolio*

The activities are, with some exceptions (school feeding, school gardens, bas-fond development), related to immediate emergency response and short-term rehabilitation.

#### *Regional distribution*

Data on the regional distribution are not available, but WFP and FAO concentrate their emergency and rehabilitation programmes in the eastern part of the country.

### 3.2.4 Transition

The transition budget line was established in 2004. The activities are concentrated in the sectors infrastructure, health, economic recovery and general sectors.

Table 3.6 Belgian Transition Assistance 2002-2006 in million Euro

2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2002-2006
-	-	5.1	5.4	7.5	18.0

Data supplied by the FPS.

#### *Portfolio*

The project portfolio is varied; significant funding was provided to national projects supporting the democratisation processes, such as preparation for the elections, national assembly; and the financial structure, such as support to the National Bank; while a substantive part of the project portfolio relates to reconstruction activities, such as rehabilitation of bridges and harbours, rehabilitation and reconstruction of hospitals.

#### *Regional distribution*

Of the funds 13 per cent were spent in the eastern part of the country, 30 per cent in the western part and 57 per cent on national projects.

The projects were implemented by the UNDP (elections), National Bank of Belgium (BNC), the ports of Brussels and Antwerp, BTC (bridge, hospital), and an NGO (hospital).

### 3.2.5 Multilateral humanitarian assistance

Belgium provides, under its humanitarian assistance, core- and programme support to ICRC, UNHCR and OCHA.

Table 3.7 Belgian Assistance to multilateral organisations exclusive to the DRC in million Euro

2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2002-2006
1.6	1.2	0.5	1.1	5.7 <sup>72</sup>	10.1

Data supplied by the FPS.

The figures from 2002-2006 include support to OCHA and ICRC for programmes in the DRC and 1.95 million Euro provided to UNFPA, UNICEF and OHCHR in 2006<sup>73</sup> for a special joint programme on sexual violence.

They do not include:

- The programme funding of the UNHCR and the ICRC that will be used within the Great Lakes region<sup>74</sup> as agreed between both parties; and
- Funding of projects of these organisations provided under the Emergency budget line.

### 3.2.6 Other

#### *Pooled Fund/CERF*

Belgium contributed 1.5 million Euro to the DRC Pooled Fund in 2006. It also contributed indirectly to the Pooled Fund with contributions to the UN central emergency fund, which made significant contributions to the DRC Pooled Fund.

#### *Programme d'Urgence*

The DGOS introduced a new programme, the Programme d'Urgence, to support consolidation, reconsolidation and pacification of the country after the elections (peace dividend). This programme (25 million Euro available in the DRC) will be implemented by the BTC and includes roads, water and sanitation rehabilitation, acquisition of ferries, and buses, port rehabilitation, et cetera. In 2006, 250.000 Euro have been spent on this programme.

## 3.3 Main Actors and Roles

### 3.3.1 FPS Brussels and the Embassy in Kinshasa

As mentioned earlier, the donor community played a very important role in the definition of the orientation and priority setting of humanitarian assistance in the DRC. Considering its position as a bilateral development donor (3<sup>rd</sup>) and humanitarian donor (6<sup>th</sup>) and as the de-facto GHD chair<sup>75</sup> of the GHD pilot in the DRC, the Belgium Embassy held a central

<sup>72</sup> Including the costs of TA of 2 GHD officers to OCHA.

<sup>73</sup> Total programme budget for four years is 7.8 million Euro.

<sup>74</sup> ToR Evaluation Belgian Humanitarian Assistance, Table 2, page 5.

*Bijdragen aan de in humanitaire hulp gespecialiseerde multilaterale instellingen*

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
5.a. UNHCR Algemene middelen voor het agentschap	1.239	1.487	620	800	} 3.967
5.a. UNHCR Middelen toegewezen aan programma's	5.714	1.735	3.323	3.383	
5.c. OCHA Algemene middelen voor het agentschap	495	495	300	300	} 1.800
5.c. OCHA Middelen toegewezen aan programma's	995	600	500	1.077	
5.d. IRKC Algemene middelen voor het agentschap	704	704	704	750	} 5.250
5.d. IRKC Middelen toegewezen aan programma's	1.685	1.685	4.250	4.250	

<sup>75</sup> The USA hardly made any contribution to the leadership of the pilot.

position. It was however observed that the attention to humanitarian assistance at the Embassy was rather minimal and not constant during the period under review<sup>76</sup>. Already in 2004, a combined D2.1. and D4.3. mission to Kinshasa recommended to make one attaché in the Embassy a permanent responsible for the contact with OCHA and ECHO, with special attention for the support to the CHAP process instead of different attachés that had to combine humanitarian assistance with development cooperation of a certain sector. Only since the beginning of 2006, after a change in the management of the Embassy<sup>77</sup>, this recommendation was followed up and one attaché was charged with the humanitarian portfolio but on a part-time basis<sup>78</sup>. For advice in technical areas he called upon support from the specialised attachés (mainly health and education). Since then, the Belgium Embassy played an active role in the humanitarian community. It was generally recognised that it has stimulated donor coordination, coordination with the UN coordinator and UN agencies, and contributed to the further improvement of the CHAP/HAP (see also GHD Chapter 2.3.3). The Embassy was complimented by the humanitarian community on its active role and the quality of its contribution<sup>79</sup>. The Embassy, together with the Food Aid Section in Brussels (D2.1.2.), also played an active role in the discussion to stimulate the WFP to increase local purchasing in the DRC<sup>80</sup>, and in the discussion with respect to the WFP DRC country plan. This plan was withdrawn after serious criticism by a number of donors, with the Belgian Embassy in a penholder position<sup>81</sup>. The attaché and the staff of the different humanitarian sections in Brussels maintained good and constructive professional relations<sup>82</sup>. The mission however observed that personal competencies and commitment contributed much to the quality of the Belgian contribution and that knowledge and experience of the humanitarian assistance was not well institutionally embedded. The departure of the attaché during the evaluation therefore could impact negatively on the position of Belgium within the donor humanitarian community.

It was observed that there were marked differences in vision with respect to the definition and scope of humanitarian assistance and the instruments. Within the Embassy; some maintained a more limited definition (emergency and direct rehabilitation), while others included a wider range of activities. While contrary to this official position as expressed in the Plan Directeur, the Embassy staff did not consider most of the activities under budget line Transition, part of humanitarian assistance.

Decision making with regard to all budget lines for humanitarian assistance is centralised at the FPS in Brussels. Identification and decision making on programmes and projects, monitoring of progress and approval of interim and final reports, and accounts administration is the responsibility of the Minister and staff of the FPS in Brussels.

<sup>76</sup> Interview Belgian Embassy, Kinshasa February 2007.

<sup>77</sup> From interviews in Kinshasa.

<sup>78</sup> He was also in charge of the food security, agriculture and forestry sectors.

<sup>79</sup> Interviews with the Humanitarian Coordinator, a number of international organisations and other donors in February 2007 in Kinshasa, and personal opinion of the evaluators based on documents, e-mail, et cetera.

<sup>80</sup> Belgium co-led the discussion, financed consultancies in the DRC on local purchase options and seminars, and provided TA; from interviews in February (among other WFP) in Kinshasa and Brussels (ECHO, DGOS).

<sup>81</sup> The WFP HQ withdrew the plan, as it feared that it would be rejected.

<sup>82</sup> Interviews in Brussels and Kinshasa; though opinions differed at times mutual respect and open communication remained.

With regard to the identification of Food Aid programmes the Embassy is directly involved, as it was requested to propose programmes to the Food Security desk (D2.1.2.) annually to be included in the annual programme. The Embassy was also asked for advice on Food Aid programmes that were suggested through other channels<sup>83</sup>. With regard to the emergency budget line (D2.1.1.), the Embassy was also requested to propose projects for multilateral organisations to be funded under the CAP allocation. For the remaining multilateral and all NGO projects funded by this budget line, the role of the Embassy in the identification process was limited to advice, as proposals were normally presented to the FPS in Brussels first. Recently, this has partly changed and the Embassy was asked to suggest projects for a CAP allocation for NGOs in 2007. With regard to the programmes funded by the multilateral organisations section (D4.3.), the Embassy was providing advice during the preparation of the annual consultation. The role of the Embassy in the identification of the transition budget line is not formalised but has apparently been minimal<sup>84</sup>. This might explain that the Embassy staff did not consider this budget line humanitarian.

Finally, with respect to the project cycle management the Embassy has a field-monitoring role with regard to humanitarian activities. As said, the frequency of field visits varied significantly between the different sectors with agriculture and food security being the most active while others seldom visited humanitarian projects.

Visits to field level implementation of humanitarian activities by the staff in Brussels were limited: The Directors of D2 and D4 together, staff of D2.1. (twice) and D2.2. (at least once) visited the field. Staff in Brussels was however well involved in the preparation of the GHD pilot and (C)HAP and a delegation from Brussels among others with the staff of D4.3. and the representation in Geneva visited Kinshasa at least twice (2004 and 2005)

### 3.3.2 Multilateral organisations

Belgium recognises the central role of the UN is the coordination and provision of humanitarian assistance and multilateral agencies are in the DRC the main channel for its humanitarian assistance. Three multilateral humanitarian organisations, UNHCR, OCHA and ICRC that are long standing partners of the Belgian humanitarian assistance received core funding as well as programme funding for regional or national programmes on a multi-annual basis from the budget-line multilateral humanitarian funding. With the many new developments such as clusters system, Pooled Funds, introduced in the DRC, and because of the mere size of the country and the seriousness of the emergency, the DRC programme was the largest OCHA programme with a key role in the coordination of the humanitarian assistance at central and local level. With a massive inflow of returnees before, during and after the elections UNHCR played in the period under review an important role in the re-settlement of refugees especially both Kivu's. It received programme as well as significant project funding (under the Relief and Rehabilitation budget-line). The UNHCR role in protection, it held a cluster lead role, was less

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

prominent. ICRC supported in the DRC returning refugees, health services, integration of child soldiers, restored family links, provided protection to communities at risk of violence, visited people deprived from their liberties and promoted respect for humanitarian law. Under the budget-line Food Aid budget line FAO and WFP implemented large, partially Belgium funded programmes, often jointly and in collaboration with other multilateral organisations or NGO's. UNICEF, had a central position in the humanitarian response in the DRC with 5 cluster leads and main implementing organisation of the rapid response mechanism, the main mechanism to provide relief to new IDP's. UNICEF and as e.g. the WHO were supported under the emergency budget line while UNDP received support for the elections under the transition budget line.

### 3.3.3 Belgian NGOs

Belgian NGOs are the second channel. Non-Belgian NGOs are excluded from the emergency budget line though they can be included under the transition budget line. International NGOs were indirectly funded when subcontracted by the UN organisations or (rarely) by the Belgian NGOs<sup>85</sup> for implementation of projects.

Several of the 13 Belgian NGOs involved have been operational in the DRC for many years<sup>86</sup> and are related/have access to large, often countrywide networks with connection at village level. But this is certainly not true for all; some have only recent experiences<sup>87</sup>. The Belgian NGOs are mostly small organisations, often with a religious background. Two are part of Belgian Universities. Except for two NGOs<sup>88</sup>, they are development organisations without a specific humanitarian background. They became involved in humanitarian assistance because of their presence in the country, massive needs or availability of humanitarian funding. This did not make them humanitarian NGOs as most of them only implemented one or two Belgian-funded humanitarian projects during the period under review; only two or three<sup>89</sup> implemented more than three.

### 3.3.4 Local NGOs

Local NGOs cannot be directly funded through the humanitarian budget lines<sup>90</sup>. Local NGOs with longstanding relations with Belgian NGOs, such as Memisa DRC, Caritas DRC or IRC DRC with the ICRC, are involved in implementation of activities of the Belgian or international counterparts. Others are involved because of past experiences of collaboration with a Belgian NGO. Some Belgian NGOs developed new (semi-) partnership relations with local NGOs for implementation or, especially UN organisations, subcontracted local NGOs for implementation.

<sup>85</sup> Oxfam-UK could respond fast as it was already present and had material readily available in the Goma crisis in 2002 and Tearfund-UK was contracted to finish the activities already started in South Kivu when a local NGO failed to deliver.

<sup>86</sup> E.g. Memisa, Louvain de Development, Cebuma, Caritas.

<sup>87</sup> Tearfund Belgium, Oxfam Belgium.

<sup>88</sup> MSF and Croix-Rouge de Belgique, communauté francophone.

<sup>89</sup> E.g. Memisa, CEBUMAC.

<sup>90</sup> There is a special, non-humanitarian budget line that supports some of the NGOs in the conflict areas in the DRC, e.g. DBOM Bukavu, on a limited scale.

### 3.3.5 Others

BTC was involved in the implementation of two food aid projects and the rehabilitation of the hospital in Kisangani. It was also involved in the implementation of several projects funded under the budget-line Transition such as the rehabilitation of the bridge in Niemba and the Mama Yemo hospital in Kinshasa. As it will implement the new Emergency Programme 2006-2008, it will increase its involvement in the future.

Some organisations without a humanitarian or development tradition became involved in implementation of the humanitarian assistance since the establishment of the new Transition budget line, such as the National Bank of Belgium (BNC) and the ports of Brussels and Antwerp.

## 3.4 Coordination of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance

In the Country Strategy Note (2002) and the 'Plan Directeur d'Assistance Humanitaire' (2007) the importance of coordination of humanitarian assistance and the central role of the UN has been expressed.

Belgium supports the coordination process through annual core funding for OCHA and a contribution to the OCHA DRC programme. Until 2005, this contribution was earmarked for local OCHA offices. Since then, the earmarking is limited to OCHA operations in the DRC. Belgium supports the coordination process further by funding two experts, within the framework of the GHD, who are assisting OCHA in coordination, planning and monitoring.

Belgium furthermore supports the Pooled Fund, an instrument that facilitates coordination at regional and national level, as all projects proposed for funding must be discussed and approved in the regional clusters. This increases the importance of the clusters, 'forces' discussions on priorities and approaches at the lowest level, and, as the Fund is the main source of humanitarian funding, provides an overview of the different humanitarian parties.

Belgium supports the Consolidated Appeal Process; at the pledging meeting in February it informs on funding available for the DRC within the different budget lines, and early in the year the projects that will be funded are selected. The evaluation did not have complete information on the extent to which Belgian-funded humanitarian projects have been part of the CAPs 2002-2006<sup>91</sup>. The available information suggests that this has been increasing for the budget line Emergency in recent years. However, the projects funded from the Transition budget line are mostly not included in the CAP.

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<sup>91</sup> There has only been a database since 2005, where this information is consequently managed. Data from OCHA are insufficiently coherent with other data.

The Embassy stressed the importance of active coordination and participation in the cluster mechanism in recent project proposal advice. It advised negatively on projects proposed by organisations not participating<sup>92</sup>.

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<sup>92</sup> This was not so for those organisations (MSF, ICRC) who explicitly declared not to participate to maintain a strictly independent position.



## 4 Assessment of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance at Project Level

### 4.1 Relevance

#### 4.1.1 Relevance of activities funded by the Emergency, Food Aid and Multilateral budget lines

The activities funded responded to generally recognised urgent and priority humanitarian needs of the people affected by the crisis in the DRC.

The activities responded to the (situational) needs caused directly by the conflicts, such as need for food aid; temporary shelter; emergency health services for IDPs; water and sanitation; transport for returning refugees; replacements of tools, seeds; reconstruction of shelter for returning IDPs and refugees; and new land for IDPs who have to re-settle in more secure environments. Programmes and projects of, e.g., WFP and FAO in North Kivu, Oxfam Belgium and UNHCR in South Kivu and Memisa throughout the country were responding to these needs.

The activities also responded to a combination of structural and situational needs that were the result of a combination of long-term negligence and mismanagement of the country and that were aggravated further by the conflict, such as the need for accessible and minimum quality health care and education. The projects of, e.g., Tearfund in North Kivu addressing education and Solidarité Protestante addressing health in South Kivu responded to these needs.

Project and programme strategies to meet humanitarian needs varied.

Most project strategies were adequate to meet identified needs. For example, the UNHCR in South Kivu provides, with a number of specialised partners - FAO, WFP, international and local NGOs - a multitude of services that enable returnees to re-settle (immigration documents, mediation with respect to conflicts about former property, health checks, transport, food, seeds, tools, materials for initial shelter, access to education, et cetera.)

### Re-settlement of refugees in Fizi, South Kivu, DRC

UNHCR provides in the Fizi area 1; Individual assistance (to repatriation of refugees such as transport, household items, food, protection. ) 2: Social protection through initial reintegration support (after return such as protection monitoring, health and education, HIV/AIDS, crop production and food security, water, shelter and income generation; in all this fields UNHCR will advocate, collaborate with others and gap fill if needed 3: Protection, support and voluntary repatriation to refugees within the DRC. North and South Kivu are priority areas with app. 45% of the total UNHCR DRC budget spend in these to regions.

UNHCR manages a transit centre for returning refugees of the Fizi area next to the harbour in the small town of Baraka. Several times per week hundreds of refugees embark in Baraka, with their belongings included small livestock, from the boat that brought them from the refugee camps in Tanzania were they had spent often as long as 8-10 years back to the DRC. During a decade of camp life, the refugees had developed a strong dependency mentality. In the well organised in clean transit centre returnees were treated with respect and provided with some rest, followed a meal before being introduced systematically to a large number of relevant services: local immigration office, health and education, as well as social welfare services supporting unaccompanied children and orphans, mediation services for land and asset related disputes, micro credit, women organisations. Basic food stocks for six months, seeds, tools and household items were distributed before transport was provided home on the same or the following day. Follow-up with the resettlement is provided by the different partner organisations. UNHCR collaborates with a large number (15-20) of partners in different forms; it has sub-contracted local and international NGO's, collaborates with other UN organisations (WFP and FAO) and local authorities (migration). Collaboration with the partners is open and constructive. UNHCR close involvement with the majority of all humanitarian organisations in the area gives it a central position in the area. Other UN organisations, very present in e.g. Goma like UNICEF and FAO were absent or had only a limited presence. Contrary to the high level presence of UNHCR in Fizi, the presence in Goma was very limited and mainly focussed on protection activities.

Most strategies assumed rather identical needs of the target groups and consisted of the supply of fairly standardised packages for a standard period. For example, the dominant response to the rehabilitation of livelihoods of IDPs assumed rather homogenous communities in terms of the production systems that had been destroyed and required external assistance to re-start. On this basis the communities were assisted with a 'broad brush' standardised approach and supplied with standardised inputs to replace assumed lost means of production, household goods, et cetera., with very little variety (mainly limited depending on family size, local soils and climates, past livelihoods). This approach did not pay attention to different needs of specific groups, e.g. settling in urban centres and changing livelihoods, which would have required other types of support. Equally, the food supply to returning refugees for a maximum of three months was too short to bridge the period between return and first harvest of stable food.

The strategies of the projects addressing educational needs in North and South Kivu were, however, not fully adequate. These projects constructed new schools in areas affected by conflicts in North and South Kivu.

### Re-settlement IDP's in North Kivu (Rutshuru and Masisi)

Six new schools for primary and secondary education were constructed to assist IDP's to re-settle in their original or new villages (located close to the main road, these villages provided more protection). A parallel project supported the rehabilitation of the agricultural production. Tearfund implemented the project themselves, maintaining good relations with local authorities and chiefs, school staff and parent committee members. The buildings replaced existing or demolished buildings and teaching staff was therefore already available. The buildings were constructed by craftsmen from the area, construction quality was good and design was adequate (6 class rooms, office and storeroom).

While aiming at the most vulnerable in the community, the project did not have strategy nor resources to make education accessible for the children of the 30-50% poorest families in the communities that could not pay the school fees (approx. 1.5\$ per month). Many of the pupils that had started school dropped out during the year because of financial problems. Similarly the project did not address issues of the quality of education: many teachers had left during the conflicts and many, often the better, did not return and were replaced by young teachers with little experience. In several of the schools visited there were no schoolbooks, et cetera. Though not within the scope of an individual project to solve the general issues of accessibility and quality of education, more was possible as was demonstrated by other projects in Kivu. These issues were also raised during the visit of D2.1.1. in May 2005 and examples from other projects were suggested to improve access to education e.g. for specific vulnerable groups

The problems of access to and quality of education can certainly not be solved within the scope of the relatively small humanitarian response projects. They are mainly structural problems (no state funding for education, no system of teacher re-training) that require solutions above project level. However, they cannot be ignored either, and intermediate solutions should be developed.

The issue of access was also debated in the health sector and, after a study, fees were reduced in areas in the Bukavu Health Region<sup>93</sup>, while in other areas fees were adapted to the standard of living<sup>94</sup>.

The activities funded by the budget lines make a deliberate attempt to target the more vulnerable groups.

For example, WFP in North Kivu provided food to malnourished children and their care-takers, new IDPs, returning IDPs and refugees, re-integrating child soldiers; Oxfam-Belgium provided new means of production such as seeds, nets, small livestock to targeted women- or child-headed households, women caring for orphans, people living with HIV/AIDS, et cetera.; UNHCR targeted, e.g., non-accompanied and school going children for specific support; and FSAO developed small livestock as a source of protein for children.

Project proposals mention particularly vulnerable groups, such as child soldiers, people living with HIV/AIDS and victims of sexual violence as specific target groups. Elderly

<sup>93</sup> This has been mentioned in interviews and in the documentation of the projects implemented by Louvain de Development.

<sup>94</sup> In interviews with BDOM and the Inspector of Health in Bukavu the example of the German Maltezer was mentioned, who adapted the fees according to the development of the living standard in an area.

were mentioned sometimes but also often overlooked as a specific target group, even though elderly people are highly vulnerable in crises and have specific needs.

Prioritising vulnerable groups implies the exclusion of other groups. This is a complex process as it touches upon power relations in societies. Tearfund in South Kivu established village committees to identify the most vulnerable households to be included in the programme, but in other programmes and projects it was not always clear how these groups would be identified and given specific attention or priority in addressing their needs. Reports provided very little information on the success of meeting the needs of the intended target groups; in available reports no references to, for instance, the number of victims of sexual violence, of elderly, of lactating women included in the programmes were found. Programmes and projects were not always successful in addressing these target groups and their specific needs as envisaged. For example, not all projects could meet the criteria of full fairness in the selection of beneficiaries: there were no special provisions made available for the elderly, and though most programmes and projects included victims of sexual violence as a special target group, none seems to provide additional assistance to address the specific needs of this group (except for the UNFPA, UNICEF, OHCHR programme that specifically focuses on this group but operates in other regions).

However, it is important to take into account the fluidity of the situation in the Kivu regions, which complicates specific targeting (e.g. most IDPs stay with host families and are difficult to identify); the enormous levels of poverty and malnourishment; and the size of the target groups in relation to the limited resources (In villages where Tearfund operated there were considerably more highly vulnerable families that qualified for houses than the 20 houses per village available. This was also the experience of Oxfam-Belgium who operated in the same area). Considering these limitations it is concluded that the projects were sufficiently successful in targeting vulnerable people (the obvious exception was the education programme that was relevant to the poor) and that the generally standardised responses, in the present context with the available resources, could be justified.

*The activities hardly consider existing coping mechanisms.*

The project documentation hardly gave any information on the coping systems of the population and, consequently, limited evidence was found that the programmes and projects took local coping systems into account in the design of interventions. A positive example is FAO supporting communities that had decided to re-settle along the main road, as this provided more protection than the original villages. FAO assisted these communities, among others with the development of the 'bas-fond', to obtain productive land. FAO and other organisations also supported small animal farming as an alternative to large animals, which were found to be too vulnerable to conflicts and extortion.

#### 4.1.2 Relevance of activities funded by the Transition budget line

Most activities funded by the *transit budget line* do not meet the criteria of humanitarian assistance.

The generally accepted definition of humanitarian needs/humanitarian activities is broad and the OECD-DAC classification includes restoring pre-existing infrastructure (repair or construction of roads, bridges and ports)<sup>95</sup> under short-term reconstruction. It is certainly difficult to draw the line between humanitarian and structural economic and social sector support. Projects that do classify as humanitarian assistance, serving relevant target groups and responding to their humanitarian needs are, e.g., the construction of the hospital in Kiliba, which also functions as a health centre in a highly affected area, and the bridge of Nyemba, which creates access for emergency supplies to conflict areas. The evaluation team concluded that many projects funded by the transition budget line, such as the restoration of the Ports of Kinshasa and Matadi, do not classify as humanitarian activities. These projects neither rehabilitated infrastructure that was damaged by the conflict nor did they have an impact on saving lives, alleviating suffering or maintaining human dignity of communities affected by violence. Other activities such as the support to the presidential and legislative elections and the National Assembly (although very important for the stability in the country) are not included in the OECD-DAC definition of humanitarian assistance. It was further observed that most, if not all, projects funded under this budget line were not included in the CHAP 2005 or 2006.

##### Harbour of Kinshasa (2005, 2006)

The two consecutive projects are based on a partnership agreement signed in 2004 between the harbours of Brussels and Kinshasa. For 2005 the project foresaw in clearance of ships obstructing the harbour, drainage near the quays, spare parts for 2 cranes, control, audit and monitoring missions. For 2006 it foresaw again in spare parts for the 2 most important cranes, lifting of wrecks, training, support to the shipyard, study to the development opportunities of the harbour. Clearance of shipwrecks turned out to be more complicated as originally foreseen and was stopped. The projects were not included in the CHAP's.

The large harbour is totally run down; technically and organisationally. Decades of systematic lack of maintenance and misuse of state property are the causes of the none functioning of the harbour. The harbour is managed by the state transport company that continues to have serious management problems. Water transport is from a cost perspective essential for the transport of humanitarian goods. River transport of humanitarian goods is presently operated from small operational private ports in Kinshasa that provide sufficient capacity. During the visit it was observed that the repaired cranes were operational. The harbour, as far as it was operational, was apparently mainly used for transit of wood from the interior and was not used for the transport of humanitarian goods.

Most of the activities planned under the new Emergency Programme, though the name suggests otherwise, can also not be classified as humanitarian activities. This programme is not part of the evaluation but this observation is made, as they were registered as humanitarian assistance of 2006 in the FPS central database.

<sup>95</sup> Classification used by FIOD D.1: From DAC, Annex 5 of the CRS Reporting Directives. Instructions for compiling Table 5 in the DAC Statistical Reporting Directives.

The above is an assessment exclusively from a humanitarian perspective. It is not an assessment of the relevance of the projects to the social and economic development of the country.

## 4.2 Connectedness

The short-term emergency activities addressing short-term emergency needs take the long-term development perspectives sufficiently into account.

Many projects funded by the Emergency, Food Aid and Multilateral budget lines make a serious effort to provide a longer-term perspective to the response to immediate needs, e.g. in North Kivu WFP and FAO often collaborate. While WFP foresees food needs in the immediate future, FAO assists to re-establish food production: WFP provided food to therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres, while FAO developed vegetable gardens, provided training to care-takers of undernourished children and delivered tools and seeds to increase household food production. The integrated approach of UNHCR in South Kivu has already been mentioned where transport and immediate support to repatriating refugees is combined with a spectrum of activities to create a viable environment to re-start their livelihoods. In North and South Kivu Oxfam-Belgium provided seeds, tools, nets and boats to returned IDPs and refugees together with technical assistance and demonstration gardens to improve production practice. Louvain Development meets immediate health needs through rehabilitation/reconstruction of health centres, the supply of drugs, and lower tariffs, while, simultaneously, strengthening the system by introducing drug stock management and improving health management and supervision. Considering that the maximum duration of the funding of activities funded by the emergency budget is 18 months, expectations of development impacts of activities were often over-optimistic<sup>96</sup>. In such a short period it is difficult to achieve sustainable results with input-driven approaches, and there are significant risks that expected results are not realised, e.g. for climatological reasons, because underlying causes are not addressed, et cetera.

Project proposals and reports did not, or insufficiently, address issues of sustainability and handing over. It is therefore doubtful whether the increased supervision of health centres will continue if the funding of primes for staff, subsidies for fuel and office costs finishes, rural roads will be maintained, et cetera. It is felt that by relating other instruments of Belgian assistance, e.g. the NGO development programmes, to the humanitarian programme, issues of handing over and sustainability could have been better addressed. On the positive side, the present system of funding of education and health services by the clients, despite all the negative aspects related to accessibility, provides a level of guarantee for the sustainability of these services.

Projects used local suppliers and companies to varying degrees.

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<sup>96</sup> In one project the delivery of a few chickens to a group was expected to provide livelihoods for the whole group.

Connectedness is also related to using local organisations and local channels, wherever possible, and working according to local practices and laws. This was general practice in the Belgium funded activities. Tearfund used locally recruited craftsmen for the construction of schools, Louvain Development bought medicines at the local market or through local tradesmen, local construction and transport companies were used while the multilateral organisations local NGO's and Government servants for implementation and number of the Belgian NGO's sub-contracted local NGO's for implementation.

WFP used local transport companies for all transport activities, other organisations used local craftsmen for school and house construction, bought drugs at local markets wherever possible. WFP could have purchased more supplies at local markets, as was observed by the Belgian Embassy and the Food Aid department.

### 4.3 Effectiveness and Impacts

Projects funded under the emergency, food aid and multilateral programmes realised envisaged outputs to a large extent.

Considering the, often extremely difficult, circumstances (large areas under rebel control, high levels of different kinds of violence, extremely bad connections, minimal services operational, et cetera.) this is a remarkable achievement.

In one project output targets had to be reduced; the new outputs were achieved. All other programmes and projects apparently achieved the envisaged outputs.

Construction was of good quality in nearly all projects visited. The health centres and offices (Louvain) as were the schools in North and South Kivu and the houses in South Kivu. were well constructed. Oxfam UK completed W&S systems, after the GOMA crisis in 2002.

Some projects exceeded the envisaged outputs by joining forces with other projects; e.g. Tearfund Belgium/World Relief distributed household items, seeds and equipment provided by FAO to 22.000 instead of the 9.000 target households. Tearfund-UK involved UNICEF to deliver W&S to the constructed schools.

#### **Water and sanitation provision for the affected communities in Goma.**

The Belgium Government funded approx. 10% of the total project (mainly the equipment component). The project aimed to diminish the risks of diseases after the volcano eruption by providing water and sanitation to the affected communities and was implemented by Oxfam Great Britain. Water and sanitation were identified as the main needs in an over populated area with regular outbreaks of cholera located in the east side of the suburb Birere of the town Goma. The exist water supply system had been largely destroyed by the eruption and the township (one of the poorest of Goma) grew significantly with an influx of people from the destroyed suburbs. The project activities included emergency water supply with lorries, construction of new supply capacity at the lake side, piping, reservoirs, latrines, hygiene and sanitation promotion. The intervention was realised in cooperation with the local population (water committees) and the local water company and linked relief with development.



Outputs are realised. When visited the project 5 years after the construction, the committees were in one or other form still existing. Water supply was (in a limited way) still operational till 3 months ago in one of the two sites. Recently the pump station broke down because of lack of maintenance). The second site, the storage tank had been broken down within one year after delivery because of construction failures and only very partial water was supplied to a small part of the population one hour a day). Considering the effective delivery of emergency water supply, the software components and the water provision during 5 years to 50% of the visited points, the effectiveness of the project was assessed as positive.

The project was realised in close cooperation with other humanitarian actors. OXFAM UK, was during the emergency action responsible for the coordination of W&S activities. It met daily with the (mainly UN) organisations responsible for other aspects of the action and OCHA. OCHA, already operational in Goma when the eruption happened was generally respected for the very effective coordination during this crisis.

The effectiveness of the projects funded by the transition budget was mixed.

The construction of the hospital in Ruzizi (Cebumac) was good and the contributions to the elections were very effective. However, the rehabilitation of the Mama Yemo project was significantly behind schedule (de facto nothing had happened); the new banknotes produced under the Project BNB et Banque Congolais had not been brought into circulation; there were serious doubts whether the activities related to the rehabilitation of the harbour of Kinshasa would have a positive effect on fluvial transport.

For most projects the effectiveness in terms of results is unknown.

The evaluation was surprised about the lack of adequate information on effects; certainly with regard to the UN agencies implementing the same or similar programmes in successive years and hardly providing any information on the effects of the interventions.

Except for one, the programmes and projects had not formulated measurable intended results. As far as final project reports are available, they do not report on results achieved, with the exception of Louvain Development who reported on 16 effect indicators. Only one project had organised an external evaluation (Tearfund/World Relief in North Kivu) and one organisation was externally monitored by donors (UNHCR). Information necessary for an assessment of effectiveness in terms of results was very scarce and the following statements are based on scattered evidence and personal observations.

Food aid was effective in saving the lives of IDPs, of children in therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres, and made a contribution to the health of students and probably to education through the primary school feeding programmes. Food aid was provided for a maximum of three months leaving certain IDPs without adequate food supplies thereafter<sup>97</sup>, and for returning refugees this period is too short to harvest their first crop.

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<sup>97</sup> The team visited a camp where IDPs, who had left their villages six months ago, lived under appalling conditions and, as far as could be observed, without external support.



Direct observation of the results of activities to re-build livelihoods (provision of tools, seeds, nets, poultry, boats, et cetera.) were mixed. In certain areas, where distribution took place one or two years back and security had been maintained, agricultural production was apparently recovering. From interviews the team concluded that yields were often below official projections, but, with security improving, final results of the distribution of inputs might well be positive and sustainable. The introduction of mosaic resistant manioc varieties was considered successful by all interviewees, while school gardens, various (not all) demonstration fields and information on crops and fishing (from unstructured interviews in various villages) were seen as less successful. However, there are serious doubts as to the effectiveness of the indiscriminate distribution of tools and seeds to caretakers in the feeding centres as a, perhaps even significant, percentage of the inputs will not be used.

The completed health projects met their indicators with regard to increased utilisation, improved hygienic conditions, treatment, and staff competences, as well as improved supervision and management. Sustainability is very sensitive to a continuation of funding for medicines and operational costs of the health management system.

The support to returning refugees was well organised and complete, social and economic life apparently recovering fast, but effectiveness might be influenced by the mentality of dependency of the returnees after approximately ten years of life in refugee camps.

The new schools were operational and attracting increasing numbers of students (although still under capacity) but the assumed results, improved education and increased number of returnees, will stay very limited without other interventions (see 4.1 on relevance).

The mission met with IDPs in miserable circumstances living in substandard temporary shelters, without water and sanitation. The IDPs had fled some time ago from contested areas in Massisi and had not received further support after initial assistance. There were clearly people living in miserable circumstances and their humanitarian needs not met.

*The effectiveness of NGO projects was limited to project level.*

Because of the scope and approaches of NGO projects, and the size of the organisations that implemented them, they hardly had any impact beyond the projects themselves. The projects delivered the outputs but hardly influenced other organisations or the debate at sector level, with the exception of Louvain Development who was responsible for participation in the health cluster in Bukavu.

## 4.4 Efficiency

Most projects delivered envisaged outputs within budget and mostly within timeframes (often they were extended by three months), e.g. Tearfund Belgium/World Relief completed six schools of good quality in six villages in different parts of the province within the envisaged budget and timeframe. The projects included a community and

beneficiary contribution component that could have easily delayed the construction process.

One construction project, funded by the emergency budget line, was confronted with significant problems. The implementing agency, ADRA DRC, was substituted and outputs decreased (from 1.500 to app. 800 families). The project completed the four schools and over 800 houses within the extended project period and the constructions were of excellent quality<sup>98</sup>.

The implementation of the project Rehabilitation of the Hospital Mama Yemo was not progressing at the time of review, the construction costs of the bridge of Nyemba significantly higher than budgeted<sup>99</sup>, and several envisaged components of the Rehabilitation of the Harbour in Kinshasa could not be realised. Efficiency of these projects was low.

During the evaluation the duration of the decision-making process was mentioned several times. The present procedure is rather time consuming. The mission was not aware of any standard set for the duration of the approval process. In the case of the Goma crisis the procedure was accelerated and within 12 days after the eruption on the 18<sup>th</sup> of January a mission visited the area and the Minister's approval of the project was communicated to Oxfam Solidarité on the 12<sup>th</sup> of March. However, the Oxfam-Belgium project to support returning IDPs in Kivu was approved four months after the proposal was presented and the delay caused the loss of a full harvest season. This implied significantly less effective support to returning IDPs.

The project 'Strategic Stock' is an alternative allowing a fast response to an emergency avoiding the approval processes. The relief goods from the central stock in Kinshasa, can be distributed by the project holder Memisa Belgium after approval from the Embassy. From 2002-2006, this project was funded annually (Strategic Stock III, IV, V, VI and VII).

#### **Strategic Stocks III – VII (2002-2006).**

With these 5 successive projects, Memisa maintained a strategic stock of medicines, small medical equipment, non-food items blankets, tents, soap, water containers, water disinfection and food- items in its warehouse in Kinshasa. The stock is immediately available to be distributed in emergency situations through its network of local partners, mostly the Caritas/ BDOM's (Bureaux des Oeuvres Médicinales Diocésaines) of the Roman Catholic church to local population (food., tents, blankets, cloths, water cans, etc. ) and health centres and hospitals of the Ministry of Health (medicines, equipment). The BDOM's create a network that has direct contacts with the local communities in large parts of the country though they vary significantly in operational strength and are not always prepared to distribute large numbers of goods under complex circumstances. Since 2005, the project also includes additional funding (budget rider) for strengthening of Memisa capacities for emergency response with technical assistance to stock management, monitoring and reporting, coordination with OCHA and other emergency organisations (ECHO, UN) and assistance to the partners in proper needs assessments,

<sup>98</sup> Agreed outputs were lower than envisaged in the project proposal and Tearfund re-reimbursed 20 per cent of the total budget to DGOS.

<sup>99</sup> Among others, because of mistakes in the app[el] d'offre

organisations of the distribution and reporting. Transport is provided by OCHA/ MONUC or local transporters. The strategic stocks are distributed to respond to natural disasters (e.g. floods, volcano eruption Goma), epidemics (e.g. typhus and pest outbreaks), accidents (mines, airplane crashes) and, mostly, violence. Decisions to intervene are taken in consultation with a crisis team (Ministry of health, donors, humanitarian health organisations) and require approval of the Belgian embassy.

The efficiency of the chain, with UN organisations contracting other organisations for the implementation of activities, and the implications of the subcontractors contracting local NGOs or groups for specific areas, was questioned in various interviews; both in terms of cost and transparency. For example, in South Kivu UNICEF/OCHA have, to implement the Rapid Response Mechanism activities, subcontracted Solidarité who then involve local groups in the villages. The chain implies overhead charges at four or five levels<sup>100</sup>. Simple comparison of cost and overhead contributions with other organisations, such as NGO's is not possible as the multilateral organisations deliver additional services at national and international level in terms of policy development and formulation, advocacy, coordination, etc. The time and budget available to the mission did not allow to analyse and assess the contributions at each level, for unravelling the complicated cost structure and assessing its efficiency. Transparency of cost structure is clearly related to accountability to donors (as well as parliament and the general public) and receiving parties, and so is a highly relevant issue but need to be addressed in a multi donor context.

Reporting of field level implementation followed the same steps in the chain: from field level implementers, to international NGO to local and thereafter HQ in the country, often via International HQ to the donors.

Several organisations, e.g. Cebumac, mentioned the negative effects of hiring instead of acquiring means of transport on efficient implementation; the conditions tied to the emergency budget only allow for hiring transport, although recently exceptions have been made.

Finally the evaluation team observed different standards for school construction. BTC, with World Bank funding, built simple schools (concrete foundation, wooden walls, and roofing sheets) with a calculated lifetime of 15 years, while others, such as the Belgian NGOs, constructed schools of a higher standard and longer expected lifespan. There clearly was a cost difference between both types. There was no evidence that the cheaper alternative had been considered in the approval process against the costly but more robust alternative.

## 4.5 Other

### 4.5.1 Gender

Women were mentioned as a special target group with specific needs in nearly all project proposals. It was observed that the obligation to give attention to gender in the

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<sup>100</sup> The international HQ, the national HQ, the Regional office, the subcontracted organisation and the local group.

instructions for project proposals and reporting<sup>101</sup> does not necessarily lead to attention to gender in implementation and reporting. In reports, gender specific data was rarely given<sup>102</sup>. Though sexual violence were often mentioned in the justification of projects and victims of sexual violence often mentioned as a specific target group, within the programmes there were no specific activities to victims of sexual violence nor were they mentioned in the reporting.

#### 4.5.2 Embeddeness, participation and accountability

Embeddedness refers to the intensity of the degree of integration of the activities in the local context.

The health projects of Louvain Development and Cebumac were highly integrated in the local context. Both organisations have established intimate links with the health inspection and Louvain implements fully through partners, some of them very strong and important local NGOs well connected to local communities.

From the project documents (but less from reports, as most interim and final reports hardly mentioned this issue) and interviews, it was observed that majority of the organisations involved local authorities in the definition of activities and kept them informed on progress. However, as the local authorities were relatively weak and the projects were in control of the resources; the power balance was unequal; de facto, the depth of the contacts with local authorities was often limited.

##### Rehabilitation of health structures in South Kivu

Two successive projects in and around Bukavu town aimed at capacity building of the local health structures. The project proposals were developed jointly with the regional health inspection, while implementation was jointly monitored. In the first project (2004) the district health offices of the town of Bukavu were rehabilitated and provided with basic equipment and transport. Technical assistance was given to the district health officers and a contribution to the operational costs was made to increase the quality and frequency of supervision of the health delivery in the districts. The upgrading or reconstruction of 23 health centres, 2 hospitals and 1 maternity ward in the town Bukavu, provision of equipment and basic stocks of essential medicines and health staff training were also included. Access to the services was improved by establishing a low basic tariff. Technical assistance was provided by BDOM (Catholic church), CEPAC (Pentecost church) and CEBUMAC. These organisations had the past decades an important role in the delivery of health services in the region as they have delegated responsibilities of the Ministry of Health. They were assisted and supervised by the staff of Louvain Développement. Quality of services and health indicators improved significantly during and after project and resulted in a significant increase of patients frequenting the district health services. The second project (2006) has the same objectives, strategy and activities and aims at 4 different Health Zones in the surroundings of Bukavu town. But does not include the rehabilitation/ reconstruction component in line with the moratorium of all mayor rehabilitations/ reconstructions foreseen in the new national health

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<sup>101</sup> The so-called Vademecum.

<sup>102</sup> WFP provided gender specific data but in the same reports planning dates were presented as realised (e.g. 80% of women in commanding positions was planned and realised) and therefore reliability was limited.

strategy. Louvain participated in the OCHA health cluster meetings and were it was responsible for the coordination of the participation of local communities.

Nearly all NGO projects involved other organisations, local authorities or local groups in problem analysis and design of activities. They were not involved in final project design and budgeting. The involvement of such groups in multilateral programme and project design is not known. In project implementation often either special project committees or existing parent groups and public health committees, et cetera., were involved in selecting beneficiaries, organising free labour, discussing solutions and progress.

Many programmes and projects involved local partners in implementation. Though relationships varied, real partnership was limited and the relations were mainly expressed through subcontracting or providing assistance within the framework of a defined project or programme

Forms of participation were information transfer, consultation, functional participation (collecting building materials, constructing walls, Tearfund UK and Belgium) and materially motivated participation (payment in vouchers for road construction, Oxfam-Belgium).

None of the projects had established a formal complaint mechanism, nor were the affected population or their representatives (formally) involved in decision making, monitoring project implementation and assessment of final results. Accountability to beneficiaries was mainly absent.

The evaluation teams concluded that considering the historic relations of many of the NGO's, role of civil organisations in the past especially in the health and education sector, and the long duration of the humanitarian assistance in the DRC and consequently many years of cooperation with local groups and organisations, more was possible.

#### 4.5.3 Strengthening local organisations

The assistance to their organisational development, as provided by some international NGOs<sup>103</sup>, was assessed as crucial in the development of their organisation and considered highly effective in improving organisational performance by Caritas in Goma and BDMO in Bukavu, both strong local NGOs. In a region well known for the strength of its local organisations and with a number of local NGO networks, the evaluation team was surprised that, even after many years, humanitarian assistance was still dominated by international organisations; local organisations were hardly represented around the table where strategic decisions were taken.

The Royal Decree, related to the emergency budget line, did not allow for strengthening local organisations except for training of staff directly involved in the implementation of activities. Most programmes and projects had limited organisational development activities for their own staff and immediate partners. However, FAO, e.g., strengthened

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<sup>103</sup> E.g. Cordaid to BDOM and Caritas international to Caritas DRC.

several organisations of the Ministry and Inspector of Agriculture. Louvain Development and, to a lesser degree, Cebumac included organisational strengthening of health inspection (investments in infrastructure, management and operational capacities) in their projects. It was felt that organisational strengthening could have been a more important element in Belgian humanitarian assistance.

## 4.6 Explanatory Factors

Various factors shaped Belgian humanitarian activities in the DRC.

The history of most Belgian NGOs involved in humanitarian activities impacted in various ways on:

- Effectiveness: because their close relations with sister organisations or local organisations provided them with an implementation channel for activities well embedded in local realities.
- Concentration on short- and long-term rehabilitation: because of their past as development organisations they tended to involve themselves in rehabilitation activities, as these can be rather similar to past development activities even if funded from another budget line.
- Connectedness: use of local suppliers and constructors, attention to collaboration with local authorities.

The importance the Belgian Government attached to the DRC resulted in direct involvement at the highest political levels in project identification and approval of contracts, while bypassing the administration and the Inspector of Finance.

- The conditions of the Royal Decree and the procedures of the emergency budget line impacted on humanitarian activities in various ways:
- Only Belgian NGOs can be funded. Consequently:
  - the implementing NGOs are mainly small with a limited knowledge base;
  - International NGOs with a broad humanitarian knowledge base were excluded.
- The lengthy procedures favour rehabilitation above relief except in high profile crises. Most activities funded by the emergency budget line are related to rehabilitation.
- Very restricted funding of institutional and organisational strengthening.
- Inefficiencies in transport.

## 5 Assessment of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance at Country Level

### 5.1 Coordination

Coordination of humanitarian assistance with the UN, through OCHA in its central position, is one of the objectives of the DRC Country Strategic Plan. Belgium contributed to better coordinated humanitarian assistance in various ways:

- Financial mechanisms:
- Belgium supported OCHA with core and programme funding. The programme funding was earmarked for the decentralisation of OCHA in the DRC, but this was later removed and the funds now only have to be spent on coordination in the DRC. Belgium also supported OCHA with two experts within the framework of the GHD, and supported the Pooled Fund and the CERF.
- Funding of humanitarian activities included in the CAP/CHAPs. Belgium funds CAP/CHAP programmes and projects of the UN organisations UNHCR, FAO, WFP through the Multilateral, Food Aid and Emergency budget lines.
- Since 2006, Belgium stressed the importance of participation of Belgian NGOs in local coordination mechanisms and cooperation with specialised technical agencies such as FAO in the assessment of projects proposals<sup>104</sup>.
- Political support:
  - Belgium co-chaired the GHD group in the DRC. The positive contributions from the GHD process in the DRC have been mentioned under 2.3.3. The Belgian Embassy played an essential and very active role as co-chair of the GHD, which was appreciated by the Humanitarian Coordinator, donor community<sup>105</sup> and implementing agencies.
  - Belgium recently took the lead in initiating efforts to improve the strategic value of the CHAP process (see 2.3.2).

At regional level, the OCHA coordination and cluster system is operational. Significant progress has been made in the coordination of ‘who, does, what, where’, definition of priorities, mobilising available capacities in case of a crisis (cholera outbreak, displacements) and avoiding overlaps. At implementation level the evaluation did not observe overlaps between Belgian-funded and other humanitarian activities. OCHA also

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<sup>104</sup> Note for discussion on GHD Embassy, February 2006, page 1: “ With the action plan, donors are given an opportunity to stimulate their implementing partners to coordinate by deciding to fund only those projects that would appear in it”; and Telop 23/6/2006 RDC –Avis sur les projets humanitaires des ONG- Memisa-B et Louvain Développement “ A noter que ses projects ne sont pas inclus dans le Plan d’Action Humanitaire coordonné par OCHA pour 2006. (UM/MDS/pl) ”.

<sup>105</sup> Interviews in Kinshasa, February 2007.



organised the coordination with MONUC on security issues and with local authorities on political issues.

This was not so with respect to intervention strategies. Humanitarian organisations continue to implement contradictory strategies. For example, MSF and IRC provide free health care, while Louvain Development and Cebumac support a local health system that charges reduced rates. That this creates confusion and anger among the population seems obvious, and it also complicates and undermines continuation of the Belgian humanitarian efforts in South Kivu in the health sector (see also 2.3.2 and 4.8 on coherence)<sup>106</sup>.

Humanitarian coordination remained a mainly isolated inter- international-humanitarian-agency process with very limited involvement of local organisations. Considering the complex role of local authorities in the conflict and their weaknesses (not being paid, no resources, et cetera.), coordination with local authorities was not simple. It found various forms, but these were certainly not always optimal and satisfactory (see also 2.3.3). Some local organisations were represented in the OCHA coordination meetings and strategic debates. The mission observed that the local organisations that participated were not very influential in these meetings. They were not present at those tables where the most important decisions were made (e.g. in the Pooled Fund Board). The mission did not meet creative solutions to provide local communities with a voice in the coordination process. It felt that, considering the important role of civil organisations in e.g. the Kivus<sup>107</sup>, the number of established NGOs and NGO networks, local communities should have been better represented in the coordination process<sup>108</sup>. Belgium, with its historic relations with many local organisations, its position as one of the most important donors and a strong position in several humanitarian UN agencies, among others OCHA, was in an excellent position to advocate a stronger local voice in coordination, but missed this opportunity

The field visits confirmed the participation of Belgian NGOs in the OCHA coordination and cluster system. Two observations can be made: 1) Several NGOs operated in several (OCHA) regions that covered more than one sector at the same time, e.g. food security and education. As they are small organisations, participation in the weekly NGO coordination meetings and in more than one cluster meeting in the region where the office is located is too heavy a burden<sup>109</sup>. 2) Many of the NGOs had doubts about the usefulness of the cluster meetings. The double role of the UN agencies and the low quality of organisation of the meetings were mentioned<sup>110</sup>.

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<sup>106</sup> See also: Consultation with and participation by beneficiaries and affected populations in the process of managing, monitoring and evaluating humanitarian assistance, DRCALNAP 2004. Page 73. With respect to the Goma crisis, "Efforts were made to harmonise content, but the way in which aid should be implemented was overlooked. One such example is the means by which human actors reward populations and people in their projects"

<sup>107</sup> See also: Consultation with and participation by beneficiaries and affected populations in the process of managing, monitoring and evaluating humanitarian assistance, DRC page 42/43ALNAP 2004.

<sup>108</sup> E.g., by involving representatives of different local networks of NGOs, think tanks, denominational groups in strategic decision making.

<sup>109</sup> See Oxfam –B that has project activities in at least North Kivu, Fizi, Baraka and Unvira, while having professional staff of three located in Bukavu.

<sup>110</sup> From Interview Oxfam-B in Bukavu: 'No prior agenda, no minutes made, not starting at the agreed time'.



### Oxfam Solidarité in North and South Kivu, DRC

The (2005) project links relief and development and aims at maintaining stability by supporting IDP's and refugees that return to their original homesteads to re-start the productive activities. The assistance targets 5100 families in a number of villages in North and South Kivu and is related to agriculture, coastal and pond fisheries and small husbandry and improving access to the villages. The vulnerable women (widows, divorced, abused), elderly and sick, HIV-Aids infected, and vulnerable children are the beneficiaries. The project distributes seeds, tools, goats, chicken, boats and nets, provides technical assistance to improve local production methods, and reconstructs 85 kilometres of local minor access roads. The activities are implemented by three partners, small local NGOs, FOPAC, a federation of 60 production cooperatives, APIDE, supporting village groups, cooperatives, etc since 13 years, and UWAKI, supporting mainly women unions. The last two organisations receive funding of Oxfam Netherlands/Novib for their other activities, Oxfam Solidarité, senior professional staff of three, provides training to partner staff, supervision and project management. The project area covers three OCHA zones. Project was in progress, groups were formed and received inputs while demonstration fields and gardens were started, though progress varied between activities. Beneficiaries were grouped according to criteria although they were free formally to select the activity they want to participate in. A new similar project was approved in 2006. With the project covering 4 OCHA regions and two sectors, the Oxfam senior staff was simply too small to participate in weekly OCHA-NGO coordination meetings and monthly cluster meetings. Although serious efforts are made, participation was necessarily limited to Bukavu where the offices are located. The Oxfam staff were very critical on the lack of preparation and reporting of the coordination meetings though recently some improvements were observed.

The dual role of the UN agencies in coordination and implementation is complex, especially in the prioritisation of projects for the Pooled Fund. In this process the UN agencies are an interested party as they receive significant funding through the Pooled Fund, are chairperson in the cluster meetings where priority listing of the projects is determined, and are judge as in the regional and national priority listing of projects. The fast growth of the humanitarian funding, among others the Pooled Fund, in 2006 diminished the potential tension but, even so, the team met with significant dissatisfaction of NGOs with regard to the performance of some agencies<sup>111</sup>.

The appreciation of OCHA's role, and certainly of the Pooled Fund mechanism, among the UN agencies also varied. The evaluation team often met with a 'the younger brother attitude' and a certain resistance to be funded through the Pooled Fund system among the large and powerful UN agencies. Though OCHA was generally respected among other as it stayed also in the most difficult crisis's in the regions<sup>112</sup>, it also met with a diminishing interest and fatigue among NGOs and the leadership of some UN agencies' in OCHA's coordination and cluster meetings.

It is important to mention that the projects funded from the transition budget of the new emergency budget are not included in the CHAP. Therefore, despite the effort to increase

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<sup>111</sup> See also: Impact of humanitarian reform mechanisms in the DRC. Oxfam, Jan. 2007.

<sup>111</sup> Such as, e.g., bringing a part of the NGO funding from the emergency budget under the HAP 2007 and the efforts of the Embassy to approve, in principle, only projects included in the CHAPs.

<sup>111</sup> The extent to which all instruments were applied in a coherent manner is outside the scope of this evaluation. See among others OCHA- Bezoek van de DSG aan het oosten van de DRC; inzichten m.b.t. de Belgische multilaterale en bilaterale ontwikkelingssamenwerking. 2007-11-20.

the share of Belgium humanitarian funding that is coordinated through the CHAPs<sup>113</sup>, that is de facto diminishing.

## 5.2 Coherence

Belgian humanitarian activities did not stand on their own. They were part of the wider Belgian policy effort to provide peace, stability and the return to rule of law in the Great Lakes region. As mentioned in Chapters 3.1 and 3.2, the DRC has a central position in Belgian foreign policy and development cooperation, and Belgium used all available instruments: preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and peace building, debt relief, structural development assistance (BTC, NGO programme, university cooperation) and humanitarian assistance. Belgium supported the international political process to restore peace and stability, many international programmes such disarmament, re-integration, light weapons control, MONUC, national elections et cetera., which have contributed to improve stability in the country with a very important improvement of the humanitarian situation since 2002. This support has contributed significantly to the increased stability and reduction of violence in the period under review<sup>114</sup>.

The Belgian approach to humanitarian assistance was not coherent. Between the FPS in Brussels and the Embassy, as well as within the Embassy, there were different interpretations of humanitarian assistance. The Embassy did not consider the transition budget line to be part of humanitarian assistance (as does the FPS) and within the Embassy some staff view humanitarian assistance from a more limited perspective than others. These inconsistencies did neither contribute to coherent programmes nor to a transparent position within the humanitarian community<sup>115</sup> and with partners.

The actually still fluid situation in the DRC, with areas of relative stability and development as well as areas of instability, inaccessibility and violence, required the application of emergency, rehabilitation, transition and structural development support in a coherent manner.

There were certainly efforts to build coherence between activities of the budget lines and the approaches to the activities, but overall coherence was low. It was not always clear how the activities, scattered in terms of target group, sector and region and with sometimes contradictory approaches<sup>116</sup>, of the Emergency, Food Aid and Multilateral budget lines served one common objective. But even more limited was the coherence between the assistance funded by these budget lines and the Transition budget line. Recently, within the Embassy, the limitations of number of actors and projects and programmes were discussed, and the Embassy made efforts to build more coherence between its humanitarian and structural assistance, among others in the health sector. It

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<sup>115</sup> The Belgian Embassy, e.g., had a clear and strong position on the limits of the humanitarian action plan that was not fully consistent with its funding policy.

<sup>116</sup> E.g., the emergency health projects support integrated structural as well as punctual support, free health services as well as stressing the importance of a user contribution. To some extent this also applies to the food security projects funded by FAO and Oxfam.

emphasised the importance of adherence to the principles of the Stratégie de Renforcement du Système de Santé (SRSS) in its assessments of new projects<sup>117</sup> and engaged the NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance in the health sector in discussions on the planning of new Belgian PIC for this sector<sup>118</sup>.

### 5.3 Efficiency of Delivery

The delivery model is based on delivery of programmes and projects, by the (branch) offices of international organisations (ICRC and the UN organisations) supervised by the representative offices in Kinshasa; Belgian NGOs<sup>119</sup> supervised by the head offices in Belgium; BTC; and various other organisations for activities funded by the Transition budget line.

The programmes of the multilateral organisations varied from 500.000 to several million Euro. The NGO projects varied mainly between 3- and 500.000 Euro and did not exceed 900.000 Euro. The projects of BTC and third parties were, on average, larger with a maximum of 2.000.000 Euro.

The Embassy advises on proposals and has a role in the monitoring of implementation. The staff in Brussels assess proposals, prepare advice to the Minister, monitor progress and, occasionally, implementation in the field and assess the end reports. The project and programme files are maintained in Brussels and vary in quality and completeness. The relations between both levels were good and although there sometimes were differences of opinion these were professional<sup>120</sup>.

The quality of proposals and reporting varied. NGO proposals and reports are generally satisfactory to good and provide sufficient information. The proposals rarely provided results-based objectives with indicators. Most reporting, therefore, only provides outputs and no results of the intervention<sup>121</sup>. The proposals of the projects funded by the Transition budget line provided minimal or no background information to assess their viability and were limited in scope. Progress reporting could not be assessed.

Conform the GHD principles, multilateral and international organization can report on programmes to the combined donors and according to their own standards. The Royal Decree requires that specific activities funded are specifically defined and reported on. These proposals of international organizations varied in quality. Some provided excellent background information on their programmes, but the programmes themselves are often rather general activity listings without results-based objectives with indicators. It was noted that particularly relevant information on the effects of outputs in previous years,

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<sup>117</sup> Telop Embassy 11/08/2006 RDC-BDOM- avis sur le projet d'appui aux ZS du district sanitaire du centre et d'appui à l'ITM and Telop Embassy 23/0606. « n... dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de la nouvelle stratégie de renforcement du système de santé ... il est impossible d'autoriser des construction dans le cadre du projet, surtout celles de CS ».

<sup>118</sup> It could not be observed whether similar efforts have been made in other sectors.

<sup>119</sup> There are a few exceptions were 'sister' organisations are involved in implementation such as Oxfam-UK in Gona, Tearfund UK in South Kivu or World Relief in North Kivu.

<sup>120</sup> From interviews both in Brussels and Kinshasa, the differences relate to the role of the GHD experts within OCHA and a proposal of a food security programme of a NGO.

<sup>121</sup> A good exception are the projects implemented by Louvain de Development.

such as the percentage of beneficiaries that de facto used the kits and realised yields/income (contrary to potential yields/income), was missing. This gave some of the programme proposals an imaginary character. Progress and final reports were short and output-focused. Sometimes the reports were of astonishing low quality, obviously using old files of past programmes and forgetting to adapt figures of past years, while presenting planning data as realised outcomes.

The Embassy was, in its advisory and monitoring role on projects, constrained by the limitations of the information provided and in obtaining first-hand actual knowledge of the situation in the project areas<sup>122</sup>. Despite these limitations, the advice on project proposals was, especially in recent years, useful and of sufficient quality. In recent years, the Embassy also regularly advised negatively on activities that were not coordinated with the other actors in the area, had not been passed through the clusters, did not adhere to strategic plans (such as the Strategy to Strengthen the Health System) or added to the number of implementing organisations<sup>123</sup>.

Reactions or follow-up on progress and end reports by staff in Brussels or the Embassy was not found in the files; project staff did not remember any reactions from Brussels or the Embassy, with the exception of a project in which the implementing agency was replaced during implementation<sup>124</sup>. This systematic lack of reaction, certainly had an impact on the quality of reporting and contributed to a feeling of wasting time and resources on redundant reporting.

From its project visits, the evaluation team concludes that monitoring visits<sup>125</sup> by Embassy staff were irregular and depended on the importance of individual staff attached to the project<sup>126</sup>. Some projects were very positive with regard to monitoring by the Embassy, while others regretted that they were never visited. Visits from staff in Brussels were also limited. Reports of such visits were not easily available, but from the only report the evaluation studied it could conclude that the visit was well prepared, analytical and useful.

The evaluation team was not in a position to assess the quality and effects of internal monitoring by HQ of both NGOs and international organisations. It noted the external monitoring missions organised by FAO but had insufficient information to formulate an opinion on its continuity and effects.

Only one project<sup>127</sup> organised an external evaluation. External evaluations are not a requirement for humanitarian activities by the Belgian Government but the existing report shows the value of external evaluations, as it highlights some important shortcomings that could lead to learning by the implementing organisations.

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<sup>122</sup> Most staff rarely travelled to humanitarian projects, but, e.g., in the case of the rehabilitation of the Ruzizi Hospital Embassy staff travelled to the project area.

<sup>123</sup> As was the case for an Oxfam involvement in food aid.

<sup>124</sup> This was well handled by all parties involved; an audit was conducted, a new agency identified, a new contract drawn up with adapted outputs and the project was completed on time.

<sup>125</sup> The evaluation mission did not obtain reports of monitoring visits by Embassy staff.

<sup>126</sup> This is also true for the staff in Brussels.

<sup>127</sup> Tearfund/ Worldrelief in North Kivu. Also d MSF-B conducted an evaluative study that contained very valuable information. MSF-B is not funded under the humanitarian programme but under the development programme.

Within the context of North and South Kivu, the evaluation team could not imagine any alternative organisations that could have fulfilled the role of the large UN organisations with respect to relief, food security, refugee management, and even the health sector. The large international NGOs that might have the structures and capacities to handle such large programmes do not have the mutual understanding and shared leadership that is also needed. The smaller NGOs neither have the structures and capacities nor the professional competencies to deal with large-scale responses at several levels.

Several critical remarks have been made about the performance of the UN agencies in the DRC. The UN organisations exclusively implement through international and local NGOs and the long and costly chain has been mentioned already. To assess needs, monitor and evaluate implementation, and learn from the experiences a close connection to the ground reality is essential as circumstances change fast. The tight security limitations of the UN agencies that limit their capacity to perform this role, has also been mentioned before. It was difficult to understand for the evaluation team that an organisation contracts other organisations, which do not have a lower risk profile, to go to places it considered too dangerous to go itself<sup>128</sup>.

The differences in performance of the UN agencies in different regions have also been mentioned before. This is partly related to the circumstances and location of the main local offices; while UNHCR was very present and UNICEF less so in South Kivu, the opposite was true for the North. This had consequences for their role, performance and cluster leadership.

The Belgian NGOs, except MSF-B, had a development background. The performance of the Belgian NGOs is satisfactory to good in terms of realising envisaged outputs under difficult circumstances (see Chapter 4.3). However, none of the organisations developed innovative and site-specific solutions. They mainly implemented relatively standard projects and applied approaches close to their core business as development organisations. Some had a long history in the country and important local partnerships or networks. This was not true for others. Only one of the Belgian NGOs developed a profile as an emergency organisation managing emergency stock through the large local network of its partner organisation.

The role of BTC in the delivery of Belgian humanitarian assistance was very limited and can therefore not be commented on.

The evaluation team had insufficient information on the role of BTC and other implementing organisations, such as the harbours of Antwerp and Brussels, to comment on their performance as humanitarian organisations.

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<sup>128</sup> As in the case of UNICEF and the subcontracted Solidarité.

## 5.4 Other

### 5.4.1 The humanitarian principles

The evaluation noted that the procedures for project identification and approval of the Transition budget line were minimal, and from files and interviews the motives and processes could not always be reconstructed. This made it difficult to assess whether the supported activities adhere to humanitarian principles of impartiality and independence of economic and political interests. The evaluation team had no reason to suspect this, but the fact that it observed (as anybody else can) that the rehabilitated cranes harbour of Kinshasa probably mainly serves wood transfer for export makes Belgium vulnerable to suggestions of not fully respecting the humanitarian principles.

## 5.5 Explanatory Factors

- The architecture of the humanitarian system. The large and ever increasing number of organisations involved in humanitarian response in the various sectors (some striking examples have been mentioned in this report), with the battles for funding, related fights for responsibilities and positions within the system, and differences in approaches limits significantly what can be achieved through coordination. The expression ‘it would be a miracle if OCHA succeeds in coordinating the UN agencies’ was once heard from one of the agencies. It makes coordination costly (in terms of time and money for OCHA but also in terms of time for the involved agencies). The complexity of coordination makes the system inward looking. The passive national and weak local authorities limited the influence of receiving communities even further.
- The size of the DRC, the long distances, the number of different sectors and the geographical spread make it difficult to have an overview in Kinshasa and address internal inconsistencies in the programme.
- The long experience and well-established networks of many Belgian NGOs in the DRC were certainly strong positive factors, but there were also quite a number of NGOs that were relative newcomers in North and South Kivu without such experience. That most NGOs involved implemented activities that were not very different from their field of expertise (development) also contributed positively.
- The management changes in the Embassy increased the attention to humanitarian assistance. In combination with the competencies of the person responsible for humanitarian activities, this motivated the Embassy to play an active role in the humanitarian community and to be more assertive in their advisory role. Limited staffing of the humanitarian portfolio in combination with the role as GHD co-chair limited field visits.
- The lack of clarity on of the definition of humanitarian aid in the FPS in Brussels (see Interim Report, February 2006).

## 6 Conclusions and Recommendations

### 6.1 Conclusions

The political priority of the DRC for Belgium made Belgium a consistent and one of the main donors of the largest ‘forgotten emergency’ in recent history. Belgium provided diplomatic and financial support to the peace and democratic processes that contributed to increased stability and security. From a humanitarian perspective this integrated approach was highly important.

In the fluid and fast changing environment of the DRC as a whole, and in the eastern provinces in particular, the simultaneous, instead of successive, application of a variety of humanitarian (emergency, food, multilateral and transition) and non-humanitarian (structural development assistance) instruments was relevant.

Considering the scale of human suffering, it is surprising that humanitarian assistance for the DRC played a limited role in terms of priorities, financial and human resources in the overall Belgian assistance to the DRC, and that Belgium’s position as a humanitarian donor remained behind its position as a donor in structural development assistance.

Because of the weak national state, the donor community played a very important role in the orientation and decision making on humanitarian assistance in one of the largest and most violent conflicts in recent history. It is therefore remarkable that priority within the embassy for humanitarian assistance within the Embassy varied, mainly for non-institutional reasons and that the development perspective dominated. Consequently, even when, at the end of the period under review, its priority increased, allocation of staff time remained too limited, restricting the management role and, especially, the contacts at implementation level. This low status of humanitarian assistance and limited staffing Belgium had, unfortunately in common with many (but not all) other donors in the DRC.

Belgium’s historic connection with many segments of the DRC community (universities, NGOs and NGO platforms, (semi-) religious organisations, private sector, local spokesmen, et cetera.) provides Belgium with a special responsibility to provide the local community with a voice in strategic humanitarian decision making. Belgian funding to OCHA and its position in the donor committees of several humanitarian organisations make it possible to influence their agendas and increase accountability to the population of the DRC.

The importance of a clear definition of humanitarian assistance, as mentioned in the Interim Report, was confirmed in the DRC country study. The lack of a clear definition of the scope of the humanitarian programme created a lack of clarity between the FPS and



the Embassy and within the Embassy, and created confusion within the international humanitarian community.

The Belgium financial and diplomatic support to the UN was important and contributed to the improved coordination of humanitarian assistance at national and local level. The new Pooled Fund is a promising development as it stimulates strongly the humanitarian actors to prioritize and coordinate at local and national. Though a promising development it is still too recent to draw final conclusions. The DRC proves that investments in coordination mechanisms and structures are important but do not solve all important coordination problems, as many constraints are related to the structure of the sector.

It was however observed that there is a simultaneously a trend to provide funding especially under the transition budget-line and the new emergency budget outside the international frameworks and coordination mechanisms.

Considering the many needs in a country devastated by half a century of mismanagement and over a decennium of war, the limited means, the choices made on funding of some activities while excluding other important activities, the use of standard packages and approaches that do not address all specific needs of different vulnerable groups, can be understood and justified.

Among others, the funding of programmes and projects included in the CAP/CHAP, the assessments procedures of project proposals and the advice of the Embassy contributed to a more or less coherent assistance in terms of selected regions, target groups and approaches funded by the Emergency, Food Aid and Multilateral budget lines. Despite this conclusion, humanitarian assistance was scattered over nearly all relevant sectors and several provinces and implemented by a large number of agencies that had sometimes significantly different approaches. In combination with the distances in the country and the limited staffing of the Embassy, orientation, field visits for progress monitoring and assessment of activities was only possible to a very limited extent.

Coherence of the relief and rehabilitation activities with those funded by the Transition budget line in terms of locations and approaches, and the Structural Development budget line in terms of geographical focus was minimal. This is even more true for the new 'emergency budget' 2006-2008. While there is a full set of instruments that can address different situations and cover the, so-called, grey zones in a coherent manner, this is not applied to good effect. A strategy to 'link' relief, rehabilitation with reconstruction and development was missing (as true for most other donors).

The funding of large UN humanitarian agencies was justified as activities were relevant and, as far as could be assessed, largely effective. UN security policies constrained effectiveness in the field and therefore the UN agencies did not fully exercise their role to assess the needs, and monitor and evaluate implementation of their programmes.

The UN organisations make contributions to the humanitarian responses at various levels (international, national and local) and have a long delivery, with contributions to overheads at each four to five links. The cost effectiveness of the chain could not be assessed within the framework of this evaluation. While concerns were expressed about



the costs of the humanitarian assistance, provided by the UN organisations, e.g. by the Belgium embassy in Burundi, there is in the present context of humanitarian assistance no alternative channel that can operate at the required scale and different levels simultaneously.

So Belgium adheres to the GHD principles that multilateral and international organisations report in principle not to individual donors projects and programmes, it present governing frameworks require reporting on projects. The project proposal varied in quality and included result based indicators while reports to meet the Belgium requirements were mainly very limited and regularly sub-standard.

The NGOs had a (somewhat) shorter delivery chain with (probably) significantly lower overheads at the various levels. They delivered envisaged outputs largely effectively, often in collaboration with well-established local networks, but nearly none had the capacities and the humanitarian background to implement large programmes and their role remained therefore often limited to rather stand-alone often not immediate rehabilitation activities. Reporting was generally better than that of the humanitarian organisations but as only very few NGOs reported on results, these reports, except for a few exceptions, did not provide the information to assess effectiveness. Assessment of effectiveness was only possible in combination with field visits.

As hardly any of the implementing organisations the evaluation team visited, got feedback on progress and final reports, there was no real external drive to change or improve present practices.

The principle of exclusively funding Belgian NGOs contributed to the number of small organisations involved in humanitarian assistance. There were no reasons to conclude that the assistance provided by those Belgian NGOs that did not have significant experience and networks in the DRC could not have been delivered by other NGOs operating in the area.

The present Royal Decree, procedures and decision-making process contributed to the focus of the Emergency budget line on not immediately urgent rehabilitation activities. This Decree also explains the limited support to organisational strengthening and the absence of direct funding for local organisations, which could have contributed to a larger representation of local organisations and people around the tables where the strategic decisions were taken.

For Belgium as one of the largest donors involved in a wide spectrum of political and development processes, with a very active 'va-et-viens' of its political leaders, a significant involvement in the private sector<sup>129</sup>, and also indirect involvement in the national army, well elaborated and respected procedures for all budget lines, are important to adhere to humanitarian principles of transparent decision making on the humanitarian activities, impartiality and independence of economic and political interests.

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<sup>129</sup> Belgium is the largest trade partner for the DRC.

## 6.2 Recommendations

Considering the present instability and continuous insecurity it is recommended to continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the DRC at the same if not an increased level.

To increase the attention to humanitarian assistance and provide sufficient resources especially time and qualified staff, for the management of the humanitarian programme in countries where Belgium is an important humanitarian donor and thus has a vital role in the orientation of humanitarian assistance. Workshops, staff training or simulation exercises for embassies in conflict areas or countries vulnerable to disasters are recommended.

For the DRC this implies for the coming years to establish a full-time position assisted by the attaché's with sectoral responsibilities, increase humanitarian competencies and a more balanced attention to non-humanitarian and humanitarian assistance.

To improve the information management of humanitarian programmes by:

- Improving and standardising project and programme file management in Brussels;
- Requiring all agencies to define objectives in terms of results and report accordingly, and to make renewal or continuation of funding conditional on adequate results-based reporting;
- Introducing a procedure for standard feedback, assessment of progress and final reports;
- Introducing, as is common in development programmes, an Embassy or external evaluation (in relief programmes real time evaluations) in the final phase of projects and programmes, if these programmes are not included in other (multi-donor) evaluations.;
- Increasing field level monitoring of the humanitarian situation and activities by the Embassy staff, creating shorter and more intensive linkages, and making more use of external evaluations and monitoring such as the UNHCR assessment by ECHO and USAID;
- Concentrating on a limited number of sectors and less but larger projects.

In the complex emergency situation in the DRC without a well-phased process with subsequent relief, immediate rehabilitation, transition and development it is important to continue using the different instruments simultaneously (including transition and structural development). This is only effective if the activities are not formulated and implemented in isolation but link with prior and simultaneous activities of other organisation.

Coherence between the applications of the different instruments must be improved.

Coherence can, among others, be strengthened by:

- Extending the advisory role of the Embassy to all relevant budget lines;
- Introducing temporarily, in areas with high levels of insecurity and (potential) instability, a geographical division of management responsibilities in addition to present sectoral division<sup>130</sup>.

It is recommended that Belgium continues the assistance to multilateral organisations in the DRC but, in a joint effort with other donors, make the assistance conditional on:

- Programmes with objectives and reporting defined in terms of results instead of outputs;
- External monitoring or (real time) evaluation (in collaboration with other donors);
- Making funds for external monitoring and evaluations available;
- Regular comparative external assessment of the cost structure and, if needed, targets for cost reduction.

It is recommended that Belgium continues its active support to coordination of the humanitarian efforts in the DRC and to the coordination of the humanitarian action plans and the WB, IMF and UNDP led international development programming. It is strongly recommended to limit funding of humanitarian activities that are not identified and discussed within the coordination mechanisms Belgium supports (such as clusters) and included in the CHAP's. It is also recommended that Belgium continues to contribute to the Pooled fund. A continuous contribution allows to closely follow the performance improvement of the fund, influence its development (push for better access to local and international NGO's, better monitoring and assessment of funded activities). With improved performance, a gradual shift from Belgium project and programme funding to Pooled Fund funding is recommended.

Belgium should raise the issue of a larger role for local communities in coordination with OCHA and actively support initiatives in this direction.

To continue the support to NGOs, whether Belgian or other, but significantly diminish the number NGO's and funding larger programmes, select on humanitarian competences, maintaining closer and more regular links with the implementing organisations, improve monitoring and assessments of results, stimulate improvement of professional competencies.

It could be considered to create the option of a programmatic approach for humanitarian activities of NGOs, as is already in use for development activities. Also, the next round of programmes for NGOs could be made more flexible allowing to shift from development activities to humanitarian assistance if the situation requires it and vice versa.

To contribute to limit the present proliferation of organisations implementing humanitarian activities, Belgium should actively encourage the UN to improve inter UN coordination, diminish the number of UN organisations that undertake humanitarian activities, diminish the number of NGO's and other organisation it is funding for the humanitarian n budget-lines.

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<sup>130</sup> The Netherlands has experience with such an approach in Dafur.

Considering the advantageous position that the Transition budget line offers in the present circumstances in the DRC, it is recommended to increase effectiveness of the transition programme by improving programme proposals and implementation and increase coherence with the other humanitarian programmes by funding in principle transition and reconstruction projects that are part of the early recovery cluster plans and included in the CHAP.

Considering the complexity of an LRRD strategy, it is recommended to consult like minded donors to develop jointly, criteria or points of departure for an LRRD strategy.

To increase transparency, to elaborate clear and consistent procedures for identification, approval and management of humanitarian activities of all budget lines to create opportunities for a programme approach, organisational and institutional support, direct funding to local NGOs, that are now excluded by the Royal Decree and introduce a standardised accelerated approval procedure to respond to urgent needs.

To formulate a consistent definition of Belgian humanitarian assistance and share it with the Embassies.

# Annex I Termes de référence pour la visite de terrain en RDC du 3 au 15 février 2007 dans le cadre de l'évaluation de l'aide humanitaire belge, 2002-2006

## Introduction

Le Service de l'évaluation spéciale S0.4 a commandité une évaluation de l'aide humanitaire belge pendant la période 2002-2006. Cette évaluation est conduite par ECORYS. Le cadre de l'évaluation est établi dans les prescriptions techniques du cahier spécial des charges et explicité dans la Note méthodologique. L'évaluation prévoit quatre visites de terrain : deux en République démocratique du Congo (RDC), une au Burundi et une au Pakistan. Ce document expose les termes de référence pour la première visite de terrain en RDC. Ce déplacement sera une visite-pilote. Sur base de cette visite de terrain, la méthodologie pourra être raffinée et développée. Une deuxième visite de terrain en RDC est prévu en mars-avril 2007.

## Contexte

L'objectif de cet exercice est d'évaluer la qualité des interventions humanitaires soutenues financièrement par le Gouvernement fédéral belge entre 2002 et 2006. L'évaluation se penchera sur les interventions réalisées, analysera les décisions prises, la pertinence et l'efficacité des interventions ainsi que leur gestion et leur mise en œuvre à Bruxelles et sur le terrain. Cette évaluation mettra en évidence les facteurs qui ont amélioré ou réduit la qualité des interventions humanitaires soutenues par le gouvernement belge. Elle fera également des recommandations pour l'amélioration du programme humanitaire du gouvernement et de la valeur ajoutée qu'il peut apporter. La méthodologie de l'évaluation a été exposée dans la Note méthodologique, modifiée suite à la réunion du Groupe de référence du 11 décembre 2006.

Pendant la phase préparatoire, les évaluateurs ont eu des entretiens avec une vingtaine d'agents du SPF Affaires étrangères et avec deux ONG belges. Ils ont également étudié le cadre réglementaire les politiques et documents stratégiques pertinents, 30 dossiers de projets concernant les lignes budgétaires *Aide d'urgence et réhabilitation à court terme*, *Transition, reconstruction et consolidation de la société* et *Aide alimentaire*, ainsi que des accords et programmes liés à la ligne budgétaire *Contributions volontaires aux organismes multilatéraux spécialisés en matière d'aide humanitaire*. En outre, les évaluateurs ont étudié d'autres documents pertinents tels que les Processus d'appels

consolidés (CAP) et les Plans communs d'action humanitaire(CHAP), des programmes de pays pluriannuels d'organisations exécutantes telles que le Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM), des évaluations d'autres programmes humanitaires au niveau d'un pays, d'une agence d'exécution ou d'une intervention<sup>131</sup>.

La RDC s'efforce de se remettre après de nombreuses années de conflits armés qui ont secoué au moins six pays dans la région. Ces conflits ont été extrêmement violents, ayant provoqué la mort de 3.9 millions de personnes, des déplacements de populations en masse, des viols répandus et l'écroulement total des services publics. Cette crise complexe a été aggravée par une série de désastres naturels tels que des éruptions volcaniques et des glissements de terrain.

Suite à l'accord de cesse-feu de Lusaka du 1999 et au déploiement de la mission de maintien de la paix de l'ONU (MONUC) le conflit s'est apaisé, mais il persiste à une moindre échelle, principalement dans l'est du pays. Le gouvernement provisoire de la RDC a commencé le désarmement, la démobilisation et la réintégration des anciens combattants et a organisé des élections, fin 2006. Le pays est toujours en transition, instable, avec des zones où la violence persiste et beaucoup des services sociaux de base ne sont pas rétablis.

La Belgique est un des principaux donateurs d'aide humanitaire de la RDC. Au nom du Groupe des bonnes pratiques humanitaires (Good Humanitarian Donnorship Group – GHD), la Belgique a coordonné, avec les Etats-Unis, le programme pilote GHD en RDC en 2004/2005. Avec 44 millions d'Euros, soit 21,9 per cent du budget total, la RDC est le plus grand bénéficiaire du programme humanitaire belge.

Le programme humanitaire belge enRDC couvre une grande variété de programmes et projets soutenus à l'aide de différentes lignes budgétaires. Le programme appuie entre autres le fonds commun (pool fund) de l'ONU pour la RDC, des programmes multilatéraux tels que celui du Bureau de Coordination des Affaires Humanitaires (OCHA) pour la RDC, l'appui de l'ONU aux élections, le programme « Aide aux victimes de violences sexuelles »du Fonds des Nations-Unis pour la population (UNFPA), de l'UNICEF et du Bureau du Haut-commissaire pour les droits de l'homme (OHCR) ; des programmes alimentaires du PAM et de l'Organisation des Nation-Unis pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO) ainsi qu'un grand nombre de projets mis en œuvre par des différents donateurs internationaux (UNICEF, UNHCR), par des ONG belges et internationales (Memisa, BRC, Tearfund). La plupart des projets sont concentrés dans la partie orientale du pays, sauf pour les projets « de transition », basés à Kinshasa et dans l'ouest du pays. La Belgique apporte un appui important à la RDC via ses lignes budgétaires « Prévention des conflits », « Diplomatie préventive »et « Coopération au développement ».

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<sup>131</sup> Entre autre, l'évaluation de l'aide humanitaire des Pays-Bas à la RDC.

## Objectif de la mission

La première visite de terrain se concentrera sur Kinshasa où les principales parties intéressées (Ambassade de la Belgique, Gouvernement de la RDC, les agences des Nations-Unis, les ONG nationales et internationales) ont leur siège. Plusieurs projets seront également visités (voir sélection ci-dessous).

La mission a deux objectifs :

1. Collecter de l'information pour répondre aux questions d'évaluation posées dans le Cahier spécial des charges et la Note méthodologique.
2. Tester et valider la méthodologie de recherche. La visite de terrain montrera la pertinence des questions d'évaluation formulées et la disponibilité de l'information. Cet exercice pourrait mener à des modifications des questions d'évaluation et des indicateurs. Les éventuelles modifications apportées à la méthodologie proposée pour les visites de terrain suivantes seront discutées avec le Groupe de référence en mars 2007.

## Approche, délimitation et méthodes de recherche et de collecte des données

### *Approche*

L'efficacité de l'appui humanitaire belge à la RDC dépend de :

- l'intégration du programme belge dans les actions d'appui humanitaire général pour la RDC
- la qualité du programme dans son entièreté et dans ses composantes individuelles ; et
- la qualité de la gestion de projet.

L'évaluation portera une attention particulière aux facteurs susmentionnés.

Pour apprécier les liens entre le programme humanitaire belge et les autres activités humanitaires en RDC l'équipe d'évaluation étudiera son articulation avec les CHAP et le CAP ainsi que la coordination avec les organisations du secteur humanitaire, les institutions gouvernementales et autres donateurs.

La qualité du programme sera évaluée sur la base des critères d'évaluation de l'OCDE pour l'aide humanitaire. Au niveau du programme, l'équipe appréciera la pertinence du programme, en se concentrant sur la couverture, la proportionnalité, les choix faits par rapport aux secteurs et aux modalités de mise en œuvre. L'équipe analysera également l'efficacité, en soulignant la coordination avec les acteurs nationaux et internationaux de l'aide humanitaire. Etant donné que le pays subit un processus complexe de transition, la connectivité (l'équilibre et les liens entre les composantes d'assistance en urgence, réhabilitation, transition et développement du programme) ainsi que la cohérence (la relation entre le programme humanitaire et les activités financées par la Belgique dans les catégories « prévention des conflits » et « consolidation de la société »). Concernant l'efficacité, une attention particulière sera portée aux délais de mise en œuvre ainsi qu'à la longueur et les coûts de la chaîne de sous-traitance.

Au niveau des projets, les bénéficiaires du programme humanitaire, c.à.d. les personnes en situation d'urgence ainsi que l'appui accordé à ceux-ci constitueront le point de départ de la recherche. L'évaluation souligne la pertinence de la réponse à la crise, telle qu'elle est perçue par les bénéficiaires ainsi que la participation de ces derniers à la conception et à la mise en œuvre du projet. L'évaluation touche également à la prestation des organisations d'exécution sur le terrain, en prêtant attention aux relations entre celles-ci et les bénéficiaires et leurs organisations. L'impartialité, l'indépendance et la volonté de coopération des organisations exécutantes ainsi que l'efficacité des activités (la réalisation des résultats et de l'impact par rapport à l'objectif), la connectivité (l'ancrage dans la communauté locale, les liens avec les pratiques et les institutions locales, la durabilité), la cohérence et l'efficacité (rapidité de l'intervention, sous-traitance) seront également prises en compte.

Cette évaluation emploie une approche basée sur la « chaîne d'intervention » pour analyser l'efficacité de la gestion du programme humanitaire et étudiera la conduite et la connexion entre les acteurs de la chaîne (de « Bruxelles » jusqu'aux organisations exécutantes sur le terrain). L'évaluation étudiera la structure, les rôles / responsabilités et le fonctionnement de la chaîne entre « Bruxelles » et l'Ambassade ainsi que entre l'Ambassade et l'organisation exécutante sur le terrain.

Les questions d'évaluation pour la recherche sur le terrain sont détaillées dans la Note méthodologique.

### *Délimitation*

Pendant cette première mission en RDC, l'accent sera mis sur la gestion du programme, l'ancrage du programme humanitaire belge dans l'ensemble des interventions humanitaires et la qualité du programme dans son ensemble. Pour garder l'équilibre entre la profondeur et l'étendue de l'évaluation, la mission rencontrera plusieurs organismes : le Gouvernement de la RDC, l'ONU, les ONG et d'autres donateurs. Une attention particulière sera accordée à l'OCHA, au rôle de la Belgique dans la coordination du programme pilote relatif à la GHD, à l'ONU (programme de la réforme et l'appui de l'ONU aux élections), au Comité international de la Croix Rouge (CICR) et au PAM. Pour ce faire, l'équipe d'évaluateurs passera la moitié du temps alloué à cette mission à Kinshasa.

Le deuxième centre d'intérêt sera sur la mise en œuvre des projets sur le terrain. L'équipe visitera un nombre limité de projets dans le Kivu de Nord ou de Sud, ainsi qu'à Kinshasa et ses environs. Les visites de projets d'aide humanitaire et d'urgence constitueront l'objet principal de la deuxième visite sur le terrain.

La sélection des projets à visiter pendant les deux missions se fera à partir des critères suivants :

- **Agences de mise en œuvre** : Les activités doivent représenter les différentes agences de mises en œuvre, avec une répartition 50-50 entre les agences multilatérales et bilatérales.
- **Objet de l'intervention** : Une distribution équilibrée entre les projets d'assistance d'urgence, de réhabilitation, de reconstruction et d'aide alimentaire.
- **Secteur** : Une représentation équitable des principaux secteurs du programme belge.



- **Tailles** : Une représentation équitable de projets de différentes tailles
- **Faisabilité** : Possibilités d'observation directe de la mise en œuvre, des résultats, des effets ; possibilité de contact avec le groupe cible, le personnel du projet et les autorités locales. Ceci signifie que des projets récents feront partie de l'échantillon.
- **Groupe cible** : différents groupes cibles seront inclus en assurant une distribution quant à l'appartenance ethnique au sexe et à l'âge.
- **Emplacement** : une répartition sur l'ensemble du territoire qui reflète les priorités du programme belge et la diversité des situations d'urgence dans le pays.
- **Accessibilité** : prendre en compte les distances ; dans la mesure du possible, les projets seront concentrés dans un nombre limité de zones.
- **Documentation** : En principe, uniquement des projets bien documentés seront inclus, sauf raison particulière pour l'inclusion (p.e. proximité).
- **Valeur pédagogique** : les projets avec un bon potentiel pour l'apprentissage en vue de projets futurs pourraient être inclus.

Une liste détaillée des projets à visiter pendant la première visite en RDC doit encore être déterminée. Comme la première visite se concentre sur Kinshasa, l'accent porte notamment sur les activités multilatérales (y compris l'aide alimentaire) et les projets de transition.

La mission envisage de visiter les projets suivants (liste non-exhaustive) :

- Réhabilitation du port de Kinshasa.
- Banque nationale congolaise.
- Appui aux élections en RDC – PNUD.
- Stocks Stratégiques MEMISA.
- Hôpital Mama Yemo.
- Bureau de coordination OCHA.

Une visite d'environ 5 jours est prévue pour le Nord ou le Sud Kivu. Des projets multilatéraux ou bilatéraux financés par la ligne budgétaire *Aide d'urgence et réhabilitation à court terme* et *Transition, reconstruction et consolidation de la société* seront ciblés.

#### *Méthodes de recherche*

A Kinshasa, les entretiens seront la principale méthode de collecte d'information. L'équipe rencontrera l'Ambassade, les représentants du gouvernement et des agences ONU, des organisations de la société civile, les ONG belges et autres donateurs.

Pendant les visites de terrain plusieurs méthodes de collecte d'information seront employées, telles que l'observation directe, des entretiens individuels et collectifs, l'opinion des leaders locaux, du personnel des agences des mise en oeuvre, des autorités locales et d'autres organisations exécutantes.

Pendant la deuxième mission, des entretiens approfondis avec des bénéficiaires et des leaders locaux seront probablement inclus pour mieux comprendre les circonstances et le contexte de vie des bénéficiaires pendant la situation d'urgence, les réponses et les

mécanismes de réponse locales, les aspects liés au genre, ainsi que les relations entre les réponses locales et externes.

En préparation à la visite de terrain, les documents suivants seront étudiés :

- CAP et CHAP
- Plans pluriannuels pour la RDC des agences de mise en œuvre telles que le PAM.
- Dossiers des projets à visiter
- Des évaluations pertinentes d'autres programmes humanitaires au niveau du pays (tel que l'étude d'évaluation de l'aide à la RDC par les Pays-Bas), d'agences d'exécution et d'interventions.

## Programme

Pour la première mission, les évaluateurs répartiront leur temps entre Kinshasa et les visites de projets.

A Kinshasa ils rencontreront des représentants de l'Ambassade, du Gouvernement, des agences de l'ONU, des organisations de la société civile etc., comme suit :

- Ambassade de la Belgique : personnel des sections politique et développement (y compris assistance humanitaire)
- Ministères et agences de coordination du Gouvernement de la RDC (Santé, Education, Transport, Banque nationale). Etant donné que beaucoup d'activités humanitaires belges sont liés à la santé et à l'alimentation, la mission se concentrera davantage sur le Ministère de la Santé et les agences connexes.
- OCHA.
- Organisations multilatérales impliquées dans le programme humanitaire belge (UNHCR, CICR, UNICEF, PAM, FAO) ou possédant une expertise dans le domaine (p.e. OMS pour le domaine de la santé), la Banque Mondiale, le PNUD.
- Coopération technique belge (CTB).
- Des ONG internationales, belges et locales impliquées dans le programme humanitaire belge et des programmes connexes, ayant une représentation dans la capitale.
- Autres donateurs, plus précisément la Finlande, la Suisse (les pays de référence pour comparaison dans cet étude), ainsi que la Communauté Européenne, les E-U.A. (partenaires de la Belgique dans le projet GHD), le Royaume Uni et les Pays-Bas.
- Organisations de la société civile, des organisations locales privées ou publiques impliquées directement dans l'assistance d'urgence, d'autres personnes-ressource (personnalités du monde académique, journalistes, des experts nationaux et internationaux etc.)

Une attention particulière sera portée à :

- L'OCHA, en vertu de l'importance du thème de la coordination des interventions humanitaires et de son rôle dans ce domaine. En outre, le gouvernement de la Belgique accorde un appui important à ce bureau (budget général mais aussi appui dédié spécifiquement à l'OCHA).

- CIRC : La mission se concentrera également sur l'appui général et le financement de programmes spécifiques par le programme humanitaire belge via le CIRC, y compris le volet « protection des populations ».
- PAM : La mission s'intéresse particulièrement à la stratégie pluriannuelle du PAM pour la RDC et à la relation de celle-ci avec les activités soutenues par la Belgique dans le cadre du PAM.
- Une ou plusieurs organisations de la société civile avec une compréhension solide du rôle des programmes humanitaires en RDC.

## Modalités de rapport

A la fin de la visite de terrain la mission tiendra une réunion de débriefing avec le personnel de l'Ambassade sur les conclusions préliminaires, En accord avec l'Ambassade, elle communiquera ces conclusions à d'autres parties intéressées.

La mission présentera ses conclusions sous forme d'une présentation PowerPoint devant le Groupe de Référence à la réunion du 5 mars 2007. Les propositions pour d'éventuelles modifications de la méthodologie seront soumises par écrit avant la réunion. Un rapport de mission complet sera présenté après la deuxième visite de terrain.

## Calendrier et composition de l'équipe

La mission se déroulera du 3 au 15 février 2007. L'équipe sera formée de Mme Anneke Slob, M. Vital Mayele Ndizeye et M. Adriaan Ferf. M. Dominique de Crombrugghe de Lootinghe du Service de l'évaluation spéciale accompagnera la mission.



## Annex II Mission program Kinshasa

Table AII.1 Mission program Kinshasa

Date	Name	Organisation/Function
03/02/07	Arrival Kinshasa	
04/02/07	Preparation/ Documentation	
05/02/07	B. de Schrevel	Belgium Embassy, Agriculture Assistant Attaché, in charge of Humanitarian Assistance
	P.Cartier	Belgium Embassy,
	Visit Harbour of Kinshasa	
	G.Darcis Y.Galvez	Senior Advisor Ministry of Transport and Communications Advisor ADG/ONATRA
	A.Andriamanaonny S-P. Nanitelamio	Coordinateur Commission Electorale Independente Chief Technical Advisor
06/02/07	M. Hadorn	Head of Delegation ICRC
	R. Cooper	DIFID, in charge of Humanitarian Assistance
	J. Nash	USAID, Attaché Humanitarian Assistance
	G. Fernandes	Country Representative OCHA
	A. De Domenico	Manager Pooled Fund
	M. Desmet	Belgium Embassy, Attaché Health.
07/02/07	B. de Schrevel	Belgium Embassy, Agriculture Attaché, in charge of Humanitarian Assistance
	M. Demeure	Country Representative BTC
	R Hans.	Attaché in charge of Humanitarian Assistance
	P. Vercammen	Chef de Bureau ECHO
	M.Hugues Bonte	Caritas
	Y.Hanoteau	Technical advisor CTB
	A.Bloomberg H.Péries	Country Representative UNICEF Senior Programme Officer
08/02/07	C.Vincent	Country Representative PAM
	M.Kassa	Former Humanitarian Coordinator
	L. Vansina / A. Nooy	Memissa DRC / Memissa DRC
	R.Mountain	PNUD, Humanitarian Coordinator DRC
	J. Swinnen	Ambassadeur Belgium DRC
	Departure A.Slob	
09/02/07	M.Vangu Lutete D.Sermand R.Gruenert J.Heseman	Deputy Representative FAO Chef de Mission MSF-B Deputy Country Representative UNHCR External relations Officer UNHCR
10/02/07	Visit Hospital Mama Yemo	
	End of mission.	



## Annex III Programme fieldvisit in Kivu

Tabel AIII.1 Projects visited in Kivu

Date	Programme	Nature
12-04	Arrival Burundi <u>Evaluation Team Burundi</u> : Mr. Augustin: Member	Meeting
13-04	Bujumbura- Bukavu	Travel
	<u>Louvain Development</u> : Mrs Sophie Wyseur, Coordinatrice, Dr. B. Malanda Responsable de Thematique de Sante	Meeting
	<u>Cebumac</u> : Dr. Ghislain Bisimwa, Coordinateur	Meeting
14-04	<u>BDOM</u> : Charles Mushagalusa, Member of the Management Team in charge of Health Projects	Interview
	<u>Louvain Development</u> : Mrs Sophie Wyseur, Coordinatrice	Interview
15-04	Bukavu- Goma	Travel
16-04	<u>WFP</u> : Mrs. A. Shneerson, Chef de Mission Kivu	Meeting
	<u>FAQ</u> : Mrs. A. Constant, Chef de Mission Kivu and all staff	Meeting
	<u>World Relief</u> : Mrs E.Lafortune, Country Director; Mr. K. Ndashinmye	Meeting, Interview
	<u>UNHCR</u> : Chef de Bureau, Mrs. M. Yonekawa	Interview
	<u>OCHA Goma</u> : A. Zadel, Information Officer	Interview
	<u>Women for Women</u> : Mrs. M.N.Cikuru, Project coordinator.	Interview
17- 04	Visit Rushuru area with: <u>WFP</u> Chef de Mission Mrs. Shneerson and Technicians PAM Mr. J.Kasonia. <u>FAQ</u> : Mr. P. H. Bansoba, Mr F.M. Lumpongo <u>World Relief</u> : Mr.K. Ndashinmye, Mr. Serubungo <u>WFP</u> : Visit IDP Camp	Visit
	<u>MONUC</u> Rutshuru	Briefing
	<u>WFP</u> : Centre Nutritionnel Matumaini/Murambi (Caritas), Staff	Visit
	<u>World Relief</u> : Primary School: Directeur, Staff, Parent Committee, Rubare	Visits/ Interviews
18-04	<u>WFP</u> : Camp de PDIS Nyongera ; Camp Committee and IDP's/ Distribution	Visit/ Interviews
	<u>WFP</u> : Ecole Primair de Muhokonzi; Schoolfeeding programme	Visit
	<u>World Relief</u> : Ecole Rwanguba, Directeur, Staff, Parent Committee	Visit/ Interviews
	<u>FAQ</u> : Champ de Manioc de multiplication de bouture de manioque	Visit
	<u>FAQ</u> : Amenagement de marais/ bas fond en Rubare	Visit/ Interviews

Date	Programme	Nature
19-04	<u>WFP</u> : Centre Nutritionnelle de Matumaini (Caritas)	Visit/ Interviews
	<u>WFP</u> : Centre des enfants associe au force et groupes armees Goma (CAJED)	Visits/ Interviews
	<u>WFP/ FAO</u> : Centre de formation métiers Don Bosco Goma	Visits/ Interviews
	<u>FAO</u> : Centre de formation métiers Don Bosco Champ de multiplication de bouture de manoke et autres cultures maraichères	Visits
	<u>World Relief</u> : Ecole Secondaire Perfect, Staff, Parent Committee	Visits/ Interviews
	<u>World Relief</u> : Ecole Secondaire Kihundu; Perfect, Staff, Parent Committee	Visits/ Interviews
	<u>WFP</u> : IDP camp	Visits/ Interviews
	<u>FAO</u> A.Constant ; Chef de Mission Kivu	Interview
20-04	<u>Oxfam GB</u> : Technicien de assainissement; Réservoirs d' Eu et assainissement, Goma	Visit/ Interviews
	<u>Caritas North Kivu</u> : Abbe O. Musuni, Director	Interview
	<u>Inspecteur Provincial de l'Education</u> : Mr. B.Rubakare.	Interview
	<u>UNICEF</u> : Mr. L. Calestini, Emergency officer	Interview
	<u>Solidarités</u> : Mr. R.Mathon: Coordinateur de Programme	Interview
21-04	Goma- Bukavu	Travel
	<u>Oxfam Solidarité</u> : P.Vanholder, Liason Officer	Interview
	Arrival Mr. J. Desmet, FPS Belgium	
22-04	Bukavu- Baraka	Travel
	<u>Oxfam Solidarite</u> : Visit to project site, Mr. Uwaki	Interviews with beneficiaries
23- 04	<u>UNHCR</u> coordinator Mr M Guisse and <u>Tearfund</u> representative Mrs. S.Almer Chedf de Project.	Meeting
	<u>Oxfam Solidarite</u> : Visit to project sites Bitibolo and Lweba	Interviews with beneficiaries and project staff
	<u>Partners UNHCR Baraka</u> .: Caritas, ARCI, Women for Women, IMC, FAO, Handicap International ADES and others	Meeting
	Working diner with staff <u>Tearfund</u> and <u>UNHCR</u>	Informal meeting
24-04	<u>UNHCR</u> Visit to Sebele and Katanga.	Focus group meeting with returnees, interviews village leaders.
25-04	<u>UNHCR</u> Visit to Transit centre	Visit, interviews
	<u>Tearfund</u> : Visit to two school and housing projects. Projectstaff, Mrs. T.Leuring, Programme Director	Interviews with School staff, parents committee and pupils Meeting with Village Committee and Beneficiaries



Date	Programme	Nature
26-04	Cebumac:_Visit to hospital in Kiliba	Interview with Medecin chef de Sector de Santé Doctor M. Lambert, hospital Director Dr . Balagizi and staff and Cebumac Coordinator Doctor G. Bisimwa and project coordinator Doctor Janvier.
27-04	<u>Louvain Development</u> Dr. B. Malanda Responsable de Thematique de Sante and BDOM (partner) Visit to Health Zones of Bagira- Krasha, Nyeantenda and Bukavu Centre	Interviews with Zonal Health Coordinators in Nyantende Dr D. Basedeki and staff, Zonal Health Coordinator Mrs R.Kahamba staff Visits to various Health Centres and zonal offices
	<u>Provincial Health Inspector</u> : Dr M.Burole and <u>Provincial Inspector Primary Health</u> : Mrs Mrs. M. Idumbo	Interview
	<u>BTC</u> : A.Meulenhof and I. Deloof: BTC Experts South Kivu	Informal interview
28-04	<u>Louvain Development</u> : Dr. B. Malanda and <u>BASD</u> (partner) : Visit Health Zone of Miti-Murhesa	Interviews with Zonal Health Coordinator and staff, BASD Technical Advisor
	End of mission	



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# Evaluation Belgian Humanitarian Assistance, 2002-2006

## Country Report Pakistan

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# Preface

The Special Evaluation Service S0.4 has commissioned an evaluation of Belgian humanitarian assistance during the period 2002-2006. This evaluation is carried out by ECORYS. The framework for this evaluation is laid down in the general TOR, and has been described in more detail in the 'Methodological Note' (phase 1 of the evaluation).

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the quality of the humanitarian interventions that have been financially supported by the Federal Government of Belgium. The evaluation will shed light on those factors that contributed to or reduced the quality of humanitarian interventions supported by the Belgian Government, and make suggestions that will support the Government to improve its humanitarian programme and increase the added value.

In the second phase a policy analysis and an analysis of the various budget lines and institutions in Brussels was made. More background information on Belgian humanitarian assistance policies and strategies, organisations and processes, and the various budget lines can be found in the second phase report that has been written as part of the overall evaluation

The third phase consists primarily of four field visits: two to the DRC, one to Burundi and one to Pakistan. The field visits to DRC and Burundi assess the response to long-term complex emergencies; the Pakistan field visit assesses the response to a fast onset natural disaster. This document contains the findings of this visit.

The team would like to thank the present and past Belgian Ambassadors for their personal interest in the visit, the Embassy staff for the warm reception and efficient support, the FAO staff for the excellent organisation of the field visit, and the many people that gave their time, valuable information and opinions to the mission.



# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Framework

In October 2005 a massive earthquake hit Northern Pakistan. The earthquake killed approximately 70.000 people, including 20.000 schoolchildren, displaced 3.5 million people and caused immense material damage to houses, roads, educational and health facilities, government buildings, drinking water and irrigation systems, livestock, fields, et cetera.

In Pakistan the Federal Government of Belgium is represented by an Ambassador. The staff of the Embassy is small and does not include specialised development experts. As Pakistan is not one of the partnership countries, it did not receive structural development funding. Neither did it receive any funding from the Preventive Diplomacy or Conflict Prevention budget lines.

Belgian support started immediately after the earthquake and is still continuing. The Government mobilised the humanitarian instruments and the budget lines B-fast, Emergency and Rehabilitation, Food Aid, and Transition to send an emergency hospital and to fund a number of projects. Recently, with debt swap construction, Belgium made a significant contribution to the ADB managed reconstruction fund. Indirectly, the Belgian Government contributed to the operations of OCHA, UNHCR and IRCRC, who played a central role in the response, as Belgium provides long-term core funding from the Multilateral humanitarian budget line.

Parallel to Central Government efforts, the Flemish Government, various provinces, the Parliament of Brussels, trade unions and the general public provided additional funding.

## 1.2 Scope and Methodology

The assessment of the design and implementation of the interventions<sup>1</sup> at project level will be based on the following evaluation criteria:

- **relevance:** responsiveness to needs, relation to local coping strategies, alignment with Belgian national and local government policies and efforts (among others, the ones related to gender);
- **connectedness:** with the overall development efforts of Belgian and other organisations, and with national opportunities and perspectives;

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<sup>1</sup> See further: Methodological Note, December 2006.

- **effectiveness and impact:** extent of realisation of objectives, effects, coordination at implementation level, coverage;
- **efficiency:** timeliness of the assistance, implementation on time within budget.

Considering the importance of a timely response to natural disasters, e.g. to effectively save lives and assist affected communities in the important first phase of the response, special attention will be given to the **timeliness** of the Belgian humanitarian response.

Further attention will be given to:

- **coordination:** alignment of Belgian-funded activities with national and international actors, considering their importance for an effective humanitarian response, and the support provided by the Belgian Government to OCHA, from the humanitarian budget;
- **LRRD**, the relation between relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases.

As Belgium has no structural development programme and does not fund peace building and conflict prevention initiatives in Pakistan, **coherence** is not a relevant criterion in this assessment.

The assessment of the Belgian response in Pakistan is limited to the five ‘humanitarian budget lines’ that are part of the evaluation: ‘B-fast’, ‘Emergency’, ‘Food Aid’, ‘Transition’ and ‘Multilateral Cooperation’<sup>2</sup>. Reference will be made to other Belgian assistance where relevant.

The assessment of Belgian-funded projects is an important element in the assessment. It is, however, important to be aware that the project assessments are not fully-fledged project evaluations. They serve as an input, together with other information, to responses to the evaluation questions at programme level. Observations on individual projects mentioned in the report are only used to illustrate the points made. They are not evaluative statements on individual activities, unless specifically mentioned.

For more details see Annex 1: Terms of Reference Field Visit Pakistan.

## 1.3 Data Collection Methods

### *Document study*<sup>3</sup>

To prepare the fieldwork, the team studied available documentation, such as:

- project files, which included project proposals, monitoring and final reports, internal assessments, correspondence, etc.
- Flash Appeals;
- external evaluation reports of the ICRC (summary only)<sup>4</sup> and the ECHO response;
- relevant websites (ICRC, OCHA, FAO).

<sup>2</sup> See Terms of Reference of the Evaluation.

<sup>3</sup> See Annex 3, Documentation.

<sup>4</sup> ICRC does not publish its evaluation reports. Extensive summaries are accessible to members of the donor support group and were made available to the mission.

### *Interviews, group discussions and direct observation*

During the field visit the mission met with:

- The Belgian Ambassador and Embassy staff;
- ERRA Deputy Chairman and staff;
- UN Resident Coordinator;
- Former OCHA representative;
- Heads of various UN organisations and the ICRC;
- Staff of IFRC societies;
- Staff of ECHO and ADB;
- Representatives and staff of projects funded by Belgium.

During the field visits to Pakistan administered Kashmir (PAK) and the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) the mission met with individuals and families, village groups (male and female) benefiting from the FAO project, project staff and local officials. Although generally effective for data collection, not all group meetings provided useful information. On one occasion the group focused strongly on requests for additional support (restocking). Though the mission met with one female village group, access with regard to gender was very unbalanced and mainly limited to male beneficiaries. The mission visited a number of farms, irrigation systems and nurseries, villages and towns under reconstruction and a debris dumpsite. These site visits allowed assessing the quality of information provided in the reports and interviews, and balancing it with personal observations.

In Belgium, interviews were held with representatives of implementing organisations (BBRI), the head of the B-fast team and the former Ambassador in Pakistan in charge at the time of the earthquake.

### *Limitations*

- In several interviews other commitments of the Belgian Government in response to the disaster were mentioned, e.g. commitments made at the Pledging Conference in 2005. The mission could not confirm these statements and could not obtain information that confirmed these statements.
- Because of the political situation in Battagram, the envisaged field visit to the shelter project implemented by the Belgian Red Cross was cancelled. The assessment is based on the extensive information provided in the progress reports and interviews in Islamabad.
- The installation of the equipment in the Kashmir Recovery, Recycling and Rehabilitation project was delayed and could not be observed in operation. The field visit was limited to a short visit to the dumping site.
- The field visit was necessarily short (2 days), and the information obtained from beneficiaries on individual activities is consequently limited.
- The activities of the World Food Programme were not included in this assessment.

### *Assessment of available information*

Accepting some shortcomings, the project files and additional information obtained during field visits and in interviews of implementing organisations provided sufficient information for a good understanding of the progress and outputs of the Belgian-funded responses to the disaster. Especially useful were the post-distribution and post-harvest

surveys from two projects, which provided valuable information on the outputs and user satisfaction effects of the activities. ICRC and ECHO external evaluations included some activities that were co-funded by the Belgian Government and thus provided important additional information for this assessment.

## 1.4 Planning

The field research was originally planned for April/May but was delayed, as the envisaged expert, Mr M. Bhatt, could not obtain an entry visa. He was replaced by Mr A. Ferf, who visited Pakistan from 19-29 August 2007.

## 1.5 Programmes and Projects

The following Belgian core funded humanitarian organisations and projects are included in the assessment:

### 1: Humanitarian organisations

The Government of Belgium provides core funding to four humanitarian international organisations on a long-term basis: OCHA, UNHCR, ICRC and UNWRA. This assessment focuses especially on the performance of OCHA in the response.

### 2: Projects

Eight programmes and projects responding to the Earthquake in 2005 have been assessed. To compare response time, one project related to the 2007 floods is also included.

Table 1.1 Belgian-funded humanitarian activities included in the assessment

Activity	Year	Budget (€ )	Status
1: B-fast: Emergency Hospital	2005	135.000	Completed
2. Food Aid: FAO, OSRO/PAK/6004/BEL	2006	1.000.000	Completed
3. Emergency: ICRC, NH/2005/44	2005	1,000,000	Completed
4 Emergency: Red Cross Belgium, NH/2005/31	2005	350,000	Completed
5. Emergency: Red Cross Belgium, NH/2006/04	2006	480.202	Completed
6. Emergency: UNICEF Support to victims of floods WATSAN	2007	?	In progress
7. Transition: Red Cross Belgium 2006-2007, GR/2006/02	2006	1,500,000 Additional funding various Red Cross societies	In progress
8: Transition: Belgium Construction Research Institute, GR/2006/12	2006	403,000 Additional funding Parliament of Brussels (approx. 50.000)	In progress
9: Debt Swap: ADB	2007	Approx. 10. 000.000	In preparation



## 1.6 The Team

Mr Adriaan Ferf (team leader evaluation) visited Pakistan and is responsible for the assessment. He was assisted by Mr Arjan Uweland in the Netherlands and Belgium.



## 2 Evolution of the Crisis Situation, the National and International Response and Institutional Context<sup>5</sup>

### 2.1 Impact

The earthquake of 8 October 2005, measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale, caused massive destruction, death, injury and displacement in northern Pakistan. Never since its foundation has Pakistan been confronted with a natural disaster of such magnitude. The death toll reached over 73.338 with another 69.400 seriously injured, among them many doctors, teachers, community leaders, and government officials, and left more than 3.3 million people homeless. Several towns, hundreds of villages and hamlets were completely wiped out in NWFP and PAK, and the material damage to dwellings, health and educational facilities, government buildings, roads and bridges, economic infrastructure, irrigation systems, land, livestock and crops was enormous.

Table 2.1 Overview impact

Area affected	~30,000 sq. km
Population affected	3.5 million people (500.000 families)
Official casualties	73.338
Children disabled	~10.000
Seriously injured	69.412
Food insecurity	~2.3 million people
Health facilities destroyed or damaged	796
Schools and colleges	6.298
Drinking and irrigation water supply systems	3.994
Roads damaged	6.440 km
Pop. lost homes	~3.3 million people (approx. 600.000 dwellings)
Estimated pop. remaining in remote areas in winter	350.000 to 380.000
Crop losses (maize, rice, fodder)	Value US\$ 101.8 million
Animal loss	Survival rate app. 60%, value US\$ 301.9 million

ERRA – Annual Review 2005 to 2006 and ERRA- UN Early Recovery Plan.

<sup>5</sup> Sources of information for this chapter:

- ERRA - Annual Review 2005 to 2006, 2006.
- ERRA - UN Early Recovery Plan, 2006.
- Cosgrave and Nam, Evaluation of DG ECHO's response to the Pakistan Earthquake of 2005, 2007.
- Interviews with Dep. Chairman ERRA, Mr. Nadeem Ahmed and Mr. McLeod, Relief to Recovery Advisor UN.

An affected area as large as Belgium with a topography of high altitudes posed an enormous logistical challenge for rescue and relief and, together with the rapidly approaching winter, an extraordinary challenge for the people, the Government and the international community.

## 2.2 Relief Phase

The immediate response came from the local population, village and local organisations. Small self-help groups formed in many of the affected areas and were supported by tens of thousands of volunteers, organisations and businesses throughout the country, providing food, blankets, medical assistance and other necessities to the population in need. Although getting limited attention in most reports, neither the size nor the importance of these efforts should be underestimated. They were massive and in the first days after the disaster of essential importance.

The Government mobilized its own resources and directed two divisions fully to the relief efforts. Within 24 hours the army was repairing roads and bridges and evacuating casualties to central hospitals. Within days the Government established the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) staffed with military and civil servants to mobilize and coordinate all resources, and made an internal appeal for assistance. All travel and other restrictions on sensitive areas in Pakistan administrated Kashmir were abolished to facilitate relief efforts.

To identify humanitarian needs and coordinate the international response a team of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Unit (UNDAC) arrived within 24 hours. International NGOs, bi- and multilateral donors responded to the appeal on a large scale with search and rescue and medical teams, transport and logistic capacities, relief goods and funding.

To coordinate the massive relief effort, the FRC and the UN put the newly developed cluster system in place<sup>6</sup>. The FRC mirrored its structure according to clusters and co-chaired the different clusters with a UN organisation. The coordination of the relief effort was effective and planning and implementation driven by needs without interference of institutional interest<sup>7</sup>.

The army played a crucial role in the relief in managing and coordinating (through the FRC), and in the implementation of the relief efforts. Although not everywhere and always<sup>8</sup>, the army was especially effective as already present in the area (where they had lost a lot of staff and infrastructure themselves), had the skills and means to operate effectively in the difficult terrain, operated highly efficiently, was remarkably cooperative and open to share information<sup>9</sup>, and gave humanitarian objectives priority above military

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<sup>6</sup> The cluster system was formally approved in December 2005. The implementation of the cluster system was facilitated by the close involvement in the response of one of the leading UN staff involved in the development of the system.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. the decision on the use of helicopters was totally separate from who delivered the helicopters and whose goods had to be transported.

<sup>8</sup> See e.g. the confiscation of Belgium funded blankets by the Army that was never satisfactory explained.

<sup>9</sup> Even army staff maps indicating all positions of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir were shared to coordinate relief activities.

objectives. The Pakistan Army showed a willingness to learn from the humanitarian community on the organisation of large scale humanitarian responses. Readily available and tested material on the organisation of responses especially the Sphere on the organisation of camps, etc. made an important contribution to learning process.

In the relief efforts the needs of the people above 5.000 feet were addressed first, then moved downwards, preventing the movement of population in large numbers to lower areas, averting congestion in already overcrowded urban centres and of destroyed infrastructure. Emergency shelters and transitional 'self-help' shelter kits were provided, together with the construction of temporary shelters, and supplemented with providing secure and safe shelter to the most isolated 'at-risk' families, resulting in providing basic living conditions during the winter. Camps were established for those who could not find shelter with family or others and required a complete set of services in a secure environment, with about 90 per cent of IDPs in camps having access to safe water and some 70 per cent to adequate sanitation. Medical teams and emergency hospitals were established to provide adequate medical treatment of wounds and diseases. Food was provided to approximately two million people in the affected areas to avoid mal-nutrition. The following table gives an impression of the large scale of the relief effort.

Table 2.2 Overview relief goods provided between Oct. 2005 and March 2006

Relief goods and services	Quantity
Tents	951.790
Iron sheets	Over 5. 000.000
Tarpaulins/plastic sheets	2.200.000
Blankets/quilts	Over 6.000.000
Schools opened	Over 1.000 enrolling 500.000 children
Food distributed	2.000.000 million people
School feeding	Over 118.000 children
Supplementary feeding children < 5 year	20.000 children
Female patients treated in mobile units	100.000 and 900 deliveries
Safe drinking water provided	Over 700.000
Est. pop. to be in camps through winter	297.000
Field hospitals established	65
Field/mobile medical teams	86
Sorties flown	30.334

ERRA – Annual Review 2005 to 2006, and ERRRA - UN Early Recovery Plan.

At the same time, rehabilitation and activities were initiated early on. Numerous cash-for-work initiatives, focusing on camp cleaning, repairs, rubble and debris removal employed thousands of men and women. Simultaneously, the Pakistani Government started preparation of the rehabilitation phase at a very early stage and created the institutional framework, first established in October 2005, with the establishment of the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA). Key staff was transferred from the FRC to ERRA in March and rehabilitation strategies and plans prepared.

The relief operation, which ended in March 2006, was largely successful. The massive movement of people, outbreaks of epidemics and extra mortality due to secondary and tertiary effects of the disaster expected by most relief organisations were all avoided. A

nutrition assessment survey did not show major food deficiencies compared to pre-earthquake levels; no increase in morbidity and mortality rates compared to the same time of year prior to the earthquake was observed.

#### *Relief to transition to recovery*

The relief phase officially ended in March 2006, the FRC was abolished and the responsibility for management and coordination was transferred to ERRA. The early recovery plan<sup>10</sup> for the period May 2006 - May 2007, outlining the strategies, implementation modalities and targets for eight different sectors guiding the early rehabilitation, aimed to bridge the gap between relief and reconstruction phases.

The early rehabilitation strategy for the rural areas focused on supported self-help, providing financial support and technical assistance to the affected population to construct (temporary) housing. This would make it possible to stay in the village during the second winter and to prepare the fields for summer and winter crops ('essential services follow people'). ERRA provided guidelines for earthquake resistant reconstruction to diminish damage and casualties in case of future earthquakes. The reconstruction of the main towns required a different strategy and town development plans were being made. The reconstruction effort aims at Building Back Better, the, by the President proclaimed objective of the reconstruction efforts.

ERRA coordinated all early rehabilitation and, thereafter, recovery efforts. The activities were, in principle, being implemented by the relevant departments, and provincial and local authorities with international organisations providing support and strengthening their capacities. ERRA's structure also mirrored the cluster system that continued to coordinate the national and international early rehabilitation efforts.

Since May 2007 the response has entered the reconstruction phase. By August 2007 nearly all camps had been closed down<sup>11</sup> and the vast majority of the affected population had returned to their villages. Much progress has been made, and in the rural areas the reconstruction of dwellings (generally considered a first priority) is progressing and has reached different levels of completion. Agriculture, livestock and homestead activities have resumed and the reconstruction of village infrastructure, such as irrigation systems, land stabilisation, local roads, water supply systems has started but is often still in the initial stages. While many schools, dispensaries and even Universities are under construction.

Although the initial spirit of altruism, national unity, collaboration and openness could not be maintained throughout and past bureaucratic hurdles, the achievements of the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction response to the 8 October 2005 earthquake have, in many aspects, been remarkable.

Nearly two years after the earthquake struck life in PAK and NWFP is returning to normality, the population living in their partly reconstructed houses or next to their houses under construction, fields being worked and harvests achieving 70-80% of pre-

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<sup>10</sup> ERRA - UN Early Recovery Plan, May 2006.

<sup>11</sup> Within ERRA, the transition cell is responsible for all residual matters such as population that remained in the camps.

earthquake production levels, livestock, although still far below pre-earthquake levels, is slowly recovering, new crops and activities are being introduced, children are going to school, etc. Although the affected towns and villages, roads and infrastructure are still under reconstruction and an enormous effort remains to be made in all sectors and at all levels to achieve pre-earthquake levels, much has already been achieved. The following table provides an overview of progress made up to mid-2007.

Table 2.3 Overview achievements by 1 August 2007

Activity	Progress
Hubs providing low priced building materials	158
Masters and artisans training	26.281 master trainers and 200.000 artisans trained in seismic resistant reconstruction
Rural house reconstruction	332.531 houses under reconstruction; (98% affected received 2 <sup>nd</sup> , approx. 33% the 3 <sup>rd</sup> and 10% the 4 <sup>th</sup> and last instalment)
Urban house construction	24.000 of the 25.000 eligible received financial assistance. Approx 1.750 transitional houses completed (2/3)
Livelihood	260.802 families received cash grants to restart their livelihood. FAO support animal health facilities, several NGOs promote fruits, nuts and medicinal plants. Introducing plants for better returns. 3.000 families received micro credit.
Health	55 transitional hospitals functional funded by INGOs/NGOs. 96 pre-fab facilities functional and 23 under construction. 209 new facilities in various stages of reconstruction. Funding assured for 266.
Education	All facilities operational through interim structures Sponsors: 58 schools completed, 151 in progress, 882 funded GoP: of the 752 planned schools 7 under construction and 356 awarded or bidding prepared.
WATSAN	Completed 653, work started on 1.342, funded 2.232 of a total of 4.035 damaged systems
Telecommunication and power	All links restored through alternative means or temporary measures.

ERRA –Progress report up to 1<sup>st</sup> August 2007.

### *Funding*

Donor response was good: private donors and some 85 bi- and multilateral donors have contributed to the UN and ICRC Flash and other appeals or provided contributions outside the appeals for a total of US \$ 1.166 million.

Table 2.4 Overview humanitarian assistance of main donors up until 28 June 2007 (appeal plus other; carry-over not included), relief goods provided between October 2005 and March 2006

Donor	Funding in million US \$	%
1: Private (individuals and organisations)	266	22.8
2: USA	204	17.5
3: UK	110	9.5
4: Turkey	66	5.7
5: ECHO	60	5.2
6: Norway	58	5.0
7: Japan	42	3.6
8: Netherlands	34	2.9
...		
18: Switzerland	11	1.0
22: Finland	7	0.6
23: Belgium	6	0.5
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1.166</b>	<b>100</b>

Financial Tracking system: [www.reliefweb.int/fts](http://www.reliefweb.int/fts) (table ref: R24).

Private organisations made the largest contribution, as was the case in the Tsunami relief. They were followed by the US and, the former colonial power, the UK. The fifth largest donor, who is also supported by Belgium, was ECHO.

At the donor conference in November 2005, held by the Government, 6.5 billion US\$ were pledged to reconstruction and recovery, 62% of which in loans. By the following March 16% had been disbursed and 48% committed<sup>12</sup>.

### Coordination

The response effort involved an enormous number of rescue and medical teams (approximately 65 emergency hospitals and medical teams were active in the affected areas), UN organisations, international and national humanitarian NGO organisations (180 international and 187 national NGOs in PAK and NWFP)<sup>13</sup> and army units of various countries. As in other large disasters, the architecture of the humanitarian sector created an enormous coordination challenge, but, contrary to many other large disaster responses, in Pakistan coordination was largely effective.

The real-time evaluation of the cluster system<sup>14</sup> states, “It was unanimously confirmed that the success of the relief effort to the earthquake turned on the extraordinary performance of Pakistan’s military and their effective adoption of the cluster system.” and “...the cluster approach did successfully provide a single and recognizable framework for coordination, collaboration, decision-making and practical solutions in a chaotic operational environment.” and: “With the cluster system leads, bearing responsibility for developing consensus on priority needs and mobilizing resources for them, an equitable allocation of funding and overall cost estimation is within reach.”

<sup>12</sup> Pakistan Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, from: Cosgrave and Nam, Evaluation of DG ECHO's Response to the Pakistan Earthquake of 2005, 2007 page 16.

<sup>13</sup> The FAO livelihood assessment 2006.

<sup>14</sup> IASC Real-time evaluation Cluster Approach- Pakistan Earthquake, February 2006.



Pakistan's army and the cluster system are the two main factors of the successful coordination. This is not to say that the cluster system in implementation did not have shortcomings, such as:

- Insufficient understanding of the cluster system and its implications, lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities, lack of HQ support, lack of sector experts with leadership and facilitation qualities to chair clusters, and agency-centric approach of some cluster leaders.
- The cluster system also failed to instil ownership and involvement in the NGO and INGO community and, consequently, prevented good constructive participation in cluster meetings. Simultaneously, the (I)NGOs themselves were not prepared to represent the NGO community effectively in the coordinating bodies. Sometimes, the participating (I)NGOs represented primarily themselves without involving their constituency.
- The existence of the early recovery cluster was appreciated but its role not fully clear. It has contributed insufficiently to creating adequate attention to the importance of early planning of recovery, timely linking relief to early recovery.
- The cluster system contributed to a speedy elaboration of the Flash Appeal, but joint definition of priority needs and mobilising resources was not achieved. With the absence of the CERF (eventually complemented with a pool fund) at the time of response, the cluster system was not complemented with an adequate mechanism for the allocation of resources in the early relief phase.
- The cluster system lacked support of and mechanisms for coordination with the large financial institutions, creating the potential for duplication of efforts.
- It lacked standardised rapid needs assessments and roll-out mechanism for more detailed assessments, planning formats and criteria, and the humanitarian information centre (HIC) needs to be redefined in relation to the cluster system.

With regard to OCHA, relevant because Belgium provides long-term core funding to this organisation, the real-time evaluation makes some critical remarks about its role: "OCHA was rated as having performed marginally in setting strategy and promulgating policies. At times OCHA played a minimalist role and served as a mail box rather than active agent of cross agency interaction." (page 12). The evaluation recommended, "OCHA and the IASC working group should examine how to further develop OCHA's role in the cluster system and refine a cross-cluster coordination framework that ensures representation of IASC members." (Key Action 4).

### *Success Factors*

The response to the 2005 Earthquake has been very successful. It is called, by e.g. the ICRC, 'one of the most successful relief operations in recent history'. Many factors that have contributed to the successful response to this massive earthquake are rather specific to Pakistan, while others were, as ICRC describes, 'of luck'. These factors will not be the same in other disasters. The main factors were:

- *The resilience of the affected communities and the mild winter.* Mainly living in villages in a mountainous area under difficult circumstances with limited resources the population has maintained traditions and structures of mutual support and a high level of perseverance to cope with emergencies. The relatively mild winter of 2005 has certainly contributed as well.

- The *role of the army*. It played a crucial role in management, coordination and implementation of the relief efforts. The army has a central and powerful position in Pakistan, which made it possible for the army to become the central force in the relief efforts. Furthermore, their presence in the area and skills to operate in the difficult terrain also contributed to the army's crucial role. It was remarkably cooperative and open to share information<sup>15</sup> and gave humanitarian objectives priority above military ones, operating with a high level of integrity and impartiality. It showed willingness to learn where it did not have past experience and seek guidance from the humanitarian sector with regard to humanitarian standards and practices. This created the conditions for an *effective civil-military cooperation* between the Army of Pakistan and the national and international humanitarian community<sup>16</sup>.
- The *good coordination* between Pakistani authorities and the humanitarian organisations. Several factors contributed to successful coordination<sup>17</sup>:
  - A clear and effective leadership by the FRC and later ERRA;
  - The adoption of the *UN cluster system*;
  - The decision of the FRC and ERRA to mirror its structure according to clusters and its co-leadership role in the clusters;
  - These two factors stimulated a general spirit of collaboration and resulted in a needs based response<sup>18</sup> instead of a heavy response influenced by organisational interests.
- The *management of the transition from relief to early rehabilitation and recovery* (LRRD)<sup>19</sup>. The Pakistani Government started at a very early date to give attention to this transition and to create the necessary institutional framework. The subsequent decision to end the relief phase in March 2006 (generally criticised at the time), the closure of the camps forcing the population back to the villages, and the start of the rehabilitation in combination with a rehabilitation strategy based on *supported self-help* (financially, with technical assistance and guidelines) for the returned population avoided aid dependence.
- The high profile of the disaster and, consequently, the *generally sufficient resources* for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.

<sup>15</sup> Even army staff maps indicating all positions of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir, were shared to coordinate relief activities.

<sup>16</sup> Even ICRC and IFRC societies collaborated intensively with the military and used its capacities.

<sup>17</sup> There are other factors as well, such as the timely arrival of the UNDAC team, the good personal relations between the military and UN, etc.

<sup>18</sup> E.g. the decision on the use of helicopters was totally separate from who delivered the helicopters and whose goods had to be transported.

<sup>19</sup> LRRD: Linking Relief to Rehabilitation and Development.

## 3 Overview of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance

### 3.1 Volume of Belgian Development Assistance

Belgian DAC funding to Pakistan before 2005 was negligible. Belgium does not maintain a structural development relationship with Pakistan, nor did it fund any Conflict Prevention or Preventive Diplomacy activities. The funding was restricted to one humanitarian activity in 2002 in the form of 0.62 million Euro food aid and a few activities funded under the NGO programme. The following table gives an overview of Belgian DAC assistance.

Table 3.1 Belgian ODA to Pakistan 2002-2006 including humanitarian assistance

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Non-Governmental assistance	70.660	44.951	45.664	187.883	339.865
Humanitarian assistance (excl. Food Aid)		-	-	-	750.000
Humanitarian Food Aid	620.000				1.000.000
Emergency aid by DGOS and B-fast				429.987	1.535.215
Flemish Region and Flemish Society				135.000	161.812
Decentralised Government services (Provinces and municipalities excl Flemish Government)	187.596	13.559	7.000	163.887	190.000
<b>Total ODA</b>	<b>878.256</b>	<b>58.510</b>	<b>52.664</b>	<b>916.757</b>	<b>3.976.892</b>

DGOS Website/statistieken/niet partnerlanden/Pakistan, 2006.

### 3.2 Overview of Belgian Assistance per Humanitarian Budget Line

#### 3.2.1 Introduction

After the earthquake humanitarian assistance increased sharply. The Federal Government Belgium mobilised four of the five humanitarian budget lines.

#### 3.2.2 The four humanitarian budget lines

The following table gives an overview of the activities funded by the four humanitarian budget lines.

Table 3.2 Activities funded by the four humanitarian budget lines

Activity	Year	Budget (€ )	Summary
<b>B-fast</b>			
1: Emergency Hospital, October 2005  (Completed)	2005	135.000	A Field hospital with 22 medical and logistic Belgian volunteers started operation on day 7 (Thursday) of the response in Gahri Doppota, Kashmir, app. 20 kilometres from Muzaffarabad (PAK). For 10 days app. 2000 patients were treated and also 1.700 blankets distributed. 23.10. the field hospital was handed over to Punjab Red Crescent (under supervision of the Ministry of Health) and shifted to Gharri Dopatta. PRC treated another 7.340 patients before handing over the hospital and remaining equipment and stocks in March to the Pakistani Authorities.
<b>Emergency</b>			
2. Emergency assistance for the victims of the Earthquake; Red Cross Belgium (French speaking)  NH/2005/31 (Completed)	2005	350,000	According to early needs assessments purchase and distribution of tents, blankets, kitchen equipment, baskets to affected families were implemented by IFRC/Pakistan Red Crescent Society jointly with the ICRC. From the ICRC survey it can be concluded that user assessments of relief goods is satisfactory to good. Logistic and distribution constraints delayed delivery to some extent. However, during transportation from India, the 12.630 blankets (value € 37.500) disappeared and could never be traced. They are formally to be confiscated by the Army for distribution. Because of large demand for tents the delivery was delayed, with the last lot being delivered at the end of December in the FRC warehouses in Islamabad. From the ICRC survey it can be concluded that user assessments of relief goods is satisfactory to good.
3. Delivery of aid supplies for the survivors of the earthquake; ICRC  NH/2005/44 (Completed)	2005	1,000,000	In response to the Fast Appeal, October 2005, tarpaulins, delivery of shoes, clothes and sheets to the survivors of the earthquake to aid survival through the winter. From a survey it can be concluded that user assessments of ICRC relief goods is satisfactory to good. The choice to deliver tarpaulins instead of tents was very appropriate and as they are lighter than tents, a significantly larger number of families could be provided with emergency shelter; the quality of the first lot of shoes was insufficient but improved by the second lot. Logistic and distribution constraints delayed delivery to some extent.
4. Emergency assistance to the earthquake victims; Red Cross Belgium (Flemish) NH/2006/04 (Completed)	2006	480.202	Distribution of 750 tents, 27.650 blankets in NWFP in January 2006.

Activity	Year	Budget (€ )	Summary
<b>Food Aid</b>			
5. PAM EMOP 10491.0 (Completed)	2005	1.400.000	Not included in the assessment.
6. Emergency provision of essential inputs for restart of small food crop production and preservation of household livestock; FAO 2006-2007 OSRO/PAK/6004/BEL (Completed)	2006	1.000.000	Seed and fertilizer distribution. Kahrif campaign (maize) for 2.500 households and Rabi campaign (winter wheat) 14.700 households in 2006/7 (extension), 15.500 households provided with fertilizer (to supplement USAID), seed and 500 animal sheds, plus technical experts for coordination and assistance to farmers and various international consultancies. The Belgian contribution is part of a large project with several larger donors.  The contribution to the Kahrif 2006 campaign was too limited, not accurately timed and had germination problems. The seeds, fertilizers and support provided to the Rabi campaign were successful, led to increase in land area planted and crops per hectare, compared to non beneficiaries, and was appreciated.
<b>Transition</b>			
7. AID a la Reconstruction; Red Cross Belgium (French speaking)  2006-2007 GR/2006/02 (In progress)	2006	1.500.000	In line with ERRA strategies and guidelines and within the organisational framework, BRC experts organised training and supervised technical support teams for self-help reconstruction of housing in the villages of two districts in NWFP (with over 8.500 damaged houses) through village reconstruction committees; construction of housing for 136 vulnerable families and 2 schools; community based reconstruction of infrastructure (roads, etc.); and psycho-social counselling. BRC developed alternative models for housing in remote, high altitude areas using local materials and technologies that are in the process of approval.  Training and supervision of support teams for self-help is completed, self-help house reconstruction and repair on-going, and house construction by BRC teams and community reconstruction activities have started but are slowed down by violence against Red Cross organisations. The psycho-social activities were therefore cancelled in June.  The psycho-social component was co- funded by various Red Cross societies.
8. Relief Recycling Reconstruction Project; Belgium Construction Research Institute (BBRI)  GR/2006/12 (In progress)	2006	403.000  Additional Funding Parliament of Brussels (50.000)	Installation of mobile demolition material recycling equipment that produces filling materials for roads and house foundations in Muzaffarabad. With the additional funding construction blocks can also be produced. The project will further promote recycling, including training of staff and delivery of parts for 2 years. The equipment will be operated by MCM, the Muzaffarabad Municipality public enterprise  Start of operations, foreseen for July/August 2006, were delayed as equipment was damaged during transport.  Project management and TA is provided free mainly by the BBRI.

The average project size was over 700.000 Euro (not including the Food Aid). This is significant above the average project size of the overall Belgium Humanitarian Assistance.

The resources made available for the response to the earthquake are approximately 4-5 % of the Belgian humanitarian budgets of 2005 and 2006

In several interviews<sup>20</sup> it was mentioned that Belgium pledged significant amounts at the Pledging Conference in 2005, e.g. to UNICEF, but the evaluation team could not retrieve this information from other sources.

### 3.2.3 Multilateral humanitarian assistance

The Belgium Government provides core funding to OCHA, ICRC and UNHCR from the multilateral humanitarian budget- line. The core funding to OCHA, ICRC and UNHCR allows these organisations to maintain permanent organisational and emergency capacity between different disasters, and made an indirect contribution to the response in Pakistan. Belgium did not additionally fund humanitarian programmes provided for Pakistan or the region by these organisations as, e.g., it does in the Great Lakes region.

### 3.2.4 Non FPS sources<sup>21</sup>

Humanitarian funding was also provided from other sources:

#### *Debt swap*

Most significant is the debt swap the Belgian Government agreed to in 2007, and which provides close to 10.000.0000 Euro to the ADB reconstruction fund for construction of schools in the NWFP. Though not from a humanitarian budget-line and outside the evaluation period, it is mentioned in this report as this makes Belgium one of the main donors of the ADB reconstruction programme, and this single contribution is larger than the combined funding from the humanitarian budget lines in the years before.

#### *Federal, provincial and other authorities*

The third party that made contributions are decentralised government authorities such as the Flemish Region and Provinces of Brabant, Antwerp, East Flanders and Limburg.

#### *General public*

Important sources of funding were the contributions made by the general public to non-governmental organisations. With such funding these organisations, e.g. the Flemish Red Cross, could respond fast and played an important role in the immediate relief phase. They exceeded the contributions by the Emergency budget line in the first <sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> Interviews with the former and with the present Ambassador of Belgium in Pakistan.

<sup>21</sup> As complete as possible, but there are likely more 'other' contributions of which we have no knowledge.

<sup>22</sup> Source: Rode Kruis Vlaanderen, Eindverslag Pakistan; Noodhulp voor de slachtoffers van de aardbeving, December 2006.

Table 3.3 Activities funded by other non FPS sources

	Year	Budget (€ )	
9: Debt Swap: ADB	2007	Approx. 10. 000.000	With Norway, Belgium funds the Asian Development Bank project to construct 169 schools in NWFP. Funding became available through a Swap.
10: Flemish society	2005	150.000	10.200 blankets and 3.500 kitchen sets.
11: Provinces	2005	Unknown	800 tents
12: General public (through the Red Cross Belgian-Flemish)	2005	Unknown <sup>23</sup>	75.000 blankets, 60.000 bed sheets, 725 tents, 40.000 galvanised roofing sheets, etc.

It should be noted that the different figures for humanitarian assistance provided in this report are not fully consistent; the DGOS website mentions a total ODA, including humanitarian assistance, 916.756 (2005) and 3.976.893 (2006) Euro, while the FTS mentions approximately 1 million Euro more. Inconsistency of figures for humanitarian assistance was observed earlier (see Interim Report).

### 3.3 Main Actors and Roles

#### 3.3.1 Main actors in decision making and administration<sup>24</sup>

##### *Administration in Brussels*

Preparation, decision-making and administration regarding funding of activities:

A: The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation and their Cabinets for decision-making.

B: The Staff of D2.1. for preparation and administration of relief and transition activities.

##### *Belgian Embassy in Pakistan*

The Belgian Embassy in Islamabad played an important role. It was actively present from day one onwards in the, initially very small, working group formed by some UN agencies, INGOs and other embassies. This group met to organise the international response and participated in coordination mechanisms thereafter. The Belgian Embassy provided useful and timely overviews of the development of the disaster and needs in the early days of the disaster to the administration in Brussels. The staff was heavily involved in the organisation of the B-fast intervention, contributing through organising international and national transport, pre-funding, making staff available to the B-fast team, translation, etc. As Belgium did not have development programmes in Pakistan, the staff of the Embassy was small and did not include development experts. During the crisis, the Embassy was not re-enforced with additional staff as, e.g., was the case for the Delegation of the European Community (reinforced with ECHO staff from Nairobi,

<sup>23</sup> In the FTS an amount of 2.560.180\$ has been mentioned but it could not be confirmed whether this amount relates to this contribution.

<sup>24</sup> See First Interim Report of the evaluation, March 2007 for more details.

Bangkok and New Delhi) and the UK<sup>25</sup>. This constrained the Belgian Embassy in participating in the many coordination meetings later in the relief phase. The role of the Embassy was remarkable, certainly when considering that several staff were affected through losing members of their family, etc. Several interviewees specifically mentioned the active and constructive role of the Embassy.

The Belgium Embassy staff had to cope with serious losses as well as with totally unprepared participating in the relief effort (one staff member was 10 days in the field translating). Mention<sup>26</sup> was made of the support given to other Embassies by their Governments to deal with the traumatic effects of the disaster. This could have been useful for the staff of the Embassy but as far as the team is informed not considered.

Several request for financial support, generally small amounts, were made to the Embassy by local organisations; e.g. by the Pakistan Alpine organisation. The Embassy considered that such support would have been very effective and cost efficient. It could however not respond as it did not dispose of funds to support small local initiatives as some other Embassies have (e.g. the Dutch).

### 3.3.2 Main actors in implementation

#### *B-fast team*

The B-fast team, part of the FPS Foreign Affairs in Brussels, was responsible for the emergency hospital and its staff providing medical assistance in Kashmir.

#### *International organisations*

The Belgian-funded activities of the international organisations ICRC and FAO were involved in needs assessments (ICRC general needs assessment and FAO livelihood assessment) and programme implementation; ICRC was responsible for the distribution of relief items (see above) and the FAO for implementing support to farmers' activities in PAK and NWFP with a number of local and international partners (e.g. Dosti Development Foundation, Diakonie, Malteser International).

#### *Belgian NGOs*

The two non-governmental implementers of Belgian humanitarian assistance are French speaking Red Cross and the Flemish Red Cross. Both obtained DGOS funds for the acquisition and distribution of non food relief goods (tents, blankets, clothing, etc). These were acquired through the Pakistan Red Crescent, Punjab Red Crescent and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Pakistan and India. For the distribution the IFRC and PRC&RC joined hands with the ICRC. Most road-transported goods were distributed by the IFRC and PRC&RC societies, airlifted relief goods by the ICRC. The Shelter Project in the NWFP (GR/2006/02) is directly implemented by the French speaking Red Cross by a local team and two to four international experts.

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<sup>25</sup> See Evaluation of DG ECHO's actions in response of the Pakistan earthquake of 2005, May 2007, page 16.

<sup>26</sup> Interview former Belgian Ambassador in Pakistan.



Table 3.1 Net income Flemish Red Cross; Pakistan Earthquake response

	Amount in Euro
Provinces	53.200,00
Flemish Government	149.968,00
DGOS	480.202,00
General Public	2.443.536,05
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.126.906,05</b>

#### *Private sector*

The Kashmir Recovery, Recycling, Rehabilitation Project emerged from a field visit of parliamentarians of the Brussels Agglomeration. Under responsibility of the steering committee with Construction Federation, Engineers without Boundaries and the Belgian Building Research Institute (BBRI) the BRR is responsible for the project management.

Among the implementing organisations are no international or local NGOs. These organisations are excluded from receiving emergency funds according the Royal Decree.

### 3.4 Coordination of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance

The success of the coordination has been described in Chapter 2. The organisations implementing Belgian-funded projects respected the coordination efforts and participated in the coordination mechanisms. FAO and WFP were in cluster lead roles and their activities were an integral part of the coordinated relief efforts. The Red Cross and Crescent family cooperated well within the cluster system, making significant contributions to the health, food, water, protection and shelter clusters (the IFRC had a coordinating role in the shelter cluster). Senior staff sometimes spending as much as 30% of their time in coordination meetings in the first month<sup>27</sup>. BBRI is not present in the country but identified the project in close cooperation with and with consent of ERRA and is part of the ERRA planning and monitoring framework<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>27</sup> External Evaluation of the ICRC Rapid Deployment in Pakistan, Executive Summary.

<sup>28</sup> See ERRA Progress Report 01 August 2007; the project is specifically mentioned.



## 4 Assessment of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance at Project Level

### 4.1 Relevance

All projects except one were responding to high-priority humanitarian needs of the population mostly affected.

Though there was some over-capacity in provision of medical services by medical teams and emergency hospitals<sup>29</sup>, this was not so in the isolated location of the B-fast field hospital.

The distributed relief goods, seeds, fertilizers and fodder, and the support to house and animal shelter construction responded to the needs as established in the needs assessments. There are no indications of significant errors in the needs assessments, although probably more seeds were locally available than originally foreseen. This shortcoming had, however, no impact on the relevance of the seed distribution as the initial distribution was small and also included fertilizers. The project documentation mentions the most vulnerable population as a target group. Not much information was available whether the distribution reached this group specifically. Considering the pre-earthquake levels of poverty, the fact that many of the better-off people left affected areas after the earthquake, and the (limited) information on beneficiaries in monitoring reports, there is no reason to doubt that vulnerable groups benefited from the relief efforts.

Many project and other documents, such as the ERRA-IASC Early Recovery Plan, were very explicit on the importance of addressing women's needs and involving women in the reconstruction process. The evaluation felt that these were often more intentions and that realistic strategies, addressing the complexity of gender aspects in this very conservative area<sup>30</sup>, were missing. The mission could not assess the extent to which Belgian-funded projects were addressing gender issues because the FAO and ICRC monitoring reports did not provide gender specific information. The reports did not note the gender of the interviewees<sup>31</sup> nor categorise opinions according to gender. The following observations

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<sup>29</sup> Evaluation of DG ECHO's actions in response to the Pakistan earthquake of 2005, May 2007, page 30, states, "In case of the Finnish Red Cross hospital there were less patients than originally foreseen, partly because of the number of hospitals and medical teams, and partly because of the large numbers of people that were airlifted out."

See for the same argument the Executive Summary; Evaluation of the ICRC Rapid Deployment in Pakistan

<sup>30</sup> Even female staff were often not accepted, as they came from outside the area. In certain parts of the NWFP women hardly ever leave the house and communicate through the walls with their neighbours. A former UNDP project could only train the husbands who were supposed to train their wives on, e.g., WATSAN issues (interview, former project manager).

<sup>31</sup> Considering the position of women, certainly in the NWFP, most interviewees expressing their opinion on kitchen sets, clothing, tents, etc. were probably men.

do not provide a full understanding but are worthwhile mentioning. The absence of female doctors in the B-fast team has already been mentioned. UNFPA noted that the presence of female doctors improved accessibility for women and attendance of women of the health services increased dramatically<sup>32</sup>. FAO focused mainly on male farmers but also developed female-led house nurseries to increase women's income and considered to introduce a female farmers' school in their farmers' schools extension programme. The BRC implemented a reconstruction project supporting women in dealing with their grief but had to cancel this because of local opposition to any specific attention to women's needs. As a specific gender issue, the return of men after the earthquake from other parts of Pakistan or abroad and the subsequent loss of income was observed<sup>33</sup> but the mission did not detect specific strategies to address this.

The importance of school buildings for education is, in general terms, obvious. There certainly are issues that impact on the relevance of school construction, such as accessibility for vulnerable groups and female students, quality of education and the role and importance of non-government suppliers of education (that were not included in the reconstruction programme), but these were not assessed during this visit. The ADB team mentioned that it had included availability of staff in the criteria for selection of schools for reconstruction.

The relevance of the RRR project is, from a humanitarian perspective, questionable. The building materials produced (granules, filling material for foundation of housing and road works) are certainly relevant, considering the large construction effort needed in the coming years, but the materials are also already available in the area. Although there probably will be some contribution to environmental safeguarding, this will be limited, as the dumping site does not create an immediate environmental hazard. Considering there is a rapid decrease in supply there also is no scarcity of dumping space. This is not to say that the project is not viable from an economic and long-term environmental perspective (protection of riverbeds, prevention of land slides, saving fuel, introduction of recycling technologies, influencing policies, etc.). The importance from the perspective of the affected communities is, however, not conclusive.

## 4.2 Connectedness

The relief goods were mainly purchased at local markets with the exception of a portion of the blankets and tents when the local industry could not cope with demand during the first months of the response. These were imported from India and China. Seeds were also purchased locally, though there were quality constraints. In the FAO project attention is given to improve quality and certification in Pakistan.

House reconstruction has an orientation towards the future, as the building guidelines of ERRA, used in the housing reconstruction programmes, provide earthquake resistant housing. Similarly, the designs and technologies for high-altitude housing developed by the CRB team are expected to be earthquake resilient. Construction skills are

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<sup>32</sup> Interview Country Head UNFPA.

<sup>33</sup> This is also mentioned in the ECHO evaluation.

strengthened at various levels: skilled labour is trained in new construction methods and designs and, in turn, is providing training and technical support to village committees. Materials used are produced in Pakistan or locally (blocks).

The re-start and support to of agricultural and livestock production has a clear short-term restoration purpose with regard to livelihoods, and a longer-term development perspective (introduction of different varieties, fertilisers and technical assistance, introduction of improved animal sheds).

The construction of permanent buildings for educations has a clear development perspective. Construction will be standardised and prefabricated, most probably not by local but by foreign construction companies.

The RRR project has mainly a development perspective, re-using existing materials for house and road construction, and includes activities to stimulate recycling.

Belgian support is provided during the relief phase (5 projects), (early) rehabilitation (2 projects) and reconstruction phases (1 project). Without considering the debt swap, the emphasis was on primary relief and, secondly, on rehabilitation. Including the debt swap, the emphasis was on reconstruction. As these projects are part of the early rehabilitation and reconstruction plans, the Belgian Government has contributed to link relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction through funding.

### 4.3 Effectiveness and Impact

The relief and rehabilitation efforts were generally effective (see Chapter 2). This was, among others, an effect of the good coordination, which resulted in excellent collaboration. The cluster system provided a good coordination mechanism. The Belgian-funded organisations operated within this framework and coordinated well with others, making their contribution to the success of the relief and rehabilitation efforts.

The contribution of OCHA, core funded by the Belgian Government, with a mandate in the coordination of the humanitarian sector, was, however, assessed critically<sup>34</sup>. It was, e.g., observed that the 'Who does What Where' analyses per sector (WWW analysis) were made late, and OCHA's capacities to provide strategic leadership were questioned.

Implementation of the various activities that were funded by the Belgian Government was generally effective. The B-fast team provided effective health services as close as possible to affected communities under difficult circumstances, which were highly appreciated. The team treated 2000 patients, provided vaccinations and made several trips to more isolated locations in the mountains. The most serious cases were referred to the larger emergency hospitals in Muzaffarabad. The Punjab Red Crescent subsequently took over the hospital and treated another 7.400 patients. The choice of a small and light field hospital that could reach isolated locations was effective; most others field hospitals had

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<sup>34</sup> See IASC Real Time Evaluation of the cluster approach, Pakistan Earthquake, 2006.

to be established in central places, such as Muzaffarabad. However, the B-fast equipment arrived in Pakistan on day five, becoming operational on day six. This is rather late<sup>35</sup>, as most lives are saved in the first days immediately after the disaster. Some suggestions were made that could have increased effectiveness. The presence of the team in Pakistan for only 10 days was considered (too) short. B-fast was fortunate that the Punjab Red Crescent Society was in a position to continue the services. It was also suggested that the team would have benefited from the presence of female doctors/specialists and more general practitioners to treat disaster-related general health problems (instead of fractures)<sup>36</sup>. The intervention showed a further need for more financial elbowroom for B-fast<sup>37</sup> to overcome unexpected problems inherent to such operations.

The distribution of relief goods was generally effective, as can be concluded from internal evaluations<sup>38</sup>, and there are no indications of significant over-supply of relief goods or duplication in the distribution, as had been the case in the Tsunami response. The composition of the non-food item packages reflected needs, and the distribution was well targeted, though little can be said about the gender sensitivity of the distribution. The availability of helicopters on a large scale and the good collaboration with the military, especially for transport and security, contributed significantly to the effectiveness of these activities. Effectiveness is, considering the scale of the operation, the conditions of the terrain and the necessary speed because of the on-coming winter, remarkable. Implementation through the Red Cross and Red Crescent, however, could have been faster. It is understood that the national Red Crescent organisations were not prepared for a disaster of this magnitude. They initially did not recognise the need for external support and their volunteers lacked experience with distribution<sup>39</sup>.

The obvious exception to the generally effective distribution of Belgian-funded relief goods is the disappearance of blankets during the transport of Project NH: 2005/31. During transportation from India 12.630 blankets (value of 37.500 Euro) disappeared and could never be traced<sup>40</sup>. Formally, they were confiscated by the army for distribution (but this has not been convincingly proven) and there is no proof of their distribution.

The FAO support was appreciated by farmers and resulted in increased yields in comparison to farmers who had not benefited from the programme<sup>41</sup>. The intervention started rather late. It is generally accepted that livelihood recovery activities need to start as soon as possible<sup>42</sup>. The input distribution for the 2006 summer crop was, however, on a limited scale, sometimes the inputs arrived (too) late, while the seed quality was not fully satisfactory. Only with the input distribution for the winter crop for the 2006/2007 harvest and the 2007 summer crop FAO was fully effective. FAO's core business apparently lies

<sup>35</sup> International search and rescue teams react faster and the teams from France, UK and Germany were operational on the 9<sup>th</sup> (EEC message no. 3).

<sup>36</sup> Interview Punjab Red Crescent Society.

<sup>37</sup> The Belgian Embassy needed to advance sizeable amounts.

<sup>38</sup> Executive Summary; Evaluation of the ICRC Rapid Deployment in Pakistan, 2007.

ICRC Post-Distribution monitoring; Non food Distribution, March 2006.

<sup>39</sup> See also Evaluation of DG ECHO's actions in response of the Pakistan earthquake of 2005, May 2007.

<sup>40</sup> It could be understood if the blankets had disappeared in the affected areas with the chaotic circumstances. But assuming that they left India and arrived in Pakistan, they did disappear in the province of Punjab (not affected by the earthquake).

<sup>41</sup> FAO, Summary of 2006 Kharif Post-harvest assessment.

FAO, Summary of 2006- 2007 Rabi Post-harvest assessment.

<sup>42</sup> See also Evaluation of DG ECHO's actions in response of the Pakistan earthquake of 2005, May 2007.

more in development, and FAO is still to fully adapt its structures and procedures to be able to move fast in emergency response activities.

The support provided to construction in two districts in NWFP is effective<sup>43</sup>. The strategic and organisational framework in which the project was embedded (clear self-help strategies, building guidelines, coordinating agencies, etc.) has contributed to the effectiveness of project implementation in general. The standardised construction guidelines were, however, not suitable for construction at isolated high-altitude locations. The steps taken by the project to develop alternative solutions and the efforts to adapt the guidelines are appreciated. Project progress has recently slowed due to security problems; the construction of new houses for vulnerable families and the community infrastructure component progress only sluggishly. The approach and activities of the psycho-social component were not convincing. The activities were also difficult to implement because of the strong, widespread local opposition to activities involving women in high altitude villages of NWFP. This component, which was only partially funded by the Belgian Government<sup>44</sup>, was cancelled in the summer of 2007 for security reasons.

The effectiveness of the RRR project could not be assessed, as the equipment had not yet been installed<sup>45</sup>.

## 4.4 Efficiency

Efficiency, in terms of timeliness of the Belgian-funded activities, has been discussed in the previous chapter and it was mainly in terms of timeliness that critical observations were made.

The timeliness of the activities in the field is also dependent on the duration of decision-making. This duration in the FPS is difficult to assess as the formal documents and dates of approval do not reflect the realities. Provisional approval by the Minister is often communicated by telop, on which most agencies can act with their own resources while awaiting the completion of the administrative requirements<sup>46</sup> and formal approval. The telops were often not found in the project files.

From these files and reports, it was observed that the Minister approved:

- The first request for funding of relief goods within 48 hours after the disaster (BRC-French);
- The second request for funding of relief goods on 26 October 2005 (in response to the Flash Appeal of the ICRC on 17 October);
- The third request for funding of relief goods in January 2006<sup>47</sup>;
- The FAO Livelihoods project in early February 2006;
- The BRC housing projects (probably) in March 2006;

<sup>43</sup> As far as can be assessed from documents and interviews the field visit had to be cancelled because of security concerns.

<sup>44</sup> The main share was funded from the CRB's own resources.

<sup>46</sup> The evaluation is not fully convinced of MCM capacities to operate the equipment in a viable and thus sustainable manner.

<sup>47</sup> Formulation of Royal Decree, approval by Inspector of Finance, etc.

<sup>47</sup> The approval dates of this project could not be found in the file. The CRB final report mentioned that the goods were purchased in January 2006 (CRB-Flemish).

- The RRR project in September 2006.

In summary, the Belgian Government committed approximately 1.5 million Euro within the first month (20% of the total funding) and approx. 3.5 million Euro (60%) within the first three months (the debt swap is not included in the calculation of the percentages). This does not compare negatively with ECHO who had committed 50% of its funds within the first three months.

However, the ECHO external evaluation stated, “However, the rules and regulations under which ECHO operates mean that contracts can only be signed at a slow pace.” and “The way in which ECHO works makes it a donor primarily for the second stage of the response rather than for the acute stage”; “Clearly the greatest potential to save lives occurs at the very beginning of the response but this is also the time when the agencies responding know least about the context.” It is in the very early phases of the disaster that the affected population is most reliant on external assistance and most lives can be saved.

These observations also partly apply to the Belgian funding of the response. The procedures of the Emergency budget line, as defined in the Royal Decree, require a detailed project proposal to be prepared before funding can be committed, which excludes funding in the acute stage, also making Belgium a donor of the second phase. But, impossible for ECHO, in the case of the Pakistan response (as in the Tsunami) the ministers decided to shortcut the procedures in some cases and communicated their (provisional) decision to fund relief good supplies; in one case a positive decision was communicated within 48 hours. However, in the Belgium response to the Pakistan floods in mid-2007, it took approximately two months after the project proposal for 400.000 Euro sent by the Belgium Embassy to Brussels before a positive decision was communicated to UNICEF. The evaluation could not establish under which circumstances the ministers decide to shortcut the procedures. This is also not clear to the receiving organisations<sup>48</sup>. The examples of the Pakistan Earthquake and Floods suggest that scale and visibility play a role.

The Red Cross organisations used their internal emergency funds to respond immediately to the first needs, replenishing these funds with contributions by the general public. The Flemish Government was also able to make funds available fast.

Efficiency in terms of cost efficiency is not part of the evaluation, but the following observations can be made: cost inefficiencies resulting from oversupply, bad targeting and duplication of efforts were not observed, neither is it likely that these have occurred on a significant scale. It was observed that the house construction was faster and at lower costs as among others in Sri Lanka after the Tsunami; among others the guided self-help strategy contributed to higher efficiency. Furthermore, it is obvious that, because the difficult terrain required substantial use of helicopters (over 30.000 sorties were made for delivery, planning, monitoring and supervision), the cost of the relief operation per unit were high.

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<sup>48</sup> Interview in Belgium with one of the humanitarian NGOs prior to the mission.



## 4.5 Visibility

During the field visit the labelling of packing material of seeds and fertilizers with “gift of the Belgian Government’ was observed.

It was especially the performance of the Belgium Embassy staff in the first weeks after the disasters and the interest the Belgium Embassy staff shows in the organisations<sup>49</sup> implementing the programmes that have contributed to the Belgium visibility<sup>50</sup>.

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<sup>49</sup> Such as the visit of the Belgium Ambassador in 2007 to FAO that was well published in the FAO newsletter.

<sup>50</sup> Comment made by Mr. M.Goffin, Ambassador in Islamabad.. .....à l'occasion du deuxième anniversaire de la catastrophe le 8 octobre, et en présence du Président Musharraf, la Belgique a été mentionnée de manière très visible dans toutes ses activités humanitaires depuis 2005 (urgence B-Fast- reconstruction BRC, recyclage gravats- Debt Swap). Suite au Debt Swap conclu en janvier 2007, nous sommes devenus un donateur privilégié et très « visible » de la reconstruction, à travers la Banque Asiatique.



## 5 Conclusions and Recommendations

### 5.1 Conclusions

Overall, the conditions for a successful response to the 8 October 2005 earthquake were created by: the leadership of the Pakistani Government and Army in combination; and, among others, the early adoption of the cluster system as the main structure for coordination; early recognition of the importance of a framework and plan for early relief; early termination of the relief phase; assisted self-help strategies; and levels of funding.

The success of the response once more confirms the importance of national Government and institutions, in this case mainly the Pakistan Army, as well as of local organisations and people in the disaster response. It underlines the importance of disaster preparedness.

These circumstances are exceptions and not likely to occur in future disasters. They contributed crucially to the success of the response and need to be kept in mind when assessing the overall very positive conclusion that the Belgian Government's response effort was highly relevant and effective.

These exceptional circumstances also hide many of the shortcomings of the architecture of the humanitarian sector, such as its large-scale fragmentation, lack of effective coordination, high turnover and unequal levels of professionalism of staff. It is too early to conclude that the UN humanitarian reform has solved the inherent problems of the sector, and the response in Pakistan<sup>51</sup> confirms that the need for further sector reforms remains.

The contribution of the Belgian Government was relatively small, compared to the country's size and level of economic development, and remained behind the benchmark countries Switzerland and Finland. Considering the response was generally sufficiently funded and the many other international (often un-met) needs, the Belgian level of funding from the humanitarian budget lines was adequate. Moreover, the recent debt swap more than doubles the Belgian contributions and puts it on par with the Swiss and above the Finnish contributions.

Considering that it will take three to four years before pre-earthquake levels of assets, production and social services will be re-established, the duration of the Belgian Government funding (covering a period of three years<sup>52</sup> and if adding the debt swap even longer) is adequate. Noting that the Belgian Government has funded projects in all three

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<sup>51</sup> Also, in Pakistan there were many hundreds of international organisations involved in the response.

<sup>52</sup> Based on the expected budget neutral extension of some activities presently in progress.

phases of the response and a choice of activities, it has facilitated the linking of relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction. Belgian humanitarian assistance is not withdrawn prematurely and the set of instruments for humanitarian assistance (B-fast and budget lines for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction) proved to be adequate in this instance.

The choice of partners was adequate. The number of humanitarian organisations involved in the Belgian Government's response was limited and the average project size was above average for Belgian humanitarian aid. The partners were primarily international organisations (WFP, FAO, ICRC) who have important mandates in the provision and coordination of humanitarian assistance, and, secondary, the Belgian Red Cross societies, who had relief goods purchased and delivered by the organisations in Pakistan integrated in the Red Cross family structure. The number and choice of organisations limited the fragmentation of the response efforts. Except for one, all partners were either experienced humanitarian organisation well embedded in Pakistani realities and with establishments in Pakistan or local associates.

The projects supported by Belgium and the B-fast intervention were largely relevant from a humanitarian perspective; they were well coordinated and connected and largely effective. Most of the critical observations relate to efficiency, specifically in terms of timeliness.

These observations are made in relation to the different (sub) phases of the relief operation: during the acute relief phase (the first days after the disaster crucial to saving lives) the B-fast team, although to be complemented for being operational with volunteers within six days, was not yet operational. The Red Cross family, especially the Federation, had limitations with regard to the timely delivery and distribution of relief items, and the FAO was late to respond to livelihood needs.

The experiences in the response in Pakistan provide some lessons with respect to the humanitarian instruments the Government has at hand to react to large-scale natural disasters:

- Local response in the days immediately after the disaster is of crucial importance. In Pakistan, as in the Tsunami in 2004, the population and its organisations responded immediately and on a large scale. The present instruments do not allow small-scale financial support to these local organisations, e.g. identified by the Embassy or other trustworthy organisation close to the disaster, they do not allow for local NGO funding; this excluded funding of the Punjab Red Cross when taking over the B-fast field hospital and strengthening their disaster preparedness capacities.
- Immediately available funding is essential. The Belgian Red Cross organisations could make funds available in the (very) short term from their own emergency funds. These funds played as important a role in the immediate relief phase response as the Belgian Government funding. These funds are, however, dependent on replenishment by the general public, which is only possible with high profile, high publicity disasters, such as the Pakistan earthquake or the Tsunami; much less so with the present floods. They have shown to be an effective instrument but the Emergency budget line does not make financing these emergency funds (nor the CERF) possible.
- Sufficient, immediately available relief goods (either from central stocks or immediate delivery contracts) and staff are essential. The Emergency budget line

does not allow for financing the provision of emergency stocks and staff. The only budget line that can finance these activities is the Multilateral budget line. That the first international experts of OCHA and ICRC (core funded by this budget line) were operational in Pakistan within 24 hours to assist in the coordination of the international effort is an indication of the importance of this funding.

- The Emergency budget line restricts funding to Belgian NGOs and international organisations, narrowing the choice of partners in many countries to the UN and the Red Cross/Crescent family (including the Belgian Red Cross). This probably shifts the balance to the international organisations excluding important alternatives that maintain emergency stocks and staff, have significant implementation capacities and often establishments and networks in countries affected by disasters.
- The new budget line Transition (since 2005) proved to be an important addition to the humanitarian instruments. The Emergency budget line limits the duration of the project to a maximum of 18 months (with a maximum extension of six months), which is adequate for early rehabilitation but often not for rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes. Rehabilitation and reconstruction projects are of longer duration<sup>53</sup> and with the Transition budget line the whole recuperation period has been covered so that relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction could be linked. The lack of criteria for the Transition budget line creates the risk of funding activities that have a limited or no direct humanitarian relevance.
- The administrative procedures of the Emergency budget line are more adequate for the second phase of the relief phase and for the rehabilitation and reconstruction phases. The procedures are based on ex ante control and, consequently, time is lost to formulate and assess proposals before a decision can be taken. Ex ante control is not adequate to the early relief phase as in the early days of the response information is still highly unreliable requiring flexibility to adapt quickly when new information becomes available and capacities and time for meeting administrative requirements are scarce. The Belgian Government demonstrated in this crisis, as in the Tsunami crisis, a high level of flexibility and willingness to cut short the procedures. However, the criteria that were applied when deviating from standard procedures and using this 'fast lane' are not clear.

Disasters are not going to diminish generally or in Pakistan, as the floods of 2007 demonstrate. Strengthening the disaster response capacity and investing in disaster prevention and mitigation are therefore important but are not included in the present Belgian portfolio in Pakistan and can only be funded indirectly<sup>54</sup> with present instruments.

The presence and constructive attitude of the Belgian Embassy from the earliest moments until today is highly appreciated in Pakistan. The immediate involvement in the organisation of the response resulted in up-to-date information provision to emergency staff in Brussels and contributed to early coordination. The personal involvement of the staff contributed importantly to the speed and implementation of the B-fast support. However, this could not be sustained throughout the relief phase. When the response

<sup>53</sup> They are often larger and based on participatory design and implementation.

<sup>54</sup> E.g. through a Belgian NGO.

operation achieved its full size the staff was too small in number to participate in the relevant forums.

Belgian visibility in this crisis and the respect it earned from the Pakistan authorities, the UN and other donors was probably best served with the impressive performance of the Belgian Embassy. As the excellent performance was the result of individual interest and commitment to humanitarian response and not from a structured preparation by e.g. staff training or simulations exercises, not all embassies can be expected to have an equal effective performance.

## 5.2 Recommendations

To increase the effectiveness of its humanitarian assistance, it is recommended that the Belgian Government increases its support to disaster preparedness of national Governments, relevant national institutions and local organisations.

To increase its effectiveness as a donor for immediate relief responses it is recommended that the Belgian Government revises the humanitarian instruments with regard to funding for sustaining stocks and relief staff for immediate mobilisation, developing options for pre-funding arrangements of first-stage relief activities, and considering creating the options of funding local responses.

To increase transparency of the decision-making process it is recommended that the procedure for fast decision making (the shortcut or fast-lane) on emergency funding is institutionalised and criteria established.

To increase its choice of partners, especially outside the Great Lakes region, it is recommended to create the option of funding qualified international humanitarian INGOs with permanent response capacities, significant in-country experience and local networks.

It is recommended that Belgium uses its position of influence on the boards and in donor support groups of the UN agencies:

- To address the shortcomings these organisations have shown in the Pakistan relief operations.
- To clarify and strengthen OCHA's position in the cluster system and to strengthen its capacity to provide strategic orientation.
- To strengthen the position of NGOs in the cluster system<sup>55</sup>.
- To use its influence in the international financial institutions to stimulate better coordination with the humanitarian cluster coordination.

It is recommended that the Belgian Government discusses with the Belgian Red Cross organisations and the IFRC the bottlenecks in delivery and distribution of relief items, and identifies possible actions and support needed to increase efficiency.

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<sup>55</sup> The NGO sector needs to simultaneously strengthen its capacities to operate in the cluster system, be prepared to participate in leadership and develop models for representation.

It is recommended that B-fast learns from the Pakistan experience and its implications for, e.g., its team composition<sup>56</sup>, flexibility to meet operational costs, easy access to cash during the operation.

It is recommended to consider temporary strengthening of staff of small embassies to cope with additional work and relieve the lack of humanitarian experience in case of large-scale disasters. This is especially relevant if staff have been directly affected by the disaster<sup>57</sup>.

It is recommended that the Embassies in countries that are particularly vulnerable to disasters or conflicts are prepared to respond effectively among others by regular updating on new developments, internal workshops, staff training on the organisation of humanitarian response and in case of a high likelihood of the outbreak of a major conflict, simulation exercises. This task could be attributed to D.2.

It is recommended that the Belgian Government continues to support sector rationalisation efforts, such as the cluster system, CERF, collaboration efforts of INGOs etc., and continues putting the GHD principles into practice, among others, by increasing transparency of emergency funding decisions, basing decisions on needs, reliability of funding through long-term (core) funding arrangements of key humanitarian organisations (not necessarily only multilateral and international organisations), etc.

---

<sup>56</sup> This is not to say that B-fast needs to be operational in the first days. The medical needs, however, evaluated over time and another team composition and duration are perhaps more adequate after the first few days.

<sup>57</sup> Some organisations provide psycho-social counselling for staff.





# ANNEX I : Terms of Reference

## Terms of Reference for the Field Visit to Pakistan and Desk Study of Sri Lanka as Part of the Evaluation of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance

### 1. Introduction

The Special Evaluation Service S0.4 has commissioned an evaluation of the Belgian humanitarian assistance during the period 2002-2006. This evaluation is carried out by ECORYS. The framework for this evaluation is laid down in the general TOR, and has been elaborated in more detail in a “Methodological Note” (phase 1 of the evaluation). The second phase consisted of a policy analysis, and an analysis of the various budget lines and the institutions in Brussels. The third phase consists primarily of four field visits; two to the DRC, one to Burundi and one to Pakistan as well as a desk study of the activities financed in Sri Lanka. This document contains the detailed TOR for the field visit to Pakistan.

### 2. Background

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the quality of the humanitarian interventions that have been supported financially by the Federal Government of Belgium. The evaluation will shed light on those factors that contributed to or reduced the quality of the humanitarian interventions supported by the Belgian Government and make suggestions that will support the Government to improve its humanitarian programme and increase the added value.

The assessment of humanitarian activities in Pakistan and Sri Lanka supported by the Belgian Government are an important part of the evaluation as it concerns the two

responses to natural disasters. The projects are financed out of three budget lines: 'B-fast', 'Food Aid' and 'Emergency'.

More background information on Belgian humanitarian assistance policies and strategies, organisations and processes and the various budget lines can be found in the second phase report that has been written as part of the overall evaluation.

### 3. Objective of the Mission

The mission and desk study have the following objective:

*To assess the quality of the Belgian humanitarian interventions in Pakistan and Sri Lanka.*

As the number of humanitarian activities in Pakistan and Sri Lanka are limited, the study will focus on the assessment of the individual projects and the role of the Embassy in identification, monitoring and evaluation.

### 4. Approach and Research

#### *Data collection methods*

The two primary methods used for data collection are desk research and interviews:

#### **Desk research (for Pakistan and Sri Lanka)**

The following documentation will be studied:

- Relevant Emergency Appeals;
- Projects dossiers;
- Relevant other evaluations of humanitarian programmes of implementing agencies and interventions (such as the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition);
- Monitoring visit report of the staff of D2.1.1.

#### **Project visits and interviews (for Pakistan)**

In this mission the evaluators will visit the projects sites when relevant and conduct interviews with beneficiaries, project implementation staff, local authorities and organisations, other actors active in the same area and emergency coordination mechanisms e.g. OCHA.

The mission will conduct (telephone) interviews with the staff of the Belgian Embassy, relevant national authorities and the staff of the implementing agencies

#### *Projects to be analysed*

The Belgian Government has supported six humanitarian projects in Pakistan and seven in Sri Lanka in the period 2002-2005.

The following projects in Pakistan are included:

#### *B-Fast*

	Year	Budget (€ )		Dossier
Earthquake October 2005	2005	135.000	22 medical and logistic staff sent to Kashmir to set up a field hospital. Field hospital is transferred to local Red Crescent	No file available, only some emails.

#### *Food Aid*

	Year	Budget (€ )		Dossier
2. PAM	2005	1.400.000	EMOP 10491.0	Not available
3. FAO	2006	1.000.000 (?)	?	AU

#### *Relief and short-term rehabilitation*

	Year	Budget (€ )		File
4. Delivery of aid supplies for the survivors of the earthquake to come through the winter.	2005	1,000,000	CICR, NH/2005/44	AU
5. Tents and kitchen equipment (earthquake)	2005	350,000	Red Cross Belgium, NH/2005/31	AU
6. Relief aid for the victims of the earthquake (Kashmir): tents, blankets, food for homeless	2006	480.202	Red Cross Belgium, NH/2006/04	AU

#### *Transition*

	Year	Budget (€ )		Dossier
7. Reconstruction	2006	1,500,000	CRB, GR/2006/02	AU
8. Reconstruction	2006	403,000	BBRI, GR/2006/12	AU

A project assessment form has been developed based on the overall methodology that will guide the analysis of the selected projects in the field.

The following projects in Sri Lanka are included in the desk study:

#### *Food Aid*

	Year	Budget (€ )		Dossier
1. Rehabilitation fishery	2005	1.500.000	FAO/TCEO, OSRO/SRL/501/BEL	Not yet available
2. bisc., ndls	2005	349.968	PAM, EMOP 10401, 20006/15	Not yet available

#### *Relief and short-term rehabilitation*

	Year	Budget (€ )		Dossier
3. Relief aid victims Tsunami in Sri Lanka	2004	247.188	RKV, NH/2004/49	AU
4. Rehabilitation and reconstruction in district de Galle, Tsunami du 26/12/2004	2005	823.000	Sol. Protest. , NH/2005/16	AU

#### *Transition*

Project	Year	Budget (€ )		Dossier
5. Defensive transport cargo with Antonov	2005	321,950	GR/20005/03	AU
6. Skills development for econ. empowerment and creation of livelihoods	2005	1,326,825	GR/20005/14	AU
7. Reconstruction schools and hospitals and rehabilitation fishery (boats and infrastructure)	2005	283.436	Déf. Nat., NH/2005/09	AU

#### *Evaluation criteria*

The methodological report presents the evaluation questions and indicators to be used for the assessment of the design and implementation of the interventions. The following criteria have to be taken into account (in Annex 1 more detailed questions per evaluation criterion are presented).

- **Relevance** of the project; responsiveness to needs, relation with local coping strategies, alignment with the Belgian (among others related to gender), national and local government policies and efforts.

- **Connectedness** with the development efforts of Belgian and other organisations and national opportunities and perspectives.
- **Coherence**, Relation with peace building and conflict prevention initiatives, among others of the Belgian Government.
- **Effectiveness and impact** in terms of realised results (outputs, outcome and impact) and the realisation of objectives.
- **Coordination** at project and country level, both among Belgian actors and external coordination

Given the limited scope of the Belgian humanitarian interventions in Pakistan and Sri Lanka and the limited resources available for this study, it is realised that no detailed assessment can be made of all evaluation criteria. Main attention will be given to the assessment of relevance, coordination and effectiveness.

## 5. Planning and Composition of the Team

Mr Adriaan Ferf is responsible for the fieldwork in Pakistan and the desk study in Sri Lanka, and is scheduled to visit Pakistan from August 19<sup>th</sup> until 29<sup>th</sup>. Mrs Adriaan Ferf and Mrs Anneke Slob will assure the integration of the case studies in the overall evaluation of Belgian humanitarian assistance. They will also be responsible for quality assurance.

## 6. Reporting

The mission will present its findings on the activities in Pakistan and Sri Lanka in two reports of a maximum of 15 pages each, excluding an Executive Summary.



## ANNEX II : Programme

Date	Programme	Nature
<b>Tuesday 03.08.</b>	Telephonic interview Mr. Johan Vyncke, BBRI	Interview
<b>Sunday 19.09.</b>	Arrival Islamabad	Travel
<b>Monday 20.09.</b>	Mr. Michel Goffin, Belgian Ambassador in Pakistan	Meeting
	Mr. Jan Vandemoortele, Resident Coordinator Pakistan	Interview
	Mrs. Hosai Rahimi, Belgian Embassy (member B-fast team)	Interview
	Mrs. Farzani Allaz, Deputy Director ERRA; Mr Irfan Ullah, Project Responsible KRRR	Interview
	Mr. Yasub Ali Dogar, Pakistan Red Crescent Society Punjab. Mrs Yasmeen Lari, Member Board ERRA, Heritage Foundation Pakistan	Interview
	Mrs. France Donnay, Country Representative UNFPA	Interview
	Mr. Michel Goffin (host), Mr. Yasub Ali Dogar, Mr. Yasub Ali Dogar, John Blunt, Mrs Yasmeen Lari, Alexander Pejicic, Mr. Phillipe Grusson	Working Dinner
<b>Tuesday 21.09.</b>	FAO: Mr. Mohammed Farah, Country Representative a.i., Mr. Said Mohammed Ali, Assistant Representative Mr. Tim Vaessen, Emergency Coordinator, Mr. Faizal Bari, Technical Coordinator. Mrs. Rabyaa Amjad, Communication Officer Dosi Development Foundation: Mr. Irfan Rajput, Executive Director	Meeting
	Mr. Alexander Pejicic, Belgian Red Cross Mr. Phillipe Grusson	Interview
	Mrs. Fasil Tereza, MSF Head of Mission	Interview
	Mr. John Blunt, Asian Development Bank Mr. Miam Straukot Shati, ADB, Team Leader EEAP Team	Interview
	Mr. Andrew Macleod, Relief to Recovery Transition Advisor, UNDP/ ERRA	Interview
<b>Wednesday 22.09.</b>	Lieut. Gen. Nadeem Ahmed, Dep Chairman ERRA. Mr. Andrew Macleod, Relief to Recovery Transition Advisor, UNDP/ ERRA	Interview
	Dr. Tamur Moueenuddin, Health Specialist UNICEF Mr. Andrew Parker, Senior Project Manager UNICEF	Interview
	Mr. Haris Siddiqui, Billiton Pakistan	Interview
<b>Thursday 23.09.</b>	Mr. Pascal Mauchle, Head of Delegation, ICRC	Interview
	Islamabad- Abbotabad	
	Mr. Tim Vaessen, Senior Emergency Coordinator, Mr. Faizul Bari, Technical Coordinator, Mr. Khalid Rasool, Agronomist, Mr. Zia- Uddin, Agricultural Engineer, FAO	Meeting FAO NWFP team

Date	Programme	Nature
<b>Friday 24.09.</b>	FAO: Mr. Tim Vaessen, Senior Emergency Coordinator, Mr. Faizul Bari, Technical Coordinator, Mr. Khalid Rasool, Dep. Technical Coordinator, Mr. Zia- Uddin, Agricultural Engineer, Mrs. Abida Gul, Community Forestry, Imtiaz Ahmad Assistant Field Coordinator. Dosti Development Foundation: Col. (R) Kahlid, Administrative Director Mr. Faisal, Mr. Jawad. Water Committee, Village Community Group, various nursery holders and farmers.	Field visit NWFP to: Bisan Village, Balakot, Showal Mazola and Garlat villages (Nurseries, irrigation schemes, animal sheds, fields)
<b>Saturday 25.09.</b>	FAO: Mr. Tim Vaessen, Senior Emergency Coordinator, Mr. Salahuddin Field Coordinator AJK, Mr. Faizul Bari, Technical Coordinator NWFP, Rashid Chichi, Engineer, UNDP: Bashrat Khan, Community development Supervisor. Department of Agriculture: Mr. Safdar Husain, Deputy Director Agricultural Extension, Mr. Tanweer Hussain, Field Assistant. Male and female members of Community groups in Malsi Bala. A.o. the President, Mr. Pavaiz Mugzal and Mr. Sectly, Sultan.	Field Visit PAK: Malsi Bala village. Community meetings.
	Visit to dumping side in Muzaffarabad of the Kashmir Recovery, Recycling and Rehabilitation Project. Interview Staff Municipal Cooperation Muzaffarabad.	Site visit and Interview
<b>Monday 27.09.</b>	Mr. Alexander Pejicic, Mr. Phillipe Grusson, Belgian Red Cross	Interview
<b>Tuesday 28.09.</b>	Mr. Michel Goffin, Belgian Ambassador	De-briefing
	Mr. Christophe Reltien, ECHO	Interview
	Mr. Thomas Glue, Economic Security Officer, ICRC	Interview
<b>Wednesday 29.09.</b>	Return flight to the Netherlands	Travel
<b>Monday 03.09.</b>	Mr. Johan van Dessel, Assistant Head Division BBRI	Interview
	Mr. Luc Sas, Head B-Fast	Interview
	Mr. Patrick Renault, Former Belgian Ambassador in Pakistan	Interview



## Annex III : Documentation Pakistan

### *Project dossiers*

- Project dossiers, including project proposals, progress and final reports, correspondence of the projects included in the evaluation.

### *Books/ reports*

- ALNAP, Asia Earthquake 2005, Learnings from previous recovery operations, 2006
- Cosgrave and Nam, Evaluation of DG ECHO actions in response to the Pakistan Earthquake, 2005
- ERRA, Rebuild, Revive with Dignity and Hope, Annual Review 2005 to 2006, October 2006
- ERRA, Rebuild, Revive with Dignity and Hope, Progress Report 01 August 2007
- ERRA, Livelihood Rehabilitation Strategy
- ERRA- IASC Country team, ERRA- UN Early Recovery Plan, March 2006
- FAQ, Household Food Security, Vulnerability and Market Assessment in Earthquake Affected Areas, March 2007
- FAQ Representation Pakistan, Monthly News, various newsletters 2006-2007
- FAQ, Livelihood Survey April- June 2006, 2006
- FAQ, Summary of 2006 Kharif Post-harvest assessment
- FAQ, Summary of 2006-2007 Rabi, Post-harvest impact assessment
- FAQ, Impact of Post-harvest Accelerated Capacity Building of Farmers through demonstration plots 2006- 2007
- Hamdani and Pakistanhamdani, Lack of coordination between INGOs regarding shelter kits during Pakistan earthquake, July 2007
- IASC, Real Time Evaluation, Application of the IASC Cluster Approach in the South Asia Earthquake, February 2006
- IFRC and FRCS, Appeal no 05EAo25, Revised 25 October 2005
- ICRC Midterm Report — January to May 2006
- ICRC, Economic Security Assessment, 11/11- 11/12, 2005
- ICRC, Post-Distribution Monitoring Results March 2006
- ICRC, Pakistan administrated Kashmir, Livestock Evaluation, May 2007
- Nadeem and McLeoyd, Non- Interfering Coordination- the key to Pakistan's successful relief effort, Draft, 2007
- OCHA, Evaluation of disaster response agencies of Pakistan, November 2006
- OCHA Financial Tracking System, Various Tables

- United Nations, Report on implementation of global cluster capacity building, 1 April 2006-31 March 2007
- Reed, Caversazio, Nuttall, Rapid Deployment in Pakistan following the 8 October 2005 Earthquake
- UNFPA, Pakistan Earthquake UNFPA Response, 2007

# Evaluation Belgian Humanitarian Assistance, 2002-2006

## Country Report Burundi

Client: Special Evaluation Service of Development Cooperation, Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation

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## Preface

The Special Evaluation Service S0.4 has commissioned an evaluation of Belgian humanitarian assistance during the period 2002-2006. This evaluation is carried out by ECORYS.

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the quality of the humanitarian interventions that have been financially supported by the Federal Government of Belgium. The evaluation will shed light on those factors that contributed to or reduced the quality of the humanitarian interventions supported by the Belgian Government, and make suggestions that will support the Government to improve its humanitarian programme and increase the added value.

The framework for this evaluation is laid down in the general ToR, and has been described in more detail in the 'Methodological Note' (phase 1 of the evaluation). The second phase consisted of a policy analysis and an analysis of the various budget lines and institutions in Brussels. The third phase consisted primarily of four field visits: two to the DRC, one to Burundi and one to Pakistan.

The assessment of humanitarian activities supported by the Belgian Government in Burundi is an important part of the evaluation, as Burundi was the second largest receiver of Belgian humanitarian aid from 2002-2006.

This document contains the final report of the field visit in Burundi. The draft evaluation report was discussed at a meeting of the Evaluation Steering Committee on 18 June 2007. Discussion in the Steering Committee and some written comments guided the revision of this report.

More background information on Belgian humanitarian assistance policies and strategies, organisations and processes, and the various budget lines can be found in the synthesis report of the overall evaluation.

The team would like to thank the staff of the Belgian Embassy for the warm reception, openness and support given to the mission. It also expresses its thanks to the staff of the many organisations and projects interviewed during the visits to Bujumbura, Ruyigi and Cankuzo.



# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Framework

Since its independence in 1962 Burundi was one of the main recipients of Belgian international assistance. However, since the downswing of the security situation in 1993, many countries cancelled their bilateral assistance and Belgian bilateral assistance was more or less frozen too. The Belgium-Burundi cooperation agreement was not cancelled and, on a small scale, some projects continued. During the period under review peace and stability were re-established and Belgian financial assistance, based on the extended humanitarian assistance concept that the donors had agreed, increased rapidly, reaching nearly 27 million Euro in 2006<sup>1</sup>.

## 1.2 Mandate and Structure of the Evaluation

In the first phase, the framework of the evaluation has been elaborated in more detail in the “Methodological Note”. This note presents the evaluation criteria, based on the OECD-DAC evaluation guidelines, to be used in the assessment of the design and implementation of the interventions, research questions and indicators. These criteria guided the field evaluations and are reflected in the terms of reference for this study (see Annex 1).

The criteria at project level are:

- **Relevance** of the project; responsiveness to needs, relation with local coping strategies, alignment with Belgian (among other related to gender), national and local government policies and efforts.
- **Connectedness** with the development efforts of the Belgian Government and other organisations and national opportunities and perspectives.
- **Effectiveness, impact (in terms of effects) and sustainability**, the realisation of objectives, effects, coordination at implementation level, coverage.
- **Efficiency** in terms of timeliness of the assistance.

And at programme level:

- **Coherence**, relation with peace building and conflict prevention initiatives, among others, of the Belgian Government.
- **Coordination**.

The visit to Burundi was prepared by collection and review of project documents in Brussels. The field visit was undertaken over the period 14 to 27 May 2007. The list of

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<sup>1</sup> DGOS statistieken partnerlanden Burundi, 2006.

persons met is included as Annex 3. Some targeted research on refugees over the period 27 May to 7 July has also been carried out and is presented in Annex 2.

### 1.3 Data Collection Methods and Evaluation Approach

Information for this case study was obtained primarily through a combination of document review, semi-structured interviews and successive debriefings with staff, and project visits. The field visits enabled the team to carry out some direct observations, and collect complementary evidence. The team members had prior experience of the humanitarian aid programmes in Burundi, which was used for the evaluation.

#### *Document study*

To prepare the fieldwork the team studied available documentation, such as:

- Belgian country plans and policy documents;
- CAP, CHAPs for Burundi from 2002 to 2007;
- monitoring reports by embassy staff;
- evaluation reports of the UNHCR programme in 2002, and of Danchurchaid Humanitarian Mine Action 2006;
- dossiers of the projects that were to be visited and other relevant project dossiers;
- Dutch evaluation study of humanitarian assistance to the Great Lakes Region;
- World Bank and IMF assessment reports.

During the field visits the team collected complementary written evidence.

#### *Interviews and meetings*

The persons interviewed were the primary stakeholders of the projects, and they were met in the course of the visit in Bujumbura and visits to project sites. Individual semi-structured interviews and de-briefing sessions with the staff of the visited organisations were the main data collection method. These revolved around the narrative reconstruction of project activities, and questions progressed by addressing the key evaluation criteria.

In Burundi contact was made with the Government of Burundi, the Belgian Embassy and the agencies implementing the projects.

The mission met with:

- The Second Vice President of Burundi, Mr. Pier Claver Rurakamvye;
- The Ambassador of Belgium in Burundi, Mr. Anton Broecke;
- The Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA);
- The United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (Unicef);
- The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
- Solidarité;
- The Refugee Education Trust;
- A number of government officials;
- Representatives of other donors;
- Numerous beneficiaries.

### *Direct observation*

The team visited as many project sites as possible in the time available to assess the quality of the information provided in reports and to balance this information with their own observations. To avoid biased information the team visited a number of sites without prior preparation and participation of implementing organisations.

### *Approach*

The approach adopted by the evaluation team is based on an in-depth review of a sample. From the broad sample and the activities visited, structural findings are extrapolated based on recurrent patterns of strengths and weaknesses. This reflects the emphasis given in the ToR to the processes of funding, strengths and weaknesses, as well as the OECD-DAC criteria.

For the interviews the team resolved to let the projects speak for themselves. Since the evaluation criteria revolve around the definition of outcomes, the evaluators were careful to use the definitions of outcomes used by the respondents, which entailed that the focus was on the use made of project outcomes as understood locally by the respondents. This was not necessarily the same as the way in which these were couched in the project documents. This understanding of the stated outcomes in implementation is an important benchmark in the appraisal of performance, as it often happens in humanitarian aid that changes in the context mean that projects have to adapt.

In countries affected by crisis it is often difficult for the respondents to differentiate an evaluation mission from a mission tasked with the identification of new phases of projects and preparation of new funding. This leads to requests for more funding, formulated more or less explicitly in interviews, while seeking to please the analysts with positive judgements about the interventions under review. Previous experience in the country, using other sources of information and direct observation, allowed the evaluation to avoid the risk of this kind of bias in responses.

## 1.4 Planning

The field visit was undertaken over the period 14 to 27 May 2007. The team visited as many project sites as possible in the time available (12 days for the field visit) in the Provinces of Cankuzo and Ruyigi.

Since all the projects (with the exception of Solidarité Protestante, which was dropped from the sample, and ICRC, where the project had been finalised in 2005) have been implemented in the Provinces of Cankuzo and Ruyigi, these were selected for visits. Evidence from the Province of Makamba was also used, based on a previous evaluation. The team visited all the agencies present on the ground, as well as some of the authorities. In the provinces the team carried out interviews in Cankuzo and Ruyigi towns, and visited project sites situated in a four-hour travelling radius around those towns. A visit was made to the Muzenze transit camp and border post against Tanzania near Mishiha to review the situation of the repatriation of refugees and reported cases of *refoulement*. Face-to-face debriefings were held at all stages of the evaluation visit with the agencies reviewed, with the exception of UNICEF where this was done by telephone.

## 1.5 Project Sample

The project sample was selected and presented in the country ToR on the basis of the following criteria:

- A balanced representation of activities implemented by multilateral agencies and NGOs;
- A balanced representation of sectors;
- A balanced representation of budget lines;
- Project size (seeking projects in the medium range); and
- Sufficient number of projects either very recently completed or still ongoing.

Projects of organisations that were already included in evaluation of the DRC were not taken into account, so as to optimise the number of different organisations covered by the overall assessment.

Table 1.1 Table of programmes and projects included in the sample

Description	Year	Organisation	Budget (in €)	Covered through
Aide à la réintégration des populations rapatriées de Tanzanie	2006	UNHCR (implementing through a variety of agencies)	1.000.000	Interview & observation
Amélioration des conditions de vie des populations vulnérables de la province de Cankuzo	2006	Med. du Monde Belgique (implementing through Solidarité France)	400.000	Interview & observation
Soutien aux écoles secondaires des provinces orientales	2005	CARAES (implementing through Refugee Education Trust)	488.953	Interview & observation
Réhabilitation d'infrastructures d'approvisionnement en eau, sensibilisation sur l'hygiène et promotion de l'assainissement de base en milieu scolaire et au niveau des communautés dans les provinces de Rutana, Bururi, Ruyigi et Cankuzo.	2004	UNICEF (implementing through Solidarité and other NGOs)	420.000	Interview & observation
Réhabilitation des systèmes hydrauliques dans la ville de Kayanza (bénéficiaires: population de Kayanza et déplacés internes)	2003	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	758.500	Interview
Réhabilitation pour sinistrés, rapatriés et déplacés à Makamba : réhabilitation agricole et reconstruction d'écoles.	2004	Solidarité Protestante (implementing through Adventist Development & Relief Agency)	501.175	Project prematurely closed down
<b>Food Aid</b>				
Semences diverses	2004	Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)	370.000	Reference to earlier evaluation of project
Semences diverses	2004	Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)	580.000	Reference to earlier evaluation of project
Semences, outils, engrais	2005	FAO (implementing through Solidarité and	500.000	Reference to earlier evaluation of project

		other NGOs)		
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The Food and Agriculture Organisation programmes in Makamba Province were not visited during the course of this evaluation, but information collected within the framework of a previous evaluation of Netherlands humanitarian aid covering the same period and carried out by the same consultants<sup>2</sup> was used.

The project ‘Réhabilitation pour sinistrés, rapatriés et déplacés à Makamba’ had to be dropped from the sample. This project was implemented by Solidarité Protestante through the American organisation Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), registered in Burundi and operating through Action Contre la Pauvreté Burundi. However, both organisations suffered from financial irregularities, were closed and the project was cancelled one year before the country visit. As both organisations were not present in Burundi any more the chances to observe the results were minimal<sup>3</sup>.

## 1.6 Limitations of Evidence

The limitations of the methodology have been laid out in the Methodological Note dated November 2006. They revolve around two key factors:

1. The limitations of much agency reporting in the field of humanitarian aid. This is caused by a high degree of staff turnover, unpredictable changes in operations that legitimately require a departure from the original planning documents, as well as by the paucity of reliable indicators concerning the population assisted.
2. The project focus of this phase of the evaluation. This is due to the concentration on key agencies in the country and a greater density of information about implementation than about strategy and budget cycles.

Consequently, the analysis is based on what has been described as the “project cycle” (Section 2.4 of Methodological Note), i.e. the communication of objectives, the allocation of tasks to stakeholders, and the monitoring and evaluation of results.

The project reports often present numbers of beneficiaries as indicators of performance. The team has chosen not to represent these figures here for the following reasons:

- Beneficiary numbers are often unreliable, as they are based on lists, which include occasional beneficiaries as well as recurrent ones, and may include double counting.
- The type of aid to a beneficiary varies by agency and sector of assistance. For example, one returnee quoted by UNHCR will receive a comprehensive and sustained form of assistance in UNICEF supported schools but may be assisted only once by FAO as part of a household.
- The definition of a beneficiary tends to focus on the recipients of an output of aid (e.g. a training workshop, those receiving tools, those who register as persons expelled from Tanzania), but this does not reflect the people for whom the assistance

<sup>2</sup> Evaluation of Netherlands Humanitarian Assistance in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, 2006, Channel Research

<sup>3</sup> The financial irregularities in ADRA also affected the ADRA-implemented project in South Kivu (DRC). Tearfund-UK was contracted and completed the project.

has an outcome (parents of children receiving meals in schools) or an impact (people in the border areas visited by persons expelled from Tanzania).

## 1.7 The Team

The evaluation team was comprised of Mr Emery Brusset (team leader) who has been an evaluation consultant with a focus on humanitarian aid for the last twelve years, and Mr Augustin Ngendakuriyo, an evaluation consultant based in Burundi with a focus on planning and audit methodologies. Final editing of the report was done by Mr. Adriaan Ferf.



## 2 Background to Belgian Humanitarian Assistance in Burundi

### 2.1 Evolution of the Crisis Situation

#### 2.1.1 Political context

Since its independence in 1962 Burundi was in the grip of an ever-increasing polarisation within society, as demonstrated by the massacres of 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1991. In 1993 political tensions between ethnic groups rapidly degenerated into civil war. As security degenerated, a massive displacement of the population took place, economic activity dropped and social services disintegrated. With little prospect for recovery, donors reduced their financial assistance, further destabilizing the country<sup>4</sup>, while the economic blockade by neighbouring countries caused additional hardship<sup>5</sup>. Many regional experts now believe that, whereas the murderous intensity seen in Rwanda was not matched in Burundi, the number of people killed in the civil war in Burundi since 1993 for ethno-political reasons has been similar.

In 1999 a start was made on the process that would result in the continuous political transition Burundi has successfully gone through over the period of the evaluation. This year, the country has emerged from an embargo on trade and transport, while a peace agreement was expected to be reached, as was the resumption of international development aid. After the failure of several internally negotiated power sharing agreements, the Arusha process started, and the former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, led regional negotiations between twenty parties involved in the conflict.

The peace has been negotiated in stages<sup>6</sup>. The first principal result, the Arusha agreement, is a thorough and balanced reflection of the 20 parties' wishes for political representation and access to political power, and is based on a series of unanimous resolutions. The three protocols (I, II, IV) establish a clear and ambitious programme of action aimed at advancing the cause of reconciliation, democracy and reconstruction in Burundi, often based on an assumption of international assistance.

*Protocol I*, which focuses on the nature of the conflict, includes the establishment of two justice mechanisms: an International Judicial Commission of Inquiry and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. *Protocol II*, which deals with democracy and good

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<sup>4</sup> IMF Country Report Aug. 2007, Report 06/307

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Mediated by UNSRSG Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, Carter Center, Community of Sant Egidio, Julius Nyerere, the Regional Initiative on Burundi chaired by President Museveni, Nelson Mandela, Jacob Zuma.

governance, lists power sharing principles and outlines a complex election system that would protect minority rights. *Protocol IV* provides a roadmap for economic aspects of the post-conflict period. All these have been contingent on international presence, monitoring, and resources.

The second landmark was a ceasefire agreement between the transitional government, led by President Buyoya, and the party of Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza signed on 16 November 2003. This complemented the ceasefire agreement with two minor rebel groups (the CNDD-FDD faction led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL faction led by Alain Mugabarabona) reached earlier in 2002. This agreement anticipated full integration of the current Burundi army and the FDD.

Following the signing, an African Union force with South African, Ethiopian and Mozambican troops was deployed in the spring of 2003, and replaced a year later by a UN peacekeeping force authorized on 1 June 2004, present until October 2006.

The balance between political and social (in)stability has remained precarious. The past rampant military-related insecurity, the chronic breakdown of civil order, attacks and intimidation against individuals and aid agencies have diminished but continue to plague the country. In the provinces of rural Bujumbura and Bubanza armed clashes between the Burundian army and the Front National de Libération (FNL) continued until 2006, and violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law principles by all parties to the conflict remain widespread. The conditions of overall economic and social vulnerability, manifested by low agricultural production, unemployment, malnutrition, loss of human development, epidemics, displacement and mortality from violence maintained a fragile environment and triggered a series of short crises - and required and still require continuous assistance so as not to slip into another major political crisis.

But the process that started in 1999 has cumulated in a little publicised but exceptionally steady success of recovery and reduction of violence. During the evaluation period the new authorities succeeded in leading a stable process of post-crisis rebuilding, demobilisation, integration of rebel groups in one army, nomination of a former rebel to the Presidency, national elections without serious incidents, and started negotiations with the remaining rebel fraction still carrying arms. At the time of the evaluation, for the first time since 1993, no gunshots could be heard in Burundi and sudden displacements of people have stopped.

The following table gives a chronological overview of the principal events:

Table 2.1 Principal events since the start of negotiations in 1997

April 1997	Beginning of peace talks, blockade partly lifted
August 2000	Arusha Peace Agreement
November 2001	Transition government installed with a three-year mandate
December 2002	Ceasefire with several groups of rebel movements
November 2003	Largest rebel movement (CNDD-FDD) agrees to peace and joins Government in mid-2004
December 2004	Integration of armed ex-rebel movement units into new army and police force; beginning of demobilisation programme
August 2005	Second democratic elections
May 2006	Negotiations begin with last rebel movement (FNL)

IMF Country Report Aug. 2007, Report 06/307.

## 2.1.2 The impact of the crisis<sup>7</sup>

### *Introduction*

The social and economic decline started in the period after independence but had been significantly accelerated by the civil war since 1993. Social indicators used by the World Bank<sup>8</sup> are disquieting. Burundi still ranks 169 out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index. With an annual population growth above 1.9%, Burundi is Africa's second most densely populated country with a population of 7.2 million people, 49% of which are under 15 (2005)<sup>9</sup>. The economy has decreased dramatically. The Bank estimates that rural poverty grew by 80% since 1993. School attendance dropped from 70% to 44% over six years. The civil war had left the country with an impoverished and highly vulnerable population and a life expectancy of only 40.9 years in 2002.

Peace and stabilisation in the country have reversed most of the downward trends. The economy showed moderate growth, population displacements decreased, school attendance increased, as did life expectancy, the level of infrastructure improved and is now high (compared to the region), while more public services became available when the security situation allowed.

### *Economic impact*

During the civil war from 1993-2002, GDP growth fell to -2.4% per annum, real GDP per capita fell by almost 27 percent, the national capital stock depreciated by 44 percent, the exchange rate was unstable, inflation high and volatile (over 30% per annum), and the number of poor below the national poverty threshold increased from 35 percent to 68 percent. By 2002, with a real GDP per capita of about US\$ 100, Burundi was one of the poorest countries in the world.

<sup>7</sup> It should be noted that the disintegration of public services meant that socio-economic quantitative data are unreliable and often not available. Data quoted must be interpreted with care and indicates more general conditions or rather are a series of data points with low a degree of comparability.

<sup>8</sup> *Burundi: An Interim Strategy 1999-2001*, Report No 19592-Bu, Macroeconomics Unit 3, Africa Region.

<sup>9</sup> UNFPA.

With the Arusha Agreement in 2000 growth slowly resumed. From 2001-2005 the economy recovered, real GDP grew to 2.2% per annum (or 11.4 percent in 2000-2005), GDP per capita stabilized (+1.2 percent) and inflation slowed markedly, reflecting improvement in the security situation, macroeconomic stabilisation, implementation of economic reforms, and a resumption of donor support. While welcome, these economic gains need to be extended and intensified to alleviate poverty<sup>10</sup>.

### *Agriculture and food shortages*

With over 90% of the population living in rural areas and 80% directly dependent on farming, agriculture is the lead economic sector with a contribution of roughly half of the GDP. Agricultural productivity was reduced diminishing economies of scale by land subdivision and decline of soil fertility.

In ‘*Conflict and Coffee in Burundi*’ Oketch and Polzer state the following on land use in Burundi “... in some areas land has been a source of conflict, directly and otherwise. ... there is the problem of intense competition. ...cultural practices and traditions of land inheritance from father to son have led to the increased subdivision of land between sons, decreasing the economies of scale that would otherwise accrue from reasonable parcels. This increased subdivision has led to general decline in soil fertility and productivity. The traditional land tenure system of subdivision between male heirs has led increasingly to the shrinking of household land. Increasingly, land is becoming too small for viable subdivision, effectively disinheriting some members of the household and leading to migration.”<sup>11</sup>

Declining agricultural productivity has aggravated the gap between food production and needs. In 2005 Burundi faced a global food deficit equivalent to 384,000 MTs of cereal, compared to 259,000 MTs in 2004<sup>12</sup>. Rising prices of staple food items extremely reduced household income levels. Inflation rates in the first six months of 2005 were estimated at more than 17%<sup>13</sup>, with price increases for basic food items ranging from 42% (beans) to 69% (cassava flour), compared to the same period in 2004. Food shortages were expected to affect approximately 1.5 million people in 2006 (about 20 percent of the total population), especially in the northern areas, where localized drought conditions have persisted.

The food shortages are the result of the combined effects of rising civil war, demographic pressure, drought periods recorded consecutively in the past three years, and the sharp decline in the production of staple crops, extensively affected by new forms of crop pests - such as the one affecting cassava crops for example, a staple food item which represents 70% of daily food consumption among the most food-insecure households<sup>14</sup>. The most serious shocks experienced by households are drought and crop pests, with 23% of households facing these types of problems in 2005, compared to 10% in 2004<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> IMF Country Report Aug. 2007, Report 06/307.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> National Food Security, Nutrition and Crop Assessment, Ministry of Agriculture, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, June 2005. This figure takes into account marginal production (animal, fruit, vegetables, soya bean, peanuts, etc.) not included in domestic availability.

<sup>13</sup> National Bank, Republic of Burundi, July 2005.

<sup>14</sup> Comprehensive Food Security Vulnerability Analysis, WFP, December 2004.

<sup>15</sup> Burundi Household Food Security Monitoring, Round One, WFP, June 2005.

### *Nutrition*

Food intake falls below the minimum requirement, and between 2002 and 2005 over 50,000 people visited nutrition centres every day. 45% of all children under five are underweight for their age<sup>16</sup>, while approximately two thirds of the population are undernourished.

Table 2.2 Percentage of undernourished population

Year	Percentage	Source
2002- 2004 average	66	UN Food and Agricultural Organisation
2001- 2003 average	67	Ibid.

Reuter Alert Net, September 2007

### *Refugees and IDPs*

Burundi has experienced two main waves of refugees, the first in 1972, when genocidal acts of the army against the Hutu elite led approximately 300,000 people to flee, mostly to Tanzania. In 1993 the assassination of President Ndadaye and the massacres that followed started another round of large-scale flight and displacement.

With an improving security situation in the country a repatriation movement started in 2001, reaching the rate of 300 returnees per day in July 2002, and never completely ceased since then. In 2002 570,000<sup>17</sup> Burundians were estimated to be in refugee camps, with another 300,000 persons thought to be dispersed across Tanzania. In 2006 the number had decreased, but 438,000 refugees had still not returned. In 2004 another approximately 280,000 persons were permanently displaced in Burundi itself, living in 226 registered places. In the same year, every month another 100,000 people on average became temporarily displaced as a result of ongoing fighting. Even during the final years of the evaluation period the number of IDPs remained at over 100,000<sup>18</sup>.

Arable Land in Burundi is dramatically scarce and much disputed<sup>19</sup>. To a certain degree all these refugees and displaced persons have been the victims of land expropriation<sup>20</sup>. The 1972 Hutu refugees were deprived virtually systematically of their goods and lands in the fertile Imbo plain by the Micombero and Bagaza regimes. The 1993 refugees were victims of expropriation less often, but this does not mean that their return is any easier. Many of the displaced Tutsis currently living on the edges of the cities, were victims of profiteers who benefited from the absence or death of the legal owners, either by seizing land or selling it at a profit. War-profiteers have also manipulated and encouraged rampant administrative and political corruption to expropriate estates that could have been used to help the resettlement of refugees.

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17 Reuters Alert Net: Burundi.

18 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 2006.

19 IMF Country Report Aug. 2007, Report 06/307: According to the authorities, about 70% of legal cases are related to disputes about land.

19 [www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2312&l=2](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2312&l=2).

20 UNICEF, State of the World's Children 2007 from: Reuter Alert Net September 2007.

### *Social sectors*

Basic health indicators for Burundi remain above the levels of internationally defined emergency thresholds. Table 2.3 lists vital health indicators that illustrate the risks and scope of vulnerability to which Burundian children and women are exposed.

Table 2.3 Children's and women's health

Health Indicators		Comments
Crude Mortality Rate	1.2 – 1.9/10,000/day	Emergency threshold: 1/10,000/day
Under-five Crude Mortality Rate	2.2 – 4.9/10,000/day	Emergency threshold: 2/10,000/day
Infant Mortality Rate	114/1,000 live births	Compared to 91/1,000 for Sub-Saharan countries
Under-five Mortality Rate	190/1,000 live births	
Maternal Mortality Rate	855/100,000	Compared to 940/100,000 for African continent (WHO)

**Source:** *Inter-agency Evaluation: Health and Nutrition Evaluation in Burundi's Humanitarian Context*, WHO, UNICEF, Centre for Disease Control, 2005.

Another important factor is the incidence of malaria, which remains a major public health problem. Although the new treatment protocol has been implemented successfully in most parts of the country since its adoption in 2003, malaria cases still represent almost 40% of consultations at health centres and about 50% of hospital deaths among children under five.

Maternal healthcare is a third concern for the Burundian public health system. The extremely high rate of maternal mortality (see Table 2.3) reflects women's poor health status, as well as the poor performance of the health system, especially in terms of prenatal care and emergency obstetrics.

The HIV/Aids infection rate reached an alarmingly high level of 11% nationally and 20% in Bujumbura, and it is estimated that since 1983 the disease caused 250,000 deaths.

Average literacy rates are approximately 60% with a male literacy rate of 67%<sup>21</sup>. Enrolment rates had been dropping during the civil war. In 2003-2004 the primary net enrolment rate was estimated at 53%, over a total population of 7.6 million inhabitants with more than half below 15 years of age. The decision of the newly elected government to withdraw primary school fees as of the 2005/06 school year has resulted in a 50% increase in enrolment for the 1<sup>st</sup> grade in all provinces, compared to the school year 2004/05. The education sector (primary, but even more so secondary) is facing structural problems mostly related to insufficient, poorly maintained infrastructure and acute shortages of teachers. Current estimates indicate that approximately 550,000 children between seven and 12 years of age do not attend school.

Institutionalised groups, such as prison inmates, face serious protection problems (separation of minors, overcrowding of cells) and lack access to healthcare.

<sup>21</sup> Reuter Alert Net, September 2007.

## 2.2 The International Response to the Crisis

### 2.2.1 Bilateral assistance

Before 1993 development assistance contributed approximately one quarter to the GDP but, as a reaction to the crisis, the overwhelming majority of international donors withdrew and international assistance decreased spectacularly: from around 300 million before 1993 to the lowest point of 27 million US\$<sup>22</sup> annually during the conflict. Belgium, France and Luxembourg were the only bilateral donors that did not cancel assistance completely. France and Luxembourg continued with a (mainly small) humanitarian programme, while Belgium also continued its development cooperation (on a minimal scale). Also, some international humanitarian organisations and international NGOs continued to provide humanitarian assistance. When the international embargo of Burundi was lifted in 1999, and with the prospect of peace emerging, international assistance was resumed. Several countries and international organisations, among others Belgium, responded positively to the United Nations appeal for a constructive engagement with the peace process and financial assistance. In 2000, at the Conference in Paris, 440 million US\$ emergency and reconstruction support were pledged. In the following years the improving security situation convinced those countries that had made their assistance dependent on peace and stability to resume their humanitarian and development assistance, thus ODA increased during the period under review.

The continuation of Belgian structural development support to Burundi in the period 2002-2006 contrasts with the practices of other donors. Most donors funded their assistance from their humanitarian assistance and conflict prevention budgets. The European Commission had suspended the European Development Fund until 2005, while the World Bank was only funding technical assistance and a Post-Conflict Fund project implemented through the UN agencies and NGOs. USAID had developed programmes in governance and emergency aid funded from the Office for Transition Initiatives and conflict prevention funds. Besides Belgium, France appears to have been the only donor financing some official aid programmes of a developmental nature in the country up to 2005.

Development support since 2000 developed as follows:

Table 2.4. Total ODA commitments Burundi (in million US\$)<sup>23</sup>

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
60	70	99	121	182	217

Source OECD-DAC statistics.

The EEC, World Bank/IDA, United States, France, Belgium and the Netherlands were the main donors<sup>24</sup> (in this order).

<sup>22</sup> DGOS Strategie nota Burundi 2002

<sup>23</sup> Including debt relief

<sup>24</sup> Aid at a glance, OECD 2007



The donor community intended to link humanitarian assistance with development support to consolidate the peace process, the so-called Humanitarian Aid Plus concept. Because Humanitarian Aid Plus is flexible and maintains the pace of implementation of humanitarian programmes, it is possible to implement quasi-structural projects (such as social infra-structure) in areas difficult to access, and in this way integrate humanitarian, transition and reconstruction activities.

Humanitarian assistance is, with close to 50% (2005), still the largest component of ODA followed by debt relief and programme assistance receiving close to 20% each<sup>25</sup>, while the development of the social sector is relatively small (education and health together receive close to 5%).

### 2.2.2 Humanitarian assistance

The largest share of humanitarian assistance goes to food security, agriculture, health and activities related to population integration. Approximately 50% of the projects and programmes were identified in the CAP.

Total humanitarian contribution (and the Belgian relative share) can be derived from the financial tracking system (FTS). These data must be interpreted with care, as countries use different definitions of humanitarian assistance, do not report all humanitarian assistance to the FTS, etc. The total Belgian humanitarian assistance in Table 2.5 is approximately 25% below the data on humanitarian assistance as provided to the evaluation team for the evaluation by the FPS (see Chapter 3.2).

Table 2.5 Humanitarian assistance Burundi per FTS (in million US\$)<sup>26</sup>

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Total HA in FTS	52.8	58.2	95.5	104.8	90.3
Belgian HA in FTS	3.6	4.0	5.2	5.8	6.3

Data from relief web Financial Tracking system Burundi Table B: total humanitarian assistance per donor appeal (carry over not included).

The main humanitarian donors in 2002 were, in order of contribution: USA, EEC, The Netherlands, Belgium (6.8%), Sweden and Norway. Private donors contributed marginally (0.5%).<sup>27</sup>

While the security situation improved new donors entered, while others increased their contributions. In 2006 the US and the EEC had remained the largest humanitarian donors and were now followed by Japan, Norway, Belgium (7%), CERF and Sweden. Private donors contributed 0.8%.<sup>28</sup> Belgium remained the third strongest bilateral donor with a stable 7% of total humanitarian funding.

<sup>25</sup> Aid at a glance, OECD 2007.

<sup>26</sup> Including debt relief.

<sup>27</sup> Data from relief web Financial Tracking system Burundi Table B: total Humanitarian Assistance per donor appeal (carry over not included).

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.



## 2.3 The Institutional Context of Humanitarian Assistance

### 2.3.1 Actors

#### *Government*

The period under review was characterised by weak performance and increasing inactivity of the Transitional Government. However, the Government, re-gained strength as progress was made in the stabilisation process, the complex electoral process was successfully completed and the Transitional Government replaced by an elected President and Government.

The elected Government led the reconstruction programme that focused on the rural provinces and created a secretariat (Comité National de Coordination des Aides) under the Second Vice President for coordination of structural development assistance. But, because of extremely reduced capacities of the administration of Burundi, especially in terms of policy planning and overall management, there was considerable international involvement throughout the whole period under review.

#### *International community: multilateral and bilateral organisations and donors*

The international community demonstrated an increasingly high level of policy coherence, supporting initially the different rounds of peace negotiations, and the implementation of the Arusha agreements thereafter. The international community supported the initial negotiations, and in 1998 the UNDP and the World Bank launched a joint strategy for comprehensive humanitarian assistance (Humanitarian Plus) to support the peace process once an agreement had been reached. The UN followed with an appeal to the international community for 'constructive engagement' with Burundi. An initially small group led by Belgium, the EU, the USA, France and the World Bank supported the vision and pledged financial support to the continuing negotiations, functionality of the civil service, demobilisation, preparation of the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees, humanitarian assistance, etc. Other donors, who had demanded first visible results, joined later as more parties joined the peace process and the country stabilised progressively.

The UN humanitarian organisations (WFP, UNHCR) and the International Red Cross never discontinued their humanitarian activities and were, with other UN organisations (UNICEF, FAO, WHO, UNFP, UNDP), involved in the implementation of humanitarian and development projects and programmes.

In 2004 a UN peace keeping force, MONUC, substituted the troops of the African Union force with South African, Ethiopian and Mozambican troops that had been deployed since spring 2003. The peacekeeping efforts were completed in October 2006.

#### *NGOs*

International NGOs, sometimes with strong local partners, played an important role in the implementation of humanitarian assistance in rural areas, as most of the other aid agencies were, in the initial years, confined to the capital for security reasons. Some of the international NGOs have cross-border operations, such as the Lutheran World

Federation spanning the Tanzanian refugee camps and the Ruyigi Province, and the Swiss-funded network on sexual and gender based violence.

The Burundian NGOs were important, but took a secondary role relative to international intervention. Civil society is not well developed<sup>29</sup>, as social mobilisation in Burundi is traditionally organised in a linear way with a focus around the authority of the public administration. The input by civil society organisations is very small (except for religious groups, whose structures are often separate). They formed nevertheless an important network across the country, often implementing tasks as subcontractors of international NGOs or multilateral organisations. This network has gradually increased its capacity to mobilise society, even though its actions were mainly restricted to construction and distribution. A few NGOs cover areas such as reconciliation and justice, therefore complementing the more traditional NGO fields of intervention, such as provision of food security, shelter, health care and construction.

### 2.3.2 Coordination mechanisms

During the period under review, the coordination of humanitarian efforts was the responsibility of the UN. The UNDP representative chaired the humanitarian coordination group as the Humanitarian Coordinator. This group was meeting on a weekly or monthly basis until the beginning of 2007.

The first international emergency appeal was launched in 1993 by the UN. The UN agency OCHA, responsible for technical coordination, opened a central office in Burundi in 2002 and two sub-offices in the Provinces of Gitega and Makamba. OCHA acts as a catalyst for coordination meetings and information management.

OCHA pursues the following objectives:

- Improved coordination of joint rapid assessments and response, contingency planning and cross-border work;
- Supporting the process of transition from relief to development with an emphasis on short- to medium-term programmes focusing on population reinsertion and community recovery;
- Continued harmonisation of common databases and information systems in priority sectors to support planning, monitoring and impact evaluation of response plans;
- Continued advocacy on protection of civilians, victims of gender based sexual violence and support to mainstreaming human rights based approaches in humanitarian action.

OCHA is the central organisation for collecting, interpreting and providing information to the humanitarian community. It provides the overall picture in humanitarian assistance and compiles assessments made by the agencies (of needs, of funding, of results) into the Consolidated Appeals Process, the Common Humanitarian Action Plan, and the Financial

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<sup>29</sup> Traditional attitudes discourage the expression of personal or community ambitions and plans.

Tracking Service. These are described as being of poor quality by Embassy personnel<sup>30</sup> due to the fact that these processes are driven by project proposals and sectors rather than a strategy reflecting institutional strengths and field presence. Of particular concern is the absence of reliable needs assessment data, and of reporting on activities funded in the previous year in the form of evaluative analyses. Although there is a new push for a standardised monitoring and evaluation component to be inserted systematically into the CAP<sup>31</sup>, this has not yet been deployed. The lack of periodically comparable indicators is, however, a larger issue, which pervades humanitarian aid and requires a sustained effort and collective will to overcome.

The CAP is mainly tailored to UN programming cycles and NGO representation is not easy, among others due to the intrinsic diversity of the NGO community. The recent increasing inclusion of NGOs into the UN appeals is still little more than the creation of a new opportunity for project fundraising, whose contribution to efficiency is doubtful.

The evaluation likes to illustrate the weaknesses of the CAP by the inclusion of five projects for Humanitarian Mine Action in 2006 where it has been observed at the end of 2005 that, contrary to UN assessments, the prevalence of mines in Burundi was very low. Some recent evaluations<sup>32</sup> have commented on the low efficiency of large operations dealing only with ordnance disposal, and on the negative impact of mine risk education programmes, when the casualty rate is low, deterring repatriation. The evaluation team would conclude that in a post-conflict situation the presence of only one single mine action NGO is probably sufficient to achieve value for money.

Unlike in the DRC and Pakistan, the newly developed humanitarian coordination mechanism within the framework of the UN Humanitarian Reform, the Cluster Lead approach, was not implemented in Burundi. Burundi, however, benefitted from the related new CERF in 2006.

Historically Bujumbura has not been strong on coordination<sup>33</sup>, but general agreement amongst donors on the priority to be accorded to humanitarian aid has contributed to reverse this situation at the level of donor policies.

Donor coordination has emerged gradually over time and was propelled forward in 2005 by the launch of the reconstruction of the country, requiring an in-depth dialogue on priorities and sectors. Within this process a group was created for transition programmes, concentrating discussions on project funding. Most discussions took place under the aegis of the humanitarian coordination meetings. Donor coordination was further stimulated by the Good Humanitarian Donorship pilot in Burundi. This donor initiative served to create a dialogue amongst donors.

Another platform for coordination was the European Union. Even though ECHO has, since the beginning of the evaluation period, maintained an active policy of dialogue with

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<sup>30</sup> We refer here to Notes for the File from the Embassy entitled « Rapport de l'Atelier du CAP 2002 » and « Humanitaire au Burundi en 2003 » and « Résumé de la rencontre du 14 décembre 2004 dans le cadre du Good Humanitarian Donorship ».

<sup>31</sup> OCHA in 2007, Activities and Extra-Budgetary Funding Requirements », United Nations.

<sup>32</sup> For example « Evaluation of Danchurchaid Humanitarian Mine Action ».

<sup>33</sup> "External Baseline Evaluation of the Burundi Good Humanitarian Donorship Pilot", OCHA/DFID, April 2004.

the member states and was a primary source of high quality information on the emergency situation in the country compensating for the weaknesses of the UN system, the EU truly emerged as a coordination forum in 2006.

Even though coordination has improved over time, it still shows significant weaknesses in well-timed identification and addressing of relevant humanitarian needs. The team was able to observe one of these gaps in coordination in Mishiha, at the border crossing to Tanzania. Among the group of people called '*Expulsés*', there is a particular group of those that are rejected from this category and receive no assistance. '*Expulsés*' are persons not enjoying refugee status in Tanzania and sent back to Burundi by force (see note in Annex 3). This group has come to international awareness this year due to the influx of arrivals alongside the refugees returning from the camps, which in 2007 rapidly overtook the number of these refugees repatriating. 40,000 persons have been registered at the time of writing, all in poor physical condition. Some of these were born of refugee parents who left Burundi in 1973, and have little knowledge of the country. Others have settled down with the related linguistic groups living in the districts around the camps, and married Tanzanians, from whom they were separated.

Within this group, there was a group of people who claimed this status of 'expulses' but who could not receive assistance because they had been identified as cheating. This selection was carried out in an arbitrary manner with no oversight by the agencies, which let people in emergency conditions remain at the border in extremely poor conditions. The complex interplay of mandates, division of labour, and poor information systems, created a small crisis on the border of Tanzania (see Annex 3).

### 2.3.3 Good Humanitarian Donorship

Burundi was named one of the pilots for the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, and a study was funded by DFID and run by OCHA in 2004. This has never been published by OCHA and is largely unknown in Burundi.

Some of the notes shared with the evaluation team in meetings of the GHD show that this donor initiative mainly served to create a dialogue amongst donors, concerning the changing humanitarian environment and the issues raised by responding agencies. It hardly addressed issues of potential improvement of donor performance with regard to specific GHD principles. Recent agreements on the introduction of indicators and benchmarks for the tracking of performance in GHD, discussed in meetings around the OECD DAC in 2006<sup>34</sup>, have not yet been implemented.

## 2.4 Final Remarks

The stability accomplished over the past years and the reversal of negative social and economic developments in the period of the evaluation was in no way predictable and

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<sup>34</sup> Good Humanitarian Donorship: overcoming obstacles to improve collective donor performance, Discussion Paper, December 2006, HPG.

represents a rare success in post-conflict exit from crisis. This is undoubtedly also related to the provision of international assistance, mainly in the form of humanitarian aid.

The suspension of hostilities in Burundi and the elections had carried the risk that a great many people who had been uprooted would rush home to a country not yet prepared to receive them. The resettlement, with its intrinsic potential of disappointment of a large number of refugees, who could have been unable to recover their property (with varying degrees of intensity depending on the area), was going to be a potential source of tension and offered ideal political opportunities to the opponents of the process. This could have placed the entire transition in jeopardy, and it is remarkable to observe that this has not happened. This is certainly related to the thorough advance preparations by the humanitarian organisations. Although the impact of overall humanitarian action in the country could not be covered by this evaluation, it is possible to assume that the humanitarian response oiled the transition process.

With respect to the future, general living conditions for the majority of the population remain precarious and stability fragile. The Government's lack of capacity to effectively respond to the population's needs in terms of food security, disaster response and social services still requires sustained support, as the recurrent cycles of emergency pockets during 2005-2007 highlighted.



## 3 Overview of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance

### 3.1 Belgian Development Cooperation in Burundi

#### 3.1.1 Introduction

Since Burundi's independence Belgium maintained a structural development relationship with the country. During the embargo relations were frozen but never terminated, as those of most other donors. At a low level, Belgium continued to provide assistance. Since 1999 development relations were intensified. At the donor conference in 2000 Belgium pledged close to 27 million Euro to various activities for 2002-2003. Nearly 12 million Euro were allocated to bilateral cooperation, and nearly five million to humanitarian operations. In 2000 the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) opened an office in Bujumbura. In 2002 Belgium defined its country strategy, and bilateral assistance increased sharply during the period under review.

The position of Belgium maintaining structural development relations with the government of Burundi was, as explained above, exceptional, as was the fast increase of development funding since 2002.

#### 3.1.2 Strategies

Only mid-2006 the Belgian Government established and approved the 'Plan Directeur d'Assistance Humanitaire Belge', an overall policy framework governing humanitarian assistance. According to the plan, the Great Lakes area is the concentration area for humanitarian assistance and the strategies closely follow the GHD principles (see synthesis report). As the plan was only approved in 2006, it did not impact on decision making on humanitarian activities in Burundi during the evaluation period.

The Burundi Country Strategy Note of 2002<sup>35</sup> defined the Belgian strategy for cooperation with Burundi. This elaborated strategy includes both a regional approach to the inter-connections between conflicts in the region and a national approach with particular attention to the integration of diplomatic, financial and aid efforts.

Belgian assistance to Burundi has three priority areas in the short term:

1. National reconciliation;
2. Poverty reduction; and
3. Revitalisation of national finances and the economy.

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<sup>35</sup> Strategie nota Burundi, December 2002.

To support these priorities financial resources were allocated to:

- Implementation of the Arusha Agreements. Various commissions were supported, as were the negotiations with parties that were not part of the original agreement. Within this framework support was provided to:
  - demobilisation, repatriation and reintegration, among others to the regional World Bank managed programme;
  - the re-organisation of the administration and legal systems to increase transparency and improve good economic and political management.
- Strengthening of administrative services of various key ministries in the social sector, essential in the process of democratisation and consolidation of peace, such as health, justice, decentralisation, community development, and human rights. Within this framework support was provided to:
  - local NGOs, ministries, Parliament, to inform the general public of the progress of the peace process;
  - local NGOs focusing on consolidation of peace, national consolidation, strengthening civil society and community organisations.
- Humanitarian needs in the areas of food security, water and sanitation, repatriation of refugees and social re-integration of all vulnerable groups in need of humanitarian support. Within this framework support will also be provided to:
  - victims, refugees, IDPs, and demobilised persons through labour intensive works and technical education outside the agricultural sector.
- Projects and programmes in the sectors health (among other HIV/Aids and primary health), education (schools and didactic materials), agriculture (among others seeds), rural construction, and justice (Codes of Law).

It should be noted that the Country Strategy explicitly named the role of humanitarian assistance in reducing or exacerbating humanitarian tensions, and highlighted the need for 'Humanitarian Plus' (i.e. including funding for rehabilitation) to be carefully monitored by the Embassy. This coincided with funding of a national technical expert, positioned within the Embassy, with a specific responsibility for projects funded by the Conflict Prevention and Humanitarian Aid budget lines.

The Mixed Commission ('Commission Mixte') of 1994 was not renewed until October 2006. The Mixed Commission is a process of dialogue between Belgian aid personnel and Burundian line ministries and serves as the main policy coordination mechanism for Belgian cooperation in all its sectors.

The 2006 Commission spelled out the main objectives of Belgian cooperation for the next four years:

- Priority was to be given to governance;
- Economic development was mainly supported through agriculture;
- Human capital – health and education remain the priority sectors as anti-poverty measures.

The changes in orientation from the 2002 Country Strategy reflect the progress made in the process of peace building and stabilisation during the past four years.



The Poverty Reduction Strategy elaborated by Burundi was not used as a reference by the Mixed Commission.

### 3.1.3 Volume of Belgian development assistance

The volume of Belgian assistance to Burundi nearly doubled in the period under review and increased from approximately 12 million Euro in 2002 to 25 million. This assistance should be set against the drastic reductions carried out by most other donors in the country during the period of the embargo; many began returning only in the period 2005-2007. This significant assistance made Belgium an important bilateral donor, even more so in the period 2000-2003 than in the following years. Development aid was central to the Belgian aid strategy in Burundi, both in terms of volume and objectives. In 2002 Belgium funded a team of World Bank technical experts to assist the Government in the elaboration of the preliminary version of the poverty reduction strategy (CSLP-1).

The following table gives an overview of the Belgian financial assistance of 90 million Euro to Burundi from 2002-2006.

Table 3.1 ODA Belgium 2002-2006 by source

Department	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>DGOS</b>					
Governmental cooperation	6,956,104	8,150,072	7,972,998	4,689,488	13,479,954
Non-governmental cooperation	1,032,505	1,597,634	1,936,941	2,260,802	2,901,555
Multilateral cooperation	34,792	55,738	377,442	25,247	1,096,034
Survival Fund		260,302		687,531	340,161
Humanitarian Assistance (excl. Food Aid)	2,735,377	2,490,428	1,194,408		
Humanitarian Food Aid	1,161,300	1,100,000	2,400,000	3,082,816	3,050,000
Scientific institutes		99,867	99,867	169,873	192,158
Other non-governmental	24,092	18,431	20,000	161,397	96,104
<b>Subtotal DGOS</b>	<b>11,944,170</b>	<b>13,772,472</b>	<b>13,981,676</b>	<b>11,077,154</b>	<b>21,155,966</b>
<b>Foreign Affairs (excl. DGOS)</b>					
B-FAST and emergency assistance			4,639,986	2,488,865	2,596,620
Conflict prevention / diplomatic prevention	41,638		2,019,437	2,725,685	1,655,105
International organisations					184,613
<b>Subtotal Foreign Affairs</b>	<b>41,638</b>		<b>6,659,423</b>	<b>5,214,550</b>	<b>4,436,338</b>
<b>Other Sources</b>					
<b>Total other official sources</b>	<b>118,010</b>	<b>177,863</b>	<b>324,412</b>	<b>320,475</b>	<b>228,072</b>
<b>Total ODA<sup>36</sup></b>	<b>11,985,808</b>	<b>13,950,335</b>	<b>20,965,511</b>	<b>16,612,179</b>	<b>25,820,376</b>

Website: DGOS; DGCD. Bel/NL/Partnerlanden/Burundi.

<sup>36</sup> We assumed that the figures in the table were correct; as these did not add up we corrected the totals. The DGOS website gives the following totals:

<b>Total ODA</b>	<b>17.595.156</b>	<b>13.848.881</b>	<b>20.970.198</b>	<b>16.280.909</b>	<b>26.735.203</b>
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The following table gives an overview of the main sectors:

Table 3.2 ODA Belgium 2002-2006 by sector

Sector	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>DGOS</b>					
Government and civil society	5,842,689	624,081	3,031,530	2,157,579	5,532,587
General budget support	2,500,004	6,995,173	2,000,004	2,000,000	2,000,000
Humanitarian Assistance (excl. Food Aid)	2,735,377	2,490,428	5,864,664	2,597,801	2,640,939
Food Aid	1,161,300	1,100,000	2,400,000	3,082,816	3,050,000
Reproductive health	149,091	213,668	194,117	208,144	561,528
Water and sanitation	147,290	132,944	84,871	97,560	1,075,890
Social services	177,254	702,373	941,637	823,072	829,959
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries		344,644	277,473	896,845	1,570,426
Debt relief			3,000,004		

Nearly 26 million Euro were allocated to financial cooperation and budget support. Further funds have been made available for the peace process, financial and administrative reform, and reconciliation and peace building. These allocations are in line with the priorities set in the Strategic note.

The Conflict Prevention and the Local NGO Support budget lines supported local organisations dealing with peace building, reconciliation and governance such as national radio and T.V. and the association 'Defence of the Rights of Prisoners' in Burundi. An exception was the international NGO Danchurchaid, which covered Humanitarian Mine Action including surveys, clearance, and mine risk education, that was funded because of its relevance to confidence building measures in the country. Several regional programmes related to strengthening of the legal system, organisation of elections, etc., covering Burundi were funded from these budget lines as well.

The Programme Indicatif de Coopération, signed in 2006 for the period 2007-2010, provides for a similar contribution to that of the preceding years: a total of €60 million, roughly €20 million per year. The sectors are defined in the programming documents in the following manner:

- Consolidation of society and governance: €15.5 million;
- Agricultural development: €9 million;
- Education: €10 million;
- Health (mainly public health): €10 million;
- Multisectoral: €15.5 million.

The programmes undertaken under this funding will mainly be implemented by Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC).

## 3.2 Overview of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance per Budget Line

### 3.2.1 Humanitarian assistance in 2002-2006

While its humanitarian assistance was lower than that of other donors in relation to ODA (between 30 and 40%), Belgium remained nevertheless the third largest bilateral humanitarian donor and contributed, on average, approximately 7%<sup>37</sup> to total humanitarian assistance.

Table 3.3 provides an overview of total Belgian humanitarian assistance to Burundi from 2002 to 2006 based on the figures provided to the evaluation by the FPS.

Table 3.3 Belgian humanitarian aid to Burundi (in Euro)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Relief & Rehab	3,033,790	3,160,418	3,981,475	2,488,865	3,096,420	15,760,968
Food Aid	1,161,300	2,240,511	3,233,333	3,082,816	4,429,000	14,146,960
Transition	-	-	-	76,095	-	76,095
Multilateral	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total HA</b>	<b>4,195,090</b>	<b>5,400,929</b>	<b>7,214,808</b>	<b>5,647,776</b>	<b>7,525,420</b>	<b>29,984,023</b>

Source: Data on HA provided by FPS for the evaluation.

Table 3.4 provides an overview of the relative share in Belgian ODA of Belgian humanitarian assistance to Burundi from 2002 to 2006.

Table 3.4 Belgian humanitarian assistance 2002-2006 as percentage of ODA, excluding debt relief

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2002- 2006
Belgian HA	4,195,090	5,400,929	7,214,808	5,647,776	7,525,420	29,984,023
Belgian ODA	11,985,808	13,950,335	20,965,511	16,612,179	25,820,376	89,334,209
HA as % of ODA	35%	39%	34%	34%	29%	34%

Data on ODA from DGOS web side; Data provided on HA by FPS for the evaluation

Both development and humanitarian assistance more or less doubled since 2002, in absolute terms, and the relative share of humanitarian assistance in total ODA remained rather constant over the evaluation period. Although the security situation improved significantly, this did not result in an absolute or relative drop in humanitarian assistance. Considering the fragile situation, emergency food and food security situation, the flow of returning refugees and resettling IDPs, this can be well understood.

Humanitarian assistance was mainly provided directly under two budget lines: Emergency and Food Aid and Multilateral Organisations. Burundi also benefited from multilateral assistance. Multilateral assistance was made available to regional funds that covered the DRC and Rwanda as well.

<sup>37</sup> Financial Tracking system, Burundi Table B: Total Humanitarian Assistance per donor (appeal plus other) (carry over not included).

### *Programme d'Urgence*

It is important to mention that for 2002-2007, outside the formal evaluation subject (the five budget lines), DGOS introduced a new programme, the Programme d'Urgence, to support consolidation, reconsolidation and pacification of the country after the elections (peace dividend). In 2006 and 2007 €15 million were channelled to the Government's Emergency Programme. This is distributed as follows: €3 million was channelled through UNDP, €1 million was allocated to school material, and €3.5 million to road rehabilitation, €4.5 million to classroom furniture, and €2 million to water, while €1 million still remain unallocated. Substantial aid through the so-called 'Emergency Programme' to Burundi for a total of 15 million Euro is foreseen, This programme will be implemented by BTC.

These funds are not channelled through the Transition budget line (though this was discussed) but are reported as humanitarian assistance to the OECD-DAC and in the DGOS annual report.

### 3.2.2 Emergency Assistance

This budget line is characterised by a wide variety of delivery channels (Belgian NGOs, Multilateral Organisations, ICRC, partly with subcontracted local organisations) and by a willingness to remain aligned with the priorities of humanitarian agencies in the country. There is no particular strategy for this budget line other than funding projects that channel funds through Belgian civil society or multilateral and international organisations, and to complement the decisions of other donors, seeking above all to achieve delivery down to the beneficiaries.

From this budget line 30 projects in Burundi were funded from 2002 until November 2006 with an average size of 875,000 Euro. This is significantly above the worldwide average of this budget line of 532,000 Euro.

The figures for emergency aid show a higher preference in terms of volume for the multilateral and international organisations (UN and ICRC) than for NGOs.

### 3.2.3 Food Aid

Food Aid support is nearly as large as the relief and rehabilitation support responding to the continuous issues of food insecurity and pockets of displacement in the country. Food Aid includes activities that improve food security, is usually channelled through the UN agencies, and involved namely:

- The World Food Programme (WFP) Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operation, which is a flexible funding mechanism allowing the agency to engage in free food relief distributions, as well as targeted distributions to vulnerable groups and even some food-for-work activities.
- The FAO agricultural rehabilitation programmes, which revolves around providing technical assistance and inputs in the form of seeds and tools to the communities.

Belgian humanitarian Food Aid DRC 2002-2006 in million Euro

2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2002-2006
1.16	2.24	3.23	3.08	4.43	14.14

Data supplied by the FFPS to the evaluation

### 3.2.4 Transition Aid

Belgian Transition Aid Burundi 2002-2006 in million Euro

2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2002-2006
-	-	-	0.076		

Data supplied by the FOD

Though the country was fully in transition, Burundi, contrary to the DRC, did not benefit from this new budget line. Only one small project related to training of the police has been funded from this budget line.

### 3.2.5 Multilateral Aid

Belgium provides, under its humanitarian assistance, core support to ICRC, UNHCR and OCHA. With, among others, Belgian support these organisations maintain the capacity to assist countries in crisis, and Burundi benefited indirectly from this support.

Belgium also supplied programme funding to the regional Africa and Great Lakes programmes of ICRC and UNHCR. Burundi benefited from a proportion of the resource mentioned in the table below as the major share was spent in the DRC.

Table 3.5 Multilateral humanitarian assistance to the Great Lakes region

Year	Total	Description
<b>2005</b>	3,000,000 €	Assistance to refugees in Central Africa, UNHCR
	2,250,000 €	Protection Programme Central Africa, ICRC
<b>2004</b>	3,000,000 €	Assistance to refugees in Central Africa, UNHCR
	2,250,000 €	Protection Programme Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, ICRC
<b>2003</b>	1,239,468 €	Contribution to the Great Lakes Programme, UNHCR
<b>2002</b>	1,239,468 €	Contribution to the Great Lakes Programme, UNHCR
	1,500,000 €	Supplement, contribution to the Great Lakes Programme, UNHCR
	2,479,544 €	Supplement, contribution to the Great Lakes Programme and West Africa, UNHCR

Data on HA provided by FPS for the evaluation.

### 3.2.6 Sectoral distribution

Belgian humanitarian assistance is not concentrated on one but covers a number of relevant sectors of humanitarian assistance. The indicative analysis of sectoral distribution of Belgian humanitarian activities is based on two budget lines: Relief and Rehabilitation on the one hand, and Transition on the other hand.

The following table shows the sectoral distribution of projects but does not take into account project size.

Table 3.6 Sectoral distribution of projects funded through Relief and Rehabilitation 2002-2006

Food and Food Security	Non-food Relief Items	Health and Nutrition	W & S, Education, Shelter, Economic Development	Multi-sectoral (incl. resettlement)	Infrastructure (Roads & Bridges)	Other
1	3	5	11	8	-	2

File: Interventions-humanitaires (DRC, Burundi, Ethiopia, PAK), file provided to the evaluation team.

Investments in the health sector are relatively small; this can be understood, as health is generally well covered as a sector in Burundi, where donors such as OFDA and ECHO covered most of the public services until 2006, and would hence not have required large amounts from Belgium.

The funding to the water and sanitation sector is also small, but again this sector is also covered in the refugee reintegration multi-sectoral projects.

There is a marked preference for programmes that support the reintegration of refugees. This is further augmented by the fact that many of the social infrastructure and public service projects have been supporting rehabilitation in the areas of origin of refugees and displaced persons with a view to increase their return. If all projects that support the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs are taken into consideration, nearly half of the total funding in financial terms has been invested in these activities.

Protection is not mentioned as a sector. Although there were no specific projects with this objective, components of the UNHCR programmes deal with protection, while a water project with ICRC, funded in 2003, in fact directly supported the organisation's protection mandate by giving it a point of entry into the area of Kayanza.

There is a significant difference between the sectoral distribution of activities in Burundi compared to the sample of 66 projects of Belgian assistance assessed in the overall evaluation. Significantly less is invested in health (worldwide average 50%), more is invested in W&S and education and slightly more in multi-sectoral projects. No investments are made in the infrastructure sector.

### 3.3 Main Actors and Roles

#### *Federal Public Service*

Decision making, with regard to all budget lines for humanitarian assistance programmes, is centralised at the FPS in Brussels. Identification and decision making on programmes and projects, monitoring of progress and approval of interim and final reports, and accounts administration is the responsibility of the Minister and staff of the FPS. During the period under review two field visits were made by the staff of D2.1.

With regard to the identification of Food Aid programmes, the Embassy is directly involved, as it was requested to propose programmes to the Food Security Desk (D2.1.2.)

annually to be included in the annual programme. With regard to the Emergency budget line (D2.1.1.), the Embassy was also requested to propose projects for multilateral organisations to be funded under the CAP allocation. For the remaining multilateral and all NGO projects funded by this budget line, the role of the Embassy in the identification process was limited to advice, as proposals were normally presented to the FPS in Brussels first. With regard to the programmes funded by the Multilateral Organisations Section (D4.3.), the Embassy was providing advice during the preparation of the annual consultation. The role of the Embassy in the identification of Transition budget line activities is not formalised but has apparently been minimal<sup>38</sup>. Finally, with respect to project cycle management the Embassy has a field-monitoring role with regard to humanitarian activities.

Within the Belgian Embassy a specialised ‘Attaché pour les projets’, supported by the Chargé de Cooperation, who has been in charge in this position for many years, was in charge of the humanitarian assistance portfolio. This continuity allowed Belgian cooperation to overcome the difficulties faced by many organisations in humanitarian assistance, namely the rotation of personnel and the consequent loss of institutional memory due to the complex nature of reporting. The attaché visited projects on the ground, participated in meetings and provided insightful advice on the situation to the administration in Brussels. His brief also covered Conflict Prevention, which gave an additional breadth of perspective and the possibility of synergies (although these were not perceived as important).

Only four donors, until the arrival of DfID in 2005, had a permanent presence in Burundi: ECHO, OFDA, France, and Belgium. Being one of the main humanitarian donors with permanent presence and very experienced staff, who had accompanied humanitarian policies and implementation in Burundi for many years, Belgium could engage in an informed dialogue with the UN agencies designing the strategies for humanitarian aid and rehabilitation, in particular UNDP and OCHA, and had a strong position within the donor platforms.

Management of humanitarian programmes in the Embassy is separated from development programmes, due to the fact that the latter are mainly aimed at government structures. This cleavage within the portfolio of the Embassy is also to be found in the broader aid regime in Burundi, where development aid coordination mechanisms are gradually falling into place under a separate regime, whereas humanitarian assistance had long been established and created a strong flow of real-time information between different organisations, generating a network form of interaction.

#### *Multilateral and international organisations*

Multilateral and international agencies are the main channel for Belgian humanitarian assistance. Multilateral organisations implementing projects funded by the Food Aid budget line are FAO, and WFP, and the Emergency budget line UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR and ICRC.

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

### *NGOs*

Seven Belgian NGOs are the second channel. Non-Belgian NGOs are excluded from the Emergency budget line, but Belgian NGOs subcontracted International NGOs, e.g. Solidarité, or regional NGOs, e.g. RET and ADRA.

### *Others*

Neither BTC, nor private sector organisations were involved in the implementation of humanitarian activities in Burundi.



## 4 Assessment of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance at Project Level

### 4.1 Relevance

#### *General*

The overall relevance of Belgian assistance during the period under review was high.

#### *Responding to needs*

Considering the prevailing conditions in the country and the prevalent needs, especially of returning refugees and IDPs, Belgian assistance responds to the priority needs of the country.

The projects responded to the humanitarian priority needs of the country during the period under review, which have been described in Chapter 2.1 of this report.

Belgian humanitarian aid has strengthened the multiple coverage provided by the humanitarian aid agencies all around the country, continuing assistance at a time when many other donors are beginning to phase out their emergency aid (in particular ECHO and OFDA), while the benefits of the increasing development assistance have not yet<sup>39</sup> arrived with the population in need and hardships and vulnerability in the population are continuing.

From 2002 to 2006, the country presented only minimal conditions for return, particularly in rural areas. The destruction and lack of maintenance of social infrastructure greatly reduced access to drinking water, and hygiene conditions, especially in schools, were extremely poor and could not respond to the needs of the increasing number of pupils at primary and secondary levels. Diminishing agricultural productivity and disputes related to land and property created tensions endangering the fragile stability in rural areas. In the urban environments the number of unemployed far exceeded figures prior to 2000, and many among these are IDPs and refugees who lost their land in their home villages, demobilised soldiers and unaccompanied groups.

As most of the assistance funded by the Belgian Government focused on the needs of the refugees and IDPs and revolved around public services (water, sanitation, shelter,

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<sup>39</sup> The Round Table for donor pledges was only held in late 2007.

education) and food security, with some elements of protection, the assistance responded to generally accepted priority humanitarian needs.

The designs of the individual projects were sufficiently based on assessments of specific needs of target groups, involving local communities and groups and/or local authorities and humanitarian organisations.

From the sample we reviewed projects focused on:

- UNHCR: repatriation packages (household material and food security) and protection;
- UNICEF: water and sanitation for returning refugees and schools;
- RET: secondary education for returning refugees and IDPs;
- MDM Solidarité: water and food security around schools and in isolated communities;
- FAO: food security for returnees and vulnerable groups;
- ICRC: water in Kayanza city for the influx of IDPs.

#### UNHCR

Belgium allocated approximately 15% of humanitarian assistance directly to UNHCR spread out over five successive projects.

UNHCR leads on refugee issues, although this has been reduced in 2004 to a pure reintegration role, handing over quick impact projects and reintegration to UNDP and other agencies. There has been a strong emergency response function<sup>1</sup> throughout the crisis, and, over time, its presence in the field is being reduced as budgets decrease. The agency operates through a number of local organisations, some of which have a highly participatory approach (Ligue Iteka for example).

The UNHCR 2006 project aims at a sustainable re-settlement and a peaceful coexistence of the different population groups. It facilitates the transport and re-integration of 55,000 refugees from Tanzania and the DRC, and Belgian funding is related to construction and rehabilitation of housing.

The UNHCR may be one of the most innovative of humanitarian agencies in Burundi. Surveys revealed that the main constraint on return has been food insecurity, but also that the issues of access to land and abuse committed by authorities on the Tanzanian side are playing a very significant deterrent role. In essence, this is due to the duality of the legal system based on formal law as well as customary tradition, which is not equipped to deal with the problem of decade-long absences and female headed households. Many refugees return to find their land occupied by neighbours who, in some cases, have made significant investments. If this were not addressed it would contribute to the diffuse climate of distrust and up-rootedness, which would undermine post-conflict reconstruction. The land issue has not been addressed by other humanitarian aid organisations due to the disconnection between relief assistance and governance activities (ICRC being the only humanitarian aid organisation undertaking *démarches* of a legal nature in the country), and protection is often one of the least funded sectors of humanitarian assistance.

UNHCR has, since 2000, supported legal assistance and access to justice for the returnees. The implementation protection programmes is carried out by Ligue Iteka and ACCORD, providing returnees and displaced persons with legal assistance in relation to private property. The reduction of returnees since 2006 can be explained from the coincidence with the agricultural calendar, the school year, and

the political developments and security in certain parts of the country. The extension of the organisation that provides legal support to the restitution of their properties to the refugees is a positive development.

UNHCR is also contributing to capacity development of the NGOs that will be able to address the severe problem of land entitlements and registration in a long-term manner.

#### **Caraes/RET**

This project was funded through the Belgian NGO Caraes, which is of Catholic inspiration and has a small administrative structure and funds projects carried out by partners in different countries. Caraes operates through the Refugee Education Trust (RET), an NGO founded by the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs Ogata, which is based in Geneva and has an office in Nairobi. The RET began its activities through an extensive needs assessment of all secondary schools in the area. RET collaborates with its privileged partners the Ministry of Education, the Provincial Departments for Education (DPE) and the BTC in the identification of the needs at the level of schools.

#### **FAO**

Food insecurity is clearly a structural problem that will plague Burundi for years to come. However, it is not yet being addressed by the Ministry of Agriculture and the main development programmes, which are still in the process of establishing themselves. Recent increases of pockets of malnutrition are indications of this inability. Interviews and observations carried out by the evaluation team have shown that those actors most able to help the rural populations to increase productivity and protect land are the international organisations operating on the ground, with the support of long established organisations such as FAO. The design of the programme was clearly the result of a participatory approach, and strengthens local capacity. For example, the support to farmers' groups in commercial seed production at the communal level includes support to seed institutes in the production of high quality early generation seeds. This is relevant due to low yields in Burundi agriculture.

### *Relevance of target groups*

**Belgian humanitarian assistance targeted the classical beneficiary groups of humanitarian assistance.**

Belgian projects were mainly targeted at classical beneficiary groups and the urgent needs of these groups (women, children, in the case of UNICEF, returnees in the case of UNHCR, farmers for FAO, children in case of MDM). But Belgian assistance also included the ICRC water project in Kayanza and the RET secondary education project, which were classical, even traditional projects, focusing on specific target populations that were often not covered by others (secondary students, urban groups). MDM/Solidarité also included very isolated communities in the target groups, which were very much affected by the crisis.

#### **FAO**

Belgium has financed the Emergency Department of FAO in Burundi. Major projects implemented by FAO-TCOR include the distribution of seeds and tools in all three agricultural seasons to IDPs, repatriated households, and chronically vulnerable households, with a special focus on gender relations. Chronically vulnerable groups are children headed households, isolated old people, the Batwa ethnic group, chronically ill persons, including HIV/AIDS infected patients. This targeting is relevant to the

household based social structure in the “collines”, with limited redistributive mechanisms amongst themselves leading to significant differences in standards of living in the same area.

Support is also given to vulnerable households in vegetable production and home gardening in urban and peri-urban areas, and is clearly given with a special focus on gender relations. This is done in order to increase income generating opportunities and food security, and addresses the specific hardships of groups that have been separated from their lands and do not currently find employment in cities.

### *Coverage*

Belgian humanitarian assistance focused on priority areas of greater need.

The projects visited are implemented in the areas of greater need, particularly for the rural population, and particularly in the eastern Provinces of Burundi (Makamba to Ruyigi,) where most of the refugees returned and will continue to do so.

### *Protection*

Belgian assistance included some elements of protection.

The support given under the UNHCR programme to solve legal issues related to land and property has already been mentioned. Furthermore, some funding has been given to protection, in particular through UNICEF (SM/2004/07771-01 for US\$ 451,292 [in UNICEF nomenclature]).

#### **UNICEF**

The role is carried out through specific advocacy activities, but also awareness campaigns. The documents, interviews, and observations by the team, point to a strong communication function within UNICEF and a good level of awareness of the rights of the child.

### *Coping strategies*

Hardly any specific attention was given to local coping strategies.

MDM/Solidarité was very much aware of local capacities and attitudes of stakeholders, while UNHCR included some description of local copying mechanism in their proposals and reports, but no specific attention was given to local coping strategies of the population in the project design of the projects.

### *Distribution of assistance over relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases*

The distribution was in line with the development of the emergency.

The assistance covered different phases of the emergency response cycle: though some activities focused on acute emergency needs, most, focused on rehabilitation, for example the ICRC water project in Kayanza and the RET secondary education project. This is in line with the development towards a more secure and stable Burundi, while not ignoring situations of acute needs.

## 4.2 Connectedness

With respect to connectedness, the visited projects presented an ambiguous picture.

The projects made a serious effort to connect short-term humanitarian responses with a long-term development perspective and attempted to build linkages with structural development aid.

However, the evaluation also observed a general lack of concentration on the mid-term implications of project implementation choices, limiting opportunities for a successful handing-over. This starts in the details of project implementation, for example maintenance of latrines renovated in schools by Solidarité. Of a very innovative design and high quality, these latrines will require specialist organisations for maintenance, and the NGO is only beginning to address this issue after having built the structures.

This trait runs through project implementation, where RET has, for example, given chemistry sets to schools with little regard for the complexity of needs and follow up (it based decisions on ministry lists and CTB practices, which do not correspond to the curriculum in some of the schools), while MDM/Solidarité applied a construction technology for the latrines that is too sophisticated. And this permeates the overall policy of humanitarian assistance, whereby public services are handed over and funding phased out in the absence of credible institutions to continue assistance. An example is the handing over of the water supply systems in the town of Kayanza by ICRC to REGIDESO, the national public water and energy company.

### **Caraes/RET**

The programme was designed to dovetail with development aid by allowing the returning students to continue secondary schooling and start university well prepared. The project is fully complementary to existing structures and organisations. It is entirely based on the existing secondary school system, uses local staff highly attuned to existing capacities, while it provides capacity development to respond to the temporarily increased needs caused by the massive influx of returning students, as well as long-term needs caused by years of neglect of the education system. The Government is seriously involved and guarantees two years free education for each of the returning students. RET is now applying for development aid programmes

### **MDM/Solidarité**

The water and sanitation activities are complemented with the rehabilitation of traditional agro-pastoral activities of 40 zonal groups, which have a high development potential, among others provinces in Cankuzo. The immediate support of distribution of inputs and tools is combined with the extension of simple techniques to improve soil productivity and erosion control, while new crops, adapted to the agro-climatological conditions are also introduced and livestock development (goats) is supported.

### **FAO**

The distribution of seeds and tools is complemented with, among others, support to seeds institutes in the production of high quality early generation seeds. Such seeds are highly relevant to agriculture

development considering the low yields in Burundi. Vegetable seeds are also highly effective because they contribute to the improvement of the nutritional quality of household consumption, and are a source for income generation. Horticulture activities are appropriate income generating strategies for households who do not have farmland but are entitled to do home gardening, and require less labour than agriculture. However, distribution of vegetable seeds without phytosanitary products and without taking into account fertilization strategies (small animal husbandry or chemical fertilizers) limited effectiveness.

However, the structural problem of diminishing rural incomes cannot be attributed to the conflict situation alone but also to high population density, high dependency on the agricultural sector for livelihoods, and decreasing agricultural productivity. Rather than continuing with the distribution of seeds and tools, this problem would have required more structural interventions aiming at stimulating off-farm employment in order to address land issues and chronic vulnerability. Other ministries should be involved in trying to stimulate off-farm livelihood strategies, but have not been so far.

Although most projects were weak in addressing mid- and long-term sustainability issues, UNHCR had a structural handing-over strategy of the re-settlement support, providing a long-term development perspective to returning refugees and IDPs, while MDM/Solidarité involved the authorities to facilitate handing-over.

#### **UNHCR**

The policies and guidelines developed by UNHCR, as regards the hand over to development, is reflected in the fact that Burundi was chosen as one of the two countries for joint projects with the World Bank, while it has hosted and handed over many of its activities to the UNDP rehabilitation programme. It has a deliberate policy of handing over public structures it has renovated to the national authorities, and a procurement system, which is based on regionally available supplies.

#### **MDM/Solidarité**

The involvement of the Direction Général d l'Hydrolique et des Energie Rurales, la Direction Provinciale de l'Enseignement, la Direction Provinciale de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage et le Bureau de la Santé in needs identification is driven by the importance of continuity of the activities in the mid and long term when the humanitarian assistance will end. The same holds for the involvement of the Comité de Development Collinaires (CDC) that prepares for the transfer of ownership of the project outputs to the beneficiaries.

The problem of absence of credible institutions to continue services, and therefore continuing projects indefinitely (involving high costs and low ownership), is widely recognised as a weakness of humanitarian assistance.

Some efforts were made to strengthen local government and local NGOs. For example, FAO also extended capacity building to state structures. There is support to the Ministry of Agriculture in order to coordinate emergency agricultural operations. The Ministry, although central to national development, is only slowly becoming operational and will require technical support on a continuous basis for a long time.

The team was given to observe Dutch NGO practices (CORDAID in Makamba) that represent an interesting combination of sector support and relief aid, which has not been reproduced widely. This consists of injecting financial resources into public structures at

the level of province or commune, and monitoring management and outcomes closely, with clear and actionable conditionalities. Such a system allows public services to begin to function while preserving an obligation of results. This model, which is not Belgian funded but the Belgian Embassy is aware<sup>40</sup> of it, has not been adopted in any other project, even though it could, for example, be used in the case of the Burundi Red Cross, which is under threat of being burdened with a large part of the project responsibilities of international NGOs handing over their programmes.

## 4.3 Effectiveness and Impact

### 4.3.1 Delivery and impact

The projects realised, or are expected to realise, the envisaged outputs, but little can be said about results.

Performance of the different projects, in terms of outputs was good; but most projects also had shortcomings or (too) late deliveries. As results indicators in proposals and reporting were absent and there was a general lack of information on results achieved, it was not possible to assess the extent to which the projects resulted in positive changes to the lives of the beneficiaries. Information from the perspective of the beneficiaries themselves on the contributions the projects made on their living conditions was also not available.

MDM/Solidarité was an exception. It was piloting a new monitoring format, called ‘*Compas Qualité*’, which is based on asking verifiable questions concerning the constraints and impacts of a project. Supplemented by a system of flags and highlights, it enables external observers to rapidly understand what gaps exist between objectives planned and outcomes achieved. Also, ICRC has developed the Planning for Results (PFR) format that allows it to separate internal and confidential information from donor reporting, while retaining a good level of indicator-based reporting.

#### ICRC

The specific objectives, the construction of a metal water storage reservoir for the town, access roads to the pumping station, electricity supply to REGIDISO, acquisition of electric and hydraulic materials and awareness-raising sessions with the population to create ownerships for the new infrastructure, were generally met. Effectiveness was negatively influenced by the (lower than expected) water quantity, with influx of returnees to the villages creating a larger demand than foreseen.

#### MDM/Solidarité

The evidence in reporting, and observed by the evaluation, points to strong performance on water activities and sanitation (verified through three site visits). With regard to the construction of water sources and latrines and school gardens the results are good. They will permit improved access to drinking water, sanitary and hygienic conditions, and knowledge of the students of soil fertility and cultivating activities. Water point committees of three to five people feel ownership for the newly

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<sup>40</sup> Interview.

constructed water points, and these committees will care for proper management, maintenance and collection of water fees. With regard to the food security window, the weather conditions and delayed start have negatively influenced effectiveness. The inputs were available long after the planting season. Staff have dealt creatively with this issue using the marshes, but this has damaged effectiveness. The impact of the food security window was not yet visible, and an extension of the project is required to reach the objectives.

### **Caraes/RET**

The manner in which the outputs intended were indeed matched with the outputs achieved is impressive. Despite the very short implementation period, RET has realised its specific objectives for the schools that had been selected for the intervention. However, the evaluation observed a sense of mis-match between some of the supplies provided and the supplies that would have been more relevant (for example chemistry sets), as RET had based its lists on those of the national authorities, when, in fact, practice in the schools is much more applied and rudimentary. Also, some of the training seminars were described by school personnel as too abstract, and the fact that staff training was carried out in Bujumbura, where conditions are very different from the conditions in the project areas (e.g. the water systems in the schools in Bujumbura are electricity driven, while in most schools there is no electricity), does not ensure that the newly acquired knowledge can be applied. However, a great number of secondary schools have been rehabilitated, satisfying a need that no other project in the country covers.

### **FAO<sup>41</sup>**

The evidence dates to the end of 2005, which is in the middle of the period covered by this evaluation. It showed that beneficiaries are satisfied with the seeds and tools obtained by FAO and its NGO partners in the field. Hoes are very much appreciated because they are not only used on one's own plot, but also constitute an asset for earning income as a daily agricultural worker. This is especially relevant for those very poor and poor households who hardly own any land. Those categories of households make 85-90% of their living as daily workers. A majority of households wanted to have two hoes, because they count two to three active members. Having a hoe really contributes to the increase of the household asset base and hence increases livelihood strategy options.

The vegetable seed distribution was also effective, but effectiveness was limited as fertilization strategies (small animal husbandry or chemical fertilizers) were not taken into account. Phytosanitary products and chemical fertilizers are very expensive on the local market. About 15-18% of seeds distributed are sold, because there was no land to cultivate them on or the seed did not match the type that the beneficiary was looking for.

However, it was also found that FAO projected higher yields than have actually been achieved, because not all the seeds were used for agriculture and thus yields were not as high as expected. Moreover, FAO has been working with yields obtained on research plots with the use of fertilizer inputs. It expected that, e.g., 1 kg of beans sowed would produce 10 kg of yield and an average yield of about 700-750 kg per hectare. Under the prevailing conditions without fertilizer inputs, average productivity was low. A farmer harvested about five times the amount of seeds in a bad season and five to ten times in a good season.

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<sup>41</sup> The evaluation was able to capitalize on a previous evaluation visit for the Netherlands Government in Makamba Province to triangulate this information.



#### **UNHCR**

UNHCR leads on refugee issues, although this has been reduced in 2004 to a pure reintegration role, handing over quick impact projects and reintegration to UNDP and other agencies. There has been a strong emergency response function throughout the crisis, and hence short time lags between crisis and the provision of aid. The long-standing relationships with implementing partners in the country, combined with the lower than expected number of returnees<sup>42</sup>, have led to good technical performance

#### **4.3.2 Coordination at project level with the humanitarian community and local authorities**

The projects made generally good efforts to coordinate with other actors and local authorities.

The projects were strong on coordination with the humanitarian community through OCHA, they also built links at local level and sometimes played an important role as informal national or regional coordination platforms themselves.

#### **MDM/Solidarité**

The organisation is based, amongst others, in the province of Cankuzo, which has high development potential, and is an outlying area where many refugees have returned to from Tanzania, and which did not receive assistance for many years due to security reasons. In this sector Solidarité has come to play, with active support from UNICEF, the role of clearing house and one-stop shop for information on socio-economic conditions. It provides logistical support and indirect coordination to other partners, in particular the visiting UN staff, World Vision, Cordaid and Conseil National des Eglises.

#### **FAO**

FAO support extends to the coordination of emergency agricultural assistance and the strengthening of early warning systems and food security surveillance mechanisms (SAP-SSA). The appearance of sudden pockets of malnutrition require very targeted forms of palliative assistance, while we find that early warning systems are an inherent part of the response.

All projects maintained links with local authorities in the implementation of activities. Caraes/RET collaborated in the needs assessment and implementation at national and provincial level with the Ministry of Education, MDM/ Solidarité with Agriculture and Health, UNICEF with Rural Hydrology and Energy and Health, etc. The significance of these links should not be overestimated as the national, provincial and local authorities were in most cases weak to very weak and could not exercise much influence.

#### **UNICEF**

Coordination is assured at the level of national and local authorities as well as with the humanitarian agencies. At the level of national and local authorities, the coordination of activities is organized in the water and sanitation coordination platform, which is co-chaired by UNICEF with the ministry. With respect to the international humanitarian originations, UNICEF participates in different coordination forums at provincial level. In combination with ad hoc meetings, this improves coordination with the

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<sup>42</sup> The slower than expected return can be attributed to the security situation in many of the home regions of the returnees, the agricultural and educational calendar.

interventions other sectors undertake for returnees. Additionally, UNICEF participates in the meetings organized by OCHA, which ensures coordination with the other humanitarian agencies.

#### **Caraes/RET**

The programme was closely coordinated with the national authorities, in particular the Ministry of Education and School Authorities. RET also participated actively in the UNICEF led sector coordination meetings.

### **4.3.3 Monitoring and reporting at project level**

Monitoring and reporting is mainly restricted to the activity-output relationship and hardly on results, while quality and completeness vary.

As mentioned before, most agencies formulated and reported exclusively on the activity-output relationship; very few had included results indicators in the proposals and reported accordingly but there is a clear need to include results indicators in monitoring.

Most impressive was Solidarité. As mentioned above, it was piloting a new monitoring format '*Compas Qualité*', which enables external observers to rapidly understand what gaps exist between objectives planned and outcomes achieved. The frequent monitoring by MDM experts from Brussels contributed to the effectiveness of monitoring. ICRC has also developed the Planning for Results (PfR) format that allows monitoring progress in relation to indicators. The PfR system also allows for the calculation of cost per unit of beneficiary (it has been carried out by the evaluators for other ICRC assessments) but this was not reported to the donor here. UNHCR has not concentrated much on knowledge management yet, but the agency is developing a new reporting format for Results Based Management, which should allow it to track the alignment of its annual planning figures, delivery and outstanding needs in the future. At present Caraes/RET report in great detail on progress, but limited to the deliverables<sup>43</sup>. The reporting was based on a system of monthly monitoring visits to the schools involved to find out about the stage of renovations, continuing needs and sustainability. FAO reporting is generic, and focused on delivery reports balanced with country vulnerability assessments. Although the seeds and distribution programme is the most important FAO emergency component in terms of funding and work, there is no system in place that enables regular monitoring and evaluation of effects and impacts of seed and tool distribution in the field. Such a system would be important, considering the observed discrepancy between expected and realized yields. However, FAO has commissioned some interesting and relevant impact assessment studies in the period 2000-2004. UNICEF's reporting is of a much more general nature and its emphasis, given to delivery figures and general statistics of need in the country, does not allow for an appraisal of programme quality in the three supported sectors of emergency aid, education, and water and sanitation.

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<sup>43</sup> This is listed by RET as : « 119 enseignants formés au Burundi, 473 enseignants réfugiés formés dans les camps en Tanzanie, 15 écoles cibles stratégiquement sélectionnées, 12 nouvelles classes construites et 15 classes rénovées, 4 blocs administratifs construits et 1 rénové, 20 latrines construites, 1.620 articles d'équipement pour les classes, les blocs administratifs, les réfectoires et les dortoirs, 7.187 livres et 135 cartes pédagogiques distribués dans les 15 écoles cibles, 60 kits de laboratoire distribués .

The requirements for reporting are established by the Royal Decree on Relief and Rehabilitation, and formally both NGOs and multilateral organisations need to provide specific progress information on Belgian-funded activities under this budget line (even if these are part of a wider programme). For NGOs the reporting requirements are defined in the Vademecum. For multilateral and international organisations the requirements are not defined and, in practice, significantly less elaborate reports are accepted.

Humanitarian assistance is characterised by a network-based form of implementation, often involving a large number of partner organisations. The agencies delivering the actual supplies or providing the service are usually four to five steps removed from the department that formulate the external reports. In the chain, information is aggregated at each level with the risk of a dilution of field level information and loss of valuable information for progress monitoring along the road. This risk increases with the length of the information chain. The chain is generally longer for multilateral organisations than for NGOs.

UN agency reporting, for reasons explained above, tended to be of a nature too general for progress monitoring. The evaluation was not able to find, for example in the UNICEF reports on water and sanitation, indications of how the outcomes were used, and on the general impact of the programme in relation to other similar programmes. The section on impacts describes, in fact, the number of schools and water points rehabilitated, and even the future number of families that are to be assisted. These are generally better described as outputs, whereas outcomes would describe the use made of the outputs, and impact the changes that have occurred as a result of the outcomes. This information is absent and there is no indication of challenges and how these were addressed.

UNHCR reporting and interviews carried out with regard to the large repatriation programme did not yield much information. However, the evaluation visited the field office in Ruyigi, which demonstrated a strong grasp of the issues and needs of the population, of the presence of operational partners, and the stage of repatriation reached.

The evaluation found that detail in intra-agency and project reporting is higher among the field implementing organisations. In the case of RET the annual report for the project highlights the severe difficulties the organisation faced at the administrative level because it had to become registered in the country to implement the programme and did not enjoy the advantages of an international organisation to speed up customs clearance.

## 4.4 Efficiency

### *Timeliness and outputs*

Except for one, the projects generally delivered the envisaged outputs within budget, while timely delivery was sometimes a bottleneck.

Overall efficiency was negatively influenced by the significantly under-performing project 'Réhabilitation pour sinistrés, rapatriés et déplacés à Makamba' of Solidarité

Protestante implemented by ADRA. This project had to be closed after the implementing organisation ran into serious problems due to misuse of funds by the new management.

The other projects delivered the envisaged outputs within the agreed financial parameters. This can be explained from the present Royal Decree, which does not allow for budget increases. Delivery on time varied. Some projects performed remarkably well, while others had to cope with delays in implementation, mainly caused by external factors, such as late approval of proposals, administrative problems, under-performance of subcontractors, lack of materials on the local market and weak national authorities. Except for the project mentioned above, none of the projects performed unsatisfactorily with respect to timeliness or envisaged outputs.

UNHCR performed very well in terms of timely delivery. There has been a strong emergency response function<sup>44</sup> throughout the crisis, and hence short time lags between crisis and the provision of aid. The short reaction time was confirmed by UNHCR discussing an item on the 'expulsés' in a meeting on 25<sup>th</sup> May, which the evaluation team had brought up on the previous day in another part of the country.

Solidarité's response time was also very short due to the facts that it was present on the ground, well equipped with supplies and logistics, had a very good monitoring system, and was very aware of the roles and capacities of local partners. However, the project had suffered from initial administrative delays in signing the contract for the food security component. This meant that the main planting season in Burundi was missed, and the project had to be extended. The cause for the delay is not clear but appears to be related to the excessive workload of personnel at the headquarters of the three organisations, Solidarité, Médecins du Monde and the Federal Public Service, which meant that contractual errors were addressed late.

The RET annual project report highlights the severe difficulties the organisation faced at the administrative level because it had to become registered in the country to implement the programme, and because it did not enjoy the advantages of an international organisation to speed up customs clearance. This clearly caused a loss of efficiency due to the fact that the project had to be implemented in a six-month instead of a one-year period, and impacted on the outputs delivered. The time constraints under which the organisation operated are a credit to the adaptability of the organisation and its personnel.

The ICRC water project in Kayanza was delayed by one year from 2004 to the end of 2005 due to the poor quality of work carried out by the local contractors, slowness of REGIDESO, the national water and energy company, as well as the over-estimation of the capacity of the original water source.

From the documents provided by UNICEF, it was observed that the speed of UNICEF's response to emergencies had been slow, mostly because of a very participatory approach and the absence of good operational partners (UNICEF implemented the water projects with the same partners as ICRC).

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<sup>44</sup> Evaluation of the UNHCR Repatriation Programme, World Bank, 2002.

### *Efficiency and security*

It is well understood that security concerns in a hostile environment, as Burundi was for many years, rightfully affects efficiency in situations of conflict, as the regretful assassination of ICRC delegates demonstrates. It is, however, difficult to understand that until mid-2007 UN staff had to move in convoys escorted by police (a security directive from 2005 that is not easy to justify). This has certainly neither contributed to the efficiency of delivery by the UN organisations nor improved the interface with the population.

### *Efficiency of the delivery chain*

The efficiency of the delivery chain could not be established.

Humanitarian assistance is characterised by a long delivery chain. The agencies delivering the actual supplies or providing the service are usually several levels removed from the centre of the organisation that holds the contract with the donor. This is certainly true for the UN organisations with their central offices in the USA or Europe, and national and local offices that contract implementation out to a number of organisations, mainly local and international NGOs. But this is, to some extent, also true for the projects of Belgian humanitarian NGOs. The *Arrêté Royal* stipulates that only Belgian NGOs who contracted local or regional NGOs for implementation can receive funding.

The Belgian Embassy expressed concern about the cost efficiency of the chain, as significant overhead costs are attached to each level. For example, in the case of the operational NGOs, such as Solidarité or RET, these costs could be in the order of 10% at each level of contract, which between the Belgian partner and the partner in Burundi could be added up to an amount of up to 20%. In the case of the UN the overhead costs could vary from 20% (case of implementation through a national NGO) to 30% (through two levels of implementation after leaving UN accounts).

At each level, value is also added because of management, technical support, coordination and policy advocacy functions. The added value consists, among others, of the ability of the middle levels of the chain to formulate and communicate issues to other stakeholders as they arise at the implementation level, be they the authorities, donors, other NGOs, or the media. The evaluation was informed by NGOs that this was an important function, played particularly efficiently by UNICEF with its ability to link emergency aid and development, technical assistance and advocacy,

The costs and added value of such activities are difficult to establish, which makes an analysis of chain efficiency extremely complex and time consuming. The evaluation did neither have the time and expertise required for such an analysis, nor did it have access to relevant information, as the agencies could not provide details of contracts and budgets for sub-agreements.

## 4.5 Accountability to Beneficiaries

The evaluation limited itself to ascertaining the existence of grievance mechanisms and reporting of beneficiary assessments, though it is well aware that the concept of accountability to beneficiaries is significantly wider. In none of the projects such a mechanism for allowing beneficiaries to express their thoughts on quality and timeliness of delivery and distribution of benefits was in place. Neither did the evaluation come across reporting on the perception of beneficiaries on humanitarian assistance delivered.

## 5 Assessment of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance at Country Level

### 5.1 Coordination

In Section 2.2.2 the coordination mechanisms in Burundi have been described. It was observed that donor coordination had improved but that there were still significant weaknesses in the systems and organisations responsible for coordination, while the new coordination mechanisms under the humanitarian reform were not introduced in Burundi, contrary to the DRC.

Belgium has been an active participant in the different coordination platforms and has coordinated its humanitarian assistance in Burundi with that of other actors to varying degrees over time through four main mechanisms:

- The humanitarian coordination group chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator. The Belgian Attaché pour les projets of the Embassy, in charge of humanitarian assistance, attended practically all meetings and pushed for issues, which would otherwise not have been adequately covered. The Embassy's ability to target funding to priority areas, based on field assessments carried out by its personnel and on good relations with all the agencies in the country, have strengthened Belgium's hand. The role of Belgium in these meetings has been clearly perceived and appreciated.
- With Belgium's in-depth knowledge of all actors and its continued presence in both humanitarian and development aid, Belgium played an active role in the coordination of the transition from humanitarian to development assistance. It, among others, supported the launch of the National Committee for the Coordination of Aid (CNCA in French) that coordinates structural assistance.
- ECHO has, since the beginning of the evaluation period, maintained an active policy of dialogue with the member states. The European Union coordination forum truly emerged in 2006, and in Burundi the EU currently tends to crystallise the convergent policies of the member states. Within this, Belgium has played a leading role<sup>45</sup>.
- Finally, most of the relief and rehabilitation projects were identified within the priorities of the CHAP and where this was not so, they were integrated into the existing coordination regimes of the different sectors and provinces by the NGOs, as described in Chapter 4.

The Belgian Embassy's federating role on the ground was extended by the funding given to agencies that had a role in coordination. The Belgian Government provided financial

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<sup>45</sup> Interviews with Swiss, ECHO, and Belgian missions.

support to OCHA through core contributions and contributions to posts in Burundi. Belgium also funded projects that ECHO felt were a priority and which it could not support at a given point in time.

## 5.2 Coherence

*At strategy level there is coherence between humanitarian and other forms of Belgian assistance, but at implementation level coherence is weak or absent.*

Coherence can be assessed at different levels.

*Firstly, at the level of overall policies.*

Belgium has primarily focused on the restoration of peace and stability in the country, actively mobilising the different diplomatic, financial and aid instruments it has at its disposal. Belgium actively supported the Arusha process of peace building and reconciliation at the national level, the creation of conditions for successful implementation of the Arusha protocols, such as de-mobilisations and integration of the different armed groups in the national army, the international peace keeping force, international debt reduction, the process of rebuilding governance and governance structures, and contributed to the efforts to revive the economy and reduce poverty (see also Section 3.1.2).

Belgian humanitarian assistance had a defined role within the overall efforts, and humanitarian activities should aim at reducing humanitarian tensions. The humanitarian strategy should therefore include relief, as well as rehabilitation and support to the transition from humanitarian to development assistance; the so-called 'humanitarian plus' approach.

As can be concluded from the distribution of the Belgian humanitarian investments (presented in Section 3.2.6), Belgian humanitarian assistance was concentrated on direct support to the reintegration of refugees and IDPs to a very large extent, which was further augmented by the many investments in social infrastructure and public service projects supporting rehabilitation in the areas of origin of refugees and displaced persons with a view to increase their return.

Considering that the large number of returnees and IDPs, the complications around the ownership of land and property, as well as the lack of alternative employment opportunities for returnees and IDPs created potential for disappointment and offered opportunities for political opponents to jeopardise the peace process, the concentration of Belgian humanitarian assistance on the support for returnees and IDPs was indeed coherent with the other general efforts to diminish tension and create peace and stability.

Considering that the election in 2004 passed without serious incidents, the Government is gaining acceptance and strength, and stability is increasing, it is possible to assume that synergy between humanitarian and other forms of assistance was indeed created, and that humanitarian assistance has contributed to oil the transition process. This is remarkable at



a time when assistance provided in many countries has been detrimental to political resolution (for example Bosnia) or contrary to humanitarian aid (for example Afghanistan). Such an assessment is, of course, outside the scope of this evaluation.

*Secondly, coherence can be analysed from the perspective of addressing the various phases of the crisis (LRRD).*

Improving stability, governance and the recovering economy increasingly created structural development opportunities. But, because of continuing overall economic and social vulnerability, manifested malnutrition, epidemics, displacement and mortality from violence, which maintained a fragile environment and triggered a series of short crises, humanitarian assistance was and still is required continuously. During the period under review, Belgium continued to provide humanitarian and structural development assistance and, while both increased, in absolute terms development assistance increased significantly faster. The continuation and even growth of Belgian humanitarian assistance is remarkable in a period when other donors are phasing out their humanitarian assistance in favour of development assistance (like, e.g., ECHO and OFDA). The evaluation observes that the persistence of humanitarian needs and increasing development opportunities seem well reflected in this distribution of Belgian assistance over the years.

In sectoral assistance there is a level of coherence with the development support focusing on sectors that also received significant humanitarian support, like agriculture, health and education and that, in principle, creates better opportunities for sustainability of humanitarian interventions.

As Belgium understood that government or civil society organisations are often not yet in a position to take over humanitarian activities and that, in practice, there exist big gaps between the end of humanitarian activities and the moment the effects of development are felt, it is not understood why Belgium did not apply the budget line Transition to bridge such gaps<sup>46</sup>. This budget line was especially created during the period under review to bridge these gaps and facilitate the transition from humanitarian to structural development assistance<sup>47</sup>. With this budget line, activities initiated with humanitarian funding could have been supported to create the conditions for handing over to other national institutions or organisations, one of the weak points of humanitarian activities as observed earlier. Similarly, specific target groups of prior humanitarian assistance could have been supported to regain their autonomy after the initial humanitarian support.

Hardly any coherence can be observed between humanitarian activities and those funded from the Conflict Prevention budget line<sup>48</sup>. The projects funded under the Conflict Prevention budget line focused support on national radio and television and (in the regional context) on justice, legal systems, prisoners' rights and elections. The humanitarian assistance budget line focused on other aspects, such as land and property

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<sup>46</sup> Only a very small project to support the national police has been funded under this budget line.

<sup>47</sup> See Annual Report DGOS 2006.

<sup>48</sup> The conflict prevention budget line is not subject of the evaluation and the above is absolutely not to be seen as an assessment of the relevance of the activities funded under this budget line.

conflicts related to returning refugees and IDPs. Only with respect to the de-mining project funded by the Conflict Prevention budget line some co-coherence was observed.

This can be explained, as the Conflict Prevention budget line targets small projects, working with NGOs not operational in the field (with the exception of mine action). And, the rationale for Conflict Prevention is based on a conflict analysis, which has, historically, been very distinct from the humanitarian aid rationale, with the exception of the fundamental principle mentioned earlier, that a lack of support to the repatriation of refugees would have risked undermining the entire peace process.

The evaluation could also not establish linkages between humanitarian activities and those identified for implementation under the new 'emergency programme' for Burundi.

### 5.3 Efficiency of Delivery

#### *The decision making process*

The location of the centre of gravity in the management of the humanitarian aid budget was divided and not always sufficiently clear to enable optimal efficiency.

The division of labour between the different levels in the public service, which affects the decision-making process, was as follows:

- Decisions concerning UN agency funding are taken in Brussels, in liaison with the various UN representations;
- Decisions concerning NGOs are taken in Brussels, often, but not always (for example the decision to fund Caraes-RET) in consultation with the Embassy;
- Decisions concerning food aid and multilateral projects are taken in Brussels in consultation with the Embassy;
- The dialogue with the implementing bodies (NGOs, UNICEF, Red Cross, CTB, etc.) takes place in Bujumbura.

This has contributed to administrative delays and effectiveness and efficiency losses of programmes. We could identify in particular:

- Decisions made in Brussels concerning the funding of NGOs that did not have a presence in Burundi (RET) leading to funding of establishment costs by the ministry. A similar programme in Tanzania was terminated after only one year as the financial auditors raised concerns, in spite of strong delivery performance.
- Delays in contracting and payments that led to loss of quality. For example, the food security component of the MDM Solidarité programme and the delay in funding the housing programme implemented by UNHCR, which resulted in some 2000 houses being built but having no roof for over a year.


#### *Availability of management information*

As described above, much of the decision making, monitoring and assessment of end-results is centralised with the FPS in Brussels. To perform these tasks FPS staff depend on the information provided by the implementing organisations.

As a consequence of the network-based form of implementation of humanitarian assistance a large number of partner organisations are often involved. The organisations delivering the supplies or providing the services are usually four to five steps removed from the department that reports to the donor.

This can be represented in the following manner:

Figure 5.1 Humanitarian network



In such a network implementation structure information is aggregated at each level with the risk of dilution of information and loss of valuable information for progress monitoring along the road. The length of the chain requires high quality knowledge management of the implementing organisation to minimise dilution of information in the chain and to provide Belgian government staff with a sufficiently reliable and complete picture of project progress and results.

Considering the observed general quality of knowledge management, the quality of reporting, the mainly output-focused monitoring systems (see Section 4.3.3), it is not possible for the FPS staff to monitor and assess the projects without additional information. This information is best obtained at field level. To assess progress, as well as learning from experience for future decision making and policy formulation, regular field observations are therefore necessary.

Unfortunately, as is the case for most donors, the Belgian ministry personnel charged with the responsibility to monitor implementation are heavily burdened with reporting obligations relating to the contractual links situated just around them and do not have the time to regularly visit the activities<sup>49</sup>.

<sup>49</sup> The need for a regular field presence to fill information gaps is also reflected in the current practice of Swiss humanitarian aid, where all projects are visited twice a year (Switzerland was chosen as a benchmark country for Belgium).

In Burundi the lack of adequate information is partly compensated for by the presence of Belgian Embassy staff who can travel to the field, participate in meetings and communicate freely with all actors, and who also have access to progress reports, e.g. post harvest monitoring reports, of implementing partners that fill the information gaps.

#### *The Embassy in Bujumbura*

The permanence of an embassy in Burundi, in contrast to the majority of EU donors who only recently (re)opened embassies, must be considered a definite strength in the management of humanitarian activities. This has also contributed to coherence with other Belgian-funded interventions and other humanitarian programmes.

The evaluation found a shining example of information management in the Embassy (as evidenced, for example, by the quality of briefing notes, the availability of information and the ease with which meetings were organised) and of the grasp of detail. This has largely compensated for any disconnectedness in terms of policy between different budget lines. Projects funded under one budget line (for example Humanitarian Mine Action by Danchurchaid under Conflict Prevention) supported the rigidity of funding of another humanitarian aid donor (ECHO), and aimed at achieving socio-economic benefits (renewed access to mine-infested areas), as well as confidence building. Careful monitoring of the project revealed programming errors and led to a cessation of funding, in turn leading to improvements in the programme<sup>50</sup>. Such a flexible and phased approach would not have been possible for a donor managing the programme mainly from its head office or another capital in the region, as this usually means less time to assess projects and obtain information in the field.

The continuity, quality and networks of the staff in charge of humanitarian assistance have certainly made an important contribution.

#### *Belgian NGOs*

The policy of funding local implementation through Belgian NGOs could be justified on the basis of a quality assurance role these organisations could play. Some of the NGOs (for example for MDM) fulfil this role actively, while for others this role is more one of visits to the country (Caraes).

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<sup>50</sup> Evaluation of Danchurchaid Humanitarian Mine Action, 2006.

## 6 Conclusions and Recommendations

### 6.1 Conclusions

*I: Belgium is recognised and appreciated as one of the most important and influential bilateral donors by the international humanitarian community in Burundi.*

This position of influence was achieved because of:

- The focus of Belgian foreign policy on the Great Lakes region and the consequently *high policy attention to and significant resources* for the (forgotten) crisis in Burundi. Before 2002 Belgium was one of the most important donors, and since then both development and humanitarian assistance increased sharply and nearly doubled.
- Belgium's *reliability as a humanitarian donor*. While other countries from 2004 onwards started to shift from nearly exclusively humanitarian funding to development funding, Belgium not only continued but even increased humanitarian funding, maintaining its position as one of the main bilateral humanitarian donors.
- Belgium played an *important role in the coordination* of humanitarian assistance and coordinated its assistance with that of other actors. Belgium was an active and influential participant in humanitarian coordination meetings (of the Humanitarian Coordinator, of ECHO, GHD donor meetings), it supported the coordination mechanisms through its support to OCHA, while simultaneously concentrating its funding on activities identified in the CHAP, and where this was not so, integrated activities in the existing coordination regimes at sectoral or provincial level.
- Belgium concentrated humanitarian assistance on the *re-integration of refugees and returning IDPs* in line with the priorities defined by the humanitarian community.
- The *continuity and quality of the Embassy staff* in charge of the management of humanitarian assistance.

*II: The focus of humanitarian activities was coherent with the objectives of other Belgian conflict prevention and development efforts.*

The enormous influx of returning refugees and IDPs created a potential for de-stabilisation and the concentration of Belgian humanitarian assistance served immediate humanitarian needs and the overall objectives of Belgian assistance of stabilisation and reconciliation.

*III: The focus on re-integration caused a different sectoral distribution of humanitarian activities in Burundi to the overall Belgian programme, while average project size was significantly larger.*

Health being the main sector had only a minor place in Belgian humanitarian assistance, while multi-sectoral approaches, water and sanitation and shelter, had a more prominent place among the sectors in Burundi. The budgets of the projects in Burundi were an average 875,000 Euro, compared to the worldwide average of 532,000 Euro.

*IV: It is remarkable that, while Burundi was fully in transition, hardly any activities were funded under the Transition budget line.*

During the period under review, Burundi went through a period of transition from crisis to significantly improved stability and there were many important gaps in funding that fully met the requirements of this budget line. Only one small project was funded under this budget line

*V: The overall assessment of Belgian-funded projects is positive but the final impact could not be determined.*

- The activities were highly relevant, addressed the acute needs of the vulnerable segments of important target groups, while simultaneously addressing some target groups that were not supported by others, were located in regions that were profoundly affected by the crisis and highly sensitive, and relevant sectors.
- The activities had a clear development perspective and grosso modo delivered the envisaged outputs, with the exception of one project that totally failed. The other (mainly minor) shortcomings in individual project implementation could be expected and understood under the (still difficult) circumstances.
- The not always timely delivery could not be attributed to one single cause but had multiple causes, such as delays in project approval, participatory approaches, shortages and shortcoming of local markets and local administration in combination with shortcomings of implementing organisations.
- The weakest point was sustainability in terms of handing over rehabilitated services to state or civil society organisations. This was sometimes hampered by inappropriate technology choices and, at other times, by the weaknesses of the governmental and civil society organisations. Although some projects included capacity development to improve conditions for handing over, this was not the strongest component, and the benefits of the recent development programmes to strengthen local organisations are not yet realised. The limited attention to capacity building can be understood, considering the restrictions of the Royal Decree on relief and rehabilitation assistance, the main source of humanitarian funding in Burundi.
- Effectiveness in terms of achievements of humanitarian objectives could not be determined, as hardly any results indicators had been formulated or used for monitoring and reporting.

*VI: It is not possible to draw conclusions with regard to the comparative effectiveness of Belgian NGOs and international and multilateral organisations as implementation channels of Belgian humanitarian assistance.*

The multilateral and international sector performs partly different functions to the NGO sector, and the sample was too small to draw any conclusions from the research. Both did not implement themselves, but monitored and reported on the implementation by other (subcontracted) organisations. The multilateral organisations also provided technical assistance and were advocates for issues observed by the implementing organisations at field level, at the intermediate and higher levels in the country. Examples of more innovative approaches and attention to protection were observed with multilateral and international organisation, while the most innovative forms of monitoring were found with subcontracted (international) NGOs. Observations were made with regard to efficiency, especially in relation to the security measures of the multilateral organisations,

but, because of the complexity an assessment of the (cost)efficiency of multilateral and international organisations was not possible within the scope of this evaluation. Intensity and quality of monitoring of implementing organisations by Belgian NGOs varied, and the added value of contracting Belgian NGOs instead of directly contracting NGOs implementing the activity, like Solidarité, was not always clear.

*VII: Progress and end reporting do not provide sufficient information for adequate monitoring and assessment of project progress as well as learning.*

The reports of multilateral organisations and Belgian NGOs (though NGO reports provided better information) do not allow for sufficient monitoring by the staff of FPS, because of the length of the information chain, absence of reporting on agreed results indicators and completeness. Most of the new monitoring tools have not yet resulted in the presentation of better management information to FPS. Additional information was best available in the field and collected by Embassy staff through field visits. Such visits by the staff of FPS or the Embassy are required if the monitoring and assessment function of FPS is to be maintained, while they are also indispensable for learning.

*VIII: More needs to be done to translate the GHD principles into concrete actions at country level.*

The GHD pilot in Burundi did not succeed to translate GHD principles into concrete improvements of donor performance at country level. The outcome of better donor consultation could also have been achieved implementing the GHD principles. Recent agreements on the introduction of indicators and benchmarks for the tracking of performance in GHD might provide better opportunities.

## 6.2 Recommendations

*I: It is recommended to continue providing humanitarian assistance to Burundi.*

Considering the humanitarian needs related to economic and social vulnerability of the population, the continuing tensions, the number of refugees and IDPs still to return, the importance of a strong link between relief, rehabilitation and development, and the transfer of humanitarian funds to development activities, it is strongly recommended to continue humanitarian funding in Burundi. This will confirm Belgium's reliability as a donor in line with one of the main the GHD principles.

*II: It is recommended to further support the coordination of humanitarian assistance and linkages with structural and other forms of international assistance.*

Humanitarian assistance, structural development assistance and the conflict prevention programmes, each have their own rationale and administrative structures, which does not make a coherent approach at strategic and implementation level easy. Certainly in the phase of increasing stability, there is a strong international tendency to concentrate fully on development opportunities at the expense of attention to humanitarian and conflict prevention issues. Belgium's recognised position as a humanitarian and development donor and its role in the coordination of both aid flows give it a special position to advocate for coherence between the different aid flows.



*III: It is recommended to build on the strength of the present programme and maintain a clear focus of humanitarian assistance in line with humanitarian and Belgian priorities.*

It is essential that under the presently fast increasing importance of structural development cooperation the importance and role of humanitarian assistance remains recognised and does not become marginalised. It is therefore important that humanitarian assistance continues with clear focus, in line with the general Belgian and international objectives. It is also important that efforts are made at all levels (FPS, Embassy) to strengthen the linkages between the different programmes, including the 'special emergency programme' started in 2006. This might require the establishment of a form of regular mutual consultation at the FPS, e.g. such as the Netherlands introduced for Sudan.

*IV: It is recommended to identify and fund humanitarian activities from the Transition budget line.*

The benefits of the development programmes (most of them will only start now as the donor conference was held in mid-2007) will only materialise in the years to come, leaving many gaps that require more immediate support, for example, among others, many of the Belgian-funded humanitarian projects cannot be successfully handed over to the government department or civil society organisations yet. The Transition budget line is perfectly placed as a humanitarian budget line to bridge such gaps. Simultaneously, more attention should be given to increasing opportunities for handing over in project formulation on the selection of technologies, organisational strengthening and exit strategies.

*V: It is recommended to insist on the introduction of different forms of proposal formulation and progress monitoring that provide a better understanding of progress in relation to results rather than, exclusively, outputs.*

The introduction of results indicators in proposals and reporting will facilitate the assessment of progress and end results, whether this is organised exclusively by individual projects reporting to the Belgian government or jointly funded donor programmes that will, in line with the GHD principles, report to the joint donor group according to their own standards. It is also recommended to introduce the practice of final project evaluations, as is common practice in development projects. This will allow for more effective progress monitoring and results assessment. Regular field visits of the Embassy staff, as already practiced, and FPS staff remain necessary for additional information collection and, certainly, for learning.

*VI: It is recommended to make maximum use of the knowledge and experience accumulated in the Embassy in Bujumbura.*

As all decision making, monitoring and assessment is centralised in Brussels, it is important to continue extensive consultation with the Embassy, as it possesses impressive accumulated knowledge and experience, and maintains contacts with the other actors (including national authorities) at the coordination forums. The decentralisation of certain tasks (e.g. monitoring and assessment of end reports) could be considered.



*VII: It is recommended to request attention to gaps in coverage from the humanitarian coordinating bodies and responsible implementing agencies (e.g. UNICEF in case of the ‘expulsés’).*

Every group in need should be provided with humanitarian assistance on the basis of its needs and no gaps, as observed by the evaluation team, should exist. Belgium can raise the importance of adequate planning of emergency aid in the annual consultations with the relevant multilateral organisations.

*VIII: It is suggested that Belgium evaluates the added value of contracting Belgian NGOs as opposed to those of other nationalities.*



# Annex 1: Terms of Reference for the Field Visit to Burundi as part of the Evaluation of Belgian Humanitarian Assistance

## Introduction

The Special Evaluation Service S0.4 has commissioned an evaluation of the Belgian humanitarian assistance during the period 2002-2006. This evaluation is carried out by ECORYS. The framework for this evaluation is laid down in the general ToR, and has been elaborated in more detail in a “Methodological Note” (phase 1 of the evaluation). The second phase consisted of a policy analysis, and an analysis of the various budget lines and the institutions in Brussels. The third phase consists primarily of four field visits; two to the DRC, one to Burundi and one to Pakistan. This document contains the detailed ToR for the field visit to Burundi.

## Background

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the quality of the humanitarian interventions that have been supported financially by the Federal Government of Belgium. The evaluation will shed light on those factors that contributed to or reduced the quality of the humanitarian interventions supported by the Belgian Government and make suggestions that will support the Government to improve its humanitarian programme and increase the added value.

The assessment of humanitarian activities in Burundi supported by the Belgian Government are an important part of the evaluation, because Burundi is the second largest receiver of Belgian humanitarian aid. The projects are financed out of two budget lines: ‘food aid’ and ‘emergency aid’.

More background information on Belgian humanitarian assistance policies and strategies, organisations and processes and the various budget lines can be found in the second phase report that has been written as part of the overall evaluation.

## Objective of the mission

This field mission to Burundi will focus in first instance on Bujumbura, where the main stakeholders (Belgian Embassy, Government of Burundi, UN organisations, national and

international NGOs) have their offices. Moreover, some projects will be visited. The mission has the following objective:

To assess the quality of the Belgian humanitarian interventions in Burundi.

## Approach and research

### *Data collection methods*

The two primary methods used for data collection are desk research and interviews:

#### **Desk research**

To prepare the field visits the following documentation will be studied:

- Country plans.
- CAP and CHAPs.
- Country multi-annual plans of implementing organisations such as WFP.
- The evaluation reports of the pool fund.
- Dossiers of the projects that will be visited.
- Relevant evaluations of other humanitarian country programmes (such as the recent Dutch evaluation study of humanitarian assistance to the Great Lakes Region, incl. Burundi), implementing agencies and interventions.

#### **Interviews**

In this mission the evaluators will divide their time between Bujumbura to meet with representatives of the Embassy, the Government, the UN organisations, other implementing and civil society organisations, etc. and visits to projects within and outside Bujumbura

In Bujumbura the mission will meet with:

- The Belgium Embassy (political, development and humanitarian staff);
- National authorities ;
- Other donors: if possible Finland and Switzerland (as these are benchmark countries for the evaluation) and the European Community, the USA (involved with Belgium in the GHD pilot), UK and the Netherlands;
- Implementing organisations (Multilateral organisations and Belgian NGO's involved in the Belgium humanitarian and related programs with representation in the capital);
- Beneficiaries (also focus groups can be organised).

Specific attention will be given to:

- OCHA: Because of the importance of coordination and the specific responsibility of OCHA to coordinate (in the wider sense including information management, humanitarian strategy analysis) the humanitarian actions as well because of the support given by the Belgian Government (core as well as earmarked support to OCHA in Burundi), OCHA will be one of the focal points of the missions attention.
- ICRC: The mission will give specific attention to core and programme funding by the Belgium humanitarian program to ICRC
- One or more civil society organisations with an in depth vision on the role of the humanitarian programmes in Burundi.

### *Projects to be analysed*

The Belgian Government has supported 41 humanitarian projects in Burundi in the period 2002-2005. An overview of these projects is listed in annex 2. A selection of the humanitarian interventions has to be analysed in detail. The projects have been selected based on different years, sectors and implementing organisations.

The following projects will be analysed in detail:

Description	Year	Organisation	Budget	No interv.
<b>Relief Aid</b>				
Humanitarian assistance to support the repatriation and reintegration of Burundian refugees	2006	UNHCR	1.000.000 €	NH/2006/08
Amélioration des conditions de vie des populations vulnérables de la province de Cankuzo	2006	Med. du Monde	400.000 €	NH/2006/34
Rehabilitation of 30 classrooms, training of teacher and taking care of children in 4 camps	2005	Caraes	488.953 €	NH/2005/23
Réhabilitation pour sinistrés, rapatriés et déplacés à Makamba : réhabilitation agricole et reconstruction d'écoles.	2004	Sol. Prot.	501.175 €	NH/2004/21
Réhabilitation d'infrastructures d'approvisionnement en eau, sensibilisation sur l'hygiène et promotion de l'assainissement de base en milieu scolaire et au niveau des communautés dans les provinces de Rutana, Bururi, Ruyigi et Cankuzo.	2004	UNICEF	420.000 €	NH/2004/37
Rehabilitation of drinking water facilities for the town of Kayanza (beneficiaries: Kyanza population and IDPs)	2003	CICR	758.500 €	19700/25
<b>Food Aid</b>				
	2004	FAO	370.000	19851 / 15
Semences diverses	2004	FAO	580.000	OSRO/BDI/403/BEL 19851/14
Seeds, tools, fertilizers	2005	FAO	500.000	SRO/BDI/501/BEL 20006/21

A project assessment form (annex 3) has been developed based on the overall methodology that will guide the analysis of the selected projects in the field.

### *Evaluation criteria*

The methodological nota presents the evaluation criteria which are to be used for the assessment of the design and implementation of the interventions. The following criteria have to be taken into account (in Annex 1 more detailed questions per evaluation criterion are presented, while in Annex 3 the project assessment form is presented exact definitions to be checked):

- **Relevance** of the project; responsiveness to needs, relation with local coping strategies, alignment with the Belgian (among other related to gender), national and local government policies and efforts.
- **Connectedness** with the development efforts of the Belgium and other organisations and national opportunities and perspectives.
- **Coherence**, Relation with the peace building and conflict prevention initiatives among others of the Belgian Government.
- **Effectiveness** in terms timeliness of the assistance, the realisation of objectives and coordination.
- **Impact (in terms of effects) and sustainability.**
- **Coverage and proportionality** of assistance according to needs.

### *Planning and composition of the mission*

The mission is scheduled to take place from May 13th until May 27th. The team consists of Mr. Emery Brusset and Mr. Augustin Ngendakuriyo.

Adriaan Ferf and Anneke Slob will be responsible for guiding the Burundi team and will assure the integration of the Burundi case study in the overall evaluation of Belgian humanitarian assistance. They will also be responsible for quality assurance.

### *Reporting*

The mission will present its findings in a country report of maximum 30 pages, excluding an Executive Summary. The project assessment forms will be presented in the annexes. A first draft report will be submitted not later than June 6<sup>th</sup> 2007.

## Annex 2: Research Questions and Indicators

### *Related to Relevance*

- To what extent were the receivers of assistance approached as actors or as passive victims? Have they been involved in the definition, setting of priorities and implementation of the assistance? How was the process organised and was there a choice between different options offered?
- Was the assistance aligned with local coping systems and efforts, making optimal use of local resources and local structures?
- Were outputs responding to needs and local customs, delivered in time, meeting quality standards, and distributed regardless of gender or political affiliations?
- Does the humanitarian programme in the country meet the requirements of impartiality and independence of political, economic and military objectives?
- Were interventions aligned with Government policies, is the programme well embedded in the national, local and humanitarian aid context?
- Was the intervention consistent with gender and environmental priorities of the Belgian development programme and sensitive to local culture?

### *Related to Coherence*

- To what extent have efforts been made to make the humanitarian country programme and intervention level coherent with conflict prevention and society reconstruction programmes?
- How were relations with peace keeping organisations maintained?

### *Related to Connectedness*

- Are humanitarian needs and programmes recognised in the country programme?
- To what extent have efforts been made to connect the humanitarian country programme and interventions with the approaches and programmes of the structural development programmes?
- Is optimal use made of local, national and regional resources for emergency assistance?
- To what extent does disaster risk reduction get attention in the development programmes?

### *Related to Coverage*

- Were the outputs distributed according to proportionality principles, was best use made of the available 'human space'? What efforts have been made to reach and protect vulnerable people in isolated situations? How have constraints been dealt with?

#### *Related to Effectiveness*

- To what extent were the interventions effective in realising their goals?
- How were the outputs assessed, was the end report based on any form of impact measurement or external evaluation?
- Which mechanisms were used to coordinate the assistance with the local government and other organisations? How effective was this coordination? Were information and resources shared?

#### *Related to Efficiency*

- Are there indications of low efficiency in the delivery process?

#### *Related to Implementation*

- Do local management, planning and control structures of the implementing organisations, as well as resources meet the minimal standards?
- Was the local staff of the implementing agencies qualified in humanitarian response, capable and prepared to build relations with the local communities and to provide quality assistance?
- What was the level of delegation of authority by head offices to the field? How is supervision of field operations organised and realised by the next higher level? To what extent are the head offices of the NGOs supporting or impeding the optimal implementation at the field level?

#### *Related to Project Cycle Management*

- Was the embassy involved in the identification and formulation process, what has been done with the advice of the embassies?
- Do the proposals make reference to sector quality standards, such as Sphere, and the Code of Conduct?
- Do the proposals include an exit and asset transfer process to other parties?
- Was there active (field level) monitoring of implementation by the embassies and sufficient reporting to the administration in Brussels? What was the quality of monitoring, result and effect measuring and reporting?
- To what extent are the embassies successful and have the capacities (financial and human resources, access to information and other resources) to develop a country vision, coordinate with government and other organisations, monitor implementation and advise Brussels?
- Which suggestions can be made to improve strategy and administrative support and what requirements will enhance the effectiveness of the humanitarian programme and interventions for the communities in need?

#### *Relation between Embassies and Implementing Agencies*

- To what extent are the humanitarian strategy, the requirements of the administration and the relations with the staff of the Ministry in Brussels supporting or impeding the implementation of humanitarian programmes in the country?
- To what extent is the know-how and understanding of local circumstances of the implementing agencies shared and used by the embassy?



## Indicators

### *Related to Relevance*

- Period elapsed between crisis and provision of assistance.
- Number of proposals and end reports that include a proper needs assessments with gender specific information on vulnerable groups (children, elderly, handicapped).
- Number of proposals that include information on the target group, their coping strategies, capacities and organisations
- Diversity within and between proposals in expressed needs and proposed assistance.
- Number of projects with information strategies and complaints mechanisms in place, and number of complaints filed and followed up.
- Appreciation of the assistance provided by the beneficiaries.
- Use of participatory methods and staff attitudes to beneficiaries.
- Number of interventions with local organisations involved in implementation.
- Appreciation of the Belgian Humanitarian Assistance by local government and donors.

### *Related to Coherence*

- Attention to humanitarian assistance in the BRC and Burundi country programmes and strategies or mechanisms to connect humanitarian interventions and conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy.

### *Related to Connectedness*

- Attention to humanitarian assistance in the BRC and Burundi country programmes and strategies or mechanisms to connect humanitarian interventions and the development interventions.
- Conformity of interventions with local policies or agreed principles in development projects, such as cost recovery, pricing, use of local suppliers such as transporters, traders, tendering, conformity to local salary scales, et cetera.
- Were local, national or regional products available to respond to emergencies or products that have been imported from outside the region?

### *Related to Coverage*

- Data on realised outputs in relation to geographically defined needs and to vulnerability of specific groups (children, women, elderly, handicapped).

### *Related to Effectiveness*

- Regularity of participation in OCHA coordination meetings with local government, other humanitarian and development actors. Information provided to local government and coordinating organisation, use of information from other sources, sharing of resources, agreements on coordination or collaboration with other humanitarian agencies.
- Number of interventions in response to CAPs and in accordance with CHAPs.

#### *Related to Efficiency*

- Number of parties involved in (sub)contracting, relationship between the Belgian Government and the final delivery to the beneficiaries.
- Time between submission of project proposal and start of the activity in the field.
- Planned implementation period versus realised implementation period.
- Transparency of project budgets and expenses statements.
- Adequacy of project teams.
- Cost per unit or beneficiary.
- Ratio supervisory versus operational staff.
- Degree of local resourcing.

#### *Related to Implementation*

- Knowledge and training opportunities for the staff in Sphere standards and Code of Conduct principles. Availability of standards in field offices of implementing organisations. Monitoring and reporting according to Sphere standards.
- Number of staff speaking local language.
- Adequacy of transport, storage and communication infrastructure of implementing agencies.
- Number of monitoring visits by senior staff.

#### *Related to Project cycle management*

- Number and experience of staff at the Embassies involved in humanitarian assistance.
- Regularity and quality of interactions with Headquarters.
- Regularity of field visits by embassy staff.
- Attention to coherence, connectedness and proportionality in embassies' or Headquarters' advice on proposals for humanitarian interventions and end reports.

#### *Related to Relation between Embassies and Implementing Agencies*

- Frequency of contacts.

## Annex 3: Belgian humanitarian aid in Burundi

### *Total humanitarian aid*

Region / Country	# Activities	Disbursements (euro)	Share of total HA
Burundi	41	22.458.602,57	11%

### *Relief aid*

Table B30.1 Total period 2002-2005

Region / Country	Number of Projects	Disbursement (euro)	Share of total relief aid
Burundi	25	12.664.548	14%

Table B30.2 Aide d'urgence et de réhabilitation

	2002		2003		2004		2005	
Pays	# Activités	Dépenses	# Activités	Dépenses	# Activités	Dépenses	# Activités	Dépenses
Burundi	7	3033790	6	3160417,6	8	3981475	4	2488865

### *Food aid*

Table B30.3 Aide alimentaire

	2002		2003		2004		2005	
Pays	# Activités	Dépenses	# Activités	Dépenses	# Activités	Dépenses	# Activités	Dépenses
Burundi	3	1161300	4	2240511	5	3233333	3	3082816



## Annex 4: List of Persons Met

M. Anton Broecke, Ministre Conseiller, Chargé de la Coopération au Développement

M. Yves Nindorera, Attaché, Ambassade de Belgique

Mlle Nelly Manirakiza, chargée de programme, Refugee Education Trust

M. Désiré Ruremesha, logisticien, Refugee Education Trust

M. Benoit D'Ansimbourg, Coordinateur, Refugee Education Trust

M. Pierre-Claver Rurakamvye, Secrétaire Permanent, Comité National de Coordination des Aides, 2ème Vice-Présidence

M. Laurent Dufour, Chargé d'affaires humanitaires, Bureau de la Coordination des affaires humanitaires

M. Eric Pitois, Assistant Technique, ECHO

M. Jean-Marie Delor, Assistant Technique, ECHO

M. Yves Guinand, Directeur Résident, Bureau de la Coopération Suisse

M. Ali Mahamat, Chargé de programme, UNHCR

M. Ahmed Baba Fall, Administrateur Principal de la Réintégration, UNHCR

Mme Marie-Goreth Nahimana, Assistante de Programme, UNHCR

Mme Maria Lange, Chargée de programmes, International Alert

Mme Tracy Dexter, Chargée de programmes, International Alert

Jean-Jacques Maerel, Chef de mission, Folkekirkens Nodhjælp

M. Cherif Bendouda, Représentant adjoint, UNICEF

Mme Tomoko Shibuya, Administrateur Adjointe, Education, UNICEF

Mlle Aude Rigot, Administrateur, urgences, UNICEF

M. Abel Ndenzanko, Conseiller Principal du Gouverneur de Cankuzo

M. Yanick Brand, Coordinateur Provincial, Solidarité

Directeurs des écoles de Cankuzo 2, Mayanga, Murore, Camazi (Cankuzo) et Ruremera (Gitega)

Professeurs et élèves de ces écoles

Comité de gestion de l'eau et usagers, Commune de Cendajuru

Mlle Sandra Maury, Coordinatrice des programmes, Solidarité

M. Méthode Ngaboyege, Coordinateur de site, Croix rouge Burundaise, Mishiha

Groupe d'expulsés non reconnus, Mishiha, poste frontière

Mme Floride Habonimana, Assistante de Terrain, Paresi, Mishiha

M. Toni Garcia Carranza, Chef de bureau de terrain, UNHCR Ruyigi et Cankuzo

Mme Jeanne Coreke, Assistante de programme, UNHCR

Mme Marianne Gasser, Chef de Délégation, CICR

## Annex 5: Expulsés

This population has been defined by UNHCR as not falling under the category of *prima facie* returnees, as they were not registered as refugees in Tanzania in the first place. They are hence assisted by Burundian organisations, most particularly PARESI, a state social service answering to the Ministry of Solidarity, and the Burundian Red Cross. They are hosted in a transit camp in Mishiha, and ferried to their areas of origin with a reintegration package similar to that received by returnees. Some of them have been beaten by the authorities (although media messages and UNHCR demarches appear to have been effective in halting this) and receive medical help. They also receive complementary assistance such as in the psycho-social sphere from a Dutch NGO (TPO), and from Solidarité for water and sanitation. UNICEF has been named the lead agency for this population, and coordinates and funds most of these implementing bodies.

The health conditions observed by the evaluation team are poor, but the small scale of the camp (110 residents at the time of visit) and the experience of the organisations, result in reasonable coverage (with the exception of transport which is very erratic). In effect the core of the “expulsés” receive the same level of assistance as those refugees that were in the camps, albeit starting with fewer assets than many of the refugees, due to spoliation at the time they cross the border into Burundi.

Those that are not recognised as true “*expulsés*” are classified as cheaters. PARESI has been tasked with the screening of the individuals crossing the border and claiming to have been forced out of Tanzania. The evaluation observed that this was done by local authorities (*chef de colline*) who have received little training, no monitoring, and who seem to concentrate on descriptions of areas of origin to discern who the cheaters are. This will be unreliable at best, when those who fled the country will have vague recollections or orally transmitted references. It is estimated by authorities at the border post and the NGOs and Cankuzo Province that half the number of candidates are rejected, representing some 40,000 persons, many women and children. The team saw three women which were declared to have come from the distant Province of Ngozi, all carrying children and one pregnant, which is highly implausible.

The observation of the evaluation team was that the persons rejected are often in very poor physical condition (dehydration, acute hunger) and exposed to the elements on the side of the road at the border crossing. They do not receive any form of assistance, and sanitation is non-existent while the water point is remote, leaving them stranded in a very isolated location. Solidarité informed the team that one person from this group had died from exposure recently, and our observations would lead us to conclude that victims may not even all be recorded.

The numbers observed were 13 for the day of 24 May, which can easily pass unobserved and do not represent a large scale emergency, but their plight highlights a glaring disconnectedness. The international agencies have allocated fragmented responsibilities to various agencies (UNICEF, Burundi Red Cross, PARESI, TPO) while those that have most capacity to deal with such issues and are operating in the area have remained outside the programmes (UNHCR, GTZ, Solidarité) and focused on refugee reintegration. This results in nobody having oversight, and the ultimate occasional and indirect control by UNICEF (exercised from Bujumbura which is one day's travel away) being the only quality assurance.

The subtle difference of registration or not as a refugee in Tanzania (which would have in effect penalised people in the past) has created a cleavage between population groups, the most affected being discriminated against for administrative reasons. It can be observed that these people have fled the country for fear of ethnic persecution in 1973 and 1993, have been forced to flee again for fear of violence in Tanzania, and yet are not granted *prima facie* refugee status, in spite of their much publicised plight<sup>51</sup>. UNHCR, in agreement with the Burundi and Tanzania authorities, has decided not to treat this caseload as refugees, and those that are not identified as “expulses” after a expeditive triage do not even benefit from the assistance given to Internally Displaced Persons in similar conditions. In summary, the humanitarian assistance distributed in the country defies the principles of connectedness.

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<sup>51</sup> Cf reports by Human Rights Watch and articles in the press in Burundi.



## Annex 6: Documents Consulted

- Evaluation of Netherlands Humanitarian Assistance in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, 2006, Channel Research
- Burundi: An Interim Strategy 1999-2001, Report No 19592-Bu, Macroeconomics Unit 3, Africa Region.
- National Food Security, Nutrition and Crop Assessment, Ministry of Agriculture, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, June 2005. This figure takes into account marginal production (animal, fruit, vegetables, soya bean, pea nuts, etc.) not included in the domestic availability.
- Comprehensive Food Security Vulnerability Analysis, WFP, December 2004
- Evaluation of Danish Humanitarian Assistance to the Great Lakes 1998, Evaluation of UNHCR/World Bank Reintegration Programme, Evaluation of Netherlands Humanitarian Assistance to the Great Lakes 2006.
- Good Humanitarian Donorship: overcoming obstacles to improved collective donor performance, Discussion Paper, December 2006, HPG
- Country Strategy Note, December 2002. This document does not indicate amounts disbursed.
- “Aid at a Glance”, OECD Development Aid Committee 2007
- [www.idpproject.org](http://www.idpproject.org)
- “Field Assessment on Perceptions of Refugee Returns”, Lutheran World Federation-Conseil National des Eglises au Burundi, 2006.
- “Enquête d’évaluation de la reintegration durable des réfugiés burundais”, Institut de Statistique du Burundi, UNHCR, 2007.
- Notes for the File from the Embassy entitled « Rapport de l’Atelier du CAP 2002 » and « Humanitaire au Burundi en 2003 » and « Résumé de la rencontre du 14 décembre 2004 dans le cadre du Good Humanitarian Donorship ».
- « OCHA in 2007, Activities and Extra-Budgetary Funding Requirements », United Nations.
- « Evaluation of Danchurchaid Humanitarian Mine Action », 2006
- “External Baseline Evaluation of the Burundi Good Humanitarian Donorship Pilot”, OCHA/DFID, April 200