

Federal Public Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign  
Trade  
and Development Cooperation

**Special Evaluation Office of the Belgian Development  
Cooperation**

# Evaluation of the Belgian Strategy for Humanitarian Aid

## Country Report

### Palestine



@UNRWA Girls in Gaza participating in recreational/PSS activities conducted under the After School Activities Programme in April 22.

June 2022

The evaluation is conducted by ADE ([www.ade.eu](http://www.ade.eu)). The Special Evaluation Office ensured that the evaluation complied with the Terms of Reference and benefited from the support of a Reference Group.

The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view and do not necessarily reflect the position of the FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background to the country

Belgium's humanitarian assistance to Palestine has been implemented in the context of one of the world's most protracted crises. The occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) is a high-risk environment with fragmentation of people and land, subjection to occupation, political and administrative controls, and a notable democratic deficit.

The continued Israeli occupation and the blockade of Gaza has contributed to the deteriorating humanitarian conditions within the oPt including:

- Continued fragmentation of Palestinian territory
- Illegal settlement expansion
- House demolitions
- Confiscation of land (particularly in East Jerusalem and Area C).

The blockade was significant in its undermining of infrastructure projects and economic recovery which increased vulnerability owing to the stress placed on already fragile services, including weakened health and education services, dilapidated wastewater system, poor access to potable water, unemployment, and electricity failures.

Limited access to essential health services is compounded by shortages in essential drugs and equipment, specialist medical staff, restricted medical referrals outside Gaza, a chronic electricity crisis, and lack of availability of potable water, evidenced by 96% of water being supplied to Gaza strip not meeting World Health Organization (WHO) minimum water standards.<sup>1</sup> The Gaza electricity crisis has resulted in Palestinians often only having 11 hours of electricity per day on average.<sup>2</sup>

Between 2017 and 2020, the number of out-of-school children in Palestine double from 12,200 to 24,570.<sup>3</sup> As of 2021, 100,618 have unsafe access to schools.<sup>4</sup> The main drivers of such education-related vulnerabilities include attacks on schools and movement restrictions. Approximately 600,000 Palestinians (56% of whom are woman or girls) across the oPt, including around 13,400 Children with Disabilities (CWDs), will need humanitarian assistance to access education in 2022, with 61% of students reporting difficulties in accessing education services.<sup>5</sup> These education-related issues in Gaza have been exacerbated by the early termination of the school year in 2021 which saw 1.3 million students losing at least three months of schooling in the oPt.<sup>6</sup>

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) remains widespread. This is evidenced by SAWA (an emergency helpline) reporting a 135% increase in caseload in May 2021 compared to May 2020.<sup>7</sup> According to OCHA, 29.4% of women between the ages of 18 and 64 experienced violence. Of those, 56.6% experienced psychological violence, 17.8%

<sup>1</sup> Humanitarian Needs Overview – OPT. 2022. December 2021.

<sup>2</sup> UN OCHA. Electricity in the Gaza Strip.

<sup>3</sup> Unesco Statistics. Palestine. Participation in Education.

<sup>4</sup> Humanitarian Needs Overview – OPT. 2021. December 2020.

<sup>5</sup> Humanitarian Needs Overview – OPT. 2022. December 2021.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> UN OCHA. Specific risks facing women and girls in Palestine.

experienced physical violence, and 8.8% experienced sexual violence.<sup>8</sup> Women and girls in communities that are impacted the most by conflict and consequent displacement— Gaza, Area C, and East Jerusalem— suffer from higher frequency of GBV.<sup>9</sup>

Persistent Israeli settlement expansion represents a significant threat to the territorial viability of the two-state solution. As stated in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the State of Palestine 2017-2022, the situation is exacerbated by the inability of Palestinian institutions to access most of Area C and the entire population of East Jerusalem. (Annex D: Maps of the occupied Palestinian territories)

The Palestinian economy was stagnant before the breakout of COVID-19 and can now be considered bleak. Between 2017 and 2019, annual GDP growth averaged 1.3%, (lower than the population growth rate) which led to decreasing per capita income and increased poverty.<sup>10</sup> World Bank estimates suggest the poverty rate peaked in 2020 at 29.7%, an increase of almost 8% since 2016.<sup>11</sup> The easing of COVID-19 lockdown measures has resulted in a slight decline of poverty rates to 27.3% in 2021, however over 1.5 million remain afflicted by poverty which has seen a rising 10-year trend (discounting COVID-related extremes).<sup>12</sup> There is risk that economic consequences of the war in Ukraine—as well as continued issues relating to the occupation — may contribute to rising inflationary pressure.<sup>13</sup>

Clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security forces or settlers resulted in 349 deaths during 2021, with 19,192 recorded injuries, as well as 47 deaths and 4,407 recorded injuries as of 4 June 2022.<sup>14</sup> The 2021 figures represent the highest annual fatalities since 2014 (2,329 deaths).<sup>15</sup> The regions of Khuza'a and Gaza are most notably afflicted, with the majority of fatalities resulting from live ammunition (245 out of 349).<sup>16</sup>

Since the start of 2020, 2,076 recorded Palestinian-owned structures have been demolished resulting in the forced displacement of people from their homes.<sup>17</sup> This has been most noticeable in the governorate of Jerusalem, which has seen 594 structures intentionally demolished since the start of 2020.<sup>18</sup> The coercive nature of compelling those to leave their homes and local communities has resulted in heightened tensions and increased stress on existing services in the arrival destinations of those who are displaced.

## 1.2 Case study context

Palestine has been a partner country of government cooperation with Belgium since 1997. Before 1997, Belgium provided funding to multilateral agencies and NGOs responding to humanitarian and development needs in the country, which Belgium continues to do along with its bilateral commitments. Enabel has a presence in the country and is operating both in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip.

During the period 2014-2021, Belgium allocated a total of EUR 201 million for humanitarian programme funds. Of the total allocated for programme funds 7% went to Palestine. (Comparison with 20% to DRC and 3% to Lebanon).

Of the total of EUR300 million allocated for **project funds** over the period 2014 to 2021, Palestine received 13% compared with 15% to the DRC and 5% to Lebanon.

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> The World Bank. Palestinian Territories' Economic Update. April 2022.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> UN OCHA. Data on Casualties. Palestinian Fatalities. 2022.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> UN OCHA. Data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank. 2022.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.


In 2021, the total international humanitarian funding to Palestine was USD 613.5 million, a significant increase from USD391.8 million in 2020 as a result of escalating conflict in 2021, mainly in Gaza. Of this, Belgium provides approximately USD17 million.<sup>19</sup>

Belgium’s humanitarian funding to Palestine remained stable during 2021 after doubling in 2020 from the USD 8.5 million humanitarian assistance provided in 2019.<sup>20</sup> Belgium provides the same level as Canada, Norway or Switzerland. (Figure 1.)

Belgium’s humanitarian assistance is provided through funding the following modalities— listed in order of size in 2021— core funding, flexible funds, projects, and programme funding. Since 2014, Core Funding has remained stable, project and programme funding have decreased, and contributions to the Flexible Funds have increased.

The main partners for Belgium’s programme funding have been Caritas, Croix Rouge Belge (CRB), Humanity and Inclusion (H&I), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), NRC / West Bank Protection Consortium (WBPC), and Oxfam. Belgium’s main partners for project funding have been Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and World Food Programme (WFP).

Figure 1 – Global humanitarian funds to Palestine in 2021 (US\$)



Source: UN OCHA. 2022. Global Humanitarian Overview 2022.

### 1.3 Methodology

The in-country evaluation visit to Palestine took place between 20 March to 30 March by the evaluation team leader (Martine Van de Velde) and the national senior expert (Amer Madi) who were joined by the Special Evaluator of Directorate General for Development (Cécilia De Decker).

<sup>19</sup> UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service.

<sup>20</sup> UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service. <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/171/donors/2019>

The team met with several partner organisations supported by Belgium's humanitarian funding, including UNRWA, OCHA, Caritas, Oxfam, and WBPC. The team met with external stakeholders including representatives of the Palestinian NGO Network and European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO). The team was able to visit a variety of community level projects along with beneficiaries supported through Belgium's funded interventions in West Bank and Gaza. (Annex B: In-country schedule.)

The country report presents the main findings for Palestine and is structured around the ten key evaluation questions (EQs) and is focussed on selected projects and programmes. Findings and lessons drawn from the Palestine case study will support the evidence base for the main evaluation report.

## 2 Findings

### 2.1 Relevance

2.1.1 EQ1 – To what extent do the two financial instruments (programmes and projects) respond to: 1) the geographical and thematic priorities of the humanitarian aid strategy, and 2) the needs of local populations?

For Palestine, interventions were carried out both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in response to an increase in humanitarian needs. In Palestine, projects and programmes are aligned with the humanitarian priorities in the country. NGOs and United Nations (UN) agencies align proposals with the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) prepared by UN OCHA on behalf of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and partners.<sup>21</sup> The HNO 2022 was informed by the first-ever Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) at the household level for the oPt. Moving forward it will be important to monitor to what extent future proposals target the most vulnerable population groups identified in the MSNA: *people living below the poverty level; Palestine refugee living in refugee camps; Palestine refugees living outside refugee camps; people with shelter damage due to the last escalation; female-headed households; small-scale farmers; Persons with disabilities; and internally displaced people.*<sup>22</sup>

Belgium does not have its own humanitarian crisis analysis or humanitarian priority setting for Palestine. The orientation and design of interventions are mainly driven by the partner organisations all of which have with a long reputation and presence in the country. The extent to which Belgium influenced the selection of interventions—through, for instance, strategic dialogues in-country—could not be confirmed.

While Belgium provided assistance in both West Bank and Gaza, its humanitarian funding was prioritised in the Gaza Strip to address the humanitarian consequences of increasing poverty, high employment and destruction due to war. Support was provided to vulnerable families through emergency food assistance, access to livelihood opportunities, and the protection of children via access to education and psychosocial support (PSS).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, funding was provided through BAHIA to support access to health services in Gaza and livelihood protection in the West Bank.

2.1.2 EQ2 – To what extent and through what mechanisms have developments in the international humanitarian landscape and international commitments been taken into account in the implementation of programs and projects?

In Palestine, civil society has been under threat by both Israeli and Palestinian authorities. The reduced space for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) is increasingly impacting on the funding for NGOs. Key informants from civil society highlighted an expected decrease of 30-40% for national and international NGOs.

<sup>21</sup> OCHA. 2022. Humanitarian Needs Overview OPT. [https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/OCHAHUMNEEDSOVERVIEW2022\\_161221.pdf](https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/OCHAHUMNEEDSOVERVIEW2022_161221.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> OCHA. 2022. Humanitarian Needs Overview. P.16.

The declining funding of civil society organisations means increased competition between national and international NGOs for available funding which is very noticeable through the oPt Humanitarian Fund. It is important to understand the challenging context for national civil society when assessing whether localisation has been effectively prioritised under Belgium's supported projects and programmes. National civil society organisations indicated that the oPt Humanitarian Fund allocations is not reflective of the capacity of national civil society organisations.

It was found that Belgium—which is on the advisory board of the Fund—did not sufficiently advocate for or prioritise localisation of its agenda. National NGO representatives found that Country Based Pooled Funds are cost-effective and are a good way of supporting localisation but that this is not achieved automatically. To support localisation effectively, transparency and accountability need to be priorities and concerted efforts need to be made to reach agreed targets for localisation.

There is no common understanding among donors and humanitarian or development actors around how localisation should be understood in the context of Palestine. Operationalisation of localisation is left to individual donors or humanitarian actors to define and is often understood as sub-contracting of national NGOs by International NGOs and UN agencies. Based on feedback in-country, civil society in Palestine considers localisation to go beyond indirect financial support through an INGO. Important elements of localisation in the context of Palestine include direct funding and ensuring participation at the strategic and technical levels, as well as support for advocacy on issues undermining the operating space for civil society in Palestine.

### **oPt Humanitarian Fund and localisation**

In 2021, the oPt Humanitarian Fund had a total of contributions of USD29.3 million. Belgium was ranked second with a contribution of USD7.2 million after Germany (USD12.7 million), and before Switzerland (USD3.3 million) and Sweden (USD2.3 million).<sup>23</sup>

**In text box: Belgium** contributed **USD7.2 million** to the Humanitarian Fund (HF) in 2021, almost double its contribution from the previous year (USD4.3 million). It first contributed to the oPt HF in 2015 and has since contributed USD26.9 million to the Fund, approximately 15% of funds received since 2007.

In terms of localisation, the Humanitarian Fund has not shown consistent improvement in its funding allocations to national NGO partners. In 2021, 31.2% of total funds were allocated to national partners directly (20%) and indirectly (11.2%), surpassing the 25% global target set during the IASC summit (oPt HF Annual Report 2021) but not reaching the target of 60 % that was set for the Fund. (oPt HF Annual Report 2020). The direct funding of national partners in 2019 was 27% and 13% for indirect funding, representing a significant drop in 2020 and 2021, a trend which is not in line with the Grand Bargain efforts and agreed targets.

While the Country Based Pooled Fund is not a specific focus for this evaluation, the results on localisation are important to consider as these reflect how international actors work in partnership with national NGOs. Even indirect funding has seen a downturn which means that international NGOs are working in partnership with local organisations less. It was not evident from the in-country consultations to what extent Belgium has raised the issue of localisation and expectations in the advisory board.

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<sup>23</sup> OCHA. OPT Humanitarian Fund. 2021 Annual Report.

### 2.1.3 EQ3 – Has the allocation of resources been done in a principled manner and in line with Belgium's commitments and international principles and commitments (Grand Bargain, European Consensus, Good Humanitarian Donorship ...)?

Protection is intrinsically linked to the core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence, and neutrality. More specifically, protection is interlinked with the principle of humanity; the purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.

Palestine is considered a protracted protection crisis with 1.8 million people in need of protection identified by OCHA's humanitarian needs overview 2022. Protection mainstreaming—or the process of building protection principles into all aspects of the humanitarian response<sup>24</sup>—is highlighted to a good extent in the different project designs. The extent to which this mainstreaming was effective on the ground could not be verified. Support for specialised protection services addressing specific protection risks and violations is limited under Belgium-funded interventions.

#### **Three protection principles (Sphere Handbook)**

1. Prevent: Enhance the safety, dignity and rights of affected people, and avoid exposing people to further harm;
2. Respond: Reduce the impact of physical and psychological harm that arises from violence, coercion, deliberate deprivation and other threats; and
3. Remedy: Assist people to claim their rights and access appropriate remedies.

There is good emphasis on protection of children through supporting the right to access to education through the funding for education in emergencies by UNRWA. Mitigating the ongoing threat of eviction in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) has been addressed with the support to the WBPC. Oxfam's programme in Gaza aimed to reach very vulnerable households with integrated transformative protection services.

To effectively address the broad range of needs faced by individuals and communities affected by conflict and violence it is necessary to adopt a variety of approaches that utilize the strengths of both national and international humanitarian actors. To achieve this financial support for organisational development at all levels and not simply in relation to specific time-bound programmes and/or activity implementation is an exception in Palestine. This and other aspects of complementarity is further reviewed under EQ 5 – Effectiveness.

## **2.2 Relevance and Connectivity**

### 2.2.1 EQ 4 – How well adapted are project and program instruments to current crises to (i) respond quickly to immediate needs (humanitarian emergency), (ii) respond structurally to protracted crises as part of a long-term strategy, and (iii) ensure connectivity between instruments in crises that present both emergency needs and structural vulnerabilities (see also EQ 10)?

Belgium has not set clear priorities for its humanitarian assistance in Palestine meaning that partner organisations are taking the lead in designing and presenting proposals for funding to Belgium. This submission process for Belgian NGOs is driven from the NGOs' main offices located in Belgium. It was found that the dialogues during the planning and design phases mainly take place between the Belgian NGOs main offices in Belgium and the Directorate-general for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD D5.1).

<sup>24</sup> Sphere Handbook Draft2 for consultation – Protection Principles – October 2017. <http://orange.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Protection-Principles.pdf>

There is no critical involvement of Belgium's Consulate in Jerusalem in the decision-making process.

Belgian NGOs work closely with their partners on the ground in developing the proposals. Belgian NGOs funded in Palestine are part of an international confederation such as Oxfam, Caritas, or H&I. Belgian NGOs themselves are not present in Palestine. There is a similar set up for UN agencies with the Agency's Headquarters submitting proposals to DGD D5.1. in Brussels.

In both cases, the offices of the NGOs or UN agencies are involved in planning and developing the proposal for funding. Proposals are developed based on the humanitarian needs in the sector or thematic areas that fall under the organisational mandate of the institution. Whether the funded interventions complement one another or be mutually supportive is not followed up.

On one hand, projects and programmes funded aim to address the needs linked to a protracted crisis requiring a longer-term approach including access to basic services, poverty alleviation, or livelihoods. On the other hand, there is no built-in crisis modifier for programmes, which means that NGOs are not able to quickly redirect funding to escalating emergencies such as the 2021 war in Gaza. This is largely the same for project funding to the UN agencies with the exception of funding allocated to food assistance where the relevant UN agency can ensure that distribution includes those impacted by the emergency.

Most of Belgium's funding to projects and programmes targeted the Gaza Strip reflecting the dire and worsening humanitarian needs there. However, in-country stakeholders mentioned that while recognising the dire situation in Gaza, donors with limited presence like Belgium are often not sufficiently informed about the humanitarian needs in areas such as Area C or East Jerusalem.

Based on the in-country visits and key informant interviews, evidence shows that the current project and programme funding duration is too short in a protracted crisis setting where needs would be best addressed with a longer-term approach. At the same time, the projects and programme set up does not sufficiently allow appropriate respond to acute emerging or sudden onset crisis.

## 2.3 Effectiveness

2.3.1 EQ5 – To what extent have program and project objectives been achieved? Have the programs and projects contributed to sufficient coverage of crisis-affected populations? What are the effects (intended or unintended) on the target populations?

The reporting on projects by some of partners lack sufficient detail on results achieved through Belgian funding. This is especially the case when it is provided to Country Based Pooled Funds or interventions that are funded with other donors. The evaluation team is of the opinion that individual donor reporting is not efficient and would not be in line with the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD).

In some instances, the reports – both for projects and programmes - do not provide sufficient analysis of changes that were achieved and are focused on providing quantitative output-based results. This is often the case for humanitarian assistance where there is a focus on short-term interventions focusing on addressing a specific humanitarian need.

For this evaluation, the team has relied on the available documentary evidence, complemented by primary evidence gathered during the in-country mission for its analysis. Instead of purely presenting the results, this section presents the analysis of the interventions funded in relation to Belgium's humanitarian strategy.

Effectiveness of humanitarian interventions is often assessed by looking at scale and coverage of the most vulnerable. For Belgium's supported interventions the picture is mixed (including mixed performance on targeting and reaching the most vulnerable) and there is a limited number of beneficiaries reached under programmes.

*i. Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) – West Bank Protection Consortium (WBPC)*

The consortium consists of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (lead agency and administrative host), Action Against Hunger (AAH), ACTED, Gruppo di Volontariato Civile (GVC), and Première Urgence Internationale (PUI) and Médecins du Monde (Mdm).

The WBPC was established in 2015 and is funded by ECHO and 10 bilateral donors. Belgium has supported the WBPC, through annual project funding, with a total of EUR6.3 million between 2015 and 2020. This is in contrast with donors like Sweden providing three-year contributions.

The WBPC addresses the protection and development needs of persons and communities. The WBPC is unique as it is the only integrated protection intervention in the West Bank. It has managed to operationalize a well-interpreted protection concept in the Palestinian context, and particularly in reaching communities in Area C which are caught in chronic protection vulnerability and are at risk of forcible transfer. The WBPC results and activities are found to be consistent with the consortium's overall goal and relevant to the communities' needs.

The evaluation team was able to visit two communities where the WBPC has provided multi-faceted assistance. One community in Al Jab'a was under threat of forcible transfer due to expanding settlements in the Bethlehem governorate. A focus group discussion with representatives of the WBPC partner organisations and community leaders highlighted the relevance and the effectiveness of the WBPC interventions which include providing Psycho-Social Support (PSS) and health services to respond to mental and physical traumas caused by violence and intimidation. Individual and group counselling are also provided to families and groups. An effective referral system has been set up to direct severe trauma cases to specialised institutions. When 4,000 dunums of olive trees were uprooted, crops were stolen, and access restrictions imposed because of illegal settlements, the WBPC was able to compensate families for their losses.

The WBPC's partners have diversified sectoral mandates, allowing for complementarity and diversity in the response. Through a community warning system, community members can alert the WBPC and OCHA and provide information allowing for a quick and timely response. National NGO representatives highlighted that consortium partners consist only of international NGOs and national NGOs can only be engaged indirectly in these interventions.

An independent evaluation conducted in 2018 of the WBPC highlighted that, despite a worsening protection environment, the WBPC is progressively realizing its objective of preventing the forcible transfer of vulnerable Palestinians in the West Bank. The WBPC helped reduce vulnerability in most of the high-risk communities it targets and, despite the increase in settler violence, it helped improve beneficiaries' feelings of safety and dignity (partially achieved). Almost all beneficiaries who have eviction or demolition orders remain in their homes due to legal representation (achieved) and through post-incident emergency support helped them not be displaced (achieved).<sup>25</sup>

Interventions in communities are complemented with advocacy activities carried out by the WBPC to raise awareness on protection and eviction issues in communities at risks. Example of these include donor visits—with Belgian participation—to areas affected by evictions.

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<sup>25</sup> Advance Consulting Services. 2018. External Evaluation of the West Bank Protection Consortium 2015-2017.

Overall, the community-based protection approach was found to be effective providing not only services but also empowerment to communities under threat. Through its funding to the WBPC, Belgium joins other donors which leads to stronger effectiveness and the sharing of risks.

**ii. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) - Education in Emergencies (EiE)**

Belgium has provided support to the EiE programme since 2017 covering 3 phases of the programme. The current Phase III is supported by Belgium with EUR 3.5 million. The EiE is implemented across the five areas of operations of UNRWA with most funding allocated to interventions in Gaza and Lebanon. The EiE provides support to the most vulnerable children and their families by addressing some of the barriers that would otherwise negatively impact children's school retention or attendance. The EiE project funding assistance also covers a gap in services that has been created because of the funding shortfall and the worsening financial situation for UNRWA.<sup>26</sup> Specifically, core funding alone can no longer ensure that a minimum level of services is maintained. More importantly, due to the rising poverty levels in Gaza, additional support has been provided to ensure children can keep going to school. These efforts have had an impact on early marriage and school drop-out rates.

Conflict-related violence and poverty have contributed to household vulnerabilities worsening the existing mental health crisis. In this context, children are particularly vulnerable to experiencing high rates of mental distress, including significant risks of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety, behavioural problems, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, as well as functional impairment.

The evaluation team visited two school locations with UNRWA. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with principals, teachers, school support staff and students highlighted a common message. War and conflict have had a devastating impact on the mental well-being of children. Poverty and unemployment have a direct impact on school attendance. UNRWA has a system in place to target the most vulnerable children with support. But the agency is not in a position to support all children in need. As one of the UNRWA staff members described: '*A system for selection is in place but hard and difficult decisions need to be made because of limited funds*'.

For Gaza Belgium's contribution was utilised to support

- school counsellors (40% of school counsellors were financed by Belgium); and
- provision of assistive devices (Belgium is the largest contributor for assistive devices for children with a disability).

Feedback from FGD with parents and students with a disability:

- Girl received an electric wheelchair to go to school independently.
- Boy received glasses and a tablet. Is now able to follow in the classroom and read the textbooks.
- The transportation provided by UNRWA for children with limited mobility makes a difference.
- Without the assistive devices and transportation children would stay at home.

During the May 2021 hostilities nine UNRWA schools were used as shelters for over 10,000 Palestinians. All schools – except for the Rafah school that was badly damaged – were able

<sup>26</sup> Funding shortfall for UNRWA. <https://www.siasat.com/un-agency-for-palestine-refugees-faces-100-funding-gap-2350055/>

to re-open at the start of the scholastic year. Based on this experience UNRWA has conducted a safety and security risk assessment and has been upgrading schools – under phase II and III of EiE – to function as shelters. Belgium’s funding has contributed to these efforts. However, UNRWA faces several challenges to have the schools upgraded fully because of Israeli restrictions on imports into Gaza. For instance, fire extinguishers cannot be brought into the Gaza Strip.

As in Lebanon, assistance supports the educational needs of the most vulnerable children in Gaza. This additional funding and targeting has a direct effect on the education of refugee children. This third phase of funding is important for strategic dialogue to ensure project assistance continues to complement the core budget of the agencies and maintain the targeting and reach of the most vulnerable children. Upgrading schools to function as shelters is considered as a very important emergency preparedness step.

### *iii. OXFAM – Transformative Protection*

The programme to ‘Promote the transformative protection of the vulnerable population in the Gaza Strip, is supported by Belgium with an amount of EUR 1.2 million.

The complementarity of activities is supported through a localisation approach where Oxfam works in partnership with several strong Palestinian NGO partners covering different sectors. The objective of the intervention was to provide vulnerable families with access to a range of protection services and assistance in accessing livelihoods opportunities (through a holistic approach). The designed approach was found to be very solid. Indeed, because often protection concerns within families are often caused by poverty and unemployment. In most instances the full cycle of assistance was provided including assessments, protection services and livelihood support. However, during consultations with beneficiaries, it was evident that in some instances access to livelihood opportunities was not provided. The evaluation team was not able to assess the proportion of beneficiaries not supported with livelihoods assistance. Some beneficiaries did not receive access to livelihoods because of a lack of existing opportunities in the labour market, or the person did not have sufficient qualifications or training. It was also evident that humanitarian actors, when remaining in the humanitarian sphere only, have limited capacity of creating and implementing more long-term income generating opportunities.

These examples clearly showed the opportunity and challenge for both development and humanitarian actors to work collaboratively as not all steps in the approach can or should be covered by humanitarian actors.

## **2.4 Efficiency of modalities**

2.4.1 EQ6 – To what extent have the modalities for implementing DGD interventions through programs and projects been conducive to achieving their respective objectives?

Belgium’s humanitarian assistance provides a central role to the UN in Palestine. It was found that this approach has reduced the burden of monitoring and reporting. However, the evaluation team found that in some instances the reporting provided by UN agencies could be strengthened.

Stakeholders in-country highlighted that Belgium is known for its pragmatic attitude, flexibility, and predictability but that timeliness is, at times, of concern as approval processes tend to take longer compared to other donors. The modalities of project and programme funding, and the BAHIA modality, seem not to be suited to respond during times of emergencies or are unable to adjust quickly to changes in the context.

As with the Lebanon case study, annual approval processes for projects—as well as for two-year funding rounds for programmes—limit efficiency and effectiveness, especially in a protracted crisis. Annual approval processes are also very time consuming and challenging and for a donor with limited resources to provide follow-up.

Visiting projects and programme interventions, the evaluation team found that the distinction between projects and programmes was not relevant if Belgium adopts an approach where humanitarian funding:

- a. Is allocated based on needs
- b. Is provided to contracted partners based on their capacity and strengths in addressing those needs
- c. considers Belgium's own resources in-country and in Brussels.

## **2.5 Belgian Alliance for Humanitarian International Action (BAHIA) project**

2.5.1 EQ7 – Efficiency of the BAHIA project: What initial lessons can be drawn from the BAHIA initiative regarding the relevance and appropriateness of increased flexibility in the financing of humanitarian actions?

Two Belgian NGOs — Caritas Belgium and Oxfam Belgium — allocated funding to Palestine for Covid-19 response activities. Both NGOs work through their respective international federations.

Caritas was able to reach out to vulnerable remote communities in the Gaza Strip with mobile clinics and Covid-19 awareness-raising materials; Oxfam's funding was used to support vulnerable communities living close to the West Bank separation barrier with community infrastructure and income generating activities. For both interventions interviewed beneficiaries highlighted the critical difference this support made to the remote communities during the pandemic.

However, funding levels did not allow Caritas to provide a holistic support to the targeted communities. This was a lost opportunity to support these vulnerable communities further with livelihood opportunities given the impact of Covid-19 on the local economy.

The BAHIA supported project implemented by Oxfam focused on providing short-term income support to vulnerable communities through the rehabilitation or construction of community-based infrastructure projects. According to feedback from Oxfam, by the time funding arrived the needs in the original selected location had changed and the intervention was then implemented in an alternative location. These interventions did make a difference to the families reached. However, based on the feedback received from community members in the original location, there were economic needs and opportunities that could have still been addressed.

## **2.6 Organizational efficiency**

2.6.1 EQ 8 – To what extent has the DGD given equal attention to the following tasks in order to achieve the objectives of the humanitarian strategy: strategic steering, execution and delivery of funds, quality control of program and project implementation?

Under Belgium's public service set up, staff members with a background in development or humanitarian assistance are not always posted in countries with humanitarian crises. In the context of Palestine which has seen conflict for decades, this requires a steep learning curve for those posted without having previous experience working in conflict settings. The Consulate in Jerusalem has limited staff capacity and staff numbers have not evolved in parallel with the increase in humanitarian funding. There are no national staff members providing support on humanitarian assistance.

Humanitarian assistance seems to be managed centrally from Brussels DGD 5.1. with limited engagement or authority by the Consulate in the partner country. The set up in Brussels focuses on partner organisations and to a lesser extent on the country which

contributes to a fragmented approach at country level, especially when a country framework for interventions is missing.

The monitoring of humanitarian interventions in Gaza is currently done through field monitoring visits, spread over a couple of days, by a Jerusalem-based staff member. The frequency of the monitoring visits is dependent on the issuance of Israeli entry permits to Gaza and the overall security situation. Not having a more permanent presence in Gaza – through, for example, a national staff member – limits the understanding of the context, partners, and interventions. The evaluation team could not confirm whether a monitoring framework is used and how evidence gathered during monitoring visits is shared with DGD in Brussels, or how observations are shared with partners in-country. The team's efforts to monitor interventions becomes less effective if the monitoring of expected outcomes is not done in a systematic manner.

It should be noted that Enabel has an office and staff members based in Gaza but the monitoring of humanitarian interventions does not come under their management. Enabel's portfolio is focused on development cooperation. The collaboration between Enabel and the Belgium Consulate was found to be not sufficiently clear in terms of sharing resources to support efficiency.

In terms of reporting, NGO partners highlighted that the single form used for design and reporting is not very efficient because of the too high level of detail that is required. They also emphasised that the process is too long at the planning and design phase.

Having one-year funding cycles in a protracted crisis is not effective and prevents longer-term engagement. It is also not efficient because of the time-scale that yearly processes often take to pass the approval stage.

2.6.2 EQ 9 - Effectiveness of advocacy and visibility: To what extent do interventions contribute to advocacy and visibility of humanitarian crises among the general public?

UN agencies provide good recognition to Belgium's humanitarian funding both on their websites and in the communities where interventions are implemented with Belgium's funding. The programme funded interventions visited, showed less visibility of Belgium's funding. This is mainly because interventions are smaller in scale.

## 2.7 Connectivity and Sustainability

2.7.1 EQ10 – To what extent have projects and programs integrated the Humanitarian Aid and Development Policy Nexus? How can we best establish the conditions of connectivity to ensure a sustainable effect of humanitarian interventions, when they are intended to last? (see also EQ 4)

When it comes to supporting the triple nexus, it was highlighted during in-country interviews that the donor community needs to be realistic on what can be achieved in the context of Palestine. In reality the double nexus – linking humanitarian and development assistance – can be supported in the absence of a meaningful peace process but with limitations. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that only a solution to the conflict will bring lasting solutions to humanitarian and development needs. In this regard, all interlocutors highlighted the need for political actors to remain engaged and to lead on the triple nexus approach.

Currently there is no link between development cooperation assistance and humanitarian assistance provided by Belgium. This is a missed opportunity in the context of a protracted crisis. A number of humanitarian interventions supported by Belgium include nexus elements and aim to bring more long-term and sustainable solutions to recurring needs where possible. However, this approach is left to the individual partner organisations and

is not guided by Belgium itself. For nexus programming to be more effective there needs to be blended programming and area-based approaches where possible.

In Palestine, several development and humanitarian actors are pressing to do things differently but at the same time are conscious of the limitations. There is limited scope for long-term development because of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and blockade of Gaza and the fact that, in reality, there is no independent functioning Palestinian state.

In the context of Palestine, the operationalisation of the nexus should not become the sole objective of Belgium's humanitarian assistance. Belgium should remain focussed on mitigating the effects of the worsening humanitarian and protection situation and, where at all possible, linking interventions with development assistance.

## **2.8 Belgium's added value in the country / visibility**

Belgium does not have a multi-year strategy or a framework that guides its humanitarian interventions. Outcomes or tactical priorities have not been set. Therefore, assessing Belgium's added value in Palestine is difficult when priorities and niche areas are not identified to guide Belgium's humanitarian interventions.

In Palestine, as with other partner countries, Belgium has a strategy for its development cooperation, which is managed by Enabel. The Joint Strategic Framework (JSF) 2022–2026, developed by Belgian NGOs, focuses on development assistance and does not cover humanitarian needs and humanitarian funding.

The absence of a guiding humanitarian framework sets Belgium apart from other donor countries that have a Palestine strategy or operating framework presenting the outcomes to which their funding will contribute.

Example: Switzerland has developed a Swiss Cooperation Programme for the Near East 2021-24. It includes all relevant Foreign Affairs departments and has a joint results framework that steers all Swiss interventions. The cooperation programme includes a consolidated operational framework and covers the financial resources provided by the divisions of development cooperation, humanitarian aid and human security (for peace promotion).

Overall, Belgium is considered as a pragmatic, substantive and principled donor. Belgium is also present and engaged in several important donor humanitarian bodies relevant to Palestine:

- UNRWA Advisory Commission (AdCom)
- County-based Pooled Funds Advisory Board
- Good Humanitarian Donor (GHD) (as the chair)

Donor representatives highlighted that Belgium's portfolio of humanitarian interventions in Palestine are relevant but fragmented. Moving forward – considering the contextual changes, including funding constraints – suggestions were made to maintain flexibility (funding to WBPC, OCHA CBPF, WFP and UNRWA) complemented with funding focused on a maximum of two thematic or sectoral areas where Belgium would bring additional added value and expertise.

### **Lessons from Palestine for Belgium's humanitarian strategy**

Belgium supports interventions through projects and programmes which are, generally, relevant to the context of a protracted protection crisis with increasing humanitarian needs and a process of de-development that has been occurring over recent decades. In a context of a protracted crisis, it becomes more challenging to differentiate which priorities could or should be addressed through humanitarian or development funding. This

differentiation is mostly driven by donors—including Belgium—and has a direct impact on how programmes are designed.

In Palestine there is no country or programme strategy or framework providing strategic direction or coherence to both Belgium’s development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, or which sets priorities for Belgium’s humanitarian assistance. Instead, a country programme for Belgium’s development assistance is implemented through Enabel. The JSF developed by the NGOs and which steers NGO interventions is also limited to development assistance and does not cover humanitarian priorities.

In the absence of such a guiding framework there is no reference point against which to assess results be it a vision, a change or some specific priorities Belgium wants to support. This means that both development and humanitarian assistance are implemented in parallel with no purposeful alignment between both. The absence of a framework encompassing both funding streams also reduces the potential of identifying nexus opportunities linking development, humanitarian, and peace building assistance in a protracted crisis.

Projects and programmes allow for a tailored response, however, it is not evident from the in-country mission the extent to which there has been a process of dialogue between partners and Belgium. The general impression is that dialogue happens in an unstructured and ad-hoc manner. For beneficiary needs analysis, Belgium relies primarily on the knowledge and assessments of the implementing partners Belgium supports. While these assessments seem to be of generally good quality, these did not allow the evaluation team to confirm whether Belgium has a good evidence base to decide where it can best intervene and have the most impact with its relatively small humanitarian funding. The team was also not able to confirm whether the design of projects is driven by the partner organisations, by DGD, or is, in first instance, driven by priority setting of humanitarian needs.

While interventions supported by Belgium have a direct or indirect protection focus, the approach is fragmented across the interventions. Belgium is buying into existing and well-performing partnerships such as the WBPC and the County Based Pooled Fund. Joining these kind of partnerships supports both effectiveness and efficiency and allows risk sharing in a politically sensitive and fragile context. However, what was evident is that being a financial contributor is not sufficient and Belgium should also bring added value to its engagements. A seat on an advisory board—for instance, the Humanitarian Fund (HF)—is only important if the country holding that exerts influence or uses the knowledge gained for advocacy.

The interventions supported have delivered good results, although at times it is difficult to verify the results linked to Belgium’s specific contributions. While interventions selected for review provide results the evaluation team found that some interventions do not seem to qualify as strictly humanitarian assistance or emergency preparedness.

It is the evaluation team’s opinion that, as a smaller contributor, it is good practice for Belgium to work with other like-minded or similar size donors and fund joint interventions. This approach of buying into existing multi-actor partnerships supports both effectiveness and efficiencies.

Reporting by partners allows Belgium to have a view on the quantitative outputs being achieved. Across the reports, it is more difficult to obtain a view on qualitative results or sustainability of interventions. This is influenced by humanitarian interventions – under both programmes and projects – being considered as short-term, and this is also reflected in the results frameworks. Where longer-term change is included in the design, these aspects are reported on to a lesser extent. Where Belgium provides recurrent funding for phases of the same interventions, the assessment and reporting of longer-term change is not sufficiently assessed over time.

Project and programme interventions are geared more towards prolonged humanitarian needs in a protracted crisis. The projects and programmes (as they are currently constructed) do not have the flexibility to respond to acute emergencies following escalations of the conflict. There is no flexibility built into the design that allows partner organisations to redirect funding quickly to an emergency. While this is a limitation Belgium is considered a flexible donor and engages with partners to adjust funding based on contextual changes. Projects and programmes funded incorporate also preparedness elements addressing the repeated onset of crises, particularly in Gaza.

Complementarity and alignment between development and humanitarian interventions are concerns that are relevant, especially in a protracted crisis setting. The 'nexus' is a very current concern, but there is no clear answer on what needs to be done in the context of the oPt. The issues and needs in a protracted crisis require a different approach, therefore, clarifying an understanding of the nexus and disaster preparedness within oPt—and where Belgium can best engage—would be useful.

The absence of a niche area where Belgium brings an added value was highlighted for future consideration. A specific focus for Belgium in the oPt will also inform design and monitoring, supporting not only effectiveness and efficiencies but also preparedness and disaster risks reduction (and resilience). In a context like Palestine where there are a multitude of coordination mechanisms with which to engage, Belgium's "voice" will have more weight if engagement can take place with partners and donors based on thematic or sectoral expertise.

Having no strategic focus leads to interventions being funding across different sectors working with different partners. This is a challenge in-country as the limited available staff are not able to engage across in all aspects of the humanitarian response. Without having strategic vision – on what to achieve and on who is doing what - Belgium is guided by partner organisations reaching out to Belgium without Belgium having a view on who is the best placed to achieve certain results.

There is no clear separation of responsibilities between Brussels and Consulate when it comes to the monitoring of or accountability for Belgium's humanitarian assistance. With the current set up, it is not clear what the role of the staff member in Jerusalem is in following up on humanitarian assistance. Visits and monitoring of interventions occur but how these monitoring visits feed into decision making is also not clear. Staff capacity to follow up and engage in quality programming is limited.

Belgium is considered a committed and approachable donor that will take informed and principled points of view, at times, with respect to difficult and sensitive issues. Belgium is also considered to be a pragmatic and predictable donor, but the timeliness of responses was raised as a concern especially in humanitarian situations where the provision of financial assistance in a timely manner is critical. This results in Belgium is not being considered a "go to donor" during times of emergency.

Localisation is not promoted enough by Belgium in its interventions. The way localisation is operationalised by some partner organisations is often limited to national organisations implementing specific programme components with their engagement dependant on the international organisation's own approach given the absence of Belgium setting its own expectations on issues.

## Annex A: List of people met

Organization	Title
<b>ECHO Jerusalem</b>	Head of Office
<b>Belgian Consulate</b>	Consul General
	Deputy Consul General and Head of Cooperation
	Deputy Head of Cooperation and First secretary (development cooperation)
	Resident Representative Belgian development agency Enabel
<b>Caritas Jerusalem</b>	Secretary General
	Admin Officer, Caritas Gaza Medical Center
	Medical Consultant, Caritas Gaza Medical Center
	Project Coordinator
<b>OCHA</b>	Head of Gaza Office and DGD Project Coordinator
	Agronomist
	Field Worker
<b>Norwegian Refugee Council</b>	Project coordinator
<b>Oxfam Gaza</b>	Gaza Director.
	Gender and Protection Officer
	MEAL Officer
	FSL Manager
	Policy and Advocacy Officer
	MEAL Assistant
	FSL Officer
<b>Oxfam West Bank</b>	Project Manager
<b>PNGO – Palestine NGO Network</b>	Chair and Board member
	Board member
<b>TAMER</b>	Case Manager Supervisor
	Case Manager
	Case Manager
	Project Coordinator
	Protection Coordinator
<b>UNOCHA</b>	Head of OCHA OPT
<b>UNRWA</b>	External Relations Officer
	Area Education Officer, South Gaza

<b>UNWRA Gaza Field Office</b>	Projects Officer, GFO Projects Office
	Project Coordinator, Education Programme
	Head Education MHPSS Unit, Education Programme
	Team Leader, Special Education Needs
	Area Education Officer, North Rafah
<b>West Bank Protector</b>	Chief of Party
	MEAL Manager

### Focus Group Discussions and site visits

<b>Al Jabaa Village</b>	FGD with WB protection consortium members and village council representatives (Head of Al-Jabaa Council and 3 Community representatives)
<b>Caritas BAHIA Project Gaza</b>	FGD with 10 women recipients of health services
	FGD with 9 men recipients of health services
<b>Médecins du Monde</b>	General Coordinator (Head of Mission) WB Coordinator General Coordinator MDM Suisse
<b>Oxfam BAHIA Project Gaza</b>	FGD with 6 participants of the project (4 women, 2 men)
	Home visit to vulnerable family – fisherman (10 persons HH)
	Visit to young woman entrepreneur
<b>Oxfam BAHIA Project West Bank Ramallah</b>	FGD with 9 beneficiaries of the projects (3 women, 6 men)
<b>PUI</b>	WB Field Coordinator WBPC Project Manager ZeiWB M&E Manager
<b>UNRWA</b>	FGD with School Counsellors and Head of Education MHPSS. Participants 7 (4 men and 3 women) at the Tal El-Hawa Elementary Girls B School
	FGD with students and parents benefitting from the assistive devices and transportation services (6 students – 3 girls and 3 boys + 6 mothers) at the Tal El-Hawa Elementary Girls B School
	FGD with school staff (total of 8 – 6 men and 2 women) including School Principal and Deputy Principal, Special needs focal points, education officers, area engineer) at the Rafah Elementary Co-ed C School
<b>WeWorld (WW)</b>	Head of Operations
	Project Manager (WBPC)

## Annex B: In-country schedule

Date	Time	Organisation	Activity	Unit/Department	Respondent
Sunday 20 March		Arrival in Jerusalem			
Monday 21 March	9am-10am	Consulate General	Briefing	Belgian Cooperation Jerusalem	Head of Cooperation Deputy Head of Cooperation
	Travel to Gaza				
Tuesday 22 March	Full day	UNRWA	Field visit to 3 UNRWA Schools, FGDs, KIIs. (Tal El-Hawa Elementary Girls School; Rafah Elementary Co-ed School; Fukhary Prep Girls School.	Gaza Field Office. Education in Emergencies. Education Programme. MHPSS Unit.	School Principals. Area Education Officers. Projects Officers. Project Coordinators. Head Education MHPSS Unit. School Counsellors. Special Needs Team Supervisor. FGDs with parents, students, counsellors.
Wednesday 23 March	Full day	Caritas	Briefing and meeting with Caritas senior management on Bahia	Senior management.	Secretary General, Admin Officer, Medical Consultant, Project Coordinator.
			Field visit to BAHIA supported communities	Caritas Gaza Office	Community members.
			Debriefing	Caritas Gaza Office	Caritas colleagues
Thursday 24 March	Full day	Oxfam	Briefing and meeting with Oxfam staff	Humanitarian Unit	Staff members
		Oxfam	Field visit & KII & FGD	with national implementing partners	Partners, beneficiaries
		Oxfam	Debriefing	Senior management, humanitarian unit	Oxfam staff members Project Deputy Humanitarian Manager
Friday 25 March		Travel to Jerusalem			

Saturday 26 March	AM	Palestinian Network	NGO	KII	NGO Network	Board member and Director of NNGO
		Palestinian Network	NGO	KII	NGO Network	Chair person of PNGO
Sunday 27 March	AM	Oxfam		Briefing	Oxfam Office Ramallah	BAHIA Coordinator
	PM	Oxfam		Field visit & FGD	Bilin village	Beneficiaries, Local partners, community representatives.
Monday 28 March	Full day	WBPC		Field visit & KII & FGD	East Jerusalem + Area C	Community representatives, Beneficiaries, West Bank Protection Consortium Members
		WBPC		Field visit & KII & FGD	East Jerusalem + Area C / Al Jabaa village	Community representatives, Beneficiaries, West Bank Protection Consortium Members
	PM	Caritas		Debriefing with Caritas Jerusalem	Caritas Jerusalem Office	Secretary General, senior management
Tuesday 29 March	AM	OCHA		KII	Senior management.	Head of OCHA OPT Deputy Head of OCHA
	PM	ECHO		KII	Senior management.	Head of Office
Wednesday 30 March	AM	Consulate General		Debrief	Consulate and Cooperation	Consul, Head of Cooperation Deputy Head of Cooperation
		Departure Jerusalem				

## Annex C: List of resources

Belgian Alliance for Humanitarian International Aid. Inception report. Project «Agile response by the Belgian Alliance for International Humanitarian Action to control the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate its multi-dimensional effects on humanitarian crisis» PJ/2020/08. February 2021.

Belgian Alliance for Humanitarian International Aid. BAHIA Project formulation and start-up Lessons learnt. Project «Agile response by the Belgian Alliance for International Humanitarian Action to control the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate its multi-dimensional effects on humanitarian crisis» PJ/2020/08. June 2021.

Belgian Alliance for Humanitarian International Aid. Quarterly Situation Report. September – November 2021.

CARITAS – Single form for the funding of actions of prevention of emergency aid, short-term reconstruction and humanitarian action. Final Narrative Report. 2018.

CARITAS – Single Form. Integrated Healthcare and Protection Services for the vulnerable groups in Gaza Strip. 2016.

Croix-Rouge de Belgique. Single form. Access to health services for the victims of the conflict and population with disabilities in the Gaza Strip. Starting date 2015. (Single Form - Final narrative report)

Enabel. Agence belge de développement. Cooperation Portfolio Palestine. 2022-2027.

Finland's Humanitarian Aid to the Palestinian territory.  
<https://finlandabroad.fi/web/pse/humanitarian-aid>

FAO. Solar energy to protect and restore agricultural productive capacities and livelihoods in the Gaza Strip. Terminal Report. 2019-2019. (+ project proposal, final review)

Handicap International. Single Form. Ensuring protection of the most vulnerable people in the Gaza Strip. Starting date 1 September 2016)

Joint Strategic Framework 2022-2026 Palestine. February 2021. (Participating agencies: APEFE, Broederlijk Delen, Caritas, OXFAM, Solidagro, Solsco, Viva Salud).

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Single Form. Humanitarian support to contribute to the Protection of Palestinians in the West Bank from Forcible Transfer. 2017 (starting date 1 September 2017 – 12 months).

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Single Form. Humanitarian support to contribute to the Protection of Palestinians in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Forcible Transfer. 2016. (starting date 01 July 2016) (Main application, Narrative report)

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Single Form. Humanitarian support to contribute to the Protection of Palestinians in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Forcible Transfer. 2015.(starting date 01 September 2015) (Final narrative report)


Oxfam. Promote the transformative protection of the vulnerable population in the Gaza Strip, OPT. 2020. Ongoing.

Oxfam. Single Form. Protecting Lives in Closed Borders. Towards addressing Gaza's humanitarian needs. 2016. (starting date 01 November 2016)

Oxfam. Integrated Protection in Area C: Enhancing the Resilience of Communities to Violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law. 2015. (starting 01 November 2015) (proposal and final narrative report)

- Particip. Evaluation of Finland's Country Strategy Approach in Fragile Contexts. 2019.
- SIDA. Humanitarian Crisis Analysis 2022. Palestine.
- UN OCHA. Humanitarian Needs Overview OPT. Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2022. Working Document. Issued December 2021.
- UN OCHA. OPT Humanitarian Fund 2019 Annual Report.
- UN OCHA. Supporting OCHA's Role in Global Humanitarian Financing. Funding Proposal. 2019.
- UNRWA. Project Proposal. Education in Emergencies for Palestine Refugee children – Phase III. Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Gaza and West Bank. (1 November 2021 – 31 October 2022)
- UNRWA. Education in Emergencies for Palestine refugee children. Final report. 18 July 2016 – 30 April 2019. (report for the Belgian Development Cooperation). 2019.
- UNRWA. (1a) (1b) Education in Emergencies (EiE) for Palestine Refugee Children. Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Gaza and West Bank. 1 July 2016 – 30 June 2018.
- UNRWA. Project Completion Report. Support to Emergency Job Creation and Transitional Shelter Cash Assistance (TSCA) Programmes in Gaza. (20 November 2017 – 19 November 2018)
- UNRWA. Proposal. Support to Emergency Job Creation and Transitional Shelter Cash Assistance (TSCA) Programmes in Gaza. 2017.
- UNRWA. Project Final Report. Support to UNRWA shelter programme in Gaza after the 2014 hostilities and Mobile Community Mental Health for vulnerable Bedouin Palestine refugees in the West Bank. (December 2015 – December 2016).
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- West Bank Protection Consortium. Advance Consulting Services. 2018. External Evaluation of the West Bank Protection Consortium 2015-2017.
- West Bank Protection Consortium. Transition/exit strategy.
- West Bank Protection Consortium. How is the Resilience and Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus implemented by the WBPC?
- West Bank Protection Consortium. Fostering beneficiary ownership in material assistance. Burden-sharing arrangements in the West Bank Protection Consortium.
- West Bank Protection Consortium. Community Profile. Al Jab'a. Bethlehem Governorate. 2021.





## Annex E: Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAH	Action Against Hunger
ADE	Aide à la Décision Économique
APEFE	Association pour la Promotion de l'Éducation et de la Formation à l'Étranger
BAHIA	Belgian Alliance for Humanitarian International Aid
CBPF	Country-based Pooled Funds
COVID-19	Coronavirus 2019
CRB	Croix Rouge Belge
CWD	Children with Disabilities
DGD	Directorate General for Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EiE	Education in Emergencies
EQ	Evaluation Questions
EUR	Euro
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FPS	Federal Public Services
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
GVC	Gruppo di Volontariato Civile
H&I	Humanity and Inclusion
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HF	Humanitarian Fund
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
JSF	Joint Strategic Framework
KII	Key Informant Interview
MdM	Médecins du Monde
MEAL	Monitoring Evaluation Accountability and Learning
MSNA	Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNGO	National NGO
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OPT	occupied Palestine territory
P&P	Projects and Programmes
PiN	People in Need
PNGO	Palestine NGO Network
PSS	Psychosocial Support
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
PUI	Première Urgence Internationale
SeO	Special Evaluation Office
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SIDA	Sweden's government agency for development cooperation
TSCA	Transitional Shelter Cash Assistance
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Analysis Framework
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nation's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees
US	United States
USD	United States Dollar
WB	World Bank
WBPC	West Bank Protection Consortium
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WW	WeWorld