



**KINGDOM OF BELGIUM**

Federal Public Service

**Foreign Affairs,  
Foreign Trade and  
Development Cooperation**

# Evaluation of the quality of the performance of the Belgian Technical Cooperation 2011



**Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and  
Development Cooperation**

**Office of the Special Evaluator  
of the International Cooperation**

# **Evaluation of the quality of the performance of the Belgian Technical Cooperation – 2011**

Study conducted by  
**consortium Particip-ADE**



**Synthesis report  
February 2012**

The office of the Special Evaluator has ensured compliance with the terms of reference. The evaluation benefitted from the support of a steering committee in Brussels

The opinions expressed in this document represent the evidenced view of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation.

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## List of abbreviations

ALG	Algeria
BDI	Burundi
BTC	Belgian Technical Co-operation (Belgian Development Agency)
DGD	Directorate-General for Development Cooperation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FPS	Federal Public Service
FR	Formulation Report
ICP	Indicative Co-operation Programme
ID	Intervention Director
ITA	International Technical Assistant
JLCB	Joint Local Partner Committee
JMR	Joint Management Representative (BTC)
LF	Logical Framework
MIS	Management Information System
MLI	Mali
MOR	Morocco
MTE	Mid-Term evaluation
NTA	National Technical Assistant
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicators
PCM	Project Cycle Management
QCC	Quality Control Committee
RBM	Results Based Monitoring
S4	Special Evaluation Office of International Co-operation
SEN	Senegal
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound Indicators
SO	Specific Objective
TFFD	Technical and Financial File Dossier
TFP	Technical and Financial Partners
TSE	Technical and Sectoral Expertise
UGA	Uganda
VIE	Vietnam



## List of projects evaluated in this study

Abbreviations used in the text	Title	Country	Budget in €	DGD Code	BTC Code	Evaluation report no.
ALG-TAM 1	Integrated public health project in Tamanrasset (TAM I)	Algeria	2,778,211	19608/11	ALG0400911	EF-22-ALG-TAM1
ALG-TAM 2	Extension of the integrated public health project in Wilaya de Tamanrasset II	Algeria	2,221,789	3002445	ALG0601711	EF24-ALG-TAM II
ALG- ATCFME	Technical support to training centres for water professionals	Algeria	2,924,858	19604/11	ALG0400811	EF-28-ALG-ATCFME
BDI-APFP	Selective support in the operation of the Burundian Parliament	Burundi	1,000,000	3001963 in 19699/11	BDI0401911	EF-06-BDI-APFP
BDI-PAI-ISABU	Institutional support to the Institute of Agronomic Sciences of Burundi (ISABU)	Burundi	3,000,000	3004517	BDI0704311	EF-12-BDI-PAI-ISABU
BDI-HPRC	Support for the restoration of Prince Regent Charles Hospital	Burundi	4,000,000	3004245	BDI0703611	EF-11-BDI-HPRC
BDI-RAFS	Support and relaunch of the seed sector in Burundi	Burundi	3,000,000	3002769	BDI0603011	EF-13-BDI-RAFS
MLI-EA_PADSS	Expertise support for the support programme for public health development EA-PADSS	Mali	420,000	3007616	MLI0903011	EF-15-MLI-EA-PADSS
MOR-EMF	Multifunctional women's centre	Morocco	912,000	19428/11	MOR/02/06P	EF-04-MAR-EMF
NIG-PHVP	Support for the pastoral and village water programme in the Dosso Region (PHVP)	Niger	7,944,934	19736/11	NER0501611	EF-05-NIG-PHVP
UG-Gulu	The rehabilitation and expansion of Sir Samuel Baker School in Gulu District	Uganda	1,525,810	3003195	UGA0601111	EF-08-UG-Gulu



PER-DEVIDA	Drug consumption prevention and drug addicts rehabilitation programme Phase II - DEVIDA	Peru	2,300,891	3003295	PER0601111	EF-17-PER-DEVIDA
DRC-Kalemie	Support for the dredging of the Port of Kalemie	DRC	450,000	3004568	RDC0812411	EF-23-RDC-Kalémie
DRC-PREPICO2	Maintenance and rehabilitation programme for agricultural service roads II - (Bandundu) - PREPICO 2	DRC	11,000,000	3004506	RDC0711211	EF-19-RDC-PREPICO 2
DRC-AP of RDC-PASREG	Support for the legislative system in DRC: provincial assemblies section	DRC	1,600,000	3004380	RDC0708612	EF-09-RDC-AP
DRC-CFU or railways	Rehabilitation of the urban railway and improving mobility in Kinshasa	DRC	7,000,000	3004368	RDC0709011	EF-31-RDC-Railways
DRC-AEP	Pilot rehabilitation and development programme for supply systems for drinking water and sanitation in DRC - AEP	DRC	5,065,910	3000520	RDC0504311	EF-14-RDC-AEP
RWA-Mental Health	Support for the national mental health programme - phase II	Rwanda	2,710,575	3002177 - 18345/12	RWA0403112	EF-07-RWA-Mental Health
RWA-Bushenge Hospital	Reconstruction of Bushenge Hospital - phase II	Rwanda	1,800,000	3006079	RWA0806112	EF-18-RWA-Bushenge
RWA-EPRER	Electrification of rural populations through renewable energies	Rwanda	17,532,659	3004548	RWA0705511	EF-26-RWA-EPRER
RWA-UNR-CHUB or PAIFDS	Support programme for medical training facilities at the National University of Rwanda (PAIFDS)	Rwanda	2,111,211	3002762	RWA0604611	EF-10-RWA-UNR-CHUB
RWA-UNR-CHUB or PAIFDS	Support programme for medical training facilities at the UNR of Rwanda - additional support	Rwanda	3,631,748	3003167	RWA0604612	EF-10-RW-UNR-CHUB
RWA-IPM	Development of integrated systems to fight against crop diseases and pests (IPM)	Rwanda	2,850,000	3003104	RWA0604811	EF-27-RWA-IPM

RWA- R&T	Improving farmers' access to quality planting material for roots, tubers and fruit species R&T	Rwanda	2,850,000	3003085	RWA0604711	EF-25-RWA-R&T
RWA-PAREF	Support for reforestation in RWA (PAREF I)	Rwanda	3,000,000	3003082	RWA0604311	EF-16-RWA-PAREF
SEN-REMEC	Support for the network of savings and loan co-operatives in Niayes (REMEC-NIAYES)	Senegal	500,000	3002497	SEN0601311	EF-20-SEN-REMEC
TAN-ICD	The construction and enhancement of Inland Container Stations in Ilala, Shinyanga and Mwanza South	Tanzania	2,025,585	3000524/11	TAN0401411	EF-21-TAN-ICD
TAN-BIP1	Development and Improvement of Processing, Packing and Marketing of Beeswax and other Bee products in Tanzania	Tanzania	1,564,140	20022/11	TAN0401311	EF-01-Tanz-BIP1
VIE-TIR	Strengthening the Textile and Research institutes' capacity of conducting research, training and experimental development of textile techniques, phase II	Vietnam	1,000,000	3004014	VIE0402911	EF-30-VIE-TRI
VIE-IP	Construction of an irrigation network and reservoir to increase the agricultural production in Ninh Phuoc district, Ninh Thuan province	Vietnam	2,940,000	3002773	VIE0402111	EF-03-VIE-IP
VIE-PARROC	Public administration reform and roll out of the comprehensive poverty reduction and growth strategy (CPRGS) in Hau Giang province, phase 2 (PARROC)	Vietnam	2,500,000	3001776	VIE0403011	EF-29-VIE-PARROC
VIE-VBTF	Vietnam – Belgium training facilities	Vietnam	1,000,000	3000475	VIE0402711	EF-02-VIE-VBTF
	Total:		105,160,321			



## Preface

This synthesis report is based on the evaluation of 32 Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) projects, where implementation began between 2004 and 2008, under the 3rd BTC-Directorate General of Development Cooperation (DGD) management contract. The evaluation work in the field took place between August and December 2011 but focused on facts and documents dating from the implementation period from 2004 to 2011. It is important to emphasize that during this period significant changes took place within the development co-operation working framework, particularly following the Paris Declaration. Co-management, results-based management and the programme approach have gained in importance and have been developed further. Decentralisation has been improved in partner countries. These trends have gradually influenced project implementation, but this evaluation has not always been able to reflect these developments adequately, since at times it is based on earlier facts and observations.



# Executive Summary

## 1. Introduction

The principal objective of the 2011 evaluation 'Evaluation of the quality of the performance of the BTC' is to account for the results obtained, based on the evaluation of 32 projects in the final phase, implemented in 12 countries. These projects represent a total budget of 105 million Euros.

The methodology for the evaluation draws on the European Commission's 'Results Oriented Monitoring' (ROM) methodology. The evaluation framework addresses relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability aspects and the cross-cutting areas gender, environment and governance. A, B, C, or D scores are awarded for each criterion and sub-question.

Despite the short duration of the field missions (5 to 7 days), the evaluators were able to establish an inventory and target the analysis on specific questions in order to provide an assessment of the project - and the performance of the BTC. The evaluation observations of these 32 projects were used to draw a set of conclusions and lessons about the BTC's performance.

## 2. Analysis according to the evaluation criteria

	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Gender	Environment	Governance
A score	28%	3%	19%	9%	9%	10%	9%
B score	66%	56%	56%	63%	63%	74%	72%
C score	6%	38%	22%	28%	28%	16%	19%
D score	0%	3%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%

**Relevance** Among the 32 projects, 94 % have A or B scores for the 'relevance' criterion. They are well integrated into the receiving country's sectoral policies and strategies and fit with Belgium's Strategic Notes. Almost all the projects clearly satisfy the needs of the beneficiaries. This relevance can how-ever change during the course of the project following political changes or interventions by other technical and financial partners (TFPs).

Several intervention logics proved unrealistic (60% of projects). They often underestimate the project's launch and implementation duration as well as likely price increases. They do not take enough consideration of the timeframes required for public procurement procedures, the hiring of technical assistants, etc.

***Effectiveness*** Effectiveness is difficult to analyse due to a lack of SMART indicators and baselines in a number of projects. It only achieved A or B scores in 59% of projects. In general, effectiveness seems to be good for projects able to complete all the activities. However, several projects were unable to implement certain activities that are vital to the project's success due to a lack of time/budget. In 2 extreme cases, the specific objectives have not been achieved at all.

Only 60 % of the projects are managed in a result based manner (A and B scores). Often the BTC and the JLCB were unable to rectify an adverse situation during a project. In these cases, the strategic discussion was lacking.

***Efficiency*** Three quarters of projects have A or B scores for efficiency. A good number of projects (41%) incurred delays, particularly in the early years. There was an extension phase in 22 of the 32 projects.

The BTC managed resources efficiently (82% with A or B scores). The implementation and internal organisation of the projects did not cause problems. The skills and motivation of the teams was highlighted along with the important contributions of the technical assistants. In the majority of projects, the Joint Local Consultative Body provided regular monitoring of the projects, with greater focus on the financial aspects and the implementation and less on the strategic orientation of the projects. These structures were not always capable of resolving significant problems in the implementation.

***Sustainability*** Only 72% of projects have A or B scores. Institutional and political sustainability is favourable, especially where the partner was involved from the start. However, financial sustainability is weaker and few efforts have been made in this area. In general, the beneficiaries took ownership of the results.

***Horizontal themes*** The 'gender' approach is rather under-developed as a whole, despite the fact that several projects are aimed at a largely female audience, with themes that are of particular interest to women. The environment aspect is covered to varying degrees depending on the projects' objectives, but there were few innovative approaches encountered. With regard to governance, no case of corruption has been reported. Efforts were made to encourage compliance with administrative and financial procedures but few interventions promote transparency and the involvement of beneficiaries.

### **3. Analysis according to sector and by (fragile) country**

#### *Sectors*

- In 'infrastructure' projects, the quality of the works is generally acceptable, but there were delays following, among other things, the launching of public tenders. The duration of some projects was too short. Several projects were unable to finish buildings and equipment due to delays and an insufficient budget (price increases).
- In 'agriculture' projects, a focus on basic agricultural products and the integration of projects in partner structures is seen. There is a poor gender approach, despite the importance of women in the sector.

- 'Governance' projects were very relevant for the countries concerned, but the timing was not always adapted to the progress of elections.

*Fragile countries* Despite difficult working conditions in fragile countries (DRC and Burundi), project performance does not vary greatly from that in more advanced countries. Project efficiency is however often impeded by the poor capacity of partner institutions and the lack of leadership within the Government. Following Belgium's compliance with the Paris Declaration, Belgian development co-operation and the BTC have committed to adapting their work rate and methods to those of their partners.

## 4. Analysis according to the project cycle

*Pre-formulation* For a good number of projects, there is a significant time span between the identification and the formulation mission; departure of competent personnel from the previous project, institutional changes and new dynamics between partners and beneficiaries must be taken into account.

*Formulation* The BTC pays great attention to this formulation phase. The reports contain a good contextual analysis and a detailed description of the interventions to be implemented. In several projects, the specific objective is too ambitious in relation to the available budget. The institutional analysis, the risk analysis and the proposals to mitigate these risks are very limited. The recipient countries have little involvement in the practical choices and decisions of the formulation.

The quality of the logical frameworks is not satisfactory and they are not used as a project management tool. The OVIs are not always quantified or SMART, which makes it difficult to evaluate project effectiveness. In several projects, there is no baseline.

### 4.1 Implementation

*Start-up phase* This phase generally takes more time than planned with the recruitment of technical assistants, the baseline study and other studies.

*Project implementation* Projects are often integrated into the structures of partner organisations and their director becomes the co- manager in collaboration with a BTC representative. The partner's personnel implement most of the activities and benefit from an improvement in skills through training and coaching from the ITAs and NTAs.

Calls Belgium complies with national procedures in terms of procurement within the scope of the Paris Declaration. Notwithstanding a positive assessment of the application of national procedures, it was noted that the application of both national and Belgian procedures was also the source of additional delays.

*Financial and administrative management* The administrative and financial procedures are complex and the NTAs and ITAs often spend much of their time on these procedures, rather than supporting/coaching teams on the content. Several projects had very low expenditure levels during the early years due in part to the slow start to the project and the complexity of the tender procedures. Before the end of the project, projects quickly complete all the activities and use the remaining budget - with certain risks for the quality of the achievements and poor follow-up of the beneficiaries.

*International and national technical assistance* These ITAs/NTAs contribute greatly to the success of projects, through technical support and in terms of administrative and



financial management (especially NTAs). They are often the drivers of a strategic discussion.

## 4.2 Monitoring - Evaluation of projects

*Monitoring system* Most of the projects evaluated have not established a monitoring system for the results achieved. Monitoring systems are still limited to monitoring activities and expenditure. The reports are too sketchy and mostly describe activities completed compared to forecasts but highlighting only very few of the project's problems and challenges. The BTC attaches a good deal of importance to the financial 'commitment-disbursement' process and there is much focus on controlling expenditure and its eligibility. Support from the Technical and Sectoral Expertise department was relatively limited in most projects but has clearly been a key element in the success of some projects.

*JLCB* The Joint Local Consultative Bodies are generally dynamic but relatively formal. Several JLCB were able to make structural decisions on project implementation. In many other projects however, the JLCB has not made the necessary decisions to rectify difficult situations or refocus the project according to new challenges/opportunities, which has seriously limited their effects.

## 4.3 Strategic monitoring of projects

In a third of projects evaluated, the evaluators observed that the project strategy has been poorly adapted after major implementation problems or significant changes in the context. The strategic consultation on the future of the project was not therefore intense enough to guarantee that all projects achieve their specific objectives in the most optimal way. In several cases, the donor's agreement was needed to refocus the project following significant modifications to the logical framework and budgets. In other cases, a more political intervention from the Belgian development co-operation would have allowed the specific objectives to be better or more quickly satisfied.

*Mid-Term evaluation (MTE)* Mid-term evaluations were often interesting exercises and crucial for rectifying difficult situations. In several projects, there was no MTE in a crisis situation (e.g. low level of activities and disbursement).

*Evaluation and final report (EFR)* The final evaluations, commissioned and approved by the BTC, are generally of an acceptable quality. The performances of the BTC and its technical assistants are not covered by these evaluations.

*Extension* Out of the 32 projects 22 had a maximum extension phase of one year. This allowed construction work to be finalised or the budget to be refocused on more relevant activities after changes in the project's context. A one year extension period is not always sufficient.

## 5. Structural aspects

### 5.1 Relationship with the local partner

*Joint management* The double system of expenditure under 'joint management' and 'own management' enables the BTC to comply with the process put forward by the Paris Declaration while ensuring a certain degree of freedom to mobilise certain resources in the form of 'own management' (technical assistance and evaluations). The co-management system can however be improved.

*Financial and administrative procedures by receiving country* The BTC conforms as much as possible to the procedures of the recipient country but it has no influence over the strength and speed of these procedures. In practice, compliance with national procedures in terms of public contracts means that the number of procedures to be followed is increased, along with the duration. The BTC is itself subject to rather rigorous administrative and financial checks by the Belgian Court of Audit, but cannot always impose this same strictness at partner level.

*Institutional strengthening* Institutional support for local partners rightly becomes increasingly important, through specific projects, technical assistance and improving the skills of personnel (at a technical and managerial level) and certain investments.

### 5.2 BTC - Embassy relationship

The strict separation between the role of the BTC and that of the DGD attachés in the Embassies, as defined in the 3rd management contract, does not offer a good enough guarantee for the smooth running of the projects within this framework. In several projects, the BTC did not have sufficient influence to ensure that the specific objectives were observed by all partners and that all the conditions were satisfied for an optimal implementation.

## 6. Conclusions and Recommendations

The conclusions and recommendations are presented in 6 areas:

### 6.1 Project preparation

The evaluators recommend that the formulation process (and therefore the TFD) focuses more on certain key aspects such as (1) realistic specific objectives according to the available budget or vice versa; (2) the time needed to launch and implement the project; (3) a realistic budget that takes into account price rises; (4) the various risks that could reduce project relevance, effectiveness and efficiency and (5) put forward the steps to be taken in the event that these risks appear. The formulation (TFF) should correctly identify and plan the support and monitoring method for field actions. The time span between identification and formulation and between formulation and the actual project start-up must be as short as possible.

### 6.2 Implementation

The aspects to be improved concern:

- Reduce the length of the launch phase as much as possible

- Adapt the aid arrangements to the institutional context which has an increasingly multi-actor nature
- Continue efforts to comply with the call procedures of partner countries
- Adapt the administrative and financial procedures to the institutional capacity of the countries and partners in fragile countries
- Provide a more specific and technical expertise suited to the project or use intermittent technical assistance
- Increase the support from the TSE department
- An in-depth reflection on how to evaluate the BTC's contribution to the success of the projects, but in a multi-actor dynamic and with the BTC being responsible for the efforts to be implemented - and a partner to be supported (!) in order to ensure the success of the projects.

### 6.3 Monitoring of expected results

The evaluators recommend increasing efforts to establish a **results-based management** system and a **quality management** approach, at least for the part of the project cycle managed by the BTC. The OIVs for the logical frameworks must be SMART and quantified. During implementation, the logical frameworks must be adapted according to the decisions made during the JLCB. The monitoring of the risks and the work of the TA should be included in the monitoring system.

The **JLCB** is still the best structure for the **strategic supervision of the projects**. The DGCD must participate in this strategic discussion and direction.

### 6.4 Recovering projects that have encountered major problems

Based on the observation that in a third of projects, unforeseen events or risks had negative effects on the project implementation, it is vital that the BTC and its partners improve their response capacity. The problems and solutions must be identified more quickly and decisions must be made rapidly to put the project back on track. This is a clear and distinct responsibility of both parties within the scope of the joint management system. The mid-term evaluations act as an alert which must be systematically integrated into project management.

### 6.5 Relationships with local partners

The evaluators recommend continuing joint management efforts and the partner's accountability for strictness in the project's implementation and the institutional strengthening of partners

### 6.6 DGD-BTC relationship around the strategic discussion of the projects

The DGD (mainly via the attachés) and the BTC (both via the TSE and the national office) should be concerned with the strategic direction. Consequently, the attachés must be able to perform strategic (and not operational) monitoring for the projects. Improved co-operation between the 2 organisations (in Brussels and in the field) would be an important guarantee of project orientation according to the specific objectives, particularly in fragile countries and for highly politicised projects.

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Context<sup>1</sup>

The Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGD) of the Federal Public Service (FPS) Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Co-operation developed an indicative co-operation programme (ICP) with each partner country for a period of four years.

The interventions selected in the ICP were identified with the co-operation of the partner countries and the international co-operation attachés representing the DGD in the field. The Belgian Technical Co-operation (BTC), which has the monopoly on the execution of bilateral development co-operation, is responsible for the formulation then execution of the interventions selected in the ICP.

This 2011 evaluation is positioned within the scope of article 17 of the third management contract between the Belgian government and the BTC. This is the fifth and final year of the management contract, and consequently the fifth evaluation organised within this framework. Over the course of the four previous evaluations, around fifty interventions have been evaluated based on the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact). Since 2009, evaluations have also focused on processes (formulation, monitoring and evaluation and strategic direction).

Previous evaluations aimed to account for the results obtained and learn lessons from the past.

## 1.2 Fields and objectives of the evaluation<sup>2</sup>

The 2011 evaluation focuses on 32 projects selected by the Special Evaluation Office (S4) of the FPS Foreign Affairs. The full list of projects is given in appendix 1. This report presents a summary of the evaluation frameworks for the 32 projects.

The total budget for the 32 projects amounts to €105,160,321 which is an average of €3,286,260 per project. The budgets vary between €420,000 and €17,532,659. For information, in 2010, the BTC had a portfolio of 200 projects and paid out a total amount of 218 million Euros.

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<sup>1</sup> See Special Specifications No S4/2011/02 p. 15

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem p. 15

Evaluation sample	
Number of countries visited	12
Number of projects visited	32
Number of evaluation frameworks produced	31 <sup>3</sup>
Budget covered (in €m)	€ 105,160,321

The principal objective of this evaluation is to account for the results obtained. It includes an overview of the results by evaluation criteria and an overview of the general performance of the BTC.

Less importance is attached to the learning process insofar as the opportunities to learn new lessons are relatively limited after four evaluations. However, the learning process is not separate and the tools used in the current evaluation also allow interesting and instructive practices or situations to be identified.

### 1.3 Methodology

The methodology<sup>4</sup> used for the current evaluation draws on the European Commission's 'Results Oriented Monitoring' (ROM) methodology. This methodology is used to evaluate a large number of interventions using the same approach in order to quantify the results, process them and compare them more easily. By following this approach the Special Evaluation Office (S4) wants simply and unequivocally to account for the quality of the performance of the BTC.

While the European Commission applies the ROM methodology during the execution of the interventions, the current evaluation methodology has been applied to 32 interventions in the closing phase. The evaluation questions have also been adapted to the Belgian reality and focus on the intervention phases for which the BTC is responsible (formulation, execution, monitoring and evaluation). This results in an evaluation framework in electronic format, comprising a series of questions and sub-questions for each of the evaluation criteria. This framework is provided in appendix 2.

The methodology focuses the analysis on evaluating the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, as well as on the cross-cutting areas of gender, the environment and governance<sup>5</sup>. For each of these criteria, the evaluation framework covers 3 to 4 questions that are each given a score (A, B, C or D). An overall score is then calculated per evaluation criteria.

The definition of the scores corresponds largely to that applied by the European Commission<sup>6</sup>. The weighting of the scores by question to obtain the score per criteria

<sup>3</sup> Evaluation framework no. 10 covers both the "Support programme for medical training facilities at the National University of Rwanda (PAIFDS)" project and the "additional support" for this project.

<sup>4</sup> Ibidem p. 16

<sup>5</sup> The 'impact' and 'synergy/coherence' criteria were not covered by this analysis.

<sup>6</sup> Based on the publication "ROM Manual - Section III - Templates and Instructions" p. 68

is defined beforehand in the methodology and cannot be changed. Scores are awarded according to the following indications:

- A score: The situation is considered highly satisfactory, largely above average and potentially a reference for good practice. Recommendations focus on the need to adopt these good practices in other operations.
- B score: The situation is considered satisfactory. Expectations have been met but there is room for improvement. Recommendations are useful, but not vital for the operation.
- C score: The overall performance of the intervention has been affected by some problems that should have been addressed during implementation. However, these problems do not require major revisions of the operations' strategies. In other words, these projects have not met expectations.
- D score: Serious deficiencies have led to the failure of the operation. Major adjustments and revisions of the strategy will be necessary.

A separate note 'Specific comments on the methodology used for the Evaluation of the quality of the performance of the BTC - 2011' contains an analysis of the relevance of the applied methodology for this type of evaluation and/or the monitoring of projects by the donor.

## 1.4 Evaluation process

A first briefing meeting was organised on 4 August 2011 by the Special Evaluation Office attended by the BTC, Particip-ADE representatives and most of the international consultants.

The **initial list of projects** (see tenderdocument) was revised by the Special Evaluation Office in early August in order to take into account the fact that certain projects on the initial list had been extended. Several health, governance and social economy projects and an infrastructure project were replaced by infrastructure projects and 2 projects in Vietnam. Not all the projects could be replaced in the same sector due to a lack of projects meeting the following selection criteria:

- Project Cycle: selection of interventions in the closing phase, particularly projects that were completed in 2011 (67 projects);
- Sample representativeness: the target is 50% coverage of the projects (33 interventions);
- The sample must cover as many partner countries as possible;
- Interventions in the sample that have already been evaluated within the framework of the current series of evaluations (2007-2010) were removed from the sample and re-placed by other interventions chosen at random in the same country or, where this was not possible, in another country;
- The sample is limited to 'standard' projects. Other co-operation tools such as budget aid were not therefore included since the methodology is not suited to other tools.

The composition of the team of Particip-ADE was adapted according to this new list of projects.

The pilot phase included the 4 following projects

Country	Project	DGD Code	BTC Code
Tanzania	Development and Improvement of Processing, Packing and Marketing of Beeswax and other Bee products in Tanzania	20022/11	TAN0401311
Vietnam	Vietnam – Belgium training facilities	3000475	VIE0402711
Vietnam	Construction of an irrigation network and reservoir to increase the agricultural production in Ninh Phuoc district, Ninh Thuan province	3002773	VIE0402111
Morocco	Multifunctional women's centre	19428/11	MOR/02/06P

A second meeting took place on 20 September 2011 based on the start-up report. The objective of this meeting was to review the evaluation framework and determine whether adjustments were needed after the first field missions.

The Special Evaluation Office and Particip-ADE agreed on several changes to the evaluation frame-work. On the whole, the questions in the initial framework remained largely unchanged, apart from the following two changes:

- Regarding the terminology used, S4 requested the use of the OECD terminology which is adopted by the DGD. In the results chain, this involves: inputs - activities - outputs - outcome - impact. In the logical framework 'output' corresponds to 'result', 'outcome' corresponds to 'specific objective' and 'impact' corresponds to 'general objective'. The term 'result' can create confusion because this word is also used as a generic term for output, outcome and impact. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it was decided to use the word 'output' instead of 'result'.
- In order to assess the external elements that have influenced the BTC's performance, a decision was made to add an additional question for each evaluation criteria in a footnote in the evaluation framework: "Are there external factors that have had a negative or positive influence on the performance of the BTC? What are they?"<sup>7</sup>.

In order to ensure coherence between the scores awarded by the different team members, all the evaluation frameworks were proofread by a quality control committee. For the 'Effectiveness and Efficiency' scores which included sub-questions on both the monitoring system and actual achievements in the field, the score was primarily based on observations in the field and documentation.

<sup>7</sup> The proposal by the team of evaluators to work with 2 appraisals (one for the project as is, and one for the BTC) was not approved by the Special Evaluator.



## 1.5 Challenges and evaluation approach

Despite the short duration of each of the field missions (5 to 7 days), the intense discussions, the guided reading of documents and the triangulation of information gathered during interviews with the partners made it possible to obtain a quick overview and focus the analysis on the specific questions that the evaluation tries to answer. Consequently, it is possible to provide an assessment of the project - and the services of the BTC and its partners - according to the standard evaluation criteria and identify the causes of the failures and successes of each project - without however analysing the specific underlying causes in detail. In terms of the synthesis report, it is therefore more important to identify areas in which the BTC's performance can be improved and provide recommendations accordingly.

However, the objective of this synthesis report is not to extend the evaluation observations of these 32 projects to the entire BTC portfolio, but rather to draw conclusions and lessons from this sample of projects. The purpose of the exercise is not therefore a synthesis of the results based on a representative sample in terms of statistics but rather the identification of relevant situations. The 32 projects are not necessarily representative of all of BTC's projects. There is probably an over-representation of projects in Central Africa and in the field of infrastructure and an under-representation of projects in Latin America<sup>8</sup>. Furthermore, it is quite possible that the choice to evaluate only projects ending in 2011 has resulted in an over-representation of projects that have achieved their objective (possibly after an extension phase). Where possible, the evaluators have separated the performance of the BTC from those of the partner and the DGD and taken into account shared responsibilities between partners. The evaluators have also taken into account the evolution of the working context and notably the fact that certain aspects gained importance during the period covered by the evaluations (e.g. partner capacity building, results-based management, the programme approach, etc.).

The analysis does not cover the entire BTC operation, neither in Brussels nor in the field. The evaluation team had contacts with the BTC as part of the preparation for the evaluation missions and the project leader held several more general interviews with the managers of several departments and services at the BTC on the subject of internal operations (organisation of project formulation, distribution of tasks between Brussels and local representatives, role of the TSE department, etc.)<sup>9</sup>. However, by evaluating the projects, the team of evaluators were able to make observations about the internal operation of the BTC - insofar as this operation affected the quality of the BTCs' projects and its contribution towards their achievement.

The conclusions and recommendations about the situation of the projects during their implementation forms part of the **report on the situation as it was presented** and is an important explanatory factor for the results. The evaluators are aware of

<sup>8</sup> Many projects in the 'health' and 'education' sector cover in fact infrastructure works. A detailed comparison of the sectoral composition (in relation to actual activities covered by the project) of the sample for this evaluation with the entire BTC portfolio has therefore been impossible.

The geographical distribution of the projects evaluated compared with the disbursements made by the BTC 2010 is as follows: 69% as opposed to 56% in Central Africa, 17% compared with 23 % in North/West Africa, 5% compared with 5% in East/South Africa, 2% compared with 7% in Latin America, 7% as opposed to 5% in Asia and 0% compared with 4% in Belgium.

<sup>9</sup> See annex 4



the fact that the BTC has developed new tools, particularly on reporting, the consideration of cross-cutting areas, and risk analysis. While these new tools have not been evaluated, there is however no guarantee that the weaknesses observed will be resolved by their introduction.

One of the challenges of this evaluation lies in the problem of **attribution** as highlighted in the 2010 evaluation of the BTC: *"The BTC is a key organisation in achieving bilateral development co-operation, but the results and the evaluation of the evaluation criteria can never be fully attributed to the BTC. The problem of attribution therefore arises, since in order to get results, the BTC depends on good co-operation with stakeholders in the partner country, but also on good co-operation with other Belgian development co-operation organisations and, of course, other actors active within international development co-operation."* This issue has become increasingly relevant during the period covered by this evaluation due to the progress of development co-operation as a whole, particularly through the gradual application of the recommendations of the Paris Declaration in implementing projects.

## 1.6 Report structure

The synthesis report is structured according to the following areas:

- Analysis by evaluation criteria (Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability) and according to the horizontal themes (gender, the environment and governance);
- Analysis by sector (health, agriculture, infrastructure and others) and country type (fragile countries versus other countries); and
- Analysis according to the project cycle: formulation, implementation and evaluation including the monitoring system;
- Structural aspects including relationships with the local partner and the DGD;
- Conclusions and recommendations.

*Caution: It should be stressed that due to the nature of this summary, certain specific conclusions may seem contradictory. This is due to the fact that the synthesis report covers quite a diverse range of projects and that a specific aspect which is a weakness in one project may be a strength in another. The objective is not therefore to arrive at unequivocal conclusions valid for all 32 projects, but to identify the key elements that have contributed or not to the quality of the performance of the BTC.*

## 2. Analysis by evaluation criteria

The present chapter contains (i) a quantitative presentation of the evaluation criteria (ii) and of each of the sub-questions in the evaluation framework. The detailed scores (by question - and by criteria) for each of the 32 projects evaluated are given in appendix 3. The main analysis points are given for each criterion and the external and internal factors are identified. The chapter 5 'Analysis by project cycle' contains a more detailed analysis of the different stages of the project cycle (e.g. the formulation phase).

### 2.1 Summary of scores by criteria

Criteria:	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
A score	9	1	6	3
B score	21	18	18	20
C score	2	12	7	9
D score	0	1	1	0

In general, the scores for 'Relevance' are better (94% with A or B scores) than those for the other criteria. 'Efficiency' (81% of A or B scores) has better scores than 'Effectiveness' (59%) and 'Sustainability' (71%).

### 2.2 Relevance

Relevance	1.1	1.2	1.3	Overall
A score	17	12	3	9
B score	15	18	17	21
C score	0	2	12	2
D score	0	0	0	0

94 % of projects have A or B scores for this criterion.

All the projects are well integrated into the sectoral policies and strategies of the receiving countries (question 1.1) and into the poverty reduction programmes.

The majority of projects also clearly satisfy the needs of the beneficiaries (question 1.2), which is 30 out of 32 projects (or 94%).

Out of the 32 projects, only 20 (62%) have an A or B score for the 'Intervention logic is realistic and feasible' (question 1.3).

### **2.2.1 Integration in the development policies and strategies of the partner country**

All the projects were well integrated into the development policies and strategies of the receiving countries (question 1.1) and into the poverty reduction programmes. The projects were also a good fit for the Belgian strategies, although these strategies are not recent.

- *RWA-EPRER This 'Rural electricity' project contributes to the achievement of the 'Vision 2020 Umurenge Program' which aims to reduce current shortfalls with an installed capacity range of 290 MW (130 MW in 2012), 30% access to electricity, subscriber numbers reaching 900,000 (350,000 in 2012) and access to electricity for all Health Centres (HC) at 100% (from 2012). The project also conforms to Rwanda's energy policy which promotes rural electrification through Micro Hydroelectric Power Plants (MHP), solar energy and the extension of the network. The project also satisfies the Belgian policy of concentrating its support in targeted intervention sectors, including energy.*

*The EPRER project has been conducted in synergy with other projects, particularly through the use of the same implementation structures strengthened by several additional human resources. This project is consistent with the European Union's 'Energy Facility' project which is managed by the same team.*

Relevance in terms of policy frameworks (that of the partner country and that of Belgium) has benefited from the reduction in the number of intervention sectors for Belgian development co-operation to 2 or 3 per country and the fact that projects often operate in the same regions within the partner country. However, within each sector, a great diversity of interventions has been observed.

It is observed that the partners' policies and strategies are so broadly defined that all the TFPs' projects fall within them. It therefore becomes almost impossible to formulate a project that would not satisfy part of the national policy. Other elements were therefore taken into account in evaluating relevance, such as the priorities within these programmes, the priority areas identified for the specific action and intervention methods defined in these strategies, the importance of the interventions at decentralised level<sup>10</sup> or consistency with other TFPs.

<sup>10</sup> One important aspect of the "Drug consumption prevention and drug addicts rehabilitation programme" (PER-DEVIDA) which contributes to the project's relevance is its support for the current

Certain events - internal and external to the project - reduced the relevance of the project on start-up (due to the significant delay between formulation and start-up) or during the project:

- Other partners (TFP or NGO) had already carried out certain activities planned under the project<sup>11</sup>;
- Changes in the policy and strategy of national government.

### 2.2.2 Response to beneficiaries' needs

In the majority of projects, beneficiaries' needs were analysed in a participatory way when the project was formulated.

- For final beneficiaries (e.g. women, students, members of parliament, farmers, etc.) the needs analyses (interviews, surveys, etc.) were used to define projects that satisfied various needs such as the need to improve the productive capacity (investments and inputs), facilitate access to social services (education, health, water and sanitation), and improve communication networks (transport, etc.);
- For direct beneficiaries (partner organisations, hospitals, schools, etc.), the institutional analyses (strengths/weaknesses) and the context were used to identify needs such as improving their ability to deliver services to their target audience, including training needs for technical personnel.

In some projects, workshops were organised with all stakeholders in the future project, both direct stakeholders (private seed producers) and indirect beneficiaries (parent pupil organisations). However, several projects did not adequately satisfy the needs of the beneficiaries (C score).

### 2.2.3 Intervention logic

The intervention logic is realistic and feasible in the majority of projects (62%), which means that in these projects, the connection between the specific objectives and the results and the connection between the results and the activities are coherent.

However, several evaluations (38%) record weaknesses in this area:

- **Project duration too short** to achieve the results and specific objectives (SO) of the project, particularly for agricultural and agroforestry projects and for infrastructure projects<sup>12</sup>.

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decentralisation processes in Peru, illustrated by the result 3, 'Local systems for prevention and treatment established in two regional contexts.'

<sup>11</sup> The relevance of the APFP project in Burundi is closely related to the timetable for elections and political events. Following the project's late start-up, other partners had already carried out certain activities planned under the APFP. Furthermore, the Burundian parliamentarians could only be trained during the final year of their term of office although there was the risk that many of the elected officials would not be re-elected.

<sup>12</sup> Rwanda UNR CHUB and RWA Bushenge: The intervention logic is correct for these construction projects but the timetables do not take into account, e.g. timeframes for awarding public contracts

- An **over ambitious intervention logic** in relation to the resources (available (budget))<sup>13</sup>.

In chapter 5 'Analysis by project cycle' - Formulation, the report analyses the different weaknesses that appear during the formulation phase.

## 2.2.4 Relevance conclusion

In general, the scores for the 'Relevance' criterion are good, but projects could have taken better account of the partner's implementation methods and consistency with other TFPs and projects. The intervention logics could have been more realistic about the duration and budget.

## 2.3 Effectiveness

Effectiveness	2.1	2.2	2.3	Overall
A score	2	2	1	1
B score	17	17	18	18
C score	12	13	12	12
D score	1	0	1	1

The scores awarded to the 'Effectiveness' criteria are distinctly less favourable than those awarded for relevance. Over the 32 projects, nineteen (59%) have good scores (A or B). In particular, the number of projects that have not satisfied expectations (C or D scores) is quite high at 13 projects (40%) for each question.

The question 'The immediate results (outputs) are achieved' (question 2.1.) received favourable scores (A or B) in 19 projects (which is 59% of cases).

The question 'The short- and medium-term results (outcome) are achieved (specific objective)' (question 2.2) received a favourable score for 19 of the 32 projects (59%).

'The BTC manages the intervention based on results' (question 2.3) had favourable scores in the same number of projects (59%). This score did not only take into account the existence of a results-based monitoring system, but also the way in which the BTC managed the project with a view to achieving maximum results.

### 2.3.1 The achievement of immediate results (output)

The outputs achieved concern, among other things, the rehabilitation of schools and hospitals, training for personnel and ministers, the drafting of a master plan for the

<sup>13</sup> Likewise UGA-Gulu School, DRC - Dredging of the Port of Kalemie

partner organisation, the training of beneficiaries and the improvement of their management structures.

- *NIG - water project Result 1 'Access to drinking water in the villages and pastoral areas of the Dosso region is improved' will be largely achieved. The number of cemented wells and boreholes created is higher than forecast and the PHVP has made it possible to provide drinking water to 119,750 people.*

*Result 2 'The hygiene and sanitation conditions in the villages in the Dosso region are improved' is achieved through the construction of family and public latrines as planned. Several interviews indicate that the family latrines are used and that hygiene has improved, but the PHVP has no specific documentation on this subject.*

*Result 3 aims to improve the technical and managerial skills of stakeholders. The indicators focus on the number of people trained (857) and the number of operational water user associations (39) and water point management committees (157): the planned number of training courses has been completed. Two NGOs trained 209 builders in the production of family latrines and set up 39 village health committees.*

*There are no indicators for result 4, which concerns the real improvement of technical services but the equipment for the planned technical services was in fact supplied and the premises for three departmental offices for the ministry of water were built.*

Other projects were unable to achieve certain immediate significant results notably because some of the activities vital to the project's success could not be achieved due to a lack of time/budget<sup>14</sup>.

### **2.3.2 The achievement of short- and medium-term results (outcome)**

The outcomes achieved cover, among other things, the existence of good quality and operational infrastructures, the availability of mental health care, an increased number of students, improved access to water, etc.

- *NIG - water project: The first specific objective to provide better access to drinking water for populations in the villages and pastoral areas of the Dosso region was achieved since between 2006 and 2011, the coverage rate for drinking water in the region went from 69.2 % to 78 %.*

Among the projects evaluated, some were used to test new approaches, which - subsequently - influenced national policy.

- *RWA-IPM - On the proposal of the last meeting of the MLCS for the project to develop integrated systems to fight against crop diseases and pests (IPM) the Farmer Field Schools (FFS) process developed by the project was integrated into the Rwanda Agriculture Board's action plan and annual budget. The approach was accepted by Minagri.*

<sup>14</sup> VIE-IPM or Uganda - Gulu

### 2.3.3 Internal and external factors

*Internal factors* Several projects have not presented optimum effectiveness for various reasons such as:

- Project duration too short as decided at formulation;
- Certain activities/critical results were not achieved or only after significant delays. e.g. the supply of equipment (furniture, medical equipment, etc.) necessary for the use of medical infrastructures or training in the use of equipment, etc.;
- The effect of one of the results has not been sufficiently monitored, e.g. the effect of efforts in the field of sanitation or the effect of vocational training;
- Insufficient guarantee of the stability of trained personnel (e.g. departure/change of project directors);
- Works are completed in a rush at the end of the project (under time pressures), without a sufficient guarantee of the quality of the works (e.g. electrical installations, plumbing, etc.).

*External factors* Several external factors influenced the project's effectiveness:

- Political instability in some countries/volatile situation;
- Political timetable (see governance project);
- Suspension of development co-operation (DRC);
- Climate events;
- Delay in the delivery of equipment influencing the achievement of the specific objective;
- Delay in the implementation of another complementary project, which is needed for the proper implementation of the activities of the evaluated project<sup>15</sup>;
- Changes in national procedures for calls.

### 2.3.4 Results-based management by the BTC

'The BTC manages the intervention using a results-based approach' (question 2.3) had favourable scores for 19 of the 32 projects (59%). This score not only took into account the existence or not of a baseline and appropriate OVIs, but also the way in which the BTC managed the project with a view to achieving maximum results.

Most projects are managed according to a programme of activities to be implemented as defined in the TFF or based on the decisions of the JLCB e.g. after a mid-term evaluation. Like many other donors and/or development co-operation organisations, their headquarters rather have a strategy based on financial results. In the annual reports and meetings with partners (MLCS and Partners' Committee), greater attention is paid to the level of overall disbursement and respect for the expenditure schedule than to monitoring based on the operational results.

<sup>15</sup> See RWA-EPRER: The project implementation was complicated by the fact that it was closely linked to the completion of four other projects.

*Objectively verifiable indicators* Not all projects have SMART OVI (quantitative and qualitative) and only a minority of projects have a baseline - drawn up during the formulation or start-up phase. Most indicators are still activity and not results indicators. Indicators are rarely quantified, which make it difficult to evaluate project effectiveness.

*Reporting* Half-yearly and annual reports have generally been produced, but the information that they contain does not make it possible to assess to what extent the project is achieving the expected results and therefore the specific objectives.

*Adaptation of logical frameworks* Logical frameworks are not systematically adapted following significant modifications in the implementation - approved by the JLCB.

*Focus on project's achieving results* Despite this almost widespread absence of SMART and quantified OVIs, the evaluators were able to provide an opinion on the effectiveness of projects based on the triangulation of the information collected from project partners and beneficiaries. In the absence of results indicators, the evaluators took into account the decision-making processes of the BTC with a view to achieving optimum results.

In the projects evaluated, the following elements contributed towards a better focus on results:

- Flexibility in the project's implementation;
- A solid monitoring system and internal assessment and planning system (in some projects);
- Budget adjustments based on implementation issues encountered.

However, the evaluators observed that in several cases, the BTC could not fully achieve the project's results and that it could not always take suitable measures to rectify difficult situations or deal with unexpected events. The main causes of these difficulties are:

- Important activities organised towards the end of the project;
- Late organisation of the mid-term evaluation, which did not leave enough time to rectify an adverse situation;
- Poor skills of the subcontractors;
- Delays in recruiting personnel.

These strengths and weaknesses are analysed in greater detail in chapter 5 'Analysis by project cycle - Monitoring system - Strategic monitoring'.

### 2.3.5 Effectiveness conclusions

Effectiveness is difficult to analyse with a lack of SMART indicators and baseline in a number of projects. It is generally good for those projects that have been able to fulfill all the activities during the project duration and with the budget set aside for that particular project; and poor when various delays (start-up, change in personnel, calls, etc.) have made it difficult to carry out critical activities during the project



duration or using the initial budget. In some extreme cases, the specific objectives have not been achieved at all<sup>16</sup>.

The 2010 evaluation had already observed improvements in the area of results-based management and the fact that recent projects have an instrument to measure results - although these systems need to be improved<sup>17</sup>.

## 2.4 Efficiency

Efficiency	3.1	3.2	3.3	Overall
A score	4	5	6	6
B score	15	22	20	18
C score	8	5	5	7
D score	5	0	1	1

75 % of projects have A or B scores for the criterion 'Efficiency'.

For question 3.1. 'There was no delay in the planned activities and results', 19 projects out of 32 received favourable scores (A or B), which is 60%. This score means that the projects were executed as planned in the majority of cases and that delays were relatively limited.

For question 3.2. 'The connection between the results achieved and resources used is acceptable', 27 projects out of 32 or 85 % had favourable scores (A or B scores). The use of resources was clearly lower than expected (C or D scores) in 5 projects.

The scores for the question 'The BTC has managed resources efficiently' (question 3.3.), are satisfactory for 26 of the 32 projects or 82%.

Out of the 32 projects, 22 were extended at the BTC's request. The evaluators considered that the fact that the project needed an extension was not a good enough reason for awarding a C score. Among the projects that were extended, a good number had already received a C score for question 1.3 'Realistic intervention logic', because the implementation timeframes had been under-estimated.

<sup>16</sup> Case of projects MAR-EMF and RWA R&T

<sup>17</sup> 2010 Evaluation p 4 "It is however clear that all the projects (i.e. the projects evaluated in 2010) now have qualitative and/or quantitative indicators which in principle allow the evaluation of effectiveness. Consequently, projects now have an instrument that is used to measure the project's development in a results-based way... However, the indicators presented are not yet specific enough and there are flaws in the intervention logic of the logical framework (objectives that overlap, poorly worded objectives), which of course, impair the quality of the results-based management."

### 2.4.1 Delay in the implementation

Only 60% of projects received favourable scores (A or B), i.e. they were completed largely as planned and delays were kept to a minimum. 5 projects out of 32 (15%) had D scores.

There are various reasons for the delays, which are mostly highlighted in the 'Relevance' and 'Effectiveness' sections. They covered weaknesses related to the project's design (e.g. poor budget/results/coherence in the SO, the planned initial implementation duration being too short), implementation problems and the political context.

### 2.4.2 Acceptable connection between results achieved and resources used

27 of the 32 projects have A or B scores.

The results/resources ratio was positively influenced by the following factors:

- The costs of the outputs were comparable to or lower than the costs for other projects or private operators;
- Motivation and commitment from the partner's personnel.

The following factors had a negative effect:

- Poor skills in the partner's human resources, which were not sufficiently considered in the project formulation;
- A lack of drive in the partner;
- Tenders which were too complex and had to be repeated;
- The project used different subcontractors for similar activities e.g. training;
- The insufficient skills of the tenderers for some tenders and poor quality of the works (which required corrective measures);
- The difficulty in mobilising the complementary skills of different sectors e.g. specific requirements in hospital infrastructures;
- Selection criteria and access conditions that were not clear or strict enough e.g. for training.

### 2.4.3 Efficient resource management by the BTC

The BTC managed resources efficiently in 82% of projects.

The implementation and internal organisation of the projects did not cause problems. The skills and motivation of the teams were emphasised. The international and national technical assistance was generally good quality, both on the technical and human level, providing good project management support.

### 2.4.4 Internal and external factors

*Internal factors* Several of the project's internal factors were the cause of a poor score for efficiency:

- The period between identification and formulation was too long, which is a responsibility shared between all partners: the DGD, the BTC and local partners;
- A project start-up which took too long;
- The inability to build on the experience of the previous project team<sup>18</sup>;
- The instability of the projects' structures and personnel<sup>19</sup>;
- The institutional capacity of the partner has been overestimated;
- The tender documents did not adequately take into account the specific nature of the projects<sup>20</sup>.

*External factors* Some external factors impeded the project's efficiency:

- The suspension of development co-operation between Belgium and the DRC in 2008;
- Price trends on world markets, especially for metals and hydrocarbons, which affected the construction projects. Such variations should have been taken into account by price revision formulas. The basic rule 'prices are fixed and cannot be revised' means solid companies do not respond to these tenders because they cannot cover the risk;
- Delays in equipment deliveries;
- Elections and changes in government;
- A combination of these elements<sup>21</sup>.

## 2.4.5 Efficiency conclusion

The 2011 evaluation concurs with the conclusion of the 2010 evaluation (p. 5): *"The management and internal organisation of projects is generally good quality, with teams who work (co-operate) hard, who are experts and motivated. The management mechanisms at project level also create an obvious link with the project objectives, as described in the project proposal, although daily reality remains influenced by complex administrative tasks."*

<sup>18</sup> SEN- PA REMEC: It was three years between the end of the previous project, the Project for the Promotion of Small and Medium Horticultural Enterprises - PPMEH (1999-2004) and the formulation report (2007). The PPMEH personnel who had supervised the savings and loan co-operatives and their network (REMEC) could not be hired for the support project for REMEC which started 3 years later.

<sup>19</sup> Rwanda PAREF: the project had to be executed with the districts (decentralisation) while the National Forestry Authority (NAFA) was to be set up by the Rwanda Government. The technical level in the districts has proved to be very inadequate and the NAFA is still not really operational at the end of the project.

<sup>20</sup> Rwanda UNR CHUB and Bushenge - Construction and Rehabilitation of medical infrastructures: The failings in the technical specifications specific to the medical field - due to the lack of experience or the absence (Bushenge) of technical support - led to many defects in the execution of the works and many subsequent modifications (contract amendments, additional financial requirements to be covered by the partners, architectural defects, etc.).

<sup>21</sup> RD AEP: The order for the latest electromechanical equipment required over one year of tender procedures (technical specifications questioned by headquarters) then following the problems of the Port of Matadi, delivery still took a further 6 months.

A more realistic planning amongst others at the project launch phase and of the duration of the tender procedures, combined with a better analysis of the institutional capacities of the partner and continued efforts to optimise the contribution of the technical assistants would contribute greatly to improving project efficiency.

The analysis shows that project efficiency was greatly impeded by an inability to react quickly to internal and external problems. A quality monitoring approach encompassing the entire process (or at least the part for which the BTC is responsible) must be implemented.

## 2.5 Sustainability

Sustainability	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	Overall
A score	12	2	8	8	3
B score	13	17	18	20	20
C score	7	11	4	4	9
D score	0	2	2	0	0

72% of projects have A or B scores for the criterion 'Sustainability'.

Almost all the 32 projects are well established in the local structures and scores on the question 'The results achieved are established in the local structures' (question 4.1) are therefore largely positive, with 25 of the 32 projects or 79%.

The question 4.2. 'There is a financial exit strategy', has distinctly less positive scores with 59% of projects. Among the 32 projects, 11 have C scores while 2 projects have a D score.

The responses to question 4.3. 'The intervention is supported at a policy and strategic level', seems to be strongly linked to the questions about the project's relevance. Out of the 32 projects, 26 or 81% have favourable scores. In general, 'the beneficiaries have taken ownership of the results' (question 4.4) has very favourable scores (28 out of 32 or 88%).

### 2.5.1 Institutional sustainability

*Integration in the partner structure* The sustainable success of the projects is clearly related to direct co-operation with public partners - generally ministries - or state organisations. This partnership with public institutions seems to be strength in Belgian development co-operation, which is greatly appreciated by the partners. A management system that is fully integrated into the local structure contributes to such strong sustainability even if it slows down the execution. Due to this policy of structural co-operation with the partner organisation, this organisation can provide some of the services (health, education, etc.) or maintain investments (road infrastructures, water points, etc.) after the project.

*Stability of personnel* Institutional sustainability is impeded by the fact that the stability of personnel is not always assured, either during or after the project. During a project's implementation, public service personnel are often motivated, financially or otherwise, which is a considerable addition to their meager salaries. At the end of the project, the disappearance of this motivation risks leading to the departure of a significant number of these executives who have been financed and trained by the project. The evaluators had indications that this risk of departure is real<sup>22</sup>.

## 2.5.2 Financial sustainability

Only 60% of projects have favourable scores for financial sustainability.

Some projects include a **self-sufficiency approach** in the specific objectives or expected results; they develop a financial viability strategy by co-operating with private sector organisations<sup>23</sup> or improve the ability of receiving groups to manage the projects' benefits successfully.

- *RDC-AEP: User groups have been trained and informed about the management of water points. The sale of the water service generates sufficient income to run the networks by correctly and legally remunerating the personnel (social security, taxes, etc.)*

*Lobbying policy makers* The projects - and the BTC - have made relatively little effort to set up self-financing systems or to influence the government to award budgets for the operating costs or to continue with investments<sup>24</sup> in particular in social projects (health and education).

*Integration of activities into a new project* The problem of financial sustainability was resolved in several cases by incorporating some activities - initially planned for the evaluated project - into the activities of a new project, with broader objectives than the previous one<sup>25</sup>. This is however a second-best solution because procedures and conditions are not always the same and there is a long time-span between both projects. In addition, with the departure of personnel, important knowledge about the beneficiaries is no longer available.

<sup>22</sup> BDI- APFP: The IT personnel at the Burundian Parliament acquired valuable experience during the installation of an IT and communication system by the 'Selective support to the operation of the Parliaments' (APFP) project, that would strengthen their position on the private labour market where salaries are 4 to 5 times higher than in the Parliament.

<sup>23</sup> BDI-RAFS: In order to ensure the sustainability of the production and commercialisation of improved seeds, the BTC co-operated with the private sector for the marketing of good-quality seed. Following a poor consultation with other TFPs, the free distribution financed by them did not however allow the BTC to create a profitable market for these seeds - and thus maintain the interest of the private sector in this sector.

<sup>24</sup> In particular, RWA - Bushenge Hospital and RWA-UNR-CHUB University Health Infrastructure and UGA-Gulu School infrastructure

<sup>25</sup> Vietnam - IP Construction of an irrigation network where time and resources prevented informing and organising the receiving population. This was therefore included in a new project CDWMS with a broader geographical coverage.

### 2.5.3 Political and strategic support

The responses to question 4.3. 'The intervention is supported at a policy and strategic level', seem to be strongly linked to the questions about the project's relevance. Out of the 32 projects, 26 have favourable scores.

For projects that were **well integrated into the priorities of the policies and strategies of the local authorities**, support from policy-makers is distinctly stronger. Local government commitment to carrying out a project is reflected in different ways such as the commitment of personnel, the provision of equipment and offices, active participation in the JLCB and consideration of the project's sustainability based on managers' gaining a real understanding of the project's challenges. For social projects, it is clear that their integration into a national policy is important<sup>26</sup>.

Although the majority of projects are successfully integrated into sectoral policies and strategies, this is not a sufficient guarantee to ensuring their sustainability. The approach and procedures also need to be consistent with those of the government.

### 2.5.4 Ownership by the beneficiaries

Generally, 'the beneficiaries have taken ownership of the results' has very favourable scores (28 out of 32) but the analysis of the attitudes of direct and indirect beneficiaries should be separated.

*Direct beneficiaries - Improving skills* Most of the projects include activities to improve skills which directly target the personnel of partner organisations, but these are not always integrated into a real human resources strategy or management policy. These are often occasional training courses, the effectiveness of which is limited by changes in roles, people leaving, etc. There are no systematic conditionalities for either the individual or the organisation that aim to retain trained personnel within the initial organisation after training.

*Final beneficiaries* Ownership by the final beneficiaries has been relatively good in most projects that have been able to achieve all of their activities within the planned timeframe and budget. A few evaluations even reported excellent efforts in support of users' organisations<sup>27</sup>. However, ownership by the beneficiaries was limited when the project had been unable to fulfill the final critical activities provided for in the logical framework. This was the case with several infrastructure projects<sup>28</sup>.

Across all projects, civil society played a relatively unimportant role. There are however several examples of constructive collaboration.

<sup>26</sup> Rwanda Bushenge: The reconstruction of the hospital is part of a national development plan for healthcare (set up by co-operatives for example). There are financial resources available to improve district hospitals in the form of provisions allocated by the State.

<sup>27</sup> See RDC AEP: The ASUREPs received training in supervising water facilities and the management that allows these associations to manage the networks autonomously.

TAN-BIP1: The strengthening of beekeeping organisations and their structure enabled these organisations to provide services to their members once the project had finished.

<sup>28</sup> BDI - Prince Regent Charles Hospital - The fact that some of the equipment was not delivered by the project had a negative effect on the immediate access to healthcare.

### 2.5.5 Sustainability conclusion

The choice of the partner and his involvement in the project seem to be key elements for sustainability. For social projects, their coherence with the sectoral political choices is essential. The BTC seems to have focused less on the financial dimension of sustainability. However, several interesting initiatives have been observed, which stimulate the beneficiaries' participation in the sustainable management of the services set up by the project.

Since several projects carried out essential and vital activities to achieve the specific objective during the final year or during the extension phase, the BTC could not always implement participatory mechanisms to ensure sustainability.

## 2.6 Horizontal themes

Three cross-cutting areas were reviewed:

- Gender (5.1),
- Environment (5.2),
- Governance (5.3),

Horizontal	5.1	5.2	5.3
A score	3	3	3
B score	20	23	23
C score	9	5	6
D score	0	0	0

### 2.6.1 Gender

The scores obtained for 'The gender is integrated in the intervention (question 5.1) are generally mixed (B or C scores). Only three projects obtained A scores for the 'gender' dimension, i.e. that significant efforts had been made in this area. 9 out of 32 projects (28%) have C scores and do not therefore meet expectations for this issue.

Several projects evaluated (i) are aimed at a solely or principally female audience<sup>29</sup> (ii) work in sub-sectors that address clearly female issues<sup>30</sup> targeting mostly women (iii) or operate in sectors with a large number of female employees<sup>31</sup>.

Despite their pro-female focus, these projects have not (or have only slightly) developed specific approaches in terms of gender. Skills in terms of gender were not necessarily improved with the partner and with the managers of the programme or no specific efforts were made to encourage the participation of women in decision-making bodies or support their access to the project's services. The leverage effect on the gender aspects of these projects was therefore limited. The negative impact of projects on women was not analysed either, e.g. difficult access to the land after irrigation works.

For several projects, the indicators are not sexo-specific and the effects of the project on gender are not systematically analysed. It is too quickly assumed that the effect would be neutral.

## 2.6.2 Environment

Approximately 80% of projects have an acceptable environmental approach (A or B scores for the question 'The intervention follows an environmental approach') while a quarter were not sufficiently active in this area (C scores). In general, the formulation reports and TFFs contain a more or less detailed analysis of the project's potential environmental impact - depending on the intervention area. Several projects successfully took into account this dimension.

- *Tanzania - Beekeeping or the project to promote beekeeping - in partnership with the Ministry of Tourism and the Environment - reinforces the synergy between the economic effects of beekeeping (creating revenues for the rural population) and the environmental effects of forest protection (and limiting bushfires).*

The environmental dimension is not always sufficiently developed, particularly:

- Projects without an environmental impact study;
- An environmental study which analyses negative environmental effects;
- Sub-optimal choices of plant species to be promoted;
- The issue of waste is not sufficiently taken into account e.g. in infrastructure/health projects.

## 2.6.3 Governance

Preliminary remark: The 'governance' questions in the evaluation framework were focused solely on the fact that there had been no cases of abuse or corruption

<sup>29</sup> E.g. Multifunctional women's centre - Morocco

<sup>30</sup> See ALG TAM 1 and 2 "Integrated public health project in Tamanrasset (TAM I)" and its extension to Wilaya de Tamanrasset (TAM2) with the improvement of mother and child health; RWA-Mental Health with a large number of women patients.

<sup>31</sup> These projects received a B score even though little or no specific effort was made to improve the gender dimension.



whereas 'governance' covers all issues related to good decision-making, stakeholder participation, transparency in budgets and expenditure, etc. The scores awarded within the scope of this evaluation are based on this broader definition of 'good governance'.<sup>32</sup>

Three projects obtained excellent scores for the 'governance' dimension (question 'The intervention promotes good governance') while 6 projects did not sufficiently incorporate this cross-cutting dimension. 23 projects have B scores:

- *DRC-Railways: The project led a fight against the corruption within the CFU (Urban Railways). Proof of this being that as the restructuring and empowerment of the CFU progressed, revenues increased sixfold and fuel purchases fell by 60%.*

The evaluations revealed problems in governance with the receiving partners and organisations of several projects.

- *BDI-ISABU: The partner's Executive Board (ISABU) had not been changed for years*
- *SEN-REMEC: The project could not provide a suitable response to governance problems within the co-operative network. Unfortunately, the BTC was unable to convince governing ministries to impose compliance with statutes and good management practices.*

## 2.6.4 Conclusions on horizontal themes

There is no denying that even if a project focuses broadly on female beneficiaries or has a clear ecological objective or good governance, this does not guarantee that these dimensions will also be fully integrated into the project's implementation, or into the indicators that are used to measure the effects on these aspects. Although the choice of intervention areas for the projects - projects for women, projects with an environmental dimension - are the responsibility of the DGD and the partner country, the BTC should consider cross-cutting dimensions when implementing the projects.

<sup>32</sup> The principal aspects of good governance (according to the OECD) are accountability, transparency, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, forward vision and rule of law. See [www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3746,en\\_2649\\_33735\\_1814560\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3746,en_2649_33735_1814560_1_1_1_1,00.html)


## 3. Analysis by sector and by (fragile) country

### 3.1 Analysis by sector

#### 3.1.1 Introduction

This chapter presents observations by intervention sector. It has been difficult to draw conclusions for every sector due to the limited sample and the different project contexts. In view of the specific nature of infrastructure projects (e.g. calls, subcontractors, etc.) and its representation in the sample, specific recommendations are made below.

Graph: Analysis of criteria by sector



### 3.1.2 Infrastructure

The following tables contain the projects evaluated in the infrastructure sector (6) and projects in the water, health or education sectors (9), most of which are mainly construction activities. They represent half of the projects evaluated.

**Table 1** *Infrastructure sector projects*

Country	Project name	
DRC	Maintenance and rehabilitation programme for agricultural service roads II - (Bandundu) - PREPICO 2	Infrastructure
DRC	Support for the dredging of the Port of Kalemie	Infrastructure
DRC	Rehabilitation of the urban railway and improving mobility in Kinshasa	Infrastructure
Rwanda	Electrification of rural populations through renewable energies	Infrastructure
Rwanda	Electrification of rural populations through renewable energies (EPRER)	Infrastructure
Tanzania	The construction and enhancement of Inland Container Stations in Ilala, Shinyanga and Mwanza South	Infrastructure

**Table 2** *Projects in other sectors with major infrastructure components*

Water Projects		
Algeria	Technical support to training centres for water professionals	Water
Niger	Support for the pastoral and village water programme in the Dosso Region (PHVP)	Water
DRC	Pilot rehabilitation and development programme for supply systems for drinking water and sanitation in DRC - AEP	Water
Vietnam	Construction of an irrigation network and reservoir to increase the agricultural production in Ninh Phuoc district, Ninh Thuan province	Agriculture/ infrastructure

Health Projects		
Burundi	Support for the restoration of Prince Regent Charles Hospital	Health/infrastructure
Rwanda	Support programme for medical training facilities at the National University of Rwanda (PAIFDS)	Health/infrastructure
Rwanda	Support programme for medical training facilities at the UNR of Rwanda - additional support	Health/infrastructure
Rwanda	Reconstruction of Bushenge Hospital - phase II	Health/infrastructure

Education Projects		
Uganda	The rehabilitation and expansion of Sir Samuel Baker School in Gulu District	Education/infrastructure

*Purchase of equipment* Several projects consisted largely in purchasing specialist equipment that would be used by existing organisations or within the framework of broader development programmes.

DRC	Support for the dredging of the Port of Kalemie	Infrastructure
Tanzania	The construction and enhancement of Inland Container Stations in Ilala, Shinyanga and Mwanza South	Environment

For infrastructure projects, the following observations stand out:

- The specific objectives are often too broad. Construction activities as such e.g. the construction of a school will make it difficult to achieve specific objectives such as 'improved education in a given region';
- In several projects, there were delays due to the difficulties of overlaying local call procedures with those of the BTC;
- The monitoring of subcontractors by the project teams was not always satisfactory;
- Price increases were not sufficiently taken into account in the formulation documents and the budget and it was therefore impossible to complete the interventions as planned;
- Construction works were rushed towards the end of the project. This presents a serious risk in terms of quality and makes it impossible to invoke the guarantees provided by the contractors in the event of unsatisfactory works;
- The choice of equipment is correct for the 2 projects concerned and efforts were made to train the partner's personnel in the use of the equipment;
- The construction by the local counterpart of the infrastructure needed for the installation of equipment provided by BTC could not be achieved in a reasonable timeframe e.g. reach-stackers by the Tanzanian counterpart.

### 3.1.3 Agriculture and rural development

The following agricultural projects were evaluated:

Burundi	Institutional support to the Institute of Agronomic Sciences of Burundi (ISABU)	Agriculture
Burundi	Support and relaunch of the seed sector in Burundi (RAFS)	Agriculture
Rwanda	Improving farmers' access to quality planting material for roots, tubers and fruit species (R&T)	Agriculture
Rwanda	Development of integrated systems to fight against crop diseases and pests (IPM)	Agriculture
Rwanda	Support for reforestation in RWA (PAREF I)	Forestry
TAN	Improvement of beekeeping project	Social Economy/Rural development
SEN	Support for the network of savings and loan co-operatives	Social Economy/Rural development

Despite the rather limited sample, several observations can be made:

- Quite diversified intervention areas but with a greater focus on basic agricultural products;
- The projects are all integrated into governmental or semi-governmental structures;
- There is little collaboration with NGOs, civil society and the private sector, although present in these sub-sectors;
- The environmental dimension is not sufficiently considered as such although some projects should have a clear and marked effect on the environment because of the type of activities (e.g. reforestation by the PAREF, decreased use of fertiliser in R&T, etc.)
- Despite the importance of women in basic agriculture, little attention is paid to 'gender' aspects; the analysis of women's place in the sub-sector is sketchy and few activities focus specifically on this group of final beneficiaries.

### 3.1.4 Health

Algeria	Extension of the integrated public health project in Wilaya de Tamanrasset II	Health
Algeria	Integrated public health project in Tamanrasset (TAM I)	Health
Mali	Expertise support for the support programme for public health development EA-PADSS	Health
Peru	Drug consumption prevention and drug addicts rehabilitation programme Phase II - DEVIDA	Health
Rwanda	Support for the national mental health programme - phase II	Health

For the health projects that have been the subject of evaluation S4-2011, the following positive observations are made:

- The projects are well integrated into the national structures and the national health policies;
- The projects focus on relevant medical sub-sectors for the vulnerable groups in society: women, the mentally ill, nomadic peoples or inhabitants in regions with poor health coverage;
- The choice of ITAs has been excellent: they are competent and professional, with a strong commitment to their work and consideration for the cultural aspects of their job;
- Sufficient attention was paid to improving the skills of local personnel;
- In general, the projects had a 'results-based' approach.

However,

- All the projects started with significant delays (1 to 4 years);
- The effect of personnel training was not monitored or evaluated;
- The budget for the projects still includes a significant number of vehicles, ambulances - in countries such as Rwanda and Algeria;
- The procedures for importing equipment are too complex;
- Few efforts have been made to ensure that operational costs and equipment renewals will be taken into account in the government budget after the project;
- Although the choice of health sub-sectors often affects mostly women, the projects have not developed a 'gender' approach (gender training for personnel, adapting access conditions for women, women's involvement in decision-making bodies, etc.).

### 3.1.5 Education

The 2 projects in the education sector do not allow conclusions to be drawn on this type of project because they are atypical projects for the sector (management of a fund and construction work respectively).

Uganda	The rehabilitation and expansion of Sir Samuel Baker School in Gulu District	Education/infrastructure
Vietnam	Vietnam – Belgium training facilities	Education

### 3.1.6 Governance

Burundi	Selective support in the operation of the Burundian Parliament	Good governance
DRC	Support for the legislative system in DRC: provincial assemblies section	Good governance - Institutional CD
Vietnam	Public administration reform and roll out of the comprehensive poverty reduction and growth strategy (CPRGS) in Hau Giang province, phase 2 (PARROC)	Good governance

The following observations can be made for these 3 projects:

- The projects are relevant from the point of view of developing democracy; the activities and interventions represent a relevant response to the weaknesses of the political institutions in these countries;
- The timing of the projects could not always be adapted to the progress of elections which greatly influences the effectiveness of these projects;
- In the JLCB, sometimes beneficiaries (deputies, senators, etc.) had contradictory interests JLCB- without the balance of an external authority to observe whether the project objectives were respected as far as possible and in view of ensuring sustainability;
- In view of the political dimension of this type of project, there must be a more intensive collusion and collaboration between the BTC and the DGD Attachés.


### 3.1.7 Conclusion on the analysis by sector

The analysis has not allowed specific conclusions to be made on the quality of the performance of the BTC in the various sectors.

## 3.2 Specific problems in fragile countries

This chapter analyses the BTC's performance in fragile countries such as the DRC and Burundi compared with other countries. Since the sample only covers a few projects per country, the comparison is made with 2 countries where at least 4 projects have been evaluated.

Graph: Comparison of fragile countries with more representative countries in the sample



The comparison of scores between these 4 countries does not reveal differences in the quality of the performance of the BTC in the different countries. It can be noted that, despite the difficult working conditions and the weakness of the partners in these countries, the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability do not automatically differ from those in more advanced countries. Following Belgium's compliance with the Paris Declaration, Belgian development co-operation and the BTC have committed to adapting their work rate and methods to those of their partners.

In fragile countries such as the DRC and Burundi, project efficiency is often impeded by the poor capacity of partner institutions and the lack of leadership within the Government. Intervention directors are often responsible for various projects and their teams do not have enough time and expertise to execute the projects properly. Furthermore, local/decentralised/devolved staff tend to neglect their own tasks in favour of activities for various projects, which pay a financial incentive for these activities.





## 4. Analysis by project cycle

This chapter analyses the strengths and weaknesses in the various project implementation stages - from formulation (and even the period before formulation) until the final evaluation.

### 4.1 Pre-formulation

Although the identification phase and the Indicative Co-operation Programmes (ICP) are not covered by this evaluation, several times the evaluators recorded that the timeframe between identification and formulation was relatively long. The evaluation of several projects revealed the negative effects of too-long an interval between a project's identification and its formulation (this aspect being particularly critical when it relates to second-phase projects):

- Intervention by other donors during this period, causing a significant reduction in the project's relevance making it necessary to re-identify the needs;
- Difficulty of building on the knowledge acquired from previous projects due to the departure of project personnel and changes in managers in partner organisations, etc.

*Observations* The observations of this evaluation are consistent with those of the 2010 evaluation, which analysed the management contract with the BTC<sup>33</sup>: *"Shortening and simplifying of the identification phase seems problematic in practice. The identification files are not always of good enough quality, which also depend on the quality of the ICPs and underlying analyses. The transition between identification and formulation is still problematic and the desired duration is exceeded. It is clear that the strict separation between the responsibilities (the partner country is responsible for the identification and the BTC the formulation) does not work well in practice."*

The evaluators obviously understand that good preparation for a (new) project requires a detailed analysis of the context and the interventions of other TFPs along with a discussion/decision-making process with the partner organisation. This would obviously justify a longer period. The duration therefore inevitably depends on the context and the intervention area.

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<sup>33</sup> Source: p.106 of the Ecorys report "Etude sur les contrats de gestion de Coopération Technique Belge" (Study on Belgian Technical Co-operation management contracts)

## 4.2 Formulation

In the project cycle, both parties - DGD and BTC - focus a lot on the formulation stage, which forms the basis for collaboration agreements with the local partners. With the aim of limiting the period between the project's identification and start-up, the 3rd management contract made the BTC solely responsible for formulation. These formulations are funded through a formulation fund available to the BTC (own personnel or external consultants). Thus the BTC no longer has to submit a proposal/tender for each formulation mission.

For confidentiality reasons and/or because the Technical and Financial File (TFF) is annexed to the contract that the Belgian development co-operation will sign with the partner State, a separate formulation report (FR) in addition to the TFF is also drafted. This makes it possible to focus on certain key elements of the project and the risks of implementing the project, especially the weaknesses of the partners.

In this section, we examine the quality and limits of the TFFs along with the processes used to prepare them and the actors involved.

### 4.2.1 Quality of TFFs

Almost all the formulation reports contain a good contextual analysis including a description of future partners or actors, a detailed description of the interventions to be implemented and a risk analysis. The expertise used by the BTC for the formulations - internal or external is generally adequate. The connections between specific objectives, results and activities are coherent and realistic if the situation at the time that these frameworks are developed is taken into account.

However, the following problems were observed:

- **Insufficient consideration of the timeframes needed to carry out the calls, recruit technical assistance**, etc.
- **Insufficient institutional analysis** In several projects, the institutional analysis is too weak and the formulation cannot offer a sufficient response to the partner's institutional problems.
  - *SEN PA-REMEC: The TFD does not contain a good institutional diagnosis of the REMEC network, although it was a project to improve this network which furthermore presents serious weaknesses on a governance level.*
- **Insufficiently defined implementation strategy** The TFD describes the activities to be implemented, but does not always describe the intervention strategy, which can lead to differences from the point of view of partners later on.
- **Insufficient budget for the activities** The insufficient budget or no provision to deal with the ever possible risk of price increases. The acceptable budget reserve for the Finance Inspection would only be 5%.
- **Insufficient risk analysis.** The description of the risks is sketchy and the measures to be taken in the event that a risk should occur are not identified
- **Logical framework and objectively verifiable indicators (OVI)** The great weakness in some frameworks is the lack of clear OVIs - on formulation or improved during the project -, which does not allow to correctly measure the achievement of the results. In addition, the logical frameworks are infrequently or never used as project management tools.

### 4.2.2 Processes and actors

*Quality control committee* The quality control committee approves the TFFs and formulation reports with the participation of the DGD's thematic experts. For several projects, the evaluators observed that this Quality Control Committee had approved projects where the objectives and services were disproportionate compared with the budget<sup>34</sup>, or where the risk management strategy was not sufficient, and/or where not enough attention was paid to 'gender' and 'environment' aspects.

*Involvement of the partners and beneficiaries in the formulation phase* All the formulation missions held a more or less intensive consultation with the various stakeholders, including others involved in the sector and receiving groups. Their concerns were generally taken into account in the TFF/FR.

- *NIG-PHVP: In this pastoral and village water programme, an inventory of drinking water needs was completed in the Dosso region in partnership with representatives from different villages. The selection of structures to be built and activities to be carried out - while making sure to maintain a balance between the different departments - took into account the requirements of the populations (for example the type of structures that they wanted: wells, borehole, etc.), the standards of the Water Ministry (WM) and the hydrogeological and environmental conditions.*

However, it is noted that local partners have not been greatly involved in the choices made by the BTC's teams of consultants. The TFF - activities and implementation arrangements - is finalised in Brussels and firstly approved by the Quality Control Committee (QCC) before being submitted to the partner. In some cases, the partner implementing organisation was unavailable or had a wait-and-see attitude during the formulation phase.

The approval of the TFF (after the QCC) takes place at an initial 'pre-JLCB' phase with the same participants as the future JLCB, which seems to be an appropriate procedure, although there have been relatively few modifications at this level.

See below 5.4 'Monitoring systems' for an analysis of the JLCB's role.

### 4.2.3 Formulation conclusions

The 2011 evaluation arrives at the same conclusions as that of 2010 which emphasises (p 7): *"Several, almost-generic weaknesses in the products of current formulations must be addressed, particularly the insufficient quality of the logical frameworks, the lack of integration of the risk analysis in the project approach and in the logical framework."*

The evaluation also supports the observation of the 2010 evaluation (p 5) *"The operation of the QCC has gradually improved, but consists mainly of a compliance check and (still) no quality control as defined in the third management contract."* Most of the evaluations show that major events - external and internal to the project - force the project to adapt its activities and/or rationale.

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<sup>34</sup> For example DRC-Kalemie

## 4.3 Implementing the projects

### 4.3.1 Start-up phase

The launch phase for the projects comprises the recruitment of personnel (including technical assistants), the completion of baseline studies or institutional analyses and the approval of the TFF by the JLCB. This proves to be a critical period in the project's success. The evaluations have also revealed **significant delays between the formulation and actual start-up of the projects**, which have had negative effects on the projects (see below).

### 4.3.2 The implementation process for the projects

The evaluation could not systematically analyse the implementation process for the projects since some of the projects evaluated were already closed or in their final stage and several teams no longer had all their members. However, by reading documents and meeting with stakeholders, the evaluators could observe certain strengths and weaknesses related to the implementation of the projects.

The projects are often integrated into the structures of partner organisations. A director at the partner institution was jointly responsible for a significant portion of the activities within the co-management framework; the partner's personnel implemented most of the activities and the partner's personnel benefitted from an improvement in their skills through training and coaching from the ITAs and NTAs. The procedures and methods of the partners were applied as far as possible.

See below 6.1.1. 'Co-management'

### 4.3.3 Tenders

Belgium has decided to conform with national procedures in terms of procurement and seems to be among the first bilateral development co-operations to realise this objective<sup>35</sup>. The use of national procedures is consistent with the commitments made within the scope of the Paris Declaration. Although the BTC has identified certain thresholds and requires a letter of consent to be obtained above €25,000 from the Resident Representative and from the BTC headquarters for over €200,000,

The application of national and Belgian procedures has however been the source of additional delays.

- *BDI-PAI-ISABU Compliance with the new Public Procurement Code to which jointly managed procurements are subject comprises 34 stages, 8 to 10 of which are required by the BTC (depending on thresholds) in addition to those required by the legislation in force in Burundi.*
- *VIE-IP In this irrigation project, the BTC was forced to re-issue the call after changes in Vietnamese law.*

<sup>35</sup> In Burundi, Belgium is currently the only sponsor to conform with national procedures.

Local suppliers often find it difficult to comply with these procedures and conditions and the calls do not usually attract the interest of international companies. Some works are completed hastily after initial delays, which makes it impossible to ensure quality and proper implementation.

- *DRC AEP and PREPICO: In these infrastructure projects, the local situation in the Congo is particularly difficult for recruiting a contractor or supplier under the terms required by Belgian public contracts: administrative requirements that are incompatible with the situation of local companies (bank and administrative certificates, etc.). Responsible international companies are wary of the situation and offer inflated prices to cover themselves in the event of problems (outside the budget). At the same time, it is impossible to rule out a bid because its price is too low and unjustifiable. The result is that good companies are ruled out (too expensive) along with local ones (administrative reasons). Unsuccessful calls are sometimes re-issued several times until being awarded to an administratively compliant company but one which may be unskilled or ultimately offer non-compliant materials and timeframes exceeded by over 100%.*

#### 4.3.4 Financial and administrative management

Discussions with the project teams reveal the burden of administrative and financial procedures. It is observed that the technical assistants (TA) often spend a good deal of their time on administrative management rather than supporting the teams on the content.

The BTC's contribution to the success of a project is also related to operational and financial elements; financial reporting, support for calls, mandate structures, etc. in other words, **initiatives that help to limit the financial risks**. This stringency in the administrative and financial management is also a clear advantage for the partner that can then improve its own procedures, e.g. in Burundi.

*Change in expenditure towards the end of the project* Several projects had very low expenditure levels during the early years due in part to the slow start-up of the project and the complexity of the tender procedures (see above). In several projects, a new momentum is observed approximately one year before the end of the project, motivated by the risk of not being able to spend the entire budget before the end of the project. Decisions are then made quickly to refocus the project on the activities that use the most funds, without this necessarily being justified in terms of relevance, efficiency or sustainability.

#### 4.3.5 International and national technical assistance

Almost all the evaluation missions observed the vital role of the international and national technical assistants in the success of the projects, particularly in the strategic discussions and project recovery, etc. The quality of the international and

national technical assistance was generally good, not only on a technical and human level but also in its support of the project management<sup>36</sup>.

- In general, there was a good synergy between ITAs and NTAs<sup>37</sup>. In the event that this synergy did not exist<sup>38</sup>, the NTA-ITA association proved to be problematic and had negative impacts on the project.
- Several TAs have spent a lot of time on administrative and financial procedures, which did not always allow them to play an optimum role in the skills transfer. This is especially true for small projects where TAs are required to perform diverse tasks.
- NTAs are often recruited to complement/compensate for the partner's weaknesses in terms of administrative and financial management - according to the financial management requirements imposed by the Belgian Inspection authorities on the BTC.
- The fact that the technical assistance was the same for several projects improved the synergy between these projects, but was a handicap when implementing certain activities<sup>39</sup>.
- In several cases, the TAs were unsatisfactory and the BTC did not take prompt action to remedy this situation.
- The ToR for evaluations (mid-term and final) rarely covered the work of ITAs and NTAs<sup>40</sup>.
- The choice of technical assistance was often the subject of discussions and even 'vetoes' by partners.
- The TAs are vital for facilitating the interventions, identifying the requirements for improving partners' abilities and strengthening the synergies between actors. Within the BTC, there is a procedure for evaluating technical assistants, which has however not been evaluated.

<sup>36</sup> Particularly for the projects EA-PADSS in Mali, Mental Health in Rwanda, APFP in Burundi (for the computerisation component)

See also the BTC 2006 study: "Changing minds and attitudes. Towards improved Belgian Technical Assistance"

<sup>37</sup> See for example the 'Expertise support for the PADSS' project: an economist/management profile combined with a public health profile

<sup>38</sup> VIE-PARROC example

<sup>39</sup> RWA EPRER The technical assistance includes a unit which is also a JMR for other rural electrification projects funded by Belgian development co-operation.

<sup>40</sup> BTC indicates that within the BTC, there is a procedure for the evaluation of the technical assistants, which has not been evaluated yet.

## 4.4 Monitoring - Evaluation of the Project

This chapter firstly addresses the monitoring system itself, before analysing the reporting. The role of the Mixed Local Consultation Structure is also analysed.

### 4.4.1 Monitoring system

Most of the projects evaluated had not established a monitoring system that would make it possible to follow the development of the results achieved by the project. In general, monitoring systems are still limited to monitoring activities and expenditures. Nevertheless, there are several very positive initiatives that can be highlighted.

- *NIG-PHVP The new internal system at the BTC for quarterly assessment and planning is a step forward and is well adapted, to the extent that the intervention logic (logical framework) and the indicators are good.*

Projects are monitored using several processes:

- A monitoring manager, hired by the project/programme;
- A technical assistant closely monitors the actions and support;
- Monitoring is conducted by an external organisation contracted for this purpose.
- No real support-monitoring of the partners is provided;
- The monitoring is conducted (remotely) by the BTC programme manager who is jointly responsible.

Certain weaknesses in the project design negatively influenced monitoring during implementation:

- The absence of a 'baseline' providing evidence of the starting situation was observed in several projects, (see above 3.1. Effectiveness);
- The indicators reflected more about the achievement of the activities and investment than the results;
- The partner organisations (administration) presented weaknesses (in human resources) in daily monitoring<sup>41</sup>;
- There is no real quality control during implementation (the Quality Control Committee only intervenes when finalising the TFD).

*Financial monitoring* The BTC, like many other development co-operation organisations seems to pay much more attention to the financial 'commitment-disbursement' process and there is great pressure on controlling expenditure and its eligibility. This administrative and financial information is contained in the annual reports for the projects and is the subject of discussions with the JLCB.

Quarterly planning is mostly carried out based on expenditure forecasts.

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<sup>41</sup> BDI-RAFS: Investments in terms of irrigation for this seed production project will result in investments that are difficult to use. A technical evaluation of the basic study would have allowed the correction of some weaknesses. The structure of a seed industry with new organisations (private sector) should have benefited from close monitoring



*Technical monitoring* The few projects where support from BTC-Brussels - Technical and Sectoral Expertise (TSE) was indicated, e.g. health projects, this support was clearly a key element in the project's success. For the other projects, more intensive support could have contributed to better implementation.

The evaluators observe significant failings in the field of project monitoring, but also note that progress has been made in recent years as highlighted in the 2010 evaluation report (p. 9), which studied projects more recent than those that were the subject of this evaluation: *"In all the projects studied, the foundation has at least been laid for the development and application of results-based monitoring systems, including among other things, the development of baselines."*

#### 4.4.2 Joint Local Consultative Body (JLCB)

The Specific Agreement delegates the decision-making for the important aspects of the project to the JLCB, particularly its monitoring and strategic discussions, but it does not establish clear and transparent procedures for validating decisions.

In general, JLCB meetings are held regularly and attended by the most important stakeholders. Despite the weaknesses referred to below, they often make structural decisions for the implementation of projects. However, not all these decisions are recorded in the logical framework that will be used to monitor and evaluate the implementation.

Furthermore, several problems were encountered:

- The absence of a suitable internal monitoring system does not enable the JLCB to monitor the results of the project and make the right decisions;
- The composition of the JLCB was both technical and political in respect of the local partner (presence of the Technical Ministry and Foreign Affairs Ministry) and only technical in terms of the BTC;
- Some JLCB are inactive and unconcerned with the specific nature of the projects.
- Members of the JLCB (from partner organisations and ministries) rarely attend meetings due to the lack of financial incentives and do not always have the technical skills for the project;
  - *DRC-Kalemie: The JLCB met twice, on 27 February 2009 and 8 February 2011. The project was therefore refocused by the project staff as the need arose, without formalisation or validation by the JLCB.*
- Members had conflicting interests in several projects, notably in the governance projects;
  - *DRC- Support to legislative system - provincial assemblies section; the significant involvement of direct beneficiaries in the JLCB (one deputy per province) and in the overall management and guidance of the project (requiring significant travel costs) led to more training for deputies and less training for the Assembly personnel - and a large number of validation workshops. It is noted that deputies did not*

*always make decisions based on the general interest and final objectives of the project.*

- Over-detailed discussions between all stakeholders; the strategic discussion is lost;<sup>42</sup>
- Some decisions made in the JLCB went against the specific objective;<sup>43</sup>
- The operation of the JLCB may be paralysed when members disagree with each other.

**Observations** Although it is up to the JLCB to monitor project implementation and make strategic decisions, in several projects evaluated, the JLCB did not make the decisions that were required to recover difficult situations or to refocus the project according to new challenges/opportunities. This seriously limited the effect of the projects.

The evaluation therefore broadly concurred with the observation of the 2010 assignment: (p. 7) *"The JLCB seems primarily to be a body that deals with important but mostly formal issues, principally of a financial and administrative nature. Many JLCB do not therefore really deal with strategic direction."*

### 4.4.3 Half yearly and annual reports

The evaluation noted that the annual reports prior to 2010 were relatively sketchy, mainly providing a comparison between the activities conducted and those that were planned, along with a statement on the budget situation. These reports are an acceptable basis for stakeholders that want information on the progress of the projects but are not sufficient to provide a basis for decision-making in the event of a problem.

These reports tend to focus on issues relating to the logical framework rather than on technical and organisational issues. The challenges of the projects and the problems encountered are not explicitly described in such a way as to be able to evaluate their relevance or risks for the project. They are therefore unsuitable for donors and for bodies such as the JLCB that need more information for strategic discussions and so as to be able to make the best decisions for the fulfillment of the projects.

### 4.4.4 Strategic monitoring of the projects

In a third of projects<sup>44</sup>, the strategic consultation between all partners on the future of the project was not intense enough to guarantee that all projects achieved their specific objectives in the most optimal way. This is a shared responsibility within the scope of the co-management.

<sup>42</sup> TAN - Strengthening of beekeeping project (BIP1): Discussions in the local language (Swahili with a loose translation) between a large number of representatives of all stakeholders made it difficult for the Belgian partners (BTC and Attaché as observer) to properly understand the content of the discussions and even the decisions made.

<sup>43</sup> UGA-Gulu Rehabilitation of the headmaster's house rather than the purchase of furniture for the school

<sup>44</sup> Especially in the following projects: VIE-IP, MAR-EMF, BDI-APFP, UGA-Gulu, RWA-PAIFDS, RWA UNR-CHUB and Bushenge, BDI-PAI-ISABU, BDI-RAFS, SEN-REMEC, TAN-ICD, RWA R & T, DRC-Kalemie.

In these projects, the project would have needed to be refocused with the agreement of the donor because significant modifications had to be made to the logical framework and/or the use of the budgets. In some cases, a more political intervention from the Belgian development co-operation would have allowed to respond better and more quickly to the specific objectives.

The evaluators therefore fully subscribe to the observations/conclusions of the 2010 evaluation (p 8). *"The role of the BTC's headquarters in the strategic direction is limited, whereas at the executive level there is an obvious need and a request for support. In several cases, the headquarters and the national office do not seem to have the necessary specific expertise. The role of the national office is mainly limited to the (greatly appreciated) administrative, financial and logistics support and trouble shooting, and less on the strategic and content levels. In many cases, the TAs, in consultation or not with the directors of the local projects, seem to assume a key role in the strategic direction of the projects. Strictly speaking, in some cases they will sanction their mandate, but they fill a void that other actors do not satisfy."*

#### **4.4.5 Mid-Term evaluations (MTE)**

The mid-term evaluations were often interesting exercises which allowed difficult situations to be rectified. In most cases, they were assigned to external consultants (international and national) with good knowledge of the sector and project cycle management (PCM). This external view of the project offered an objective analysis of the situation and proposals to be debated in the JLCB in order to arrive at a consensus about the best approach for improving the situation.

In several projects, the evaluators observed that an MTE had not been performed, although this exercise would probably have helped to confirm the intervention logic of the project or propose a strategic reorientation. In other cases the MTE took place well after the mid-term, sometimes almost at the end of the project.

The mid-term evaluation is a vital tool for analysing the progress of projects. It is essential that the JLCB takes steps to rectify the problems and weaknesses observed in the MTE as quickly as possible and adapt the logical framework of the project.

#### **4.4.6 Evaluation and final report**

The final evaluations are launched by the BTC who drafts the ToR and selects the consultants (one national and one international). These evaluations have been systematically carried out. The reports are generally of an acceptable quality. They contain information and analysis on the project's progress according to the standard criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact) along with an expenditure analysis and recommendations for the final months of the project.

Most of the evaluations were organised 6 to 12 months before the project's closing date, which offered the opportunity to take recovery measures or ensure project sustainability, based on the report's recommendations.

The following weaknesses have been observed in most evaluations and should be addressed by adapting the format of the evaluations:

- Not all the final evaluations managed to measure the results of the project successfully due to the lack of a monitoring system for beneficiaries (see above);

- They do not analyse the BTC's contribution to the project's success - compared with the contribution and responsibility of the partners;
- They do not systematically evaluate the skills of the technical assistants (national and international) and their contribution to the project's success;
- The external factors that impeded or contributed to the smooth implementation of the project are rarely taken into account (whereas the current evaluations have observed the importance of these external factors in the project's success or failure);
- They do not provide enough detail on exit strategies;
- They cannot fully account for the results obtained by the project if they took place 12 months before the end of the project.

**Conclusion** None of the 32 final evaluations revealed a biased opinion (pro-BTC) by the evaluators of the BTC. However, the fact that the evaluations are commissioned and approved solely by the BTC - even if they are conducted by external experts - risks reducing their importance/validity in justifying the place and role of the BTC in the project's implementation with regards the donor.

**Knowledge management and preparing for the next intervention** There were relatively few efforts to capitalise the experience of the projects. This could however help to improve the preparations for future projects in the same sector.

#### 4.4.7 Extension

Extension in 22 of the 32 projects<sup>45</sup>, a maximum extension phase of one year took place (see 3rd management contract), which allowed the construction works to be finalised or the balance of the budget to be refocused on more relevant activities. In several cases, the budget was increased.

The evaluation showed that:

- The level of effectiveness of several projects was largely dependent on the activities implemented during this extension phase;
- The sustainability of a good number of other projects was limited because some of the project's activities such as the training of beneficiaries could not be finalised.
  - *BDI-APFP: The project could not train the personnel of the Assembly and the newly elected deputies to take advantage of new IT equipment.*

In conclusion, the extension phase allowed distinct improvements in the performance of projects that were confronted with changes in their context/environment or which were affected by delays due to the complexity of the procedures. However, the duration of this extension (maximum 1 year) is not long enough.

<sup>45</sup> This includes the projects BDI-APFP, TAN-BIP1, VIE-IP, MAR-EMF, NIG-PHVP, BDI-APFP, UGA-Gulu, DRC-AP, RWA- UNR-CHUB 1 and 2, BDI- Hospital PRC, RDC-AEP, BDI-RAFS, MLI-EA-PADSS, TAN-ICD, ALG-TAM 1 & 2, RWA R & T, RWA-EPRER, RWA-IPM, ALG-ATCFME, VIE-PARROC.



## 5. Structural aspects

This chapter firstly analyses the BTC's relationships with local partners and those with the DGD.

### 5.1 Local partners

#### 5.1.1 Co-management

The double management system under 'co-management' and 'own-management' has enabled the BTC to comply with the approach put forward by the Paris Declaration. The choice of budget items under 'co-management' (investments and operating costs) and others under 'own-management' (ITA, mid-term and final evaluations) seems coherent. These budget items are needed to ensure the smooth implementation of the project (technical assistance, mid-term evaluations, etc.) or to ensure accountability in relation to the donor (final project reports).

The advantages and disadvantages of the co-management system could not be analysed in detail, but the evaluations did however enable several observations to be made about this system.

- In the majority of projects, project managers are appointed by the partner ministry. These are often executives from the ministries and/or regional directors. In several projects, these are directors of semi-public or private partner organisations. Several co-management representatives also fulfill this same role for other BTC projects (e.g. 5 projects in Rwanda), for other projects/donors but also and mainly alongside their official role in the administration. This advantage of scale carries the risk of poor availability.
- Some project teams work relatively independently within the host structures, with risks for the institutional sustainability of the projects. When the project management is failing and the partners cannot manage to meet, co-management does not offer a clear mechanism for mediation to resolve underlying conflicts<sup>46</sup>.

In conclusion, the option to use both systems in parallel is an extremely positive point, although the co-management system could be improved. The evaluators could not make any observations about the 'governance' system.

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<sup>46</sup> Examples: MAR-EMF, RWA-PAREF

### **5.1.2 Financial and administrative procedures by receiving country**

The BTC conforms as much as possible to the procedures of the receiving country in all countries covered by the evaluation but it has no influence over the strength and speed of these procedures. In practice, compliance with national procedures in terms of public contracts means that the number of procedures to be followed is increased, along with the duration of those procedures.

The BTC is itself subject to rather rigorous administrative and financial checks (by the Belgian Court of Auditors), but cannot always impose this same strictness at partner level. This is mainly a problem in countries with a low level of governance such as Burundi and the DRC.

Compliance with national procedures is important within the framework of the Paris Declaration, but means there could be significant delays.

### **5.1.3 Institutional strengthening of partners (within the scope of co-management)**

The institutional support for partner ministries or other specialist organisations has an increasingly important place in development co-operation. This institutional support often includes technical assistance (see above) and support for improving the skills of personnel, along with investments in transport and IT resources. Given the growing responsibility of local institutions and organisations, this co-operation method seems to be extremely relevant.

Within the scope of this evaluation, only a few projects were explicitly related to institutional support<sup>47</sup>, but other projects had large sections targeting the improvement of the skills of personnel.

The evaluators highlight the importance of such institutional support and the need to adapt the support and monitoring system for this type of intervention in order to better monitor the effect of the interventions and to better identify BTC's contribution to the change process within its partner institutions.

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<sup>47</sup> In particular BDI-PAI-ISABU, MLI - PA-PADSS, SEN- PA-REMEC

## 5.2 BTC - Embassy Relations

Based on the analysis of the 32 projects, the evaluators conclude that the strict separation between the role of the BTC and that of the DGD attachés in the Embassies, as defined in the 3rd management contract, does not offer a good enough guarantee for the smooth running of the projects. In several projects, the BTC did not have sufficient influence to ensure that the specific objectives were observed by all partners and that all the conditions were satisfied for an optimal implementation.

- *SEN-REMEC: The BTC's pressure on its partners - the Department of Microfinance and the Department for Regulation and Control - so that they could intervene in the network of REMEC co-operatives, was not effective before the Belgian development co-operation was involved through the drafting of a joint letter.*

*Poor monitoring by the donor* Contrary to certain other bilateral development co-operations and the European Union, the Belgian donor is only involved in the project monitoring through the reading of annual reports, (irregular) attendance at JLCB as an observer and through more or less frequent contact with the BTC programme manager. The conclusions of the mid-term evaluations and final evaluations are shared with the attachés. The projects are reviewed during the Partners' Committees twice a year and problems are reported.

*Unbalanced representation of the two partner countries in decision-making bodies* Recipient countries are represented in the JLCB not only by the technical ministry concerned but also by political partners (Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of Co-operation) that monitor projects through the JLCB. However, BTC is Belgium's sole representative and the Belgian political authorities do not have the same resources to monitor and participate in strategic decisions about the future of the project.

*Observation* The evaluation is also similar to the observation of the 2010 evaluation with regards the role of the DGD and especially the attachés (p. 8) "DGD personnel no longer have a direct role in the strategic direction of the projects, and it lacks the necessary resources and information for this purpose." Insufficient co-operation between the 2 institutions (in Brussels and in the field) has prevented the development process and the project/programme cycle from being optimised.





## 6. Conclusions and recommendations

### 6.1 Conclusions

The evaluation covered 32 projects in 12 countries, representing a total budget of €105 million. The evaluation framework used for each of the projects was based on the 'Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM)' methodology which makes it possible (1) to make observations on the BTC's performance in the various fields and identify the causes of these failures and successes and (2) to formulate recommendations with a view to improving performance. The evaluation was based on standard evaluation criteria and cross-cutting areas. It also identified the internal and external factors that affected the BTC's results related to the context and the strengths/weaknesses of the partners.

#### 6.1.1 Evaluation criteria

The scores of the 32 projects evaluated are generally better for relevance than for the other evaluation criteria.

Table: Total scores for the 32 projects evaluated

	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
A score	9	1	6	3
B score	21	18	18	20
C score	2	12	7	9
D score	0	1	1	0

The analysis of **relevance**, reveals that most projects are integrated into national policies and strategies and appropriately satisfy the needs of the beneficiaries. The less favourable scores for relevance dealt with project processes which proved to be unrealistic during implementation although these inconsistencies could have been identified at the formulation stage. The scores for **effectiveness** are relatively evenly spread between B and C. Effectiveness was often impeded by various delays in the implementation, which prevented all the planned activities from being completed. The analysis of **efficiency** shows that management and internal

organisation are generally good, but that the BTC reacts too slowly to internal and external problems. The scores for **sustainability** are generally good (B score), apart from those for financial sustainability which are still limited.

	Gender	Environment	Governance
A score	3	3	3
B score	20	23	23
C score	9	5	6
D score	0	0	0

With regards the **horizontal themes**, the 'gender' scores are acceptable on the whole because several projects target a female audience. It is however regrettable that these projects had not developed a specific 'gender' approach. The 'environment' and 'governance' scores are good for 80% of the projects, but these seemingly positive results hide weaknesses in the analyses and specific procedures. In the field of governance, no cases of corruption or abuse were recorded. Efforts were made to encourage compliance with administrative and financial procedures but few initiatives specifically promote transparency and involvement.

### 6.1.2 Project cycle

**Project formulation** The technical and financial file (TFF) offer good prospects for the implementation of the project - except for several projects where the project duration is clearly too short or the objectives too great compared with the allocated budget. Some aspects, particularly the institutional analysis and the risk analysis, are not developed enough.

Delays in the project **start-up**, especially in the recruitment of personnel, baseline studies, etc. are recorded.

With regards **implementation**, the projects are often integrated into the partner organisations. The implementation of the projects is correct, but the procedures are too complex. The teams are motivated and the technical assistants (international and national) have adequate skills. However, for some projects and countries, the technical assistance was not specialised enough. Procedures (local and Belgian) that were too complex (including for the calls) impeded the project's implementation.

The **monitoring and reporting system** focuses primarily on the implementation of the activities and the expenditure realised (compared with the forecasts in the TFF). Indicators are not always SMART and quantified and baselines exist for only a few projects. The management of the projects - and their monitoring - is not focused enough on results - and does not adequately consider changes in context. The JLCB are dynamic, but deal primarily with formal administrative and financial issues and do not offer a sufficient guarantee of the correct reorientation of projects in the event of problems or changes in context.

On approaching the **end of the time dedicated to the activity**, several JLCB made decisions to revitalise the implementation of the projects, especially during extension periods of a maximum of one year (22 projects out of 32). Several projects did not implement all the activities necessary to achieve the specific objective, with consequences for the effectiveness and sustainability of all the project's benefits.

**The analysis by sector and by country type** did not allow incontrovertible conclusions to be drawn given the modest sample size. This being the case, for projects relating to infrastructure works (50% of the 32 projects), the evaluators observed significant delays in the start-up and tender procedures along with insufficient consideration of possible price rises when drafting budgets during the formulation period.

**Collaboration with partners** The projects are co-managed and generally well integrated into the partner structures and procedures.

The BTC has made significant efforts to implement the recommendations of the Paris Declaration, particularly with regards compliance and management by partner countries, but efforts still need to be made on standardisation, results-based management and shared accountability (and responsibility).

**Relationship with the DGD with regard to project monitoring** The DGD and the Attachés did not provide adequate strategic monitoring of the projects although, in several cases, the problems encountered required a strategic discussion and major adaptations to the project so as to ensure the optimum achievement of the specific objectives.

**General observation** Apart from the specific conclusions for each evaluation criterion and implementation aspect, a very important observation in this evaluation is that in over half the projects, major events (unforeseen or risks that have appeared) endangered the proper implementation of the projects as planned in the technical and financial document. **In these cases, neither the BTC, nor the JLCB were fully able to recover the situation in order to achieve the specific objective agreed between the partners. This indicates a weakness at management level and in particular in the speed of identifying and reacting to problems, within the BTC and within the local partner organisations.**

## 6.2 Recommendations taken from the analysis of the evaluation criteria

*Relevance* In addition to ensuring coherence in relation to national and Belgian sectoral policies and strategies, as well as with the priorities of the government and the decentralised structures of the partner country, the formulation should also take into account the intervention arrangements proposed in these policies and strategies and the relationship with the interventions of other TFPs. Furthermore, the intervention must be realistic in relation to the specific objectives and the results to be achieved within a set time span and with a given budget.

*Effectiveness* Based on the observation that around 40% of the projects did not have optimum effectiveness for a range of reasons (various delays in the start-up, turnover of personnel, calls, etc.), it is vital that the BTC and its partners (including the DGD) demonstrate a greater ability/commitment to react and adapt in order to ensure that, at any moment, the projects can offer the most suitable response possible to unforeseen situations (or 'risks' according to PCM terminology). The evaluators emphasise the fact that results-based management must go beyond the

availability of an appropriate internal monitoring tool. It assumes a consideration and long-term commitment to the development of a 'quality approach'. This term must be understood as a system that is used to monitor and improve quality (and therefore quickly identify risks starting to occur and implement corresponding mitigation strategies) at each of the stages and for each of the functions of the organisation that is implementing it.

*Efficiency* More realistic planning of the project inception phase, the duration of the tenders, better analysis of partner capabilities and continued efforts to optimise the use of TAs would contribute greatly to improving project efficiency. Here too, the quality approach recommended above must make it possible to improve performance. Where possible, the quality approach must be shared with the partners.

*Sustainability* The search for sustainability should begin at the formulation phase because the choice of partner and its involvement in the project seem to be key elements for this. For social projects, they must be coherent with the choice of sectoral policies in order to guarantee continued funding after the end of the project and therefore ensure the permanence of services provided to final beneficiaries (the sick, students, etc.). Projects should pay greater attention to the issue of financial sustainability and gradually phasing out dependence on external donors or the partner country's budget. Any strengthening in project ownership by the partner organisations - combined with the contributions of beneficiaries - would contribute towards better prospects for financial sustainability.

*Horizontal themes* The BTC must improve its consideration of the horizontal themes in the project's implementation and in the indicators that are used to measure the effects on these aspects. This should be done on identification by the DGD and especially during the formulation and monitoring of the implementation.

## **6.3 Recommendations in relation to the following six areas**

The recommendations are grouped together around 3 operational areas (Project preparation, Implementation and Monitoring of expected results) and 3 systemic/strategic areas (Recovering projects that have encountered major problems, Relationships with partners and DGD-BTC relationship).

### **6.3.1 Project preparation process**

The timeframes between identification and formulation and between formulation and the actual project start-up must be as short as possible while guaranteeing a good collection of information and ownership of the project by the partners. The evaluators recommend that the formulation process (and therefore the TFD) focuses more on certain key aspects such as:

- realistic specific objectives according to the available budget or vice versa;
- the time needed to launch and implement projects, particularly for infrastructure projects where the cycle is spread across several years (e.g. the production of seeds, forestry, etc.) as well as for projects where relevance is closely related to another cycle which is not necessarily concurrent with the project cycle (e.g. projects to improve the skills of elected officials) and others if relevant;

- measures to ensure the project's financial sustainability, especially to facilitate the inclusion of operating costs (e.g. social projects) in the government budget or promote a process of increasing contributions from the beneficiaries or the private sector;
- a realistic budget that takes into account price rises;
- an analysis of the various risks that could reduce the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the projects and
- put forward the steps to be taken in the event that these risks appear.

Depending on the specific nature of the projects the formulation (TFF) should correctly identify and stipulate the mode of support and the monitoring method for field actions with the beneficiaries while allowing a margin of flexibility for future project teams, so that they can adapt the project implementation to changes in context and to the evolution of the needs that should be satisfied.

Since the partner is not sufficiently involved in the formulation phase, it would be interesting to suggest to the partner government that it appoints a 'competent task force' at the start of the formulation phase as a focal point to support the formulation.

### 6.3.2 Implementation

*Start-up phase* Considering that the first 3 to 9 months of a project are a crucial period in the project's lifecycle, the evaluators believe that specific attention must be paid to this phase using a double approach: (1) Reduce the duration of the start-up phase as much as possible: anticipate the arrival of the co-manager and/or provide an office for the intervention director (electricity, internet) and one (or more depending on the size of the project) vehicle. (2) If this is not realistic, organise a more concise formulation mission and a quick start-up, but allow a period (3 to 6 months) during which the co-managers and perhaps a consultant will review the TFF in detail, define the baseline and the OVIs based on the baseline and present their roadmap to the JLCB on the methods of achieving the Specific Objective: timetable, activities, results and thus the monitoring/evaluation system through which it can be evaluated. During this period, additional feasibility and impact studies (environmental impact studies) can be conducted, along with any training of partners and with gaining more knowledge about the environment/ownership.

The evaluation did not provide an in depth analysis of the internal operation of the BTC and cannot therefore make recommendations based on this subject, except on a few key aspects for the project implementation:

*Administrative and financial procedures* The evaluation mission recommends that the Belgian Government and the BTC headquarters analyses how to simplify and improve the control chain in order to facilitate the operational project implementation. This should facilitate the move towards management based on operational results rather than financial ones.

*Tenders* The evaluators recommend continuing efforts to conform with the tender procedures of partner countries, despite the delays that this may cause. Additional procedures on the BTC side must be limited and tenderers' abilities and specific technical aspects must be considered more fully when drafting calls.

*National and international technical assistants* Given the need for more specialist technical assistance and the fact that the permanent TAs spend a great deal of their time on administrative and financial issues, proposals are made to:

- provide for state-of-the-art technical assistance for most projects through short project training/coaching/support assignments - or 'intermittent' technical assistance, particularly for infrastructure projects.
- retain permanent technical assistants in institutional support projects or projects that aim specifically to improve partner skills, or 'soft' projects
- also retain permanent technical assistance in fragile countries where the national administration presents weaknesses and where the private sector and civil society are less developed.

For implementation, the aspects to be improved concern:

- The adaptation of aid arrangements to the institutional context which has an increasingly multi-actor nature
- More detailed discussions on the possibilities of evaluating the BTC's contribution to the success of projects, but in a multi-actor dynamic, with the BTC responsible for the efforts to be made - and a partner to support (!) in order to ensure the success of projects.
- The adaptation of the administrative and financial procedures to the institutional capacity of the countries and partners in fragile countries

The evaluators observe that the support from the Technical and Sectoral Expertise Department is a real requirement in a good number of projects. Regular visits are needed to ensure smooth implementation.

*End of project* It must be possible to request an extension once it becomes clear that the project cannot be performed within the proposed timeframe. A longer extension period (e.g. 2 years) should be possible - possibly with an increase in the budget provided that the conditions for the project's success are guaranteed. The project exit strategies must be developed in order to give the recipient administration a roadmap for the project's continuation and therefore a clear framework within which further support can be mobilised.

*Building on* experience must be improved: the important tools developed or used within the scope of a project could be included in the appendix of the final report

### *Specific recommendations for infrastructure projects*

Insofar as half the projects evaluated in 2011 covered infrastructure works, the following recommendations seem appropriate:

- In the TFF, plan for price rises according to predicted inflation and include specific clauses on the adjustment of prices for construction materials in the Specific Agreements and the Implementation Agreements;
- Ensure that the selection of subcontractors takes into account their genuine capacity to complete the works;
- Adapt the implementation timetables to the delays in the project start-up;
- Negotiate the option for a budget increase and project extension with partners (DGD and partner State), so as to be able to complete the final project stages such as the finishing of buildings and the purchase of furniture and equipment;

- Allow for the possibility of an intervention by the BTC or other organisation during the structure guarantee period (one year after provisional acceptance of the works) in case of problems;
- Combine the logical framework with a detailed planning for the construction works (including the surveys) which takes into account the actual timeframes for the public procurement procedures (e.g. PERT programme) from the project start-up.

In some countries, the management of all infrastructure 'projects' of this type - surveys, launch of tenders, awarding of contracts (in compliance with procedures), supervision of works, progress reports, etc. - could also be assigned to a qualified private operator (engineering consultants or architects firm) recruited through the tender procedure. The BTC's role would then be limited to monitoring progress and disbursements. A co-manager could be appointed by the BTC, who would handle several projects and monitor the projects.

*Specific recommendation for fragile countries* The evaluators propose a dual strategy: (1) government capacity building through the creation of a suitable framework for the development of the sector in question and the monitoring of project activities and other development partners (2) the direct implementation of projects in the field, preferably with local organisations in order to ensure the sustainability of the project benefits.

### 6.3.3 Monitoring of expected results

Given that effectiveness is difficult to analyse and demonstrate due to a lack of SMART and baseline indicators, the evaluators recommend that a results-based monitoring/evaluation management system is set up and that this system is used primarily as a project management tool, especially the implementation of a '**quality**' approach.

All the relevant actors must be concerned with collecting monitoring data, its interpretation and potential follow-up and the subsequent learning process. Suitable training courses on project cycle management and logical frameworks must be planned for certain projects.

**JLCB** The role and mandate of the JLCB as a strategic steering committee responsible for monitoring the project results should be reviewed. The JLCB is still the best structure for the **strategic supervision of the projects**. Its mandate, role and composition (involvement of the DGD) must be reviewed so that it can ensure the optimum project implementation. To do so, it must have more information about the project challenges and problems.

The **objectively verifiable indicators** must be SMART and quantified and gender-specific where applicable.

A **revision of the logical frameworks** must be planned during the project implementation, particularly based on the conclusions of the mid-term evaluations (if they are shared) and decisions made during the JLCB (decisions that affect the logical framework). The logical framework then becomes the basic steering tool for a project.

**Mid-term and final evaluations** It should be ensured that (i) sufficient resources are available for the mid-term evaluations (to be included in the project's budget governed by - or to be funded from the formulation/evaluation funds) by persons



external to the BTC and the local partner; (ii) this 'warning' function should be better integrated into the project management.

#### 6.3.4 Recovering projects that have encountered major problems

Based on the observation that project effectiveness and efficiency were often impeded by delays or practical problems, it is vital that the BTC improves its **response capacity**: the BTC must act much more quickly in the event of problems and in line with its partners. Problems and solutions must be identified more quickly and decisions must be made rapidly to put the project back on track. This is a clear and distinct responsibility of both parties within the scope of the co-management system.

Improving the response capacity starts with the formulation, through a risk analysis and more importantly the identification of more advanced mitigation strategies. It continues with more thorough and regular monitoring and a more intensive use of the existing tools. It is improved by developing a 'quality approach', where all actors are responsible for the quality and therefore of the performance at their level, with clearly established roles and responsibilities.

#### 6.3.5 Relationships with partners

The evaluators recommend continuing efforts regarding the **co-management** which is a good system because it offers enough flexibility and gives the partners a sense of responsibility. The options for improving this shared responsibility must however be further explored.

**Stricter financial and administrative procedures in receiving countries** In order to move towards greater involvement and accountability of local partners in project implementation, it seems important to ensure that local partners comply with the same strict measures in relation to expenditure justification. In the event of a serious problem in the management of financial resources by the partner, measures must be taken to make the collaboration arrangements stricter, even if that risks being difficult from a political point of view.

**Institutional support** The evaluators highlight the importance of this institutional support and the need to adapt the support and monitoring system to this type of intervention so as to be able to improve the monitoring of the effect of this type of intervention and for better identification of the BTC's contribution to the change process within partner institutions.

#### 6.3.6 DGD-BTC relationship around the strategic orientation of projects

The DGD (mainly via the attachés) and the BTC (both via the TSE department and the national office) should be concerned with the strategic direction. Consequently, the attachés must be able to provide strategic (and not operational) monitoring for the projects. The evaluators recommend promoting increased co-operation between the 2 institutions (in Brussels and in the field) in a bid to optimise the development process - and the project/programme cycle, in particular:

- Better consideration of the lessons of current and previous projects in the identification and formulation phase;
- Within the sectors selected by the ICP, a discussion on the specific intervention areas (sub-sectors, regions, level of intervention or specific target audience) of Belgian development co-operation;
- The participation of attachés in JLCB meetings. Their role is not to intervene in the daily management of the projects, but to safeguard the achievement of the specific objectives and the project's strategic discussion;
- Approval of the ToR and conclusions of the mid-term and final evaluation missions of Belgian development co-operation (and partners) by the attachés.

This co-operation is particularly important in projects of the following nature:

- Projects that need a strategic discussion about their future because important risks have appeared that endanger the smooth implementation of the projects;
- Projects where JLCB members are involved as direct beneficiaries and where they have personal interests in the project's completion;
- Projects where coordination with the other donors - and the national partner - helps to avoid counter-productive approaches and/or a political dialogue is necessary;
- Projects/sectors that are covered by the next Indicative Co-operation Programme (ICP) in order to use the experience acquired from current projects in this sector.



## Annex 1: List of projects and timing of the missions. Workplan

Mission Nb	Project number	Country	Title intervention	International Expert	National Expert	Mission start date	Mission end date	DGD code	BTC code
1	27	Tanzania	Development and Improvement of Processing, Packing and Marketing of Beewax and other Bee products in Tanzania	Gerda Heyde	Sekumbo Justin	21-Aug	29-Aug	20022/11	TAN0401311
2	30	Vietnam	Vietnam – Belgium Training Facilities	Jozef Embrecht	Vuong Thanh Huong	20-Aug	04-Sep	3000475	VIE0402711
2	31	Vietnam	Construction of an irrigation network and reservoir to increase the agricultural production in Ninh Phuoc district, Ninh Thuan province	Jozef Embrecht	Vuong Thanh Huong	20-Aug	04-Sep	3002773	VIE0402111
3	12	DRC	Appui au désensablement du Port de Kalemie	Matteo Scaramella	Pierre Tshimbumbu	14-Nov	23-Nov	3004568	RDC0812411
3	10	DRC	Remise en Etat du Chemin de Fer Urbain et Amélioration de la Mobilité à Kinshasa	Matteo Scaramella	Pierre Tshimbumbu	14-Nov	23-Nov	3004368	RDC0709011

Mission Nb	Project number	Country	Title intervention	International Expert	National Expert	Mission start date	Mission end date	DGD code	BTC code
4	11	DRC	Programme d'entretien et de réhabilitation des routes de dessertes agricoles II - (Bandundu)	Philippe Lothe	Tshibumbu Katende	07-Oct	28-Oct	3004506	RDC0711211
4	9	DRC	Programme pilote de réhabilitation et de développement des systèmes d'approvisionnement en eau potable et d'assainissement en RDC	Philippe Lothe	Tshibumbu Katende	07-Oct	28-Oct	3000520	RDC0504311
5	14	Morocco	Espace multifonctionnel des femmes	Claire Leloup	Affane Mohammed Najib	11-Sep	17-Sep	19428/11	MOR/02/06P
6	4	Burundi	Appui ponctuel au fonctionnement du Parlement du Burundi	Gerda Heyde	Hatorimana Terence	01-Oct	7-Oct	3001963 en 19699/11	BDI0401911
7	7	Burundi	Appui et relance du secteur semencier au Burundi	Michel Schepens	Remy Nsengiyumva	19-Oct	5-Nov	3002769	BDI0603011
7	5	Burundi	Appui Institutionnel à l'Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Burundi (ISABU)	Michel Schepens	Remy Nsengiyumva	19-Oct	5-Nov	3004517	BDI0704311
7	6	Burundi	Appui à la réhabilitation de l'hôpital Prince Régent Charles	Michel Schepens	Remy Nsengiyumva	19-Oct	5-Nov	3004245	BDI0703611
8	23	Rwanda	Accès à l'électricité pour les populations rurales à travers les énergies renouvelables	Michel Schepens	Leon Kamanzi	12-Nov	26-Nov	3004548	RWA0705511

Mission Nb	Project number	Country	Title intervention	International Expert	National Expert	Mission start date	Mission end date	DGD code	BTC code
8	19	Rwanda	Amélioration de l'accès paysan au matériel de plantation de qualité pour racines, tubercules et espèces fruitières	Michel Schepens	Leon Kamanzi	12-Nov	26-Nov	3003085	RWA0604711
8	20	Rwanda	Développement des systèmes de lutte intégrée contre les maladies et ravageurs de cultures	Michel Schepens	Leon Kamanzi	12-Nov	26-Nov	3003104	RWA0604811
9	24	Rwanda	Programme d'appui aux infrastructures de formation dans le domaine de la santé à l'UNR du Rwanda – Appui supplémentaire	Philippe Loth (avec contribution d'Eric Donelli)	Fiacre Kamanzi	04-Oct	10- Oct	3003167	RWA0604612
9	22	Rwanda	Programme d'appui aux infrastructures de formation dans le domaine de la santé à l'Université Nationale du Rwanda (PAIFDS)	Philippe (avec contribution d'Eric Donelli)	Fiacre Kamanzi	04-Oct	10-Oct	3002762	RWA0604611
9	25	Rwanda	Reconstruction de l'hôpital de Bushenge - phase II	Philippe Lothe	Fiacre Kamanzi	29-Oct	04-Nov	3006079	RWA0806112
9	18	Rwanda	Appui à la reforestation au RWA (PAREF I)	Philippe Lothe	Leon Kamanzi	28-Oct	7-Nov	3003082	RWA0604311
10	16	Niger	Appui au Programme d'Hydrauliques et Pastorale dans la Région de Dosso (PHVP)	Claire Leloup	Idrissa Moussa	25-Sep	03-Oct	19736/11	NER0501611
11	1	Algeria	Projet intégré de santé publique à Tamanrasset (TAM I)	Eric Donelli	Non applicable	19-Oct	31- Oct	19608/11	ALG0400911

Mission Nb	Project number	Country	Title intervention	International Expert	National Expert	Mission start date	Mission end date	DGD code	BTC code
11	2	Algeria	Extension du Projet intégré de santé publique dans le wilaya de Tamanrasset II	Eric Donelli	Non applicable	19-Oct	31- Oct	3002445	ALG0601711
12	8	DRC	Appui au système législatif en RDC: volet assemblées provinciales	Claire Leloup	Roger Lumumba	08-Oct	18-Oct	3004380	RDC0708612
13	3	Algeria	Appui technique aux centres de formation et de perfectionnement aux métiers de l'eau	Philippe Lothe	Saddek Mammeria	27-Nov	02-Dec	19604/11	ALG0400811
14	17	Peru	Programme de Prévention de la Consommation de Drogues et de Réhabilitation des Toxicomanes Phase II	Maria Navarro	Rosa Dierna	22-Oct	29-Oct	3003295	PER0601111
15	32	Vietnam	Strengthening the Textile and Research institute's capacity of conducting research, training and experimental development of textile techniques, phase II	Sophie Papalexiou	Vuong Thanh Huong	28-Nov	08-Dec	3004014	VIE0402911
15	33	Vietnam	Public administration reform and roll out of the comprehensive poverty reduction and growth strategy (CPRGS) in Hau Giang province, phase 2 (PARROC)	Sophie Papalexiou	Vuong Thanh Huong	28-Nov	08-Dec	3001776	VIE0403011
16	21	Rwanda	Appui au programme national de santé mentale – phase II	Eric Donelli	Fiacre Kamanzi	1-Oct	10-Oct	3002177 - 18345/12	RWA0403112

Mission Nb	Project number	Country	Title intervention	International Expert	National Expert	Mission start date	Mission end date	DGD code	BTC code
17	28	Tanzania	The construction and enhancement of Inland Container Stations in Ilala, Shinyanga and Mwanza South	Philippe Lothe	Sekumbo Justin	17-Nov	23-Nov	3000524/11	TAN0401411
18	26	Senegal	Appui au Réseau des Mutuelles d'Épargne et de Crédit des Niayes (REMEC-NIAYES)	Gerda Heyde	Abdoulaye Kane	14-Nov	21-Nov	3002497	SEN0601311
19	29	Uganda	The Rehabilitation and Expansion of Sir Samuel Baker School in Gulu District	Matteo Scaramella	Henri Mukisa	09-Oct	17-Oct	3003195	UGA0601111
20	13	Mali	Appui en expertise au Programme d'appui au Développement socio-sanitaire	Eric Donelli	Ndiaye Maimouna	02-Nov	06-Nov	3007616	MLI0903011





## Annex 2: Evaluation framework BTC

Evaluation framework BTC-evaluation 2011					
<b>1. GENERAL INFORMATION</b>					
Project title :					
Country:					
DGDC intervention number:					
Navision code BTC project execution:					
Partner institution:					
Duration of Specific Agreement:					
Provisional starting date:					
Provisional end date:					
Total Budget:					
Belgian contribution:					
Partner contribution:					
Intervention sector:					
Report number :					
Name evaluator :					
Date of report :					
<b>1. PROJECT DESCRIPTION</b>					
(Background, main objectives, expected results, main stakeholders...)					
<b>2. GRADING PER CRITERIA</b>					
Judgement criteria	Grading				
Relevance	a				
Effectiveness	b				
Efficiency	d				
Sustainability	a				
a=4 (very good)	b=3 (reasonable)	c=2 (with)	d=1 (very)		

Evaluation framework BTC-evaluation 2011						
1. RELEVANCE						
<b>Project title :</b>						
<b>BTC Project code :</b>		<b>Report number :</b>		<b>Date :</b>		
<b>DGD Project code :</b>		<b>Name evaluator :</b>				
<b>Judgement criteria</b>	a=4	b=3	c=2	d=1		
<b>1.1 The formulation of the intervention is linked to the development objectives and strategies of the partner country</b>					<b>Weight</b>	<b>30%</b>
<i>Were the formulation documents made in a participatory way with the partner structures ?</i>  <i>Do the formulation documents reflect the policy choices and preferences of the partner structures ?</i>						
<b>1.2 The formulated activities and results answer the needs of the beneficiaries</b>					<b>Weight</b>	<b>40%</b>
<i>Was there a stakeholder analysis of the beneficiaries ?</i>  <i>Were the formulation documents made in a participatory way with the stakeholders and the partner structures ?</i>  <i>Will the achievement of the planned results improve the situation of the beneficiaries ?</i>						
<b>1.3 The intervention logic can realistically be implemented</b>					<b>Weight</b>	<b>30%</b>
<i>The succession of activities and results in the intervention logic is realistic</i>  <i>Was a risk analysis done in which real risks are identified ?</i>  <i>Were the target values of the indicators determined on the basis of data (such as baseline data, benchmarking data, lessons learned from similar interventions) ?</i>						
<b>Key : a = very good ; b = reasonable ; c = with difficulties ; d = very problematic</b>		<b>General judgement :</b>		<b>4,00</b>	<b>a</b>	
<b>Remarkably good or bad practices can be described in the sheet "Learning opportunities"</b>						
<b>Have there been external factors influencing the services of the BTC positively or negatively?</b>						

Evaluation framework BTC-evaluation 2011						
2. EFFECTIVENESS						
<b>Project title :</b>						
<b>BTC Project code :</b>		<b>Report number :</b>		<b>Date :</b>		
<b>DGD Project code :</b>		<b>Name evaluator :</b>	0			
<b>Judgement criteria</b>	a=4	b=3	c=2	d=1		
<b>2.1 The outputs of the intervention are achieved</b>					<b>Weight</b>	<b>30%</b>
<i>Are the results achieved according to plan ?</i>  <i>Can the results be measured on the basis of SMART indicators ?</i>						
<b>2.2 The outcomes are achieved (= the specific objective)</b>					<b>Weight</b>	<b>40%</b>
<i>Is the specific objective achieved according to plan ?</i>  <i>Have the outputs contributed to the achievement of the specific objective ?</i>  <i>Can the achievement of the specific objective be measured on the basis of SMART indicators ?</i>						
<b>2.3 BTC managed the intervention in a results based fashion</b>					<b>Weight</b>	<b>30%</b>
<i>Are the objectives and indicators SMART ?</i>  <i>Was a monitoring system used to measure progress and to redirect the intervention (if necessary) ?</i>  <i>Were the constations and recommendations of the mid-term evaluation used to redirect the intervention (if necessary) ?</i>  <i>Were the existing consultation structures used appropriately to redirect the intervention ?</i>						
<b>Key : a = very good ; b = reasonable ; c = with difficulties ; d = very problematic</b>			<b>General judgement :</b>		2,60	<b>b</b>
<b>Remarkably good or bad practices can be described in the sheet "Learning opportunities"</b>						
<b>Have there been external factors influencing the services of the BTC positively or negatively?</b>						

Evaluation framework BTC-evaluation 2011						
<b>3. EFFICIENCY</b>						
<b>Project title :</b>						
<b>BTC Project code :</b>		<b>Report number :</b>		<b>Date :</b>		
<b>DGD Project code :</b>		<b>Name evaluator :</b>				
<b>Judgement criteria</b>	<b>a=4</b>	<b>b=3</b>	<b>c=2</b>	<b>d=1</b>		
<b>3.1 There were no delays in the planning</b>					<b>Weight</b>	<b>30%</b>
<i>Was the budget spent according to plan ?</i>  <i>Were the activities executed according to plan ?</i>						
<b>3.2 The ratio between results and inputs is acceptable</b>					<b>Weight</b>	<b>40%</b>
<i>Is the ratio between outputs and inputs acceptable ?</i>  <i>Is the ratio between outcomes and inputs acceptable ?</i>  <i>Is the choice for the type and amount of technical assistance motivated and acceptable ?</i>						
<b>3.3 BTC managed the means efficiently</b>					<b>Weight</b>	<b>30%</b>
<i>Were problems with the planned managed adequately ?</i>  <i>Was existing capacity used instead of external expertise ?</i>						
<b>Key : a = very good ; b = reasonable ; c = with difficulties ; d = very problematic</b>		<b>General judgement :</b>		<b>1,00</b>	<b>d</b>	
<b>Remarkably good or bad practices can be described in the sheet "Learning opportunities"</b>						
<b>Have there been external factors influencing the services of the BTC positively or negatively?</b>						

Evaluation framework BTC-evaluation 2011						
4. SUSTAINABILITY						
Project title :						
BTC Project code :		Report number :		Date :		
DGD Project code :		Name evaluator :		0		
Judgement criteria	a=4	b=3	c=2	d=1		
<b>4.1 The achieved results are anchored in the local structures</b>					Weight	25%
<p>Were the results achieved in collaboration with the local structures which are responsible for the future management ?</p> <p>Was the BTC expertise that was needed to achieve the results transferred to the local structures ?</p>						
<b>4.2 There is a financial exit strategy</b>					Weight	25%
<p>Did BTC think about which means will be necessary to sustain the results ?</p> <p>Did BTC help the partner structure to think of ways of finding means for the period after the project (eg. for maintenance costs) ?</p>						
<b>4.3 There is support from the political and strategic level</b>					Weight	25%
<p>Do the achieved results contribute to the development objectives of the partner structure ?</p> <p>Did BTC associate the political and strategic level enough and inform it of the importance of the intervention ?</p>						
<b>4.4 The beneficiaries have ownership of the results</b>					Weight	25%
<p>Are the beneficiaries satisfied with the results of the intervention ?</p> <p>Are there initiatives of the beneficiaries to further continue the results and/or to maintain them ?</p> <p>Were the beneficiaries associated to the intervention ?</p>						
Key : a = very good ; b = reasonable ; c = with difficulties ; d = very problematic			General judgement :		3,75	a
Remarkably good or bad practices can be described in the sheet "Learning opportunities"						
Have there been external factors influencing the services of the BTC positively or negatively?						

Evaluation framework BTC-evaluation 2011					
5. HORIZONTAL THEMES					
Project title :					
BTC project code :		Number report :		Date :	
DGD project code :		Name evaluator :			
The scores of these criteria are to be treated separately and should not be weighted and added up to have a general judgement					
Judgement criteria	a=4	b=3	c=2	d=1	N/A
<b>5.1 Gender is mainstreamed in the intervention</b>					
<p>Were possibilities looked for during the formulation to integrate gender in the intervention ?</p> <p>Are there gender specific indicators ?</p> <p>Were gender specific themes reported on ?</p>					
<b>5.2 The intervention follows an environmentally friendly approach</b>					
<p>Were possibilities looked for during the formulation to implement the intervention as environmentally friendly as possible ?</p> <p>Are there environment specific indicators ?</p> <p>Were environment themes reported on ?</p>					
<b>5.3 The intervention promotes good governance</b>					
<p>Was there an anti-corruption monitoring instrument ?</p> <p>Were cases of corruption reported to the authorities ?</p> <p>Were measures taken in cases of abuse ?</p>					
Remarkably good or bad practices can be described in the sheet "Learning opportunities"					

Evaluation framework BTC-evaluation 2011				
<b>6. LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES</b>				
<b>Project title :</b>				
<b>BTC Project code :</b>		<b>Report number :</b>		<b>Date :</b>
<b>DGD Project code :</b>		<b>Name evaluator :</b>		0
<b>Opportunities to draw lessons</b>				
<p><i>Are there learning opportunities in this intervention? If yes, describe them and indicate how you would use this opportunity. The following questions can help to identify learning opportunities :</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Are there good/bad practices from which can be learned. Can these lessons be generalised ?</i></li> <li>- <i>Were there methodologies which worked remarkably well or badly ?</i></li> <li>- <i>Were there sociocultural elements in the approach which worked remarkably well or badly?</i></li> <li>- <i>Were there innovative practices which can be repeated ?</i></li> <li>- <i>Have you identified subjects that you would recommend for further study? For which reason ?</i></li> </ul>				





## **Annex 3: List of scores awarded to the projects based on the evaluation framework**

## Annex 3: List of scores awarded to the projects based on the evaluation framework

Projets			Overall Grades					Overall Grades				Relevance			Effectiveness			Efficacité			Sustainability				Horizontal		
title	DGD code	BTC code	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficacité	Sustainability	Category	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficacité	Sustainability	30%	40%	30%	30%	40%	30%	30%	40%	30%	25%	25%	25%	25%	na	na	na
Development and Improvement of Processing, Packing and Marketing of Beew ax and other Bee products in Tanzania	20022/11	TAN04013 11	a	b	b	b	1	4	3	3	3	a	a	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	a	c	b	b	c	a	b
Vietnam – Belgium training facilities	3000475	VIE04027 11	b	c	a	b	2	3	2	4	3	a	b	b	b	c	c	a	b	a	a	b	b	b	b	b	c
Construction of an irrigation network and reservoir to increase the agricultural production in Ninh Phuoc district, Ninh Thuan province	3002773	VIE04021 11	a	c	c	b	2	4	2	2	3	a	a	b	c	c	b	d	c	b	a	b	a	b	c	c	b
Espace multifonctionnel des femmes	19428/11	MOR/02/0 6P	b	d	d	c	3	3	1	1	2	a	b	c	d	c	d	d	c	d	c	d	d	b	b	n/a	c
Appui au Programme d'Hydrauliques et Pastorale dans la Région de Dosso (PHVP)	19736/11	NER05016 11	a	a	a	b	1	4	4	4	3	a	a	b	a	a	b	a	b	a	a	b	a	b	b	a	b
Appui ponctuel au fonctionnement du Parlement du Burundi	3001963 en 1969/11	BDI04019 11	a	b	b	b	1	4	3	3	3	a	a	b	b	b	b	c	b	b	b	c	b	b	c	b	c
Appui au programme national de santé mentale – phase II	3002177 - 18345/12	RWA0403 112	b	b	b	b	1	3	3	3	4	a	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	a	b	b	a	b	b	b
The Rehabilitation and Expansion of Sir Samuel Baker School in Gulu District	3003195	UGA0601 111	b	b	b	b	2	3	3	3	3	a	a	c	c	b	b	b	a	b	a	c	a	a	b	c	b
Appui au système législatif en RDC: volet assemblées provinciales	3004380	RDC07086 12	a	b	b	c	2	4	3	2	2	a	a	b	b	b	c	c	b	b	c	c	b	c	c	c	b
Programme d'appui aux infrastructures de formation dans le domaine de la santé à l'Université Nationale du Rwanda (PAIFDS)	3002762	RWA0604 611	b	c	c	b	3	2	2	2	3	b	b	c	c	c	c	d	b	c	c	b	b	b	b	b	b
Programme d'appui aux infrastructures de formation dans le domaine de la santé à l'UNR du Rwanda – Appui supplémentaire	3003167	RWA0604 612	b	c	c	b	3	2	2	2	3	b	b	c	c	c	c	d	b	c	c	b	b	b	b	b	b
Appui à la réhabilitation de l'hôpital Prince Régent Charles	3004245	BDI07036 11	b	b	b	b	1	3	2	3	2	b	a	b	b	c	b	b	b	b	b	c	b	b	b	b	b
Appui Institutionnel à l'Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Burundi (ISABU)	3004517	BDI07043 11	b	c	b	c	2	3	2	3	2	a	a	c	c	c	b	c	b	b	b	c	d	b	c	b	b
Appui et relance du secteur semencier au Burundi	3002769	BDI06030 11	c	c	b	c	3	2	2	3	2	b	c	c	c	c	c	b	b	b	c	c	c	b	c	b	b
Programme pilote de réhabilitation et de développement des systèmes d'approvisionnement en eau potable et d'assainissement en RDC - AEP	3000520	RDC05043 11	b	b	c	b	2	3	3	2	4	b	b	c	b	b	b	c	b	c	a	b	b	a	a	b	a

## Annex 3: List of scores awarded to the projects based on the evaluation framework

Projets			Overall Grades					Overall Grades				Relevance			Effectiveness			Efficacité			Sustainability				Horizontal		
title	DGD code	BTC code	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficacité	Sustainability	Category	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficacité	Sustainability	1.1	1.2	1.3	2.1	2.2	2.3	3.1	3.2	3.3	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	Gender	Environment	Governance
Appui en expertise au Programme d'appui au Développement socio-sanitaire EA-PADSS	3007616	MLI0903011	b	b	a	b	1	3	3	4	3	a	b	b	b	b	a	a	b	a	c	b	b	b	b	b	a
Appui à la reforestation au RWA (PAREF I)	3003082	RWA0604311	b	c	c	c	3	3	2	2	2	a	b	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	d	c	c	c	c	b
Programme de Prévention de la Consommation de Drogues et de Réhabilitation des Toxicomanes Phase II - DEVIDA	3003295	PER0601111	b	b	b	a	1	3	3	3	4	a	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	a	a	a	a	b	c	b	b
Reconstruction de l'hôpital de Bushenge - phase II	3006079	RWA0806112	b	b	b	a	1	3	3	3	4	b	b	b	b	b	c	b	b	b	a	b	a	a	b	b	b
Programme d'entretien et de réhabilitation des routes de dessertes agricoles II - (Bandundu)-PREPICO 2	3004506	RDC0711211	b	b	b	c	2	3	3	3	2	b	b	b	a	b	c	b	b	b	b	c	c	b	b	b	c
Appui au Réseau des Mutuelles d'Épargne et de Crédit des Niayes (REMEC-NIAYES)	3002497	SEN0601311	a	c	b	c	2	4	2	3	2	a	a	b	b	c	c	b	c	b	b	c	b	c	b	b	c
The construction and enhancement of Inland Container Stations in Ilala, Shinyanga and Mwanza South	3000524/11	TAN0401411	b	c	c	b	2	3	2	2	3	b	b	c	c	c	b	d	b	b	b	b	b	a	b	b	c
Projet intégré de santé publique à Tamanrasset (TAM I)	19608/11	ALG0400911	a	b	a	b	1	4	3	4	3	a	a	b	b	b	b	b	a	a	b	b	b	b	a	b	b
Appui au désensablement du Port de Kalemie	3004568	RDC0812411	b	c	b	c	2	3	2	3	2	b	b	c	c	b	c	c	b	b	b	c	c	b	b	c	b
Extension du Projet intégré de santé publique dans le wilaya de Tamanrasset II	3002445	ALG0601711	a	b	a	b	1	4	3	4	3	a	a	b	b	b	b	b	a	a	a	b	b	a	a	b	b
Amélioration de l'accès paysan au matériel de plantation de qualité pour racines, tubercules et espèces fruitières R & T	3003085	RWA0604711	c	c	c	c	3	2	2	2	2	b	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	b	c	b	c	c	b	b
Accès à l'électricité pour les populations rurales à travers les énergies renouvelables	3004548	RWA0705511	a	b	b	b	2	3	3	3	3	b	a	a	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	a	b	b	b	b
Développement des systèmes de lutte intégrée contre les maladies et ravageurs de cultures (IPM)	3003104	RWA0604811	b	b	b	a	1	3	3	3	4	b	b	a	b	a	b	b	b	b	a	b	a	a	b	a	b
Appui technique aux centres de formation et de perfectionnement aux métiers de l'eau	19604/11	ALG0400811	b	c	b	b	2	3	3	3	4	a	b	b	c	c	b	b	b	b	b	a	b	b	b	b	b
Public administration reform and roll out of the comprehensive poverty reduction and growth strategy (CPRGS) in Hau Giang province, phase 2 (PARROC)	3001776	VIE0403011	b	b	b	b	2	3	3	3	3	b	b	a	b	b	b	b	a	b	b	b	a	b	b	b	b
Strengthening the Textile and Research institute's capacity of conducting research, training and experimental development of textile techniques, phase II	3004014	VIE0402911	b	b	a	b	1	3	3	4	3	b	b	b	b	b	c	a	a	b	a	b	b	a	b	b	b
Remise en Etat du Chemin de Fer Urbain et Amélioration de la Mobilité à Kinshasa	3004368	RDC0709011	b	b	b	b	3	3	3	3	3	b	b	c	c	b	b	c	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	a



## **Annex 4: List with the people met for the preparation of the Synthesis Report**

Name	Organisation - Fonction
Olivier Thery	Office of the Special Evaluator S4
Ivo Hooghe	Office of the Special Evaluator S4
Marc Denys	DGD-D1- Director Bilateral cooperation
Sophie De Groote	DGD-D0.1 Advisor
Mario Goethals	BTC - Director Operations
Paul Verle	BTC - Director Departement technical and sectoral Expertise
Rudy Poulussen	BTC - Departement thematic and sectoral Expertise - Formulations
Christophe Maréchal	BTC - Director organisational Development
Myriam Van Parijs	BTC - Expert Monitoring & Evaluation

PS: People met during the different field missions are mentioned in the related Evaluation Framework for the respective mission



## The management response of the BTC

BTC received this evaluation with great interest. Ensuring and continuously improving the quality of our performance is an everyday concern, both in the field as well as at our headquarters. This evaluation also allows the quality of our performance to be examined objectively.

As the evaluation shows, the challenges in the development cooperation sector are countless. The sector has evolved considerably over the last decade as a result of cooperation modalities since the Paris Declaration and a changed context in the donor landscape; the challenges in partner countries remain high and the pressure to achieve results is ubiquitous. Within this changed context, BTC strives to continue to evolve as an organisation so that it can meet the requirements of its donors and partners as best as possible. With this in mind, we have taken many initiatives in recent years to guarantee the quality of our organisation's operations and of our activities in a sustainable manner. Developing a results-oriented strategy and establishing a system to monitor performance related to development results to which the BTC contributes, as well as the quality of the services provided and the satisfaction of external stakeholders related to these services, are key. Examples of actions taken in this context include obtaining ISO 9001 certification, reviewing the M & E system and improving M & E skills in the field, developing a "tool" to be able to manage the risks per country as a whole and conducting a satisfaction survey<sup>48</sup> related to the support that BTC offers in achieving development results, etc. With regard to the satisfaction survey, there are a number of parallels between the conclusions drawn by this evaluation and those drawn by the survey, particularly with regard to the support for risk management and supply of reliable information concerning the extent to which development results are achieved. For other points, e.g. the involvement of the partners in the formulation phase or even the transversal themes, the conclusions are contradictory. These must therefore be handled with the necessary caution.

Given that the improvement initiatives mainly took place at BTC headquarters and considering the evaluation sample consisted entirely of activities that were concluded in 2011 (or the beginning of 2012), it is impossible to fully evaluate the effects of all these changes at intervention level. This takes time. However, there are some positive signs. Furthermore, it is also true that the evaluation describes elements of the formulation and implementation phases as they were then, rather than how they are currently managed. This is inherent to the methodology and characteristics of the sample used for this evaluation. As the evaluators themselves indicate, the conclusions drawn by this evaluation must be placed in the right context as they

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<sup>48</sup> The satisfaction survey was carried out in association with the FPS P&O by the attachés and partners in 17 partner countries. The complete results are available from the Organisational Development Office (do@btcctb.org).



apply to the group of 32 assessed interventions and cannot be generalised to BTC's entire portfolio or therefore to BTC's performance. Given the increasing complexity of the activities, there is also the issue of attribution, whereby (un)achieved results cannot be automatically attributed to the quality of the performance of a single actor. Nevertheless, we conclude that all the recommendations are already being implemented. Most recommendations transcend BTC's level and are being handled at the political-strategic level. We are rather hesitant with regard to some of the recommendations. Though we recognise that the issue must be dealt with, we believe that the aspect needs further analysis before actually committing to a recommendation (A10-11).

This evaluation confirms our intention to continue on this path. Together with our donors, we want to support partners in a sustainable manner to achieve development results.

## 1. Recommendations based on the evaluation criteria

### Recommendation A1 Relevance

In addition to ensuring consistency with regard to national policy and strategies and those of Belgium, it is also important during the formulation phase to take account of the priorities of the partner country's government and decentralised structures as well as of the intervention modalities proposed in local policies and the alignment of interventions by other donors. Furthermore, the interventions must be more realistic in terms of specific objectives and results that must be achieved within a certain timeframe and with the available resources (as determined in the identification phase).

### BTC's response

In agreement - Being implemented

BTC supports this recommendation. Developing realistic interventions that are consistent with the policy and strategies of the partner as well as with Belgium is a complex process that is spread over various phases of the intervention cycle. The formulation phase and the beginning of the implementation phase represent the last stages in this process. In fact, establishing the basic characteristics for an intervention, including specific objectives, budget and timescale, originates in the preceding phases with the ISP and subsequently the identification sheet. Furthermore, even though it is theoretically possible, experience shows that it is difficult to return to preceding, already completed decision-making processes. Sustainable progress can therefore only be achieved by means of a joint approach by the DGD (Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid) and BTC. This issue is also part of the discussions related to the 4th Management Contract. With regard to alignment with other donors, the agreements made in Busan concerning "joint programming" must also provide a solution to this over time. BTC will do the necessary to implement and support the concrete agreements that will be made at the Belgian level and at the international level.

In terms of relevance, it is still interesting to complement the conclusions drawn by the evaluation with a statement from the satisfaction survey that demonstrates that the partners are satisfied with the information that BTC supplies on the link between development results, context, resources and modalities.

### **Recommendation A2 - Effectiveness**

Given that almost 40% of the projects do not score favourably for various reasons (delay at the start, changes in personnel, public procurement), it is vital that BTC and its partners (as well as the DGD) demonstrate greater responsiveness and capacity to adapt so that the projects can provide an adequate response at all times. The evaluators stress that results-oriented management goes further than establishing an internal monitoring system. It also involves consideration for and long-term commitment to developing a "quality approach". This means that a system must be developed that allows for an improvement in quality - in every phase and for each function of the organisation - more specifically by identifying the risks more quickly and developing targeted strategies.

### **BTC's response**

In agreement - Being implemented

For the past two years, BTC has invested in and been actively working on focusing the management systems on development results. Given that the sample for this evaluation involved interventions that were largely formulated before the Paris Declaration or in the period just after Paris, results-oriented management was not incorporated in all parts of the organisation from the start and its effects were not as visible everywhere. Neither will it have escaped the evaluators' attention that the annual reports after 2010 reflect a results-oriented approach and that there is considerable emphasis on strategic guidance and risk management. This is just one aspect of results-oriented management as also mentioned by the evaluators. BTC adopts a global integrated approach whereby its various actions are interwoven so that the activities have a results-oriented monitoring system providing the intervention staff (BTC and partner) with the necessary knowledge and skills to monitor their activities in a results-oriented manner. Points of concern involve linking M & E to all the other aspects it relates to, such as the promotion of learning, underpinning strategic guidance, active risk management, integrating the system at intervention level in the partner country's system and use of the partner country's M & E system, etc. We are therefore confident that the quality of BTC's results-oriented management will advance in the coming years, but this will be a steady process.

It must also be added that possessing a sound results-oriented monitoring system and developing targeted strategies are two separate aspects, whereby the monitoring system is a prerequisite for improved strategies and active risk management, but does not automatically lead to this. At the intervention level, these aspects either fall under the responsibility of the BTC or of the partner, or under their joint responsibilities (mainly with regard to the effectiveness at the level of the specific objective).

In terms of effectiveness, it is interesting to point out that the satisfaction survey shows that the partners are very satisfied with the significant contribution BTC makes to the implementation of sector strategies as well as to planning the activities

necessary for achieving results and subsequent development results. The satisfaction survey also revealed that a greater contribution is needed to increase the partners' capacity for monitoring the evaluation of sector strategies as well as a need for increased support for risk management and for reporting on development results.

### **Recommendation A3 - Efficiency**

A realistic schedule for the start-up phase and the time limit for public procurement as well as a better analysis of partners' capacities and the continuation of efforts to optimise the use of technical assistants will contribute to increased efficiency for the projects. The "quality approach" as described above will improve total performance and must be shared with the partners as much as possible.

#### **BTC's response**

In agreement - Being implemented

The controversial points mentioned are operational issues that BTC is making efforts to improve upon within the framework of its mandate. The schedule for public procurement is actively monitored to tackle any difficulties in a timely manner. A group has been established that is exclusively focused on increasing capacity, and therefore also on the analysis of partner capacities and a plan of action has been established to facilitate and actively monitor the start-up phase. Given the large numbers of actors and actions that contribute to efficiency, it is necessary to consider this matter using an integrated approach. The 4th Management Contract can offer assistance in this respect, and more specifically, elements related to implementation modalities, the use of partner country's procedures and the introduction of analyses at sector level, etc.

### **Recommendation A4 - Sustainability**

The aim for sustainability must begin during the formulation phase, given that the choice of partners and their involvement in the project are key elements. Social projects must be consistent with sector policy so that further financing is guaranteed after the project and the benefits for the end target group (patients, students) are secured. The projects must devote more attention to the financial autonomy and progressive reduced dependence on external donors and the partner country's budget. Any reinforcement of "ownership" by local partners, combined with contributions from the target group, contributes to improved financial sustainability.

#### **BTC's response**

Partly in agreement

Carrying out sustainable activities is high on the agenda. However, it is easier to improve sustainability for some aspects than others. The activity's integration in a partner country's structure is more feasible than ensuring the stability of the staff as this is part of the development issue itself. The same is true for financial sustainability, as BTC has little influence on this matter as an organisation. BTC will

however continue to make efforts to increase sustainability and advocates that this criterion be taken into consideration from the programming phase.

### **Recommendation A5 - Horizontal themes**

BTC must take more account of the transversal themes in the projects' implementation and when drafting indicators that make it possible to measure the impact the project has on these aspects - from the identification and formulation phases.

#### **BTC's response**

In agreement - Being implemented

Integrating transversal themes in the entire intervention cycle is a priority operational point that is included in the general quality approach as well as in the adaptation of the M & E system's framework. To ensure that this has maximum impact, these themes must already be embedded in the programming phase. Even though indicators do not adequately expose the transversal themes, the satisfaction survey also brought to light the fact that the partners are highly satisfied with the support BTC provides during the implementation of their gender, environmental and climate strategies.

## **2. Recommendations related to specific aspects**

### **Recommendation A6**

Project preparation

#### **BTC's response**

Partly in agreement - Being implemented

Improvements in preparations for the activities are being implemented through different channels. Specific sub-aspects form the subject of elements that are being discussed in the context of the 4th Management Contract (e.g. realistic specific objectives depending on the budget). For topics that only concern BTC's internal operations, initiatives to ensure the smooth transition from formulation to implementation are also being implemented, as well as those to guarantee that the formulation phase devotes sufficient attention to important recurring themes (e.g. risk management). BTC is also in favour of greater "ownership" by the partner in the formulation phase; however, this remains a difficult issue that is often due to a partner's shortage of human resources. However, it doesn't share the evaluators' opinion that the partner is currently insufficiently involved. This is also confirmed by the satisfaction survey that demonstrates that the partners feel they are adequately involved in the formulation phase. It is therefore recommended that this discrepancy be further investigated.

**Recommendation A7**

Project implementation

**BTC's response**

In agreement - Being implemented

BTC recognises the elements to which this recommendation refers. In most cases, these are already being implemented or their implementation is currently being examined. We are naturally prepared to offer our full cooperation (including administrative and financial procedures, end of project) for those aspects that fall partly outside of BTC's competence. The satisfaction survey revealed, however, that the partners are largely satisfied with the way in which the implementation modalities delegate the responsibilities between BTC and its partners.

**Recommendation A8**

Monitoring the expected results

**BTC's response**

In agreement - Being implemented

The proposed recommendation is already being implemented. The role and mandate of the GLOS (mixed local consultation structure) are part of the discussions related to the 4th Management Contract. With regard to the other parts of this recommendation: these are provided by the adaptation, application and increased monitoring of the application of the M & E system.

**Recommendation A9**

Refocusing the project after major difficulties

**BTC's response**

In agreement - Being implemented

This recommendation is related to the strengths and weaknesses of the joint management system. BTC and the partner are jointly responsible for refocusing activities. This implies that, by definition, changes are steered and borne by the partner. On the other hand, sharing the responsibility involves a risk in and of itself because the end responsibility is less clear-cut and each of the parties may have a different understanding of a "difficulty". This means that the process of identifying a difficulty and the related decision-making process generally takes longer. BTC is working on this recommendation by improving the alignment of its different "departments". This must make it possible for reporting to detect difficulties in a timely manner and to approach them from the proper decision level; central

departments' management of activities must detect and identify difficulties; and evaluations can be used to analyse difficulties outside the standard period (mid- & end of term). By improving these departments' coordination, we assume that the necessary information will be supplied to the GLOS in a timely manner so they can jointly discuss the difficulties and take the necessary measures. The satisfaction survey also revealed that the partners believe that BTC can make improvements by establishing a continuous dialogue that supports them in their decision-making. Monitoring the quality of its services will also allow BTC to adequately focus on this issue.

### **Recommendation A10**

Partner relationships

#### **BTC's response**

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The implementation of this recommendation is determined at the political-strategic level.

### **Recommendation A11**

The relationship between BTC and DGD related to strategic management

#### **BTC's response**

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Strategic management deserves adequate attention as it is closely linked to an intervention's success. It is therefore important to delineate those elements that belong to strategic management and those that belong to operational management, and the point at which the elements belong to political decision-making. This must take into account each one's competences as well as lessons learned from the past. This matter transcends BTC and is jointly managed with DGD in discussions related to the 4th Management Contract.



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