

Country Case Study: Indonesia

# EVALUATION OF CITIZENS' VOICE & ACCOUNTABILITY



September 2008



# Preface

Since the 1990s there has been a growing emphasis on the quality of governance as a central factor influencing poverty reduction and macroeconomic stability and therefore the achievement of the MDGs. Citizens' Voice and Accountability (CV&A) are important dimensions of good governance. It is widely acknowledged that both citizens and state institutions have a role to play in delivering governance that works for the poor and enhances democracy. Citizens' capacity to express and exercise their views has the potential to influence government priorities and processes, for example when stronger demands are made for transparency and accountability. However, in order to convey their views, citizens need effective "voice". For their part, governments or states that can be held accountable for their actions are more likely to respond to the needs and demands thus articulated by their population. There is, however, a lack of evidence and real understanding of the dynamic and complex nature of factors influencing voice and accountability and thus a need to more systematically examine and evaluate current interventions.

The objectives of the CV&A evaluation were therefore to improve understanding among donors and help improve aid policy and practice on CV&A by assessing the effects of a range of CV&A interventions on governance, aid effectiveness and sustainability in a variety of developing country in order to learn lessons on which approaches have worked best, where and why.

The evaluation was commissioned jointly by a core group of DAC partners from Belgium (SES), Denmark (Danida), Norway (Norad), Sweden (Sida), Switzerland (SDC), the UK (DFID) and Germany (BMZ) and managed on their behalf by DFID. The Evaluation Core Group provided guidance for the evaluation. Country cases studies on CV&A were conducted in Bangladesh, DR Congo, Mozambique, Nepal and Indonesia. They followed a literature review and pilot case studies in Benin and Nicaragua. The reports from the case studies will feed into a synthesis report undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), UK.

The country case study in Indonesia was commissioned by the Evaluation and Audit Division of BMZ and co-financed by DFID and Norad. It was carried out by **Dr. Jan Douwe Meindertsma** (team leader), **Dr. Jörn Dosch**, **Mrs. Joana Ebbinghaus** (international co-evaluators) and **Mr. Faisal Djalal** (national co-evaluator).

The evaluation in Indonesia took place in the period from November 2007 to February 2008. Seven case studies with a total of ten selected CV&A interventions were carried out. The interventions cover the national, the district as well as the community level. State and non-state actors are involved, as well as interventions in urban and rural areas. The evaluation assessed the selected interventions against their intended objectives and their relevance for strengthening voice and accountability. In addition, an overall assessment of donors' role, success and failures in supporting CV&A in the Indonesian context was undertaken. This led to conclusions on what works and what does not in the Indonesian context.

As usual, the opinions presented in this study are those of independent external experts and do not necessarily reflect the views of the BMZ or any other member of the Evaluation Core Group. This report can be downloaded from the BMZ website: <http://www.bmz.de/en/service/infothek/evaluation/index.html>. It should be cited as: Meindertsma, Jan Douwe et al. (2008): Evaluation of Citizens' Voice & Accountability. Country Case Study: Indonesia. Evaluation Report. Bonn: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

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## Abbreviations and glossary

Accountability	Accountability exists when those who set and implement society's rules – politicians and public officials- are answerable to the people who live under those rules. In this evaluation the focus is on the relationship between the state and its citizens and the extent to which the state is accountable to its citizens.
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ALIT	<i>Yayasan Arek Lintang</i> (Arek Lintang Foundation) Surabaya
ASSD	Advisory Service Support for Decentralisation (GTZ-supported Project)
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
Bappenas	<i>Badan Perencanaan Nasional</i> (National Development Planning Board)
BKN	<i>Badan Kepegawaian Negara</i> (National Civil Service Authority)
BMZ	<i>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</i> (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) (Germany)
BRIDGE	Building and Reinventing Decentralized Governance (UNDP Project)
Bupati	District Head
CB Kades	Capacity Building for Village Heads (Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung)
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CCS	Country Case Study
CEFIL	Civic Education for Future Indonesian Leaders
CGI	Consultative Group on Indonesia
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIM	Centre for International Migration (Germany)
CS	Civil Society
CSIAP	Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty (The Asia Foundation)
CSIAP-ALIT	<i>Yayasan Arek Lintang</i>
CSIAP NTB	<i>West Nusa Tenggara</i> (Nusa Tenggara Barat)
CSIAP-PATTIRO	Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty (The Asia Foundation) Research and Information Center (PATTIRO)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CV&A	Citizens' Voice & Accountability
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
Danida	Danish International Development Agency

Demand side	Interventions working directly with NGOs, CSOs on their ability to express their voice, as well as to improve channels along which it is expressed
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DGDC	Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (Belgium)
DPA	<i>Dewan Peduli Anggaran</i> (Board concerned with Budget Issues)
DPD	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Daerah</i> (Regional Representative Council)
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> (House of Representatives)
DPRD	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> (District Representative Council)
DRSP	Democratic Reform Support Project (USAID-funded)
DSF	Decentralisation Support Facility
EC	European Commission
ECG	Evaluation Core Group
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Germany, Political Foundation)
FNS	Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (Germany, Political Foundation)
GDI	Gender Development Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLG	Good Local Governance (GTZ-supported Project)
GOI	Government of Indonesia
GTZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH</i> (German Technical Cooperation)
HDI	Human Development Index
HPI	Human Poverty Index
ILGR	Initiative for Local Governance Reforms (World Bank)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INFID	International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development
IRCOS	Institute for Research and Community Development Studies
JBIC	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JWGD	Joint Donor Working Group on Decentralisation
Kabupaten	District
KAS	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Germany, Political Foundation)
KDP	Kecamatan Development Programme (World Bank Programme)
Kecamatan	Sub-district
LAN	<i>Lembaga Administrasi Negara</i> (National Institute for State Administration)

LEAD	Access to Justice for Disadvantaged Groups (UNDP managed Programme)
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MenPan	Ministry for Administrative Reforms
MFP	Multistakeholder Forestry Programme (DFID)
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
Musrenbang	<i>Musyawahar Perencanaan Pembangunan</i> (Village Development Planning)
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NT	<i>Nusa Tenggara</i> (West and East Nusa Tenggara Province)
NTB	<i>Nusa Tenggara Barat</i> (West Nusa Tenggara Province)
NTT	<i>Nusa Tenggara Timor</i> (East Nusa Tenggara Province)
NU	<i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i>
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute (UK)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAR	Participatory Action Research
PARC	Performance Assessment Resource Center
Perda	<i>Peraturan Daerah</i> (Local By-Law)
Perum Perhutani	State-Owned Forestry Company
PKK	<i>Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga</i> (Indonesian Women's Organisation)
PNPM	<i>Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat</i> (National Community Empowerment Programme)
Political Foundations (Germany, <i>Stiftungen</i> )	Germany has developed a unique system of political foundations. As legally independent institutions that are affiliated with one of the six major German political parties they provide civic education, political information, research, and consultancy. Their stated goal is to promote the democratic involvement of citizens, both in Germany and abroad.
PROMIS	Poverty Alleviation and Support for Local Governance in NTB and NTT (GTZ-supported Programme)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Rp	<i>Rupiah</i> (Indonesian currency); USD 1 = Rp 9,000; € 1 = Rp 13,000
SATUNAMA	Name of Indonesian Non-Governmental Organisation
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SES	Special Evaluation Unit (of DGDC, Belgium)
SfDM	Support for Decentralisation Measures (GTZ-supported Project)

SfGG	Support for Good Governance (GTZ-supported Project)
Sida	Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
Sofei	Support Office for Eastern Indonesia
SPADA	Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas Project (World Bank)
Supply side	Interventions working with government institutions on improving accountability
TA	Technical Assistance
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
V&A	Voice & Accountability
Voice	The capacity to express views and interests and the exercise of this capacity. Voice is about poor people expressing their views and interests in an effort to influence government priorities and government processes.
WB	The World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization

# 0.Executive summary

## **Background and purpose**

There is an increasing emphasis in development forums on governance as the key dimension to addressing poverty reduction and inequality and promoting economic stability and growth. This goes beyond the institutional framework of government to address the interaction between formal and informal actors, processes, customs and rules. It is a process of bargaining between those who hold power and those who seek to influence it. But only those who can convey their views have a “voice” and only governments or states that are accountable, and can be held so, will respond.

This Country Case Study Indonesia on strengthening Citizens’ Voice and Accountability (CV&A) is part of a joint donor evaluation exercise. Similar evaluations are being conducted in four other countries (Nepal, Bangladesh, Mozambique and DR Congo).

The overall objectives of the CV&A evaluation are twofold:

- To improve understanding of CV&A among development partners by mapping and documenting approaches and strategies of development partners for enhancing CV&A in a variety of developing country contexts; and to learn lessons on which approaches have worked best, where and why.
- To assess effects of a range of donor CV&A interventions on governance and on aid effectiveness, and whether these effects are sustainable.

The purpose of the country case study is to:

- Assess the selected interventions against their intended objectives, and on the basis of that draw conclusions on what works, and what does not, in relation to intervention programme theories;
- Assess the relevance of the interventions for strengthening CV&A in the Indonesian context;
- Provide an overall assessment/analysis of donors’ roles, success and failures in supporting CV&A in the Indonesian context.

## **Selection of interventions to be evaluated**

First, a long list was prepared in which all programmes and projects of the ECG members were included. From this long list, seven programmes with a total of ten interventions, co-funded by BMZ and DFID were selected for the present evaluation. This was done in an iterative process applying several sets of selection criteria. These included ‘*eligibility criteria*’ for individual interventions, such as: (i) ‘maturity’; (ii) focus on CV&A in parts or overall; (iii) substantial share of bilateral funding in the total funding of the intervention; (iv) size; as well as criteria for the *overall sample* to maintain a good balance in aspects, such as: (i) ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ interventions; (ii) administrative levels; (iii) themes and areas; (iv) geographical spread; (v) mix of implementing agencies and modalities. Finally, a number of practical and logistical criteria were taken into account, such as (i) ‘willingness to cooperate’; (ii) coverage of donors; (iii) specific location.

## **Evaluation methodology**

Regarding the evaluation methodology, the ‘evaluation framework for CV&A’ developed by ODI has been broadly followed. The findings are grouped according to the framework’s five components: The first three: (1) Opportunities, constraints and entry points; (2) Capacities of state and non-state actors; and (3) Channels (actors and mechanisms) form *in interaction with the Con-*

*text the Enabling Environment* that result in two levels of results: (4) Changes in policy practise, behaviour and power relations, and (5) Changes in societal or overall development objectives.

### **Field visits and data collection**

The evaluation team took a strategic decision to visit as many interventions as possible directly in the location where their actions took place. This meant that the time spent in Jakarta was kept to a minimum. Field visits were undertaken to four different locations in Central and East Java and three to some of the most poor and remote areas of Indonesia, i.e. West and East Nusa Tenggara, Lombok, Bima (Sumbawa) and Alor. The field visits also showed how stakeholders react and interact with target groups and partners. In addition, some of the meetings unexpectedly involved large numbers of people, including not only official representatives of project partners and counterparts, but also the beneficiaries of interventions.

The main emphasis in data collection instruments has been on focal group discussions, qualitative interviews and group discussions with project-implementing agencies, as well as consultation of basic project documentation, i.e. project formulation documents, progress and final reports, and internal and external evaluation reports. The availability of reports varied among the interventions.

### **Context for CV&A**

Since the financial crisis of 1998/99 and ending of the Suharto regime, Indonesia has gone through an impressive process of structural political change that is expected to continue for the years to come, i.e. new democratic institutions and free elections, freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media and a reduced political role of the armed forces.

The political system, however, is still constrained by a high level of corruption, patronage politics and lack of rule of law. The independence of the judicial branch has grown during the post-1998 transformation to democratic rule and is no longer directly dependent on the government's interests. At the same time, the judicial sector is considered to be the most corrupt in Southeast Asia. Systematic corruption in Indonesian courts, including the Supreme Court, has not improved but rather consolidated. Moreover, Indonesia's law enforcement agencies lack trained human resources capable of effectively managing their increased responsibilities in a democratic society.

The financial crisis of 1997/98, which had a tremendous effect on the economy and well-being of the people, has been overcome. The Indonesian economy has grown substantially over the past years (with an annual increase in GDP of 6%). The improved economic performance is reflected in increased fiscal space, public spending and investments and progress made in a large series of structural reforms. Nevertheless, the number of the poor and unemployed is still high and little improvement in reducing poverty and inequality has been made. State institutions have been equally unsuccessful in reducing gender-based exclusion. In Indonesia's paternalistic culture, it is still difficult for women to gain access to public office and the political will to introduce comprehensive gender-based reforms is lacking. Women in general remain marginalised in various sectors.

The decentralisation process (Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 32/2004) represents the most decisive transformation of the administrative infrastructure in the country's history. Within almost half a decade, Indonesia has moved from being one of the most centralised countries to one of the most decentralised worldwide. Decentralisation moves have included not only the transfer of both fiscal and political responsibility from Jakarta to the districts and municipalities, but also

democratic reforms, such as direct elections of district heads. If the quality of public service delivery is taken as a barometer for reform efforts, it can be stated that on average no significant improvements were made since the onset of decentralisation. On the other hand, its continuation at a similar quality as in the pre-decentralisation setting can already be taken as an achievement. Unclear legal frameworks, weak oversight from the national level, endemic corruption, rent-seeking mentalities within the public administration and limited capacities, including those of local councillors, are major factors contributing to bad governance practices at local level.

A lack of capacity – especially with regard to citizens' voice and accountability – is not only a matter of limited technical skills, but also a question of political will. It is difficult, though, to come up with overall statements regarding the reform-mindedness of political leaders in the decentralised setting. In general and especially compared with other post-authoritarian countries within and outside the region, Indonesia's government has shown a strong willingness for democratic reforms, reflected in numerous government decrees and statements. In a highly decentralised setting, the reform-mindedness of individual local leaders makes a difference to the ability of citizens to make their voices heard and for the functioning of accountability.

Accounts of civil society performance are mixed. Between 1997 and 2002 alone, the number of NGOs grew from a few (officially registered) hundreds to tens of thousands. The civil society scene – largely dominated by advocacy-based CSOs – is lively and in part well developed. Civil society networks related to voter's education and election monitoring have, for instance, proved to be very effective in contributing significantly to the overall peaceful, well informed and well managed elections. They also played a crucial role in influencing public policies in the areas of democracy building, protecting human rights and empowering citizens. However, they have not been particularly successful in influencing public budget policies and in making the private sector more accountable or in meeting the needs of marginalised people.

### **Aid environment with a focus on CV&A**

Indonesia is not an aid-dependent country. In 2005, it reached the status of a Middle Income Country according to OECD categories. On average, ODA to Indonesia is about USD 1.46 billion yearly, which is about 0.5% of GDP. In percentage of public expenditure, total ODA spending amounts to around 4.3%.

Japan is by far the largest donor (735 million USD), followed by the United States (164 million USD), the Netherlands (107 million USD) and Australia (97 million USD). Germany ranks 8<sup>th</sup> with USD 30 million and the UK 11<sup>th</sup> with 22 million USD (annual average 2000-2005). JBIC, ADB and the World Bank are the most important lending institutions for development related loans.

Supporting the overall reform process in Indonesia and specifically contributing to improved governance is a priority reflected in all country strategies and programme outlines of the major donor organisations at all levels (national, provincial, district, village and community).

In recent years, an increasing number of donor-funded projects have started engaging directly at the local level, providing capacity building to district government units and/or strengthening civil society institutions, including the media (one-third of all donor projects). Support to justice sector reforms also ranks high on multi-donor agendas (ADB, UNDP, EC), as it is seen as essential for the overall reform process and especially for curbing corruption.

From the onset of decentralisation, the GTZ (BMZ-funding), the World Bank (through the Dutch Trust Fund), JICA, CIDA, UNDP and USAID provided assistance to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Finance as the major actors in developing the regulatory framework for decentralisation and democratic reforms. In subsequent years, more donors attached themselves to the National Planning Board as the central government institution responsible for overall donor coordination. Instead of the bilateral implementation of projects, DFID has chosen to link closely with the World Bank and ADB in order to influence the poverty policies of these major lending institutions.

Indonesia is not a priority country for any of the smaller ECG donors. They share the main strategies and policies of the main donors on environmental management, good governance, anti-corruption and human rights. These ECG donors predominantly support non-state actors. They either channel their funding through large national NGOs, research institutes or basket funding, such as the Partnership for Governance Reform and UNDP-managed programmes on human rights and democratisation.

Modalities for aid delivery in Indonesia can mainly be classified into three different categories: direct implementation, outsourcing and basket funding. The third form has increased in importance, mainly through the establishments of Multi-Donor Trust Funds, whereas the share of direct implementation is decreasing. Sector-wide approaches or budget support that are common instruments of donors in other parts of the world are not being implemented in Indonesia.

The establishment of effective mechanisms and platforms for dialogue and coordination with donors is a difficult challenge. This is partly due to the high number of Indonesian government institutions with frequently overlapping and unclear mandates, which makes governance reforms and democratisation efforts that cut across all sectors a complex undertaking. Nevertheless, there are also sentiments about foreign aid that see it as promoting the donors' own agendas and not necessarily reflecting Indonesian interests. Donors often complain about the general lack of direction and commitment of the GOI for coordinated donor aid.

### **Opportunities and entry points**

The most important overall entry point is the decentralisation process with a lot of opportunities it raises for increased civil society participation (citizens and the private sector) as well as inherent weaknesses and shortcomings of the ongoing reform. Interventions are directed at the empowerment of local governance institutions to fulfil their functions (especially in planning, budgeting and provision of public services) and implementing pro-poor development strategies and policies. Specific entry points are the low quality of public services, rampant corruption, the need for citizens to demand better public services, the emergence of CSOs that monitor local government performance and demand improved accountability and the need to improve CSO – government relations, which are still dominated by mutual distrust. Donors generally assume improved governance practices and better public services will automatically contribute to reduced poverty without clearly conceptualising how to include marginalised groups into CV&A activities.

Other interventions focus on poverty alleviation and capacity building of NGOs and CSOs in strengthening the voice of the poor, while promoting an enabling policy, i.e. natural resource management, social services like health, education and others. The main entry points are insufficient pro-poor and gender-balanced budgeting, low-quality service provision by local governments and the limited access of the poor to these services.

## **Constraints**

Constraints include the low capacity of state and non-state actors, the long tradition of top-down approaches in the design and planning of development programmes (mindset of officials), endemic corruption, and a strongly sector-structured government that leads to the duplication of efforts. There is little room for the development of integrated programmes and a lack of incentives and/or driving force once donor funding has ended. The fractured nature of civil society organisations leads to most working alongside each other rather than cooperating on core issues despite the existence of networks. A major constraint at the implementation level is that reform-mindedness is not broadly embedded in local governments and reform-resistant pockets and factions still exist.

## **Capacities of state and non-state actors**

Local governments are endowed with new and major responsibilities for local economic, social and political development and, correspondingly, highly increased funds. However, these are not matched with the existing capabilities and the mindsets of the executive and legislative apparatus. Local governments face legal, financial and structural challenges with regard to recruiting qualified staff and to developing their human resources. Local government-owned training facilities are often characterised by insufficient financial resources. Furthermore, low teaching qualities and training for government officials is mainly considered a requirement for promotion between ranks, instead of a means of genuinely developing skills. Consequently, there is a great need for building the capacity of local government department and agency staff.

The relationships between CSOs and the government are still marked by mutual suspicion and distrust. A genuine dialogue, support and cooperation between civil society and the state are still rare. CSOs themselves are not free of corruption and in their internal management they seldom apply principles of transparency and accountability. Religious organisations generally enjoy a high level of trust, whereas towards NGOs there is still a marked level of mistrust, probably as NGOs are generally urban-based organisations and the majority of the rural population having little direct interaction with them.

CSOs lack a number of basic, as well as technical skills, such as sufficient proficiency in English, skills for proposal-writing and networking capacities. NGOs at local level often still depend on intermediary national NGOs to gain access to international funding. Donors themselves contribute to this problem by tending to rely on those NGOs they have already established relationships with, not wanting to take risks by cooperating with less experienced or well-connected NGOs. Direct collaboration between CBOs and donors is rare. With a few exceptions, hardly any organisations genuinely represent the poor or other marginalised groups. Women's organisations other than the compulsory uniform women's organisation PKK, generally headed by the wife of the village head's wife, are hard to find.

## **CV&A channels and processes**

Quite a number of interventions address both 'supply' and 'demand' sides. However, donors seem to predominantly perceive themselves either as a partner of civil society actors or as a partner of government institutions. Both types of interventions may also involve government or civil society respectively, but if so, then only to a limited degree. Therefore, equal engagement of both state and non-state actors is still rare. Regarding the demand side, funding is often channelled through international NGOs that predominantly play the role of a financing agency for local NGOs, with little direct involvement in programme implementation. Projects focusing on policy advice at national level (supply side) have the potential of engaging with both state and non-state actors, but sometimes still have to deal with strong reservations of government offi-

cial in engaging with civil society actors that limit them, in turn, to engage equally with both sides.

The wide range of mechanisms used and the major actors involved are summarized in Table 1.

**Table 1: Summary of CV&A channels: mechanisms and actors**

Mechanisms	Actors	V, A (1)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Advice to drafting of laws and acts, incl. facilitation of civil society participation involving NGOs</li> </ul>	National government (Ministry of Home Affairs), NGO	V
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Customer complaint survey in public service delivery</li> <li>▪ Capacity building for government watchdog organisations</li> </ul>	Local governments, customers of public services, NGOs,	A
	National government (Ministry of Administrative Reforms and National Institute for Administration)	V, A
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Improvement of annual bottom-up development process</li> </ul>	Village communities, village government, sub-district administration	V
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Public Hearings on local by-laws</li> </ul>	Local government, CSOs	V
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Religious events</li> <li>▪ Budget analysis and monitoring</li> <li>▪ Public expenditure tracking</li> </ul>	Islamic mass-based organisations, local parliaments, local government, 'street people', health personnel	V
		V, A
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Multi-stakeholder forums and dialogues for development planning, public policies</li> <li>▪ Participatory Action Research</li> <li>▪ Demonstration sites</li> <li>▪ Media training</li> <li>▪ Policy-related research</li> <li>▪ Regional information centres</li> </ul>	NGOs, farmers organisations / representatives, women's representatives, youth representatives	V
	Local government,	
	National government, research institutes, local print media and radio journalists	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Trainings for village heads</li> </ul>	Village heads, district officials as resource persons	A
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Civic education training</li> </ul>	Civil society leaders	V,A

Source: CCS-Indonesia Team, based on interviews with project staff, conducted field visits, consultation of project and related documentation.

Note (1). V stands for Voice; A stands for Accountability

The “public hearing” or “public consultation” mechanisms were found to be major channels developed and applied by donors in Indonesia. Although they often have a limited openness (official, written invitations needed, only specific stakeholders or their representatives, hardly inclusion of marginalized groups), they generally have fostered the hearing of citizens' voice.

Applied by a few interventions, multi-stakeholder forums that focussed on the demand side were much more open and had a more valid representation of all sides. They proved to be a successful instrument. The introduction of a customer complaint survey in one of the interventions is an innovative instrument that, against all odds, worked very well.

Collaboration with non-traditional organisations is still rather underdeveloped in Indonesia, except with Islamic organisations. Engaging with Islamic mass-based organisations is generally considered a very innovative approach by development practitioners. To contribute to a well-developed and active civil society that expresses its voice and demands accountability, these organisations still have great potential to become partners for donor initiatives. It needs to be kept in mind though, that their traditional base does not extend to the whole of Indonesia. Ex-

emptions are found especially in Christian areas, but also in those regions dominated by customary law and traditional socio-cultural norms.

**Changes in policy practice, behaviour and power relations**

Table 2 presents an assessment of the changes brought about by the evaluated interventions. Most projects showed good results in achieving change in voice and accountability issues. The interventions were most effective in positively changing state responsiveness (i.e. willingness to respond to demands/actions), but not all interventions were successful in improving accountability (ability and willingness to be kept accountable). Due to the bias in intervention selection (i.e. concentrating on those that explicitly aimed at strengthening CV&A, as well as poverty alleviation), the evaluated interventions obtained good results in changing inequality and discrimination, and, to a lesser extent, to changing power relations between the state and government organisations and citizens. However, when it comes to the concrete implementation of agreements and regulations (providing pro-poor budgets and better/more services), expectations were often only partially met. This shows that constraints and the adverse interests among executive powers to maintain the status quo are still strong (even in reform-minded institutions and local governments).

**Table 2: Changes brought about by the evaluated nine interventions (1)**

Changes	Good results		No good results		
	Very much, above expectation	Sufficient, according to expectation	Below expectation	Far below expectation	
Contribution to change					N.A, unknown (2)
1. State responsiveness	*	****			****
2. State accountability	*	**	**		****
3. Power relation		***	** *		***
4. Inequality, discrimination	*	*****		*	**
5. Budget reallocation		**	***		****
6. More, better services	*	**	****		**

Source: CCS-Indonesia Team, based on interviews with project staff, conducted field visits, consultation of project and related documentation.

Notes (1). \* represents interventions; (2) N.A. stands for "Not applicable": not all interventions address or lead to all six mentioned contributions of change.

Interventions were found to be most effective in strengthening CV&A when they:

- address both the supply and demand side;
- work effectively at the national level (policies) and at the local level;
- work with multi-stakeholder processes (partners need to see each other as constructive);
- are able to link grass-root engagement with advocacy at policy level as part of institutionalised mechanisms (should not be ad-hoc, related to individuals);
- work is undertaken with concrete examples, demonstrations, tested guidelines, pilots, combined with a good communication strategy that encourages multiplication and imitation;
- have specific issues and target groups, instead of broad, undefined objectives;
- are designed based on a thorough analysis of socio-political contexts (forming alliances).

**DAC evaluation criteria**

Regarding the DAC evaluation criteria, the assessment has been in general positive. All interventions are relevant and almost half of them are very relevant for strengthening V&A. No seri-

ous shortcomings were identified in terms of efficiency: projects are usually good value for money (though for some interventions no assessment could be made). On the whole, all interventions obtained a satisfactory assessment for achieving their objectives (effectiveness). Overall, interventions have been assessed as having impact, but compared to the other DAC criteria this criterion does not come out as strong: obtaining only satisfactory scores (or + and mixed +/- scores) and with none obtaining a very high score (++). This is explained by the many constraints that are mainly outside the control of the interventions. No serious concerns related to sustainability have been detected (except for in one intervention).

### **Pathways to development objectives**

There is no strong empirical evidence for a clear positive relationship between CV&A and development (especially poverty reduction) in Indonesia as in most democratising polities. It is a matter of the actual performance of a democratic system, the way that opportunities of the environment are shaped and seized, and the actual interests and strategies of state and non-state actors (as well as formal and informal relationships between the two groups) that determine to what degree CV&A positively impacts on development. In this regard, all evaluated CV&A interventions in Indonesia ultimately focus, either directly or indirectly, on the improvement of democracy and good governance, more sustainable use of natural resources and reduced conflicts on the one hand, and poverty alleviation (decreased vulnerability of the poor; improved economic well-being; secured rights of the poor) on the other. In most cases there are clear explicit or implicit links to the MDGs<sup>1</sup>. Enhancing the consistency of the various decentralisation policies and improved citizens' participation are expected to reinforce the positive effect of reforms on poverty reduction and political stabilisation in Indonesia. Each intervention is designed and implemented in a way that it contributes towards overall change, but the impact is felt locally and in small segments of society: it is still "pocket-wise". Scaling-up is needed to really make a difference and many are needed to make it work.

### **Strengthening CV&A and aid effectiveness**

Most of the evaluated interventions do not contribute directly to overall donor harmonisation. Moreover, joint donor-GOI coordination has become much less intense over the past few years, e.g. through the disbanding of the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), and a lack of commitment and interest in sector-wide approaches from the GOI. On the other hand, a good part of the interventions contribute to policy making in specific areas (forest management, decentralisation legislation and by-laws, and are therefore involved in a policy dialogue with the GOI at national and local levels.

The Indonesian Government admits that there is still a lot of work to be done in terms of further developing and implementing reforms and tackling poverty in the country. It therefore continues to value foreign assistance. However, there is currently no clear plan or seemingly little interest on the side of the Indonesian government to harness those mechanisms of donor coordination or multi-donor policy dialogue already in place. Indonesia is not in an aid-dependent position and does not need to accept preconditions set by donor organisations to qualify for their support.

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<sup>1</sup> "Democracy and Good Governance", as well as "Political Participation" are identified in the Millennium Declaration as prerequisites for achieving the MDGs

Nevertheless, in the Indonesian context, bilaterally funded interventions may well impact on policy formulation and legislation, or may even be in a better position than multilateral aid initiatives.

Ownership is a crucial factor when it comes to aid effectiveness. The supply-oriented interventions tried to ensure that national ownership over the decentralisation process is maintained and that the Indonesian government is not “pushed” in a way that it might block or even reverse the reform. At the same time, mutual accountability, i.e. making sure that the aid relationship is embedded in an accountability mechanism that guarantees an adequate degree of monitoring of reciprocal commitments, is not well developed yet. The demand-oriented interventions tried to influence policies by taking on board government actors in multi-donor forums and by building coalitions with like-minded executive and legislative representatives.

## **Recommendations**

In line with the approach of this evaluation, recommendations put forward are directed towards the donors. Donors should:

### *On the overall approach*

- address both the supply and demand side;
- work effectively both at national level (policies) and at the local level;
- work with multi-stakeholder processes (partners need to see each other as constructive);
- explore and tap the potential for accountability channels, especially in order to reach and engage disempowered community members;
- pay more attention to mechanisms for improving the accountability of parliamentarians towards their electorate;
- in strengthening CSOs, improve their legitimacy and outreach towards the community (their constituency), i.e. improve CSO transparency and accountability, and in particular their engagement with marginalised groups;
- develop a much clearer pro-poor approach; empower communities to increase their access to services and decision-making at village level, with a special focus on marginalised people, such as women and the poor;
- not rely exclusively on setting up dialogue forums based only on representation, but ensure that marginalised people themselves also get a chance to participate.

### *On operational issues*

- build trust through long-lasting relationships (even in times when other donors withdraw due to resistance against reform and participatory approaches);
- take sufficient time to understand local socio-political dynamics in order to select adequate partners and devise effective strategies;
- pay more attention to empowering partners to take over donor roles (exit strategies);
- conceptualise a poverty-focus in interventions aiming to improve governance and service delivery;
- put better monitoring and evaluation systems in place that include updates on local socio-political developments and allow a continuous learning process for local partners themselves;
- undertake more efforts in terms of quality control, especially when donors operate through intermediate organisation.

### *On policy dialogue*

- not advocate too openly for political reforms; donors should combine technical capacity building requested by government partners with the facilitation of participation and citizens' feedback in service delivery or decision making;
- (taking the above into account) continue contributing to structural reforms at national level, such as regarding the judicial system, civil service reform, tackling corruption as well as electoral reforms;
- directly link empowerment of excluded and marginalised groups with interventions aiming to influence policy decisions;
- address political will and support local governments in the implementation of reforms by accompanying tangible benefits;
- work with reform-minded actors in order to strengthen change agents and foster role models.

# 1. Introduction

## *Background: this report and the team*

The report forms the third and final output of the CCS Indonesia of the Joint Evaluation of Strengthening Citizens' Voice and Accountability (CV&A). The first output consisted of the Inception Report (Draft version 19 November 2007; Final Report, Jakarta, 9 December 2007). The second output was a PowerPoint presentation, containing the evaluation approach, preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations that was presented and discussed at the Debriefing Meeting in Jakarta on 18 December 2007.

The evaluation team consisted of Dr. Jan Douwe Meindertsma (team leader), Dr. Jörn Dosch, Mrs. Joana Ebbinghaus (international co-evaluators) and Mr. Faisal Djalal (national co-evaluator). This team had been carefully selected along the lines of overall and specific in-country knowledge and complementarity. The evaluation team is, therefore, in an excellent position to assess and make judgements on the context and specific features of CV&A in Indonesia. A description of the team members' profiles is provided in Appendix B.

## *Background: evaluation on CV&A*

There is an increasing emphasis in development forums on governance as the key dimension to addressing poverty reduction and inequality and promoting economic stability and growth. This goes beyond the institutional framework of government to address the interaction between formal and informal actors, processes, customs and rules. It is a process of bargaining between those who hold power and those who seek to influence it. But only those who can convey their views have a "voice" and only governments or states that are accountable, and can be held so, will respond.

This Country Case Study (CCS) Report for Indonesia is part of a joint donor evaluation exercise<sup>2</sup>. A similar evaluation is being conducted in four other countries (Nepal, Bangladesh, Mozambique and Congo) which followed a literature review and pilot studies conducted by ODI in Benin and Nicaragua.

## *Objectives, purpose and scope*

The overall objectives of the CV&A evaluation are twofold:

- To improve understanding of CV&A among development partners by mapping and documenting approaches and strategies of development partners for enhancing CV&A in a variety of developing country contexts; and to learn lessons on which approaches have worked best, where and why.
- To assess effects of a range of donor CV&A interventions on governance and on aid effectiveness, and whether these effects are sustainable.

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<sup>2</sup> The Evaluation Core Group (ECG) consists of donor partners from the UK (DFID), Sweden (Sida), Denmark (Danida), Switzerland (SDC), Belgium (SES), Norway (Norad) and Germany (BMZ).

The specific objectives of the country case study are to:

- Assess the selected interventions against their intended objectives, and on the basis of that draw conclusions on what works, and what does not, in relation to intervention programme theories;
- Assess the relevance of the interventions for strengthening CV&A in the Indonesian context;
- Provide an overall assessment/analysis of donors' roles, success and failures in supporting CV&A in the Indonesian context.

### *Scope*

The evaluation of CV&A interventions is based on the common framework (made by ODI) and is carried out according to the processes/steps outlined in the methodological guidance attached as an annex to that document, which provides references to a choice of methods and tools for the evaluation (see documentation ODI for the overall CV&A evaluation).

The basic evaluation questions are:

- What are the concrete channels, i.e. actors, spaces and mechanisms supported by donor-funded interventions, how do these channels work and how important are they to achieve CV&A outcomes?
- To what extent have the different approaches and strategies adopted by donors contributed to enhanced CV&A in partner countries?
- In what ways are CV&A interventions contributing to broader development goals?

More detailed information is contained in the Terms of Reference (see Appendix A).

### *Structure of the report*

The structure of the CCS Indonesia Report follows the template for country studies agreed during the ECG Meeting in Bonn on 20 and 21 October 2007. A few amendments to the template have been made, such as the inclusion of the overview of DAC criteria.

The main report has been kept concise, while a limited number of appendices provide additional information, including the Summary Sheets of each evaluated intervention (Appendix D).

After this introduction (Chapter 1), the evaluation methodology is summarised in the second chapter (a more elaborate version of the methodology is presented in Appendix B). Chapter 3 contains the Indonesian context for CV&A, first focusing on (i) the socio-political situation in relation to democratisation and decentralisation as the major topics, and then providing (ii) a short description of socio-economic conditions; and (iii) the aid environment. Appendix C contains a more extensive version of the context description, including the socio-economic context. The findings are presented in Chapter 4 following the five components of the Evaluation Framework, i.e. (i) entry points; (ii) capacities; (iii) channels; (iv) change; and (v) pathways to development objectives. The conclusions and lessons learned are summarised in Chapter 5, while the final chapter (6) presents the major recommendations.

## 2. Methodology

### 2.1 Selection of CV&A interventions

#### *Selection process*

During the inception phase, a tentative selection was made of interventions subject to this evaluation. First, a so-called long list, containing all interventions supported by the ECG members in Indonesia<sup>3</sup> was prepared (this activity was already initiated before the preparatory visit). Two different levels and categories of indicators were developed and applied to the long list: (i) eligibility criteria for both individual interventions and the overall sample to maintain a desired balance in characteristics; and (ii) substantive and non-substantive criteria. The selection process is further explained in Appendix B. The selection process resulted in seven programmes with a total of ten interventions. A summary is provided in Table 2.1.

**Table 2.1: Summary interventions selected for evaluation**

Title and Acronym	Donor/implementing agency
1. Multistakeholder Forestry Programme ( <b>MFP</b> ) (interventions in NTB and in Yogyakarta)	Funded by DFID, implemented by NGOs and the Ministry of Forestry
2. Poverty Alleviation and Support for Local Governance ( <b>PROMIS</b> )	Funded by the BMZ, implemented by GTZ in 6 Districts in the Nusa Tenggara Provinces
3. Support for Good Governance ( <b>SfGG</b> )	Funded by the BMZ and implemented by GTZ and the Ministry of Administrative Reform
4. Advisory Support Services for Decentralisation ( <b>ASSD</b> )	Funded by the BMZ and implemented by GTZ and the Ministry of Home Affairs
5. Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty ( <b>CSIAP</b> ). With three interventions: (i) <b>NTB</b> Pro-poor budget advocacy in West Nusa Tenggara Province; (ii) <b>PATTIRO</b> , Solo, Central Java; Budget advocacy on Increased health spending (Asia Foundation, PATTIRO); (iii) <b>ALIT</b> Health advocacy programme for the poor, street children	Funded by DFID, coordinated by The Asia Foundation, implemented by (consortia) of local NGOs. The three interventions are not interrelated, but form part of the overall CSIAP programme of The Asia Foundation
6. Capacity Building for Village Heads ( <b>CB KADES</b> )	Funded by the BMZ, implemented by the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS).
7. Civil Education for Future Indonesian Leaders ( <b>CEFIL</b> ); Training conducted by SATUNAMA	Funded by the BMZ, implemented by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS).

Source: CCS- Indonesia Team


<sup>3</sup> For the long list see the Inception Report CCS Indonesia Strengthening Citizens' Voice and Accountability, Jakarta 9 December 2007.

The acronyms included in Table 2.1. will be used throughout the remainder of this report. Basic information on each intervention is presented in the Summary Sheets in Appendix D.

These programmes/interventions were (co)-funded by two ECG donors: BMZ and DFID. Interventions of other ECG donors were not selected as they had one or more of the following characteristics: (i) incidental activities, not being within the mainstream of interventions (SDC); (ii) a very small size (below a certain minimum of around € 100,000 (SES)); (iii) interventions were recently started and therefore they did not qualify as they would not permit the assessment of whether the approach followed was successful or not (Sida, Norad); (iv) low priority of ECG member to be included (Danida).

The location of the field visits paid to the various interventions is shown in the map below.

**Map of Selected CV&A Interventions**



- Jakarta:**  
ASSD,  
SfGG,
- Wonosobo:**  
CB-Kades
- Yogya:**  
CEFIL  
MFP  
MFP
- Solo:**  
CSIAP –  
PATTIRO
- Surabaya:**  
CSIAP –  
ALIT
- Lombok:**  
CSIAP – NTB  
MFP
- Bima/NTB:**  
SfGG  
PROMIS
- Alor/NTT:**  
PROMIS

Table 2.2 presents the overall balance in the criteria for the interventions selected.

**Table 2.2: Selected intervention for the Indonesia CCS CV&A<sup>4</sup>**

	<b>1. MFP</b> Multistakeholder Forestry Programme	<b>2. PROMIS</b> Poverty Alleviation Support Local Governance in NTB and NTT	<b>3. SfGG</b> Support for Good Governance	<b>4. ASSD</b> Advisory Support Services to Decentralisation
<b>Supply-Demand</b>	Both	Both	Both	Supply
<b>Themes</b>	Natural resource management, livelihoods, empowerment, policy advocacy, support to law formulation	Decentralisation, community empowerment, local government reform participatory planning	Decentralisation, anti-corruption, public service delivery, civil society watchdogs, Ministry of Administrative Reform	Decentralisation, participatory process in policy making, law drafting
<b>Beneficiaries</b>	Communities, local and central government	Local government and communities	Local government, watchdog organisations, Indonesian population	Population in general, intermediary organisations
<b>Implementing agency</b>	DFID's own structure of coordinators (1 <sup>st</sup> phase);	GTZ and GOI-Ministry of Home Affairs, local government	GTZ and GOI-Ministry of Administrative Reform	GTZ and Ministry of Home Affairs
<b>Aid modalities</b>	Bilateral	Bilateral TA	Bilateral TA	Bilateral TA
<b>Adm Level</b>	Community, district, national	District and community	District and national	Central
<b>Urban-rural</b>	Rural	Rural and urban	Both	Both
<b>ECG</b>	DFID, Norway	BMZ	BMZ	BMZ
<b>Location</b>	Country-wide NTB, NTT	NTB and NTT	NTB, C-W Java, West Sumatra	Country-wide

<sup>4</sup> Each intervention passed the eligibility criteria, i.e. maturity, strong component CV&A, share ECG in total budget, size, willingness to cooperate

**Table 2.2: Selected intervention for the Indonesia CCS CV&A (continuation)<sup>5</sup>**

	<b>5 CSIP</b> Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty. 5a. NTB: Pro-poor budget advocacy; 5b. PATTIRO: Budget advocacy on increased health spending; 5c. ALIT: Health advocacy for the poor	<b>6. CB KADES</b> Capacity Building councillors and villages heads	<b>7. CEFIL</b> Capacity Building Institution for CSO actors
<b>Supply-Demand</b>	Demand	Supply	Demand
<b>Themes</b>	Promotion of pro-poor budgeting, improved access to basic services for the poor	Democratisation local governance	NGO capacity building, media, civic education
<b>Beneficiaries</b>	Poor segments of the population, street children, women	Members of parliament, villages heads	(Representatives of) Civil Society Organisations
<b>Implementing agency</b>	NGO The Asia Foundation (coordination) and local NGOs	Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS)	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS-SATUNAMA)
<b>Aid modalities</b>	Bilateral	Bilateral	Bilateral
<b>Administrative Level</b>	Community and local government	District and village	Community, district
<b>Urban-rural</b>	Both	Both	Rural
<b>ECG</b>	DFID	BMZ	BMZ
<b>Location</b>	Java and NTB	Sumatra, NTB, NTT, Java	Nationwide, focus Java

## 2.2 Data collection methods used

### *Field visits*

The evaluation team took a strategic decision to visit as many interventions as possible directly in the location where their actions took place. This meant that the time spent in Jakarta was kept to a minimum. Field visits were undertaken to four different locations in Central and East Java and three to some of the most poor and remote areas of Indonesia, i.e. West and East Nusa Tenggara, Lombok, Bima (Sumbawa) and Alor.

Merely visiting offices in the capital would not have generated the richness of information and feeling of what is actually taking place. The practical disadvantage of increased travelling time was taken into account. However, spending more time in Jakarta would

<sup>5</sup> Each intervention passed the eligibility criteria, i.e. maturity, strong component CV&A, share ECG in total budget, size, willingness to cooperate

anyway not have proven much more efficient as due to traffic conditions it usually takes hours to visit offices in the congested metropolis.

The field visits also showed how stakeholders react and interact with target groups and partners. In addition, some of the meetings unexpectedly involved large numbers of people, including not only official representatives of project partners and counterparts but also the beneficiaries of interventions. An extensive overview of meetings held, their participants, and how they were invited, is provided in Appendix E, along with a list of specific interviews conducted.

Another deliberate choice made was to work in two sub-teams of two persons each, with changing sub-team compositions, so as to increase interaction and exchange of experiences within the whole team. This contributed positively to internal team discussions and the formulation of general findings and recommendations.

#### *Data collection instruments*

The main emphasis of data collection has clearly been on focal group discussions, qualitative interviews and group discussions with project-implementing agencies – certainly the most appropriate instruments for the purpose of the evaluation, as they generated a maximum volume of information in a short period of time.

It had been intended to conduct additional participatory approaches such as simplified versions of ‘Most Significant Change’ or some Participatory Rural Appraisal elements (Venn Diagram) for specific projects (see Inception Report). The application of these instruments was foreseen, for instance, in PROMIS areas. However, given the fact that this intervention ended two years ago and that the application of these instruments would have required a long preparation period as well as the intensive involvement of project staff, this could not be realised.

Another instrument used in the evaluation was the so-called “Checklist”, which was actually much more than that. It involved a format based on the five components of the ODI Evaluation Framework prepared for the joint evaluation, as well as all elements needed to make sound assessments of the interventions. It served to keep the team focused on the real issues. The format is included in Appendix B<sup>6</sup>.

For each intervention, essential available project documentation was collected and consulted, i.e. project formulation documents, progress and final reports, internal and external evaluation reports. The availability of reports varied among the projects. Whereas GTZ-funded projects and the MFP had a rich variety of information available, the interventions of the political foundations and the Asian Foundation interventions were much less documented and lacked in general monitoring and evaluation tools, and consequently outcomes are more difficult to assess.

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<sup>6</sup> This checklist was made by the CCS Indonesia Evaluation, and was based on the sub-questions of the ODI Evaluation Framework. The content of the checklists are summarised as evidence in Chapter 4 on Findings.

## 2.3 Challenges and limitations

The obvious constraint for the field study was the fact that it took place very late in the year. Many stakeholders wanted to finalise their own activities before going on leave. Furthermore, important religious holidays fell during the same time as well (Eid ul- Adha, Feast of Sacrifice, and Christmas). Furthermore, the United Nations' Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on Bali took place between December 3 and 14 and was also attended by a large number of high-level donor representatives and embassy staff who, therefore, were not available for the evaluation team to be interviewed. These timing-related constraints were also felt in the turn-out to the Debriefing Meeting. Whereas about 16 stakeholders attended the Launching Meeting, the number of participants was only 9 for the Debriefing Meeting held on December 18, 2007. In both cases about 30 stakeholders were invited by email and fax.

Challenges and limitations regarding the use of the ODI evaluation framework are presented in Appendix B.

### *Coverage of donor-supported CV&A interventions in Indonesia*

The interventions by the ECG donors and especially those selected for this evaluation are not fully representative of the general pattern and approaches of major donor organisations in Indonesia (see the overview in Appendix C, Table C.2.4). This is due to the selection process conducted and, in particular, the criteria for selection applied, as well as the limited time available. Bilateral programmes were mainly evaluated, while multi-donor programmes such as UNDP human rights and democratisation programmes and the Partnership for Governance were not included. There is a tendency among the multilateral donors to focus more on support to state-actors in policy dialogue and strategy formulation, including capacity building both at the national and the local level. These donors focus especially on support to legal and judiciary reforms (see Section 3.4 on the aid environment). Donors such as Australia, the United States or the Netherlands follow a more balanced approach towards CV&A, whereas the interventions in this evaluation have a stronger focus on either voice and civil society demand or accountability.

To summarise, interventions focusing on past elections (voter education and capacity building for Election Committees), anti-corruption, law enforcement by public institutions, as well as impunity and improved access to justice were not included. Unfortunately, there was no time available for a desk study of earlier evaluations of the mentioned interventions. Table 3.2 shows that anti-corruption measures, law enforcement and access to justice are still very weak areas in Indonesia. The problems in these areas are immense and complex, willingness to reform is weak, and external donors' room for manoeuvre is small (see Section 3.4 on the aid environment).

In addition, it is recalled that "theme" was only one of the various criteria to maintain a balance in the sample, and that some interventions focusing on other themes (e.g. support to labour unions, access to justice for the poor) that were initially selected for this

evaluation did not meet the eligibility criteria (i.e. maturity, share of ECG budget, overall size, etc.) and could therefore not be selected.

At the start of the evaluation, last-minute changes were made in the choice of interventions of the CSIAP programme of the Asia Foundation, due to availability of project staff. This had no adverse impact on the evaluation, but shows the difficulty in obtaining prior basic information on the selected interventions.

#### *Ethical considerations and quality assurance*

The Evaluators were all fully aware of and had ample previous experience in working in multi-cultural contexts. Accordingly, they paid respect and took into account local customs and manners while conducting the evaluation.

Quality assurance has been taken care of at three levels: (i) internally at team level, by changing among the two member sub-groups conducting interviews and undertaking project visits, joint team meetings to discuss assessments and full access to all intermediate outputs and internal drafts and notes; (ii) at the level of the contracting company (Particip) involving an experienced quality control manager; and (iii) involving the external quality assurance company Performance Assessment Resource Center (PARC) to assess the draft and final evaluation outcomes.

The draft Evaluation Report was widely circulated among the ECG members and stakeholders in Indonesia. Their comments were included in a Response Grid, filled in by the evaluation team, and attached to the Revised Draft Evaluation Report. All stakeholders could therefore assess how their comments had been addressed, giving them a further opportunity to react.

#### *ODI Evaluation Framework*

Overall, the ODI Evaluation Framework was considered useful by the Indonesia evaluation team, as (i) it focussed the team on the crucial issues of the five evaluation components; and (ii) the Literature Review was useful for the team members to come to grips with the substantive part of the evaluation and for internal group discussions. On the other hand, the Guidelines for Country Evaluations were of much less value, as they were too detailed and not country-specific. The numerous steps were not logical and a certain degree of overlap existed.

A major weakness of the Evaluation Framework was that there was not a good match between its many requirements and the time available for the evaluation. Consequently, the team had to make choices on where to place emphasis and where not. The invitation of team leaders to the Bonn meeting contributed significantly to their understanding of the priorities of the ECG members and the Synthesis Team. Telephone discussions with the External Quality Assurance Team and the Synthesis Team helped to clarify specific issues (i.e. regarding details of the intervention selection process and models of change). Standards for the evaluation and the reporting were largely developed along the way. More comments on the Framework are contained in Appendix B.

## 3.Context for CV&A

### 3.1 Democratisation and the political system

Within almost half a decade, Indonesia has moved from one of the most centralised countries to one of the most decentralised worldwide and, at the same time, has implemented fundamental democratic reforms. The rapid regime change has brought about a wide variation of local government performance. The 2007 Freedom House report “Freedom in the World” identified Indonesia as the only fully free and democratic country in Southeast Asia.<sup>7</sup>

The World Bank gives Indonesia a special mentioning as one of only five countries worldwide that have achieved “significant improvements” with regard to voice and accountability.<sup>8</sup> These findings are not surprising as they mainly reflect formal institutional conditions, i.e. the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media. Indonesia has indeed made decisive progress in the structural context for CV&A, due to the relatively free and fair parliamentary elections of 1999 and 2004, local elections (since 2005) and constitutional amendments<sup>9</sup> that strengthened participatory elements by facilitating the first direct presidential election in 2004, improved mechanisms of checks and balances in relations between the executive and legislative branches of government, reduced the political role of the armed forces and enhanced decentralisation.<sup>10</sup>

A central reform focus has been the strengthening of the judiciary and public oversight/audit mechanisms. A separate Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*) was established in 2003. It has the power to review laws against the constitution, decide over the dissolution of a political party and inspect alleged violations by the president. A new and by far the most substantial attempt to increase the judiciary’s independence was made in April 2004 when, for the first time in almost four decades<sup>11</sup>, the Supreme Court was de jure freed from direct government intervention, assuming administrative and financial responsibility for the lower court system from the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. At the same time though, the judicial sector is considered to be the most corrupt in Southeast Asia. Systematic corruption in Indonesian courts, including the Supreme

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<sup>7</sup> The category “free” is mainly based on an assessment of political rights and civil liberties. According to Freedom House’s Framework Indonesia from 2005 until 2006 made the step to a “free” country, primarily as a consequence of its overall peaceful and democratic election process at regional and national level. See: [www.freedomhouse.org/template/cfm?page=15](http://www.freedomhouse.org/template/cfm?page=15).

<sup>8</sup> The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. *A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance*, Governance Matters 2007 Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996–2006, Washington DC, 2007. See also Asia Foundation. *Democracy in Indonesia – A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate in 2003*, Washington DC, 2003.

<sup>9</sup> For an accurate English translation of the Constitution see <http://www.us-asean.org/Indonesia/constitution.htm>

<sup>10</sup> Sebastian Benesch. “The Indonesian Constitution: Historical Developments and an Evaluation of Recent Constitutional Amendments”. In Bob S. Hadiwinata, Christoph Schuck, eds. *Democracy on Indonesia. The Challenge of Consolidation*. Baden-Baden: Nomos 2007, pp. 177-200: 187.

<sup>11</sup> In 1964 the country’s founding president Sukarno placed the entire legal system under his control.

Court has not improved but rather consolidated. The judiciary has regularly been influenced by the military, business interests and politicians outside of the legal system. Bribes have influenced prosecution, conviction, and sentencing in countless civil and criminal cases. Moreover, Indonesia's law enforcement agencies lack trained human resources capable of effectively managing their increased responsibilities in a democratic society. Shortcomings in this respect not only with regard to the poor technical knowledge and expertise in investigative techniques and case management but also in relation to standards of performance of law enforcement personnel. While improvements have been signalled with regard to the training of judges with the adoption of the Supreme Court Blueprint for Reform, the governance audit of the Attorney General's Office - financed by ADB - remains to a large degree unimplemented. This situation is compounded by a sense that the judicial system is neither accessible nor responsive to the needs of the poor and other marginalised groups.

Despite the important achievements in advancing democracy in Indonesia, there are still restrictions and obstacles to the quantitative and qualitative advancement of CV&A. For many Indonesians democracy is merely a state of majority rule through a process of voting and elections. For others, democracy comes with upholding the rule of law, protecting civil liberties and the rights of minorities. A growing number of political and civil society actors perceive current attempts to formalise sharia-based laws as a threat to democratic values and Indonesia's culture of pluralism.<sup>12</sup>

While the electoral democratic institutions seem to be working in Indonesia, the political system is still constrained mainly by a high level of corruption, patronage politics and a lack of the rule of law. Regular media reports of arrests of corrupt officials give some evidence that the government has become more serious about tackling corruption and graft. Indonesia is only one of five countries in Asia to have ratified the UN Convention against Corruption to date, suggesting at least the government's determination in the region to tackle corruption. The institutional framework to reduce corruption – as materialised in the presence of the Anti Corruption Commission (KPK) – also referred to as the Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC) – and the Corruption Court as well as the amendment of laws and new regulations – has improved. In some high profile cases senior officials, including the chairman of the General Election Commission, were sentenced for corruption.

An important initiative that addresses corruption in a collaborative effort of state and non-state actors is the Partnership for Governance Reform. It was set up in 2000 as a vehicle for coordinated international support to the Indonesian reform process with national ownership. During its first years the focus was on diagnostic work on corruption which was fed into a public discourse. Through a series of public consultations a national strategy to fight corruption was developed. Since 2003 the Partnership proceeded with the implementation of this strategy, partly by devising its own activities, but mostly by sup-

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<sup>12</sup> Arskal Salim. Muslim Politics in Indonesia's Democratisation: The Religious Majority and the Rights of Minorities in the Post-New Order Era. In Ross H, McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre, ed. Indonesia. Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance. Singapore: ISEAS, 2007, pp. 115-137.

porting selected partners and projects whose agenda are in line with the anti-corruption strategy. Grantees include CSOs, universities, central or local government agencies or mass organisations such as *Nahdathul Ulama* or *Muhammadiyah*.

However, corruption is still endemic and despite the recent court cases high-ranking of-fice holders are still able to escape prosecution. With a score of 2.4 in the Transparency International Corruption perception Index 2007 Indonesia is still one of the most corrupt states in Asia (rank 25 of 32) and the world (rank 143 of 179). According to the Indonesian Corruption Watchdog (ICW) a significant number of major graft cases, worth hundreds of trillions of Rupiah, are still unresolved.<sup>13</sup>

There are two sides of the political system in Indonesia. The formal institutional structure (see Table 3.1) is decisively constrained by informal institutions that limit the opportunities for voice and demand and political participation and restrict vertical and horizontal accountability. These informal institutions have survived the New Order regime.

**Table 3.1: The Main Institutions of Indonesia’s Political System**

Executive	Legislative
<p><b>President and Vice President</b>            President is both Head of State and Head of Government            Legislation passed in 1999 limits the president to two five-year terms</p>	<p><b>People's Consultative Assembly</b> (<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i>, MPR, 700 members): highest state institution → promulgation of the constitution, appointment or dismissal of the president and vice president, decides the guidelines of state policy</p>
	<p><b>People's Representation Council</b> or House of Representatives (<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i>, DPR, 500 members): oversees the direction of the government, and, along with the government, drafts regulations and laws</p>
	<p><b>Council of Regional Representatives</b> (<i>Dewan Perwakilan Daerah</i>, DPD, 128 members – 4 representatives from each Indonesian province): advisory body (intended to serve as second chamber, but not achieved yet).</p>

The late President Suharto, who ruled Indonesia from 1966 to 1998 through his gate-keeping agencies, installed new forms of state and social power, providing the bases upon which complex links between politico-business families and conglomerates were forged. These alliances were then incubated in state monopolies and rents. They later

<sup>13</sup> The Jakarta Post, 22 September 2007.

gained vibrancy from infusions of foreign investment, admitted into domestic markets through selective liberalisation. Much of this oligarchy survived the economic crisis of 1997–1998 and democratisation in a remarkable way. Notwithstanding the collapse of centralised authoritarianism and the withdrawal of foreign capital from which they had earlier drawn sustenance, favoured families and conglomerates have managed to outlast the new order by reorganising their alliances and shifting their efforts from the office of the president to the political parties.

The implications are: (i) because institutions only reinforce prior configurations of power, meaningful neo-liberal reforms cannot be made through new regulatory designs; (ii) in trying to discover power relations, such conventional categories as leadership, the bourgeoisie, the new middle class, civil society, and even globalisation, each so contingent in its make-up and causal impact, are unreliable as explanatory variables; (iii) attention is thus correctly shifted to stakeholders – understood principally in the Indonesian case as political-business families and conglomerates – and the ways in which they coalesce or compete in pursuing the state power through which their interests are secured.<sup>14</sup>

## 3.2 Decentralisation

The most significant political change that has taken place apart from the general democratisation drive is the decentralisation reform,<sup>15</sup> which has found its legal framework in the promulgation of laws No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy and No. 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance. These laws were revised in 2004 to become Law No. 32/2004 and Law No. 33/2004. The laws are based on the dual approach of democratising local governments and enhancing their autonomy from Jakarta.<sup>16</sup> The decentralisation process represents the most decisive transformation of the administrative infrastructure in the country's history. Central civil servants were reassigned, over 16,000 public service facilities were handed over to the regions and a new intergovernmental fiscal system was put in place. The programme included the transfer of both fiscal and political responsibility from Jakarta to over 400 districts and municipalities. The decentralisation legislation bypasses the provinces and transferred authority from the central government directly to districts

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<sup>14</sup> Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz. *Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*. London and New York: Routledge, 2004

<sup>15</sup> For more detailed analyses of specific aspects of the decentralisation see for example, Christopher R. Duncan. "Mixed Outcomes: The Impact of Regional Autonomy and Decentralisation on Indigenous Ethnic Minorities in Indonesia" *Development and Change* 38(4), 2007, pp. 711–733; Sudarno Sumarto et al. *Governance and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from Newly Decentralized Indonesia*. SMERU Working Paper, March 2004; Aniruddha Dasgupta and Victoria A. Beard. "Community Driven Development, Collective Action and Elite Capture in Indonesia". *Development and Change* 38(2), 2007, pp. 229–249; Andrew J. White, III. "Decentralised Environmental Taxation in Indonesia: A Proposed Double Dividend for Revenue Allocation and Environmental Regulation", *Journal of Environmental Law*, Vol. 19 No. 1, 2007, pp. 43–69.

<sup>16</sup> The process initially centred around two pieces of legislation: Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance and Law 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions. However, the central government passed the laws so quickly that they lacked clarity and were rife with contradictions and inconsistencies. As a result, both laws were amended with the passage of two revised laws on regional autonomy in 2004. Law 32/2004 on Regional Administration replaced Law 22/1999, and Law 33/2004 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regional Governments replaced Law 25/1999.

(*kabupaten*) and municipalities (*kotamadya*), the level of government directly below that of the province. Legislators hoped that transferring power to the districts and municipalities would make government more responsive to local communities and placate the critics of centralised rule. They also thought that bypassing the provincial level of government would curtail separatist tendencies that are more prominent at that level (particularly in places like Aceh and Papua), something that had hindered earlier efforts at decentralisation. Furthermore, the government would have more control over the smaller districts than it would over larger, more powerful provinces. The initial legislation was drafted in haste and had significant shortcomings in terms of unclear and overlapping functions and responsibilities it assigned to the different administrative levels. Law No. 32/2004, however, was drafted behind closed doors during the last few days of the Megawati administration and largely repeated the key weaknesses of Law No. 22/1999.

A recent USAID study on decentralisation in Indonesia amplifies many stakeholders' voices, who note that "decentralisation reforms have been progressive in principle, but incomplete and not sufficiently realized on the ground. These general sentiments are not surprising; reform progress is not always linear, rapid, or sustained. However, the mixed feelings about decentralisation need to be seen against the widespread expectations that the 2004 revisions would truly 'consolidate' decentralisation, curbing excesses and addressing impediments".<sup>17</sup> This, however, has not been the case and the legal framework for decentralisation is currently being redrafted.

Overall, both national actors – state and non-state – and donors hoped that the process of decentralisation would allow for stronger local participation in government, increased opportunities for public scrutiny and feedback, better service delivery and make regional leaders accountable to their constituents. Enhanced accountability was expected to lead to better policy and governance including an improvement of natural resource management. Law No. 32/2004 indeed introduced important democratic reforms such as direct elections of district heads (*Bupati*) which create more direct accountability between the highest office holder in the district and the citizens. The electoral system, on the other hand, prevents local parliaments from effectively representing the voice of the people and in exerting its role in checks and balances. Parliamentarians are mostly appointed from party lists leading to accountability of representatives towards their party structures rather than towards their own electorate. Constituencies also do not always coincide with administrative boundaries. Thus, councillors are even further disconnected from the people. Parties on the other hand are subject to little public scrutiny. Especially at local level it is not rare to find parties forming alliances with private sector contractors or the executive in order to secure access to projects and government funds.<sup>18</sup>

The Governance and Decentralisation Survey II from 2005 conducted by the World Bank showed improvements in terms of quality of service delivery since the onset of decentralisation, but also confirmed large variations across sectors and regions. However,

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<sup>17</sup> USAID/DRSP. Decentralisation 2006. Stock Taking on Indonesia's Recent Decentralization Reforms. Main Report. Summary of Findings, August 2006.

<sup>18</sup> Shields, D., Decentralisation, Democracy and Civil Society: Overview of Current Situation, March 2005.

these findings were rather based on perception and subjective rating of respondents than on empirical evidence. To date little systematic evaluation has been done of the actual change in quality and outreach of public service delivery, but case studies and anecdotal evidence suggest considerably uneven performances with a handful of regions realizing innovations in service improvements<sup>19</sup> whereas on average no significant improvements were made or the quality of service delivery even deteriorated.<sup>20</sup> Unclear legal frameworks, weak oversight by national-level, endemic corruption, rent-seeking mentalities within the public administration and limited capacities are some of the major factors contributing to bad governance practices at local level.

On the other hand, it is equally difficult to make overall statements regarding the reform-mindedness of political leaders in the decentralised setting. However, it is generally accepted that compared with other post-authoritarian countries, within and outside the region, Indonesia's government has shown a strong willingness for democratic reforms, reflected in numerous government decrees and statements. In a highly decentralised setting the reform-mindedness of individual local leaders makes a difference for citizens to make their voices heard and for the functioning of accountability.<sup>21</sup>

Another phenomenon contributing to insufficient government capacities at local level and thus to bad governance practices and low quality of public services is the rapid rise in the formation of new local governments by splitting up existing districts, sub-districts and villages. This trend can also predominantly be associated with rent-seeking mentalities among local elites as the formation of new regions provides for additional resources from national level to create new administrative infrastructure from scratch. The availability of qualified personnel to fill the newly created positions, on the other hand cannot keep pace with this development, particularly in the outer islands<sup>22</sup> as these often already disadvantaged regions are mostly affected by limited government skills and capacities.

Accounts of civil society capacities and the way opportunities provided by the decentralisation process were being taken up are mixed. Between 1997 and 2002 alone the number of NGOs grew from a few (officially registered) hundreds to tens of thousands. The civil society scene – largely dominated by advocacy-based CSOs – is lively and partly

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<sup>19</sup> E.g. the districts of Solok, Sragen, Jember with regard to health, educational and administrative services (e.g. one-stop service delivery).

<sup>20</sup> See: DRSP/USAID, *Decentralization 2006. Stock Taking on Indonesia's Recent Decentralization Reforms*, 2006, The World Bank Report, *Drinking Water and Environmental Sanitation Service Provision in Post-Decentralization Era*, 2004, SMERU, *Governance and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from Newly Decentralized Indonesia*, Working Paper, March 2004, SMERU, *Indonesia's Transition to Decentralization Governance. An Evolution at the Local Level*, Working Paper, June 2003 and von Luebke, C., *Local Leadership in Transition: Explaining Variation in Indonesia Subnational Government*, doctoral thesis, ANU, 2007.

<sup>21</sup> For comparative assessments see, for example, The World Bank. *East Asia Decentralizes. Making Local Government Work*. Washington DC. The World Bank. 2005; Michael Malley "New Rules, Old Structures, and the Limits of Democratic Decentralisation." in: Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, eds., *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation & Democratisation*. Singapore: ISEAS, 2003, pp. 102–116.

<sup>22</sup> In Maluku and Papua the number of new district or city governments has more than doubled between 1998 and 2004 – from 16 to 45, in Kalimantan the number increased from 74 to 132 and in Sulawesi from 40 to 62. (see: Fitriani, F.; Hofman, B, et al., *Unity in Diversity? The Creation of New Local Governments in a Decentralizing Indonesia* in: *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 41 (1), 2005.

well developed. Civil society networks related to voter's education and election monitoring have for instance proved to be very effective in contributing significantly to the overall peaceful, well informed and well managed elections.<sup>23</sup> They also played a crucial role in influencing public policies in the areas of democracy building, protecting human rights and empowering citizens. But they have not been particularly successful in influencing public budget policies and in making the private sector more accountable or meeting the needs of marginalised people.

Overall, the decentralisation process has so far not resulted in better governance, which, in turn, is expected to provide the impetus for poverty reduction. With some notable exceptions of a handful of progressive cities and districts, decentralisation has not systematically created new formalised channels for CSOs to bring the concerns of the poor closer to the government in effective and efficient ways. In general terms, while the 'voice and demand accountability' capacities of CSOs, including Islamic organisations, trade unions, citizens' watchdog organisations and the media have grown, it is important to differentiate between NGO and non-NGO actors, CSOs based in Java and other parts of the country, government co-opted and genuinely state-independent groups, moderate and radical faith organisations etc. in determining their specific potential in improving and strengthening CV&A.


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<sup>23</sup> Douglas Ramage, *A Reformed Indonesia* in: The Australian Financial Review, October 12, 2007.

Table 3.2 presents the development in the Good Governance Indicators (KK) of the World Bank.

**Table 3.2: Development of *World Bank Governance Matters* Indicators in Indonesia since 1996**

**Indonesia - Comparison between 2006, 2004, 2002, 1998, 1996 (top-bottom order)**



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: *Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006*

Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, NGOs, and international organisations. The aggregate indicators do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.

The table above shows the steady governance improvements that were made in Indonesia with relation to voice and accountability. However, especially rule of law and control of corruption have decreased since 1996, and both are now within the bottom 23<sup>rd</sup> percentile worldwide.<sup>24</sup>

### 3.3 Socioeconomic conditions

The context analysis would be incomplete if the overall socio-economic situation, both at macro and micro level, were not taken into account. Unsuitable macro-economic policies

<sup>24</sup> See: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/home>.

would nullify most intervention results, while citizens with an ‘empty stomach’ would not really be in a position to appraise democratic and political reforms.

The financial crisis of 1997/98, which had a tremendous effect on the economy and well-being of the people, has been overcome. The Indonesian economy has grown substantially over the past years (with an annual GDP growth of 6%). The strength and size of the Indonesian economy is illustrated by the following parameters:

- The current account balance shows a *surplus* of USD 4.6 billion in the first half of 2006, due to growing exports and a slowing growth in imports;
- The international reserves (Foreign Exchange) increased to USD 41 billion in September 2006, despite repaying almost USD 8 billion in debt to the IMF.

These figures are important to keep in mind for the relative importance of development aid (see Section 3.4).

The improved economic performance is reflected in increased fiscal space, public spending and investments, and progress made in a wide range of structural reforms. Table 3.3 presents some key changes in government finances for the years 2000 and 2006.

**Table 3.3: Public spending in Indonesia in 2000 and 2006**

Situation around 2000	Situation by 2006
The financial crisis of 1997/98 caused a sharp decline in public and private investment (from 27% of GDP to less than 20% in 2000). Public development spending declined even more sharply from 6.5% of GDP in 1996 to less than 4% in 2000.	Indonesia’s post-crisis is over: public investment reached pre-crisis levels of 7% of GDP. Sectors that benefited most were education with 17.4% of the budget, including teacher salaries (was 11.4% in 2001) corresponding to 3.9% of GDP), and investment in health has been doubled (but is still below 1% GDP).
By 2003 public expenditure had reached pre-crisis levels, but in 2004 and up to October 2005 it dropped again due to ballooning of the fuel subsidies.	In October 2005, Indonesia reduced fuel subsidies that freed USD 10 billion to be spent on development programmes in the year 2006 alone.
The state budget had three huge expenditures; debt servicing (70-80% of GDP in 2000-2002), subsidies and government administration.	Due to declining debt service (below 40% of GDP, from 55% in 2001) and increased revenue collection another USD 5 billion became available in 2006.
In 2001 the ‘big bang’ process of decentralisation started off: One-third of central government expenditure was transferred to the regions.	A second significant increase in the budget to the sub-national governments took place in 2006, transfers increased by another 28%. They now manage 40% of total public expenditure and more than 50% of public investment.

Source: Data taken from the Indonesia Public Expenditure Review 2007, World Bank

Despite these improvements in macro-economic performance, there are also less positive trends, including:

- Unequal performance in development, with rural areas and Eastern Indonesia strongly lagging behind urban areas and Western Indonesia;

- Poverty (living on 2 USD per day) rose from 16% to 17.75% between 2005 and 2006.<sup>25</sup>
- Rising unemployment (11.2% in 2005 compared to 8.1% in 2001, according to official Indonesian statistics). Particularly troubling is high youth unemployment of about 30%.

In conclusion, the improved economic performance and the sharp budget increase for local government has not been translated into a reduction of poverty and inequality. State institutions have been equally unsuccessful in reducing gender-based exclusion. In Indonesia's paternalistic culture, it is still difficult for women to gain access to public office and the political will to introduce comprehensive gender-based reforms is lacking. Women, in general, remain marginalised in various sectors. Table 3.4 presents some major social development indices.

**Table 3.4: Indonesian's position on three international human development indicators**

Categories*	Value	Rank	No countries
Human Development Index (HDI)	0.728	107	177
Human Poverty Index (HPI)	18.2	47	108
Gender Development Index (GDI)	0.711	80	156

\* Source: UNDP. These parameters are fully elaborated and explained in Appendix C.1.

### 3.4 Overview of the aid environment

Indonesia is not an aid-dependent country. In 2005, it reached the status of a Middle Income country according to OECD categories. Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2005 reached 2.5 billion USD but it was exceptionally high that year due to the response to the humanitarian disaster following the tsunami on 26 December 2004. On average, ODA to Indonesia is about USD 1.46 billion yearly (see Table C.1, Appendix C), which is about 0.5% of GDP. In percentage of public expenditure, total ODA spending amounts to around 4.3%<sup>26</sup>. JBIC, ADB and World Bank are the most important lending institutions for development related loans; in terms of total grants, Japan, the United States, the Netherlands and Australia are in the lead.

Supporting the overall reform process in Indonesia and specifically contributing to improved governance is a priority reflected in all country strategies and programme out-

<sup>25</sup> The cash compensation programme was calibrated to compensate the poor for the direct and indirect impacts of higher fuel prices (the poor use for cooking oil), but higher rice prices deteriorated the situation of the poor. Poor is defined as living on less than USD 2, or very poor, less than one USD per day.

<sup>26</sup> World Bank, Spending for Development: Making the Most of Indonesia's New Opportunities. Indonesia Public Expenditure Review 2007.

lines of the major donor organisations. Donor interventions contribute to structural reforms and to capacity building of state and non-state actors and are to be found at all levels; national, provincial, district as well as community level (see Table C.2.4. in Appendix C).

From the onset of decentralisation, GTZ, the World Bank (through the Dutch Trust Fund), JICA, CIDA, UNDP and USAID provided assistance to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) as the major actors in developing the regulatory framework for decentralisation and democratic reforms. In subsequent years more donors were attaching themselves to the National Planning Board (*Bappenas*) as the central government institutions responsible for overall donor coordination. The Ministry of Home Affairs is generally considered as a somewhat more difficult partner for international donor assistance, as it is more sensitive to political currents such as increasing nationalist sentiments and also has a stronger politically based recruitment system with thus less internationally educated staff than for example Bappenas.<sup>27</sup>

Especially in the years between 2003 and 2005, a sort of reform fatigue and reluctance was observed from the GOI side, to draw on foreign assistance. Whereas policy dialogue in the early days of the decentralisation process was largely dominated by bilateral donor organisations, with the GTZ being one of the major advisors involved in the drafting of the decentralisation legislation in 1999, since 2000, the International Finance Institutions (World Bank, IMF, ADB) as well as JICA have started providing substantial support to policy development, with especially the World Bank focussing its advisory support on the Ministry of Finance.

In recent years, an increasing number of donor-funded projects directly engage at local level providing capacity building to district government units or strengthening civil society institutions, including the media (one-third of all donor projects). Prominent examples for capacity building initiatives include the USAID-funded *Local Governance Support Program* (LGSP) that works in more than 100 districts in seven provinces; the UNDP-supported *Building and Reinventing Decentralized Governance* (BRIDGE) focusing on capacity building for local governments, parliaments and civil society in 4 provinces in Sulawesi; and the GTZ-assisted *Good Local Governance* (GLG) project working in four provinces with more than 25 local governments. The World Bank with its *Initiative for Local Governance Reform Programme* (ILGR) has chosen local Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) processes as an entry point to support general governance reforms at district level.

This strong focus on capacity building for government actors at national and local level is complemented by considerable efforts to directly empower and give voice to communities. This is mostly done by involving communities in participatory planning processes related to basic government services including the provision of rural infrastructure.

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<sup>27</sup> DRSP, Donor Working Group on Decentralisation, 2006, *Stock Taking on Indonesia's Recent Decentralisation Reforms*.

Whereas these programmes were conceived as poverty alleviation programmes, they increasingly made use of the opportunities provided by the democratic reform process including more and more aspects of civil society strengthening. Most prominent examples are the World Bank supported *Kecamatan* Development Program (KDP) and its urban equivalent Urban Poverty Program (UPP). The programmes cover several thousand villages and are seen as very successful. The World Bank considers these programmes to be the most important contribution it has made towards the strengthening of citizens' voice and accountability.<sup>28</sup> As of January 2007, all block-grant schemes have been integrated into the National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM) to be implemented by the Indonesian Government up until 2009 in the whole of Indonesia. SPADA, a third World Bank supported programme follows a similar approach on participatory planning, but is especially implemented in conflict-affected regions. Other programmes using participatory planning as an entry point for general community empowerment include the Community and Local Governance Support Sector Development Programme (CLGS) which was funded by an ADB loan or the AusAID ACCESS Programme (Australian Community Development and Civil Society Strengthening Scheme).

Even though direct community empowerment is a major strategy of the large donors in their effort to contribute to poverty alleviation, and much needed infrastructure and services are delivered to poor communities, it can nevertheless rarely be claimed that these programmes successfully reach the poorest of the poor and other marginalised groups. Notable exceptions are the World Bank-initiated *Programme for Women Headed Households* (PEKKA), which provides social and economic empowerment to widows<sup>29</sup>, and the AusAID-funded ACCESS Programme that is recognised by other donors to have a strong and visible poverty and gender focus<sup>30</sup>.

DFID has in the meantime decided to discontinue direct implementation of bilateral programmes and will withdraw its support to Indonesia in 2011 altogether due to the country's middle income status. Instead, DFID has chosen to take the lead in donor harmonisation and channels considerable funds through the multi-donor platform *Decentralisation Support Facility*. Donor harmonisation has, thus, become the entry point to achieve overarching goals of improved governance and poverty alleviation. Instead of maintaining direct relationships with government partners to influence governance and poverty related policies, DFID closely liaises with the World Bank and ADB in order to influence the poverty policies of these major lending institutions. As a contribution to strengthening civil society, DFID collaborates with the Asia Foundation in supporting a variety of partnerships between Islamic mass-based organisations and NGOs (three of which are included in this evaluation), with a focus on influencing budgeting processes at local level.

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<sup>28</sup> Personal communication Joel Hellman, Coordinator Good Governance, World Bank, Jakarta.

<sup>29</sup> "Widow" in the Indonesian context is used both for women whose husband has passed away or who have been divorced by their husbands.

<sup>30</sup> See: The World Bank; Gender in Community Driven Development Project: Implication for PNPM Strategy. Working Paper on the Findings of Joint Donor and Government Mission, 2007.

CIDA, USAID and AusAID are other bilateral donors that are engaged in policy advice at national level, with CIDA focusing especially on public financial management, USAID on general democratic reforms and AusAID on capacity building. All three donor organisations complement their engagement at policy level with interventions at local level aiming to improve the capabilities of local governments and civil society organisations, with a strong focus on dialogue processes between government and civil society. Support to justice sector reforms also ranks high on donor agendas, as it is seen as essential for the overall reform process and especially for curbing corruption (ADB, UNDP, EC).

Indonesia is not a priority country for any of the smaller ECG donors, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium or Switzerland. They share the main strategies and policies of the main donors on environmental management, good governance, anti-corruption and human rights. These ECG donors predominantly support non-state actors. They either channel their funding through large national NGOs, research institutes or basket funding of *The Partnership for Governance Reform* and UNDP-managed programmes. Norway intends to provide considerable co-funding for the second 3-year phase of the previously DFID-funded *Multi-stakeholder Forestry Programme* (which is part of this evaluation). Sida stands out by having a visible focus on justice with the provision of co-funding for the LEAD Access to Justice Programme (UNDP administered) and collaboration with Tifa Foundation on a legal aid programme at community level.

Modalities for aid delivery in Indonesia can mainly be attributed to three different categories: direct implementation, outsourcing and basket funding. The third form increased in importance, mainly through the establishments of Multi-Donor Trust Funds, whereas the share of direct implementation is decreasing. Sector-wide approaches or budget support that are common instruments of donors in other parts of the world are not being implemented in Indonesia. The establishment of effective mechanisms and platforms for dialogue and coordination with donors is a difficult challenge. This is partly due to a high number of institutions with frequently overlapping and unclear mandates which make governance reform and democratisation efforts that cut across all sectors a complex undertaking. But there are also sentiments about foreign aid that see it as rather pushing forward the donors' own agendas and not necessarily reflecting Indonesian interests. Donors often complain about the general lack of direction and commitment of the GOI for coordinated donor aid. The *Decentralisation Support Facility* (DSF) and the *Partnership for Governance Reform* were meant for both (i) policy dialogue of donors with GOI and (ii) for implementing programmes, but were not very effective in the first one. A special section is included in Appendix C – elaborating on the overall aid architecture in Indonesia.

The Ministry of Home Affairs' (MoHA) main complaint is the fact that donors often initiate interventions on decentralisation directly at the local level without going through the national government and discussing and harmonising their concepts with MoHA. The large multi-donor supported *Decentralisation Support Facility* (DSF) was not necessarily welcomed by MoHA, "*DSF confused us. We were introduced to the Consultative Group without prior consultation. There is a feeling in MoHA that we need to redirect donor programmes*".

## 4. Findings

### 4.1 Opportunities, constraints and entry points for CV&A<sup>31</sup>

#### *Opportunities and entry points*

There is widespread agreement among donors and implementing agencies on the initial conditions and opportunities for V&A interventions, as well as the limiting factors (constraints). All seven programmes regard the institutional frameworks, particularly the laws on decentralisation, but also in a more general sense the new “rules of the game” in Indonesia’s democratising polity, as decisive opportunities that, in turn, create specific entry points for C&V interventions. This consensus – which is also shared by a majority of national actors – is mainly shaped by a perception that the formal structural setting for policy-making in Indonesia is so far insufficient to overcome the pre-eminence of prevailing informal power structures, such as clientelism and patronage networks, which have survived the Suharto era and limit both political participation (voice) of civil society actors and accountability of state agencies.

Donors also generally consider support for improved governance and public service delivery as an important entry point for poverty reduction. This is based on the assumption that increased citizen’s participation and government responsiveness also allows marginalised groups, especially the poor, to channel their voice into decision-making and gain access to public services which, thus, ultimately contributes to reducing vulnerability and absolute poverty.

All evaluated interventions clearly operate in the context of governance and democratisation in the broadest sense with a particular emphasis on the ongoing process of decentralisation, public service delivery, access of marginalised groups (particularly the poor) to public services and forest management. Across the board, the interventions outline their specific entry points – partly in great detail – in the respective project documentation and relate them to specific aims and objectives.

The most important overall entry point is the decentralisation process, the opportunities it raises for increased participation of civil society (citizens and the private sector), as well as the inherent weaknesses and shortcomings of the ongoing reform.

The three GTZ interventions (ASSD, PROMIS, SfGG) are part of the agency’s overall good governance and decentralisation programme which is generally directed at the empowerment of local governance institutions to fulfil their functions especially in plan-

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<sup>31</sup> There is some overlap and lack of clarity as far as the three “key features” (i) initial conditions and opportunities, (ii) constraints and (iii) entry points in the evaluation framework are concerned (p. 13). For example, corruption and neopatrimonialism are both part of categories i (as informal power structures) and ii; decentralisation is given as an example for policy reform processes (under entry points) but is also part of the institutional framework (law 32/2004 etc.) in category i. Furthermore the categories lack analytical differentiations between structures and agencies. Overall, opportunities and entry points are very closely related and the analysis reflects this link.

ning, budgeting and provision of public services in better ways. As shown in the chapter on the aid environment (section 3.4), many programmes are implemented in this field. A general opportunity for the three interventions is the GTZ's well-established long-term presence in Indonesia and the trust that it has built up in its relationship with the government. In particular, GTZ has a comparative advantage in working closely with two main ministries, namely the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and the Ministry for Administrative Reforms (MenPan).

Previous work done by the GTZ with central ministries<sup>32</sup> for more than a decade built up trust that is rare in Indonesia. According to a senior official in the Ministry of Home Affairs, "GTZ has developed a system to ask the government what it needs. We don't want to be pushed by the donors. Other donors should learn from GTZ".

The GTZ interventions particularly address shortcomings in the:

- regulatory framework of decentralisation (ASSD) and administrative reforms (SfGG);
- consistency and public participation in the planning and budgeting process (ASSD, PROMIS);
- coverage and quality of public services (all);
- application of good governance principles<sup>33</sup> (all);
- ways in which government institutions communicate with civil society (all).

The specific entry points of ASSD are the weakness of Law 32/2004 (on decentralisation) and the need for establishing minimum standards for service delivery. A specific shortcoming of the decentralisation process is the inadequate performance of public service institutions in Indonesia at all levels. Increasing the accountability of the public sector and creating performance-based initiatives are the challenges for good governance. The endemic corruption, of which particularly the poor are victims, is mentioned as the core constraint (see also 4.2).<sup>34</sup>

The climate of the democratisation era and the need for structural changes formed important entry points for SfGG (as well as the GTZ-funded SfDM, which was the predecessor programme of ASSD). More specific entry points were the low quality of public services, rampant corruption, the need for citizens to demand better public services, the emergence of CSOs that monitor local government performance and demand improved accountability and the need to improve CSO – government relations which are still dominated by mutual distrust. The preparation for the project was not easy. The Ministry for Administrative Reforms was not used to working directly with foreign donor-supported projects (SfGG was the first). In the first years, collaboration was difficult and other part-

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<sup>32</sup> Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Administrative Reforms and their respective implementing agencies, SfDM, PROMIS, Urban Quality, SfGG.

<sup>33</sup> The concept of good governance comprises the following main elements: respect for human rights, popular participation in political decision-making, rule of law, market-friendly and social economic order, development-oriented state action.

<sup>34</sup> Referred to by Indonesians as KKN (*Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme*).

ners were considered, but it was realised that despite shortcomings, MenPan is a strategic institution for bringing about improvements in public services in Indonesia as it has the mandate and authority to do so.

The need to strengthen local government capacities in planning and implementing pro-poor development strategies and policies in the broader sense, due to the high incidence of poverty in all its dimensions, formed the main entry points for GTZ-PROMIS. The project proposal contains an extensive context analysis that takes into account not only the socio-economic and political context, but also the capabilities of state and non-state actors and types of NGOs active in the region.

All measure implemented by the *Multistakeholder Forestry Programme* (MFP) have a strong link to poverty alleviation, strengthening voice of the poor, policy-influencing and natural resource management (forests are the main focus but the programme also includes water and land). In all programme regions there is a high incidence of conflicts between government and communities, among communities and among individuals over forest and water resources along with a growing deterioration of natural resources (e.g. through illegal logging). Most people living on the fringes of government owned forests are very poor and depend largely on forest products. Consequently, the use of forestland is an important contribution to their livelihoods. Participatory poverty analysis forms part of most interventions, but was only introduced to project partners at a later stage in order to enable really reaching excluded and marginalised target groups.

Insufficient pro-poor budgeting and service provision by local governments are the entry points for the three interventions of the Asia Foundation. With the support of DFID, the Asia Foundation designed a three-year advocacy campaign programme to improve service provision and to support reforms improving policies and governance in sectors important to the poor (CSIAP). The evaluation looked at three interventions that all share the general entry points of Regional Autonomy Law No.32/2004, which assigns the responsibility for the provision of health services to regional governments, and the limited knowledge and awareness among civil society of access to health services, budget-related information, etc. The specific opportunities and related entry points are:

- limited access of the poor to government services;
- poor quality of government services;
- public participation and scrutiny resulting in revision of budget allocations that are pro-poor, gender-balanced and avoid exclusion.

The Asia Foundation places Muslim mass-based organisations, or NGOs and individuals close to them, at the centre of the advocacy process. The affiliation with Muslim mass-based organisations also opens doors which are usually closed to “secular” CSOs. Islamic mass-based organisations implement and coordinate advocacy campaigns, or collaborate with secular NGOs specialised in a certain sector (e.g. health) or have more experience in advocacy strategies.

It is typical for projects funded by German political foundations that entry points are encouraged and shared by existing partners that have already proven their reform-

mindedness. The foundations are generally interested in collaborative pro-good governance interventions with reform-minded local partners who share the foundation's political values.

CB KADES focuses on decentralisation reform by explicitly using the government regulation on village governance (PP No. 72/2005) as the entry point with the aim of narrowing the existing knowledge and capability gaps of local government officials in the policy-making process and promoting good local governance. Decentralisation gives increased authorities and funds to villages that are not matched by sufficient capacities, mechanisms for accountability and community participation. The Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS) could build on established relationships with key actors in Wonosobo District, including the Bupati and the Institute for Research and Community Development Studies (IRCOS). The specific entry point was a request from the Bupati to conduct a training activity for newly elected village heads modelled on the earlier capacity building programme for legislature.

CEFIL, as the longest-running of the eight interventions, has also the most general entry point, mainly reform processes directed at the improvement of socio-economic conditions in Indonesia. The project was proposed in 1997 by the NGO SATUNAMA at the time of the economic crisis and was triggered by a concern about the number of Indonesians living under the poverty line (30 million), the poor quality of the educational system and a general lack of leadership skills and networks within civil society. The original contract between the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and SATUNAMA states that the project was aimed at providing contributions for the establishment of civil society and particularly at educating well-informed future leaders in organisational, leadership and communication skills. These broad objectives have mainly remained unchanged since then, although various improvements and changes to the training concept have been implemented over the past ten years.

In sum, there can be little doubt as to donors' strong awareness of the political and socio-economic context in which they operate. The design and implementation of all selected interventions are deeply grounded in often extensive analyses of the structural context conditions, and entry points are regularly identified by a close study of the conditions and opportunities which are deriving from the state of Indonesia's political and economic development. Yet, 'roads not taken' can also be identified. Few project designs consider, let alone explicitly elaborate on, the inter-relationship between formal and informal rules, procedures and power structures and, most importantly, the resulting consequences of the formal/informal cleavage in policy-making for the identification of the most suitable entry points for CV&A interventions. In other words, while the weaknesses of existing institutional/legal structures are acknowledged and used as starting points to justify and legitimise interventions, not much attention is given to the underlying conditions and reasons (patronage, clientelism, bossism, corruption, etc.) that are largely responsible for these weaknesses in the first place.

### *Constraints*

General constraints, as far as the context conditions are concerned, include a long tradition of top-down approaches in the design and planning of development programmes (mindset of officials), endemic corruption, a strongly sector-structured government that leads to the duplication of development efforts and thus little room for integrated programmes, a lack of incentives and/or driving force once donor funding has ended and the fractured nature of civil society organisations, which tend to be working alongside each others rather than cooperating on core issues despite the existence of networks. A major constraint at the implementation level is, for example, the fact that reform-mindedness is not broadly embedded in local governments and reform-resistant pockets and fractions exist. There is a certain unwillingness of some authorities to be more transparent, as this would reduce the opportunity for additional personal income. Local governments have to respond to many changes, many projects are happening at the same time and there is sometimes a lack of capacity. Some local governments have difficulties in absorbing the technical assistance. Some specific constraints of the evaluated interventions are summarised below:

ASSD, SFGG, PROMIS<sup>35</sup>:

- A general constraint is the fragmented institutional framework for policies and regulations for administrative and civil service reforms (MenPan, LAN, BKN, Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance). Indonesia does not lack a regulatory framework, laws or regulations. Rather, the complexity of overlapping mandates and poorly defined responsibilities are forming hurdles for development.
- The main constraint for a more prominent involvement of NGO/CSO actors in the law-making process (ASSD, SFGG) is the general scepticism of government officials vis-à-vis non-state actors (although the number of reform-sceptical officials in the Ministry of Home Affairs has decreased over the past years). Citizens' participation in electoral politics is accepted and regarded as useful but this does not extend to the participatory involvement of CSOs in non-electoral processes.
- So far, the policy-making process lacks formally institutionalised participatory processes. Participation of non-state actors takes place on an ad-hoc basis – if at all.
- The ability and capacity of CS actors to participate in policy-making processes varies significantly: while the participation of universities and local government organisations works well, the NGO sector generally lacks the capacity for policy advice.
- Lack of previous experience of ministry staff to work jointly with the CSO sector, the instability of counterpart staff at the Ministry and low capacities to implement the programme objectives.

The context MFP is operating in is characterised by a very complex setting of interrelated problems concerning forestry management and poverty alleviation with a lot of different stakeholders involved. Since neither the government nor civil society are ho-

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<sup>35</sup> Some of the more general constraints also apply for other evaluated interventions.

mogenous groups, a lot of different interests and relationships exist. MFP's main approach was to initiate multi-stakeholder dialogue processes. The question of who took over the role of a moderator in involving these different stakeholders in a continuous dialogue is most important for its sustainability. Legitimacy, acceptance, sustainability, etc. of these moderator institutions are thus crucial factors. For NTB, no real ownership by the government at local level exists to actively steer follow-ups initiated by MFP. As for Java, one of the constraints was to find a local actor who has the legitimacy and standing to involve the State Forest Company (*Perum Perhutani*). Beyond MFP, the issue of the legitimacy of the moderator in multi-stakeholder processes is of general importance for most interventions.

Most of the above-mentioned constraints apply in more or less the same way to the CSIAP interventions. The specific feature of collaboration with Islamic mass-based organisations is highlighted here. In the case of NTB, many members of the local parliaments have a background of membership in one of the Islamic organisations. The cooperation between NGOs and Islamic organisations thus helps to open doors within the local parliament and to exert political influence as well as the building up of public pressure. However, at the same time it also limits advocacy efforts as they are rather accommodative towards the parliament. Open criticism on possible corruption or irregularities involving members of parliament is not possible in the context of such an alliance. It was also agreed within the *Dewan Peduli Anggaran* (DPA), the joint platform of cooperation between Islamic organisations and local NGOs in NTB, that the NGO members should refrain in general from direct confrontation with the government – which also forced one of the coalition members to rather reduce their involvement in the DPA. In an effort to push for the reallocation of funds for public services it could also happen that there is a bias on the part of the government to rather accommodate demands by religious organisations to receive increased funding at the expense of other non-religious service providers (for instance, religious schools versus other educational institutions).

The main challenge faced by the political foundations' (CB KADES, CEFIL) training programmes was how to design a comprehensive one-size-fits-all training programme for the general empowerment of CSO/NGOs (CEFIL) or village heads (CB KADES) that does not overwhelm the participants. The participatory approach to training, as chosen by the two interventions, is certainly innovative. However, it also poses “a challenge for some participants as they find it difficult to express themselves in a culture where most are used to listening but not participating in discussions”.<sup>36</sup>

## 4.2 Capacities of state and non-state actors

### *General findings*

Due to decentralisation and accompanying democratic reforms, local governments (which are targeted directly or indirectly by most CV&A interventions in Indonesia) are

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<sup>36</sup> This is the observation of a senior SATUNAMA staff, Roundtable discussion, 13 December 2007.

endowed with new and major responsibilities for local economic, social and political development and, corresponding, highly increased funds. However, these are not matched with the existing capabilities and mindset of the executive and legislative apparatus. Local governments face legal, financial and structural challenges with regard to recruiting qualified staff and to developing their human resources. Local government-owned training facilities (*diklat*) are often characterised by insufficient financial resources and low teaching qualities. Furthermore, training is mainly considered a requirement for promotion between ranks by government officials, instead of an opportunity to genuinely develop skills.<sup>37</sup>

This evaluation has confirmed what has been stated already by other research – that the quality of governance and reforms at the local level is highly dependant on the individual commitment and capacity of regional heads. They are the major drivers of reform (a very good example is the Bupati of Alor, one of the poorest districts in Indonesia, that became a front runner in participatory processes in planning and policy making – see the next sections). However, it was found, that even when regional heads are committed to reforms, they often still have to deal with opposition within their own apparatus or the local parliament. Consequently, there is a great need for building the capacity of local government department and agency staff.

The evaluated interventions were implemented in a context in which, in general, the relationships between CSOs and the government are still marked by mutual suspicion and distrust. A genuine dialogue, support and cooperation between civil society and the state are still rare. CSOs themselves are not free of corruption and in their internal management they seldom apply principles of transparency and accountability. Religious organisations generally enjoy a high level of trust, whereas towards NGOs there is still a marked level of mistrust, probably as NGOs are generally urban-based organisations and the majority of the rural population having little direct interaction with them.<sup>38</sup>

CSOs lack a number of basic and technical skills, such as sufficient proficiency in English, and skills for proposal-writing and networking capacities. In general, CBOs as genuine community- or interest-based organisations (e.g. farmers associations, women's groups, etc.) hardly have access to international funding sources. They depend largely on NGOs to facilitate access to donors for them. NGOs at local level, in turn, also often depend on intermediary national-level NGOs to facilitate the link to international NGOs or donors. Donors themselves contribute to this problem by tending to rely on those NGOs they have already established relationships with and not wanting to take risks of cooperating with less experienced or well-connected NGOs. Direct collaboration between CBOs and donors is rare. With a few exceptions, such as urban poor associations in the large cities such as Jakarta and Surabaya, there are hardly any organisations genuinely representing the poor or other marginalised groups. In the run-up of the 2004

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<sup>37</sup> ADB, Country Governance Assessment Report, Republic of Indonesia, 2004.

<sup>38</sup> Ibrahim, R., Indonesian Civil Society 2006. A long journey to a Civil Society, CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for the Republic of Indonesia, 2006.

elections, there were many efforts by CSOs to increase political representation of women at the national, as well as the local level. In this context a number of large women's networks were formed, which were, however, confined to an elite level. Women's organisations beyond the compulsory uniform women's organisation PKK are hard to find. These organisations were founded in every village since the early days of the Suharto regime and are generally headed by the village head's wife.

*Findings of evaluated interventions*

Four out of seven interventions evaluated addressed either the demand or the supply side, whereas three interventions included both the demand and supply sides into capacity building activities (see Table 4.1). Four of the five interventions that addressed the supply side place a strong emphasis on process facilitation regarding participation of citizens in planning, budgeting and policy making.

**Table 4.1: Overview of interventions evaluated**

	Demand Side	Supply Side	Technical Skills Training	Process Facilitation
MFP	X	x	X	x
PROMIS	X	x	X	x
SfGG	X	x	X	x
ASSD		x	X	x
CB KADES		x	X	
CSIAP	X		X	
CEFIL	X		X	

The capacity building of the interventions is assessed below.

ASSD can look back at a very long history of cooperation with the Ministry of Home Affairs, with long-term advisors providing technically-related on-the-job training to individual partners within the Ministry itself. Organisational development support aims at strengthening the institutional capacities of the Ministry. Process-related support in the context of advising the revision of Law 32/2004 on Regional Autonomy particularly endeavours to involve civil society representatives in the discourse on policy options. However, generally, policy advice at national level is a long and complex process involving a lot of different actors with partly diverging agendas. Therefore, political will is not even such a straight forward factor to be assessed and acted upon.

PROMIS took a similar approach in providing on-the-job training and advice as well as tailor-made training courses to local government partners in order to improve understanding and skills in relation to regional development planning and pro-poor economic development. Process-related support included the facilitation of a series of stakeholder forums to elicit inputs of community representatives into the mid-term development vision and a participatory assessment of competitive economic advantages involving a variety of non-government stakeholders. However, initial project locations were selected

based on poverty indicators rather than commitment for political reforms. The facilitation of participatory consultations was thus not continued by government partners at their own initiative. With regard to raising capacities of non-state actors, PROMIS was the only intervention that still had its own implementation structure down to the community level. Capacity building targeted poor farmer self-help groups, which were initially formed under the national government poverty reduction programme IDT<sup>39</sup> aiming at strengthening technical capacities related to agricultural activities, savings and credit activities and group development. Under the IDT Programme<sup>40</sup> village heads were given the task to form self-help groups including the poorest members of the village. However, reality showed that these IDT groups rarely consisted of the village poorest, but sometimes even of those families with good connections to the village government. Participation in the groups was attractive, as the IDT Programme brought financial benefits to these groups. Over time, PROMIS support for the self-help groups stimulated a process of self-selection, with those members who were not in need of the benefits the programme brought (such as food-for-work activities, rotating funds, etc.) and not willing to pay back to the group small credits they had received under the IDT Programme, dropping out.<sup>41</sup>

The complaint surveys developed by SfGG are part of a process of public service improvement. The surveys result in the formulation of pledges for improvement summarised in Service Charters, followed by the implementation of the pledged measures. The project activities related to “implementation of customer complaint surveys”, which is considered by the project as a first step to public service improvement<sup>42</sup> and capacity building for the demand side (training for Government Watch Organisations) are directly linked. The core group of Watch Organisations comes from the regions where the customer complaint surveys are applied. This means that parts of the skills and acquired knowledge from the “first exposure” courses were immediately applied in the regions through participation in other project activities. There were agreements with local governments to include the Watch Organisations in the ongoing implementation of customer complaint surveys.

SfGG is the only project on the supply side that follows the approach to train trainers within their partner institutions (Ministry of Administrative Reform and National Institute for State Administration) who then continue providing capacity building and process advice to local administrations in the implementation of customer complaint surveys. Such an approach is usually more common to be found in programmes on the demand side – donor initiatives training NGOs who then continue to transfer their knowledge to other NGOs, CSOs or communities. This shows a high degree of ownership on the Indonesian partner side and is an important contribution to the sustainability of capacity building ef-

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<sup>39</sup> IDT – *Inpres Desa Tertinggal* (Programme for the poorest villages)

<sup>40</sup> The groups were foremed before the start of the BBZ funded programme.

<sup>41</sup> BMZ, Evaluation of Programm Armutsminderung und Selbstverwaltung in der Region Nusa Tenggara, Indonesien, December, 2003

<sup>42</sup> Where in other parts of this report Customer Complaint Survey iis mentioned, one should take into account this is a first step of improved public services.

forts. The customer complaint mechanism for public service delivery that was developed by SfGG was by its nature about strengthening voice and accountability, thus did not have to be accompanied by additional capacity building activities especially focusing on including the voice of citizens. In the process of capacity building and advice in support of the Administrative Procedure Act, facilitation of civil society inputs by major Indonesian NGOs, such as Indonesia Corruption Watch or Transparency International Indonesia also played a major role. Capacity building activities on the demand side targeted local Government Watch Organisations and dealt with issues about how to tackle corruption cases, monitoring of procurement, development planning and budgeting processes, effective communication strategies and conflict management, but also issues relevant for their organisational development (e.g. leadership skills, planning and analytical skills, fundraising and proposal writing). The latter trainings aiming at supporting organisational sustainability were done in a comprehensive one-time course, which is useful as a first exposure, but probably not enough to effectively apply the newly acquired knowledge.

Additional support measures were provided by SfGG, such as access to CSO-networks to share experience and knowledge, technical and financial support provided to Watch Organisations in the pilot regions, enabling them to carry out social control activities. The design of the trainings included issues requested by the Watch Organisations that were needed for the implementation of ongoing activities.

CB KADES. FNS capacity building for village heads in the district of Wonosobo is an example of capacity building that was exclusively developed and provided in response to the demand from the district head. The request for trainings included training sessions on technical skills, but also on aspects of good governance, increased participation of villagers in decision-making and accountability of village governments towards villagers. There is indication that some of the village heads passed on their knowledge to other village officials and that participatory elements in planning processes have become more prominent following the training (i.e. decisions on how to spend major parts of the village block grant are now made in village assemblies). However, as newly elected village heads usually have little prior knowledge of any of these subject matters, many might be overwhelmed by the amount of information which was communicated in a workshop and eventually find it difficult to implement more efficient and effective approaches to village government, based on the contents of a single workshop alone. Nevertheless, the capacity building initiative can be considered an innovative approach, as village governments as a target group are generally overlooked by donors wanting to contribute to the improvement of CV&A. Secondly, village heads were exposed to relatively new concepts of village autonomy and collaborative approaches towards solving land-related conflicts which in turn will help them to further advocate their needs towards the district government and bring governance ultimately closer to the people.

For the MFP, capacity building was not the main entry point in order to contribute to strengthening CV&A but was rather meant to support the building of partnerships and networks in order to influence and inform decision-making and policy-development at

local and national level. Capacity-building had several dimensions. Broad categories were the Shared Learning Strategy and the Out Sourcing Strategy.

- Sharing knowledge and experiences from NGOs to farmers with a direct poverty focus and related to influencing policy-making: improving skills of members of farmer groups on sustainable forest management, sharing among farmers: cross-visits, facilitating peer-learning and the dissemination of good practices; creating evidence for advocacy purposes;.
- Out-sourcing from MFP to local partners: MFP offered capacity building to their partner organisations, e.g. on effective communication and advocacy strategies, but also on more technical and issue-related trainings. Partners were also trained in Participatory Poverty Assessment in order to improve the overall poverty focus of programme activities.<sup>43</sup>

Government representatives were partly involved in capacity building activities such as shared learning events, but there were no separate capacity building initiatives designed exclusively for the government.

CSIAP. The Asia Foundation provided some initial technical training with regard to budget analysis and advocacy to their grantees. Besides that, the facilitation of shared learning from experience also has a prominent role in their capacity building strategy as well as cross-visits to interesting regions without programme support. Their grantees in turn also implement their capacity building activities. Generally, it can be differentiated according to 4 categories:

- Capacity building for religious leaders who subsequently can play a more effective role in budget advocacy;
- Education of the general public by way of local media, posters or public events;
- Capacity building for marginalised groups concerning their rights and entitlements (e.g. homeless urban poor);
- Technical skills training for service providers to improve their role and services (especially ALIT Surabaya).

Targeted capacity building of rather rural grassroots communities with regard to advocacy or understanding the importance of pro-poor budget decisions so far has hardly been sufficiently done.

CEFIL. This was the only intervention exclusively on the demand side. As a civic education programme for participants with the potential to become future civil society leaders it is not directly targeted towards vulnerable and marginal groups but it is assumed that the empowerment of civil society organisations ultimately will strengthen citizens' voices. Some of the alumni have already formed networks among them, whereas others have moved to rather influential positions.

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<sup>43</sup> At a very late stage of programme implementation and in response to findings of impact assessment

### 4.3 CV&A channels

Table 4.2 presents an overview of the mechanisms used for channelling citizen's voice and holding the government accountable, as well as the major actors involved.

**Table 4.2 Overview of channels for Voice (V) and Accountability (A) of evaluated interventions**

	<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Actors</b>	<b>V/ A</b>
MFP	Multi-stakeholder dialogue forums to influence public policies	NGOs, farmers organisations/ representatives, local government, national government, research institutes, local print media and radio	V
	Participatory Action Research		V
	Demonstration sites		V
	Media training		V
	Policy-related research		V
	Regional Information Centres		V
PROMIS	Improvement of annual bottom-up development process	Village communities, village government, sub-district administration	V
	Ad-hoc Stakeholder Forums to channel civil society voice into mid-term development planning	NGOs, women's representatives, youth representatives	V
	Public Hearing, Participatory legal drafting (local by-laws)	CBOs	V
SfGG	Customer Complaint Survey in public service delivery	Local governments, customers of public services, NGOs, national government (Ministry of Administrative Reforms and National Institute for Administration)	A
	Capacity building for Government Watch Organisations		V, A
	Advice to Draft Administrative Procedure Act		V,A
ASSD	Facilitation of civil society participation in law-making by involvement of NGOs	National government (Ministry of Home Affairs), NGO	V, A
CSIAP	Religious events used for pro-poor advocacy purposes	Islamic mass-based organisations, local parliaments, local government, "street people", health personnel	V
	Budget analysis and monitoring		V, A
	Public expenditure tracking		V, A
CB KADES	Trainings for village heads	Village heads, district officials as resource persons	A
CEFIL	Civic education for potential future civil society leaders	Civil society leaders	V,A

ASSD has set up an expert advisory team that managed to involve also NGO representatives into the policy dialogue on the revision of the decentralisation law No. 32/2004. The NGO, though, does not represent the view of a certain segment of society, but

rather provides an advocacy platform. The NGO has previously advised other national government agencies in cooperation with donors such as the Ford Foundation, USAID and the Asia Foundation, which has made its involvement acceptable for the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The chairperson of a Bandung-based NGO that had been participating in meetings with the Ministry of Home Affairs on developing new regulatory frameworks said: *“Previously, it was very difficult for us to establish links with the government. Besides, we don’t want to push the government too hard as NGOs, it’s difficult to be straightforward. GTZ has facilitated participatory processes which have resulted in effective public consultation. We couldn’t get involved on our own. It needed GTZ to facilitate the process”.*

The MFP aimed at establishing long-term dialogue processes between government and civil society by initiating multi-stakeholder forums. Among these were, for example, different working groups consisting of civil society and government actors to advise the local government on community-based forest management. Another example was a comprehensive Participatory Action Research exercise involving communities, local NGOs, universities and provincial and district government officials to assess problems and conflicts related to natural resource management around the National Park of Gunung Rinjani. It ultimately also led to agreements on how to solve these problems. MFP could connect already well-established networks from community up to district level and to the policy dialogue at national level. MFP also generated empirical evidence to be used in policy-making, for example by providing grants and capacity building to local NGOs in order to investigate illegal logging cases as well as supporting national research institutes to conduct larger-scale research of illegal logging. Another important instrument employed was the use of pilot and demonstration sites to prove the effectiveness of community-based forest management. In regions with high incidence of forest-related conflicts, the programme cooperated with local journalists to increase their capacities on principles of peace journalism. In every region MFP was working in they also set up Regional Information Centres managed by local NGOs to increase flows of information between civil society actors, but also in order to feed information to local media. On the other hand, the Ministry of Forestry took also the initiative to invite major civil society organisations, research institutes and donor programmes to provide their inputs for the revision of social forestry policies.

SfGG was one of the few projects with a strong focus on strengthening channels for accountability. Their main entry point is a methodology developed around customer feedback surveys in public service delivery. Initially such an approach was deemed not appropriate in the Indonesian socio-cultural context, where achieving harmony and consensus are overarching principles and expressing complaints is thus rather unnatural behaviour. The procedure followed by ticking off a list of possible complaints in a particular sector proved to be very useful. The complaint survey results were placed on a board at the entrance of the centre visible for all. The health staff had to formulate how they would address the complaints, which were also put open to the public. This survey is to be conducted every 2-3 years to monitor progress. In those locations where it had been

done already repeatedly at the initiative of the local government, significant service improvements were observed.

In addressing the demand side, SfGG facilitated networking and capacity building for local Government Watch Organisations. As Government Watch Organisations in general are still a relatively new phenomenon in Indonesia and relations between NGOs and local governments are still often strained, it was an important initiative to strengthen the professional capacities of those organisations with regard to monitoring, communication, but also understanding technical processes and policies in government procedures and facilitate constructive relationships with local government e.g. in the negotiation of social contracts (e.g. Pact of Integrity in Solok, West Sumatra).

In its other component of support to the formulation of a new law on administration of the civil service, SfGG was able to contribute to more inclusive and participatory policy making at national level in the process of advising the draft process of the Administration Procedure Act. The draft law was discussed with a wide range of stakeholders – from NGOs to academicians, the Ombudsman commission and constitutional lawyers – and was made public through radio and television talk shows as well as putting it on the MenPan's website. Information campaigns, public relations and involving media networks formed an integral part of the process of improving public service delivery.

A special feature of CSIAP is that it encourages partnership between local NGOs and local branches of Islamic mass-based organisations. The rationale is that religious organisations in Indonesia are those CSOs that enjoy the highest credibility in society. With their mass base especially in rural areas they have the legitimacy to speak on behalf of large sections of the rural population and thus can exert considerable political pressure. In the CSIAP-NTB, "public hearings" are conducted in which the NGOs present the findings of their budget analysis and ask for further input towards their advocacy efforts. Analysis of government budgets is difficult and complex and would actually need explanation from the various government agencies that propose them in order to be able to fully understand them. But this does not happen in the case of Lombok. Therefore, rather than expecting direct change in budget composition, the approach is intended to raise public awareness and to build up pressure towards political decision-makers for more transparent and pro-poor budgets. In addition, they also use religious events (e.g. large gatherings around *Ramadhan* or religious public lectures) to create public awareness and attention to budgets.

There are reservations among Indonesian civil society leaders themselves towards the effectiveness of involving these organisations: *"Not many people believe in the power of religion anymore, they are also corrupt. Corruption in Indonesia is a matter of the system, not of individuals. We believe in the power of systems, that's the way to fight it. And before you fight corruption in public you have to start with yourself"*<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Meth Kusumahadi, co-founder and member of Board of Directors of SATUNAMA.

PROMIS worked towards the improvement of the only nation-wide institutionalised channel for citizens' voice, namely the *Musrenbang* (annual bottom-up development process feeding into district development planning and budgeting). In those villages PROMIS assisted village-level planning became more inclusive towards a variety of stakeholders at village level and planning outputs were more realistic. The instrument of Public Hearing has been institutionalised in the District of Alor as all regulations and by-laws that effect the population and private sector have to be discussed in meetings with affected stakeholders in a two-way process, first in each of the 17 sub-districts and secondly at the district level. A third instrument has been the formation of multi-stakeholder teams on local economic development - *Team Prospek* and the Team Good Governance. These Teams were supported by a Bupati's Decree, providing them with legal status, albeit without effective powers. In addition, a number of ad-hoc stakeholder forums were held to elicit civil society inputs for mid-term and long-term development plans. Separate stakeholder forums were conducted for NGOs, women and youth.

Efforts by ASSD, MFP and PROMIS to open up and institutionalise new channels of dialogue and civil society participation in local-level - and even more pronounced - in national-level policy-making is very relevant, considering the generally still antagonistic relationship between state and civil society organisations, as well as the still limited capacities of non-state actors beyond voicing mere criticism (see Appendix C.1). The CSO scene, to date, is still fractious and strong networks facilitating the access of local organisations to the national policy-making process, or even simply to enable shared learning, are largely dysfunctional. SfGG, in their support to Government Watch Organisations, and SATUNAMA, with their CEFIL programme, are realistically taking these conditions into account.

FNS with their capacity building for village heads also rather focused on improving accountability channels – in this case at village level. The trainings aimed amongst others to increase transparency of policy-making at the village level, including decision on how to use village block grants and the creation of more open spaces for citizens to participate in decision-making processes and to review the outcomes of such policy-making. Synergies exist as the result of the evolutionary character of the relationship that FNS and *Kabupaten Wonosobo* have developed since 1999. CB KADES builds on earlier training activities (the regent, a member of the PKB party, underwent a FNS training for party newcomers who have the potential to contribute to party reforms from within and FNS had also earlier conducted capacity building for local parliamentarians in Wonosobo) and benefits from both the mutual trust in FNS-Wonosobo relations and a good track record of previous interventions.

The civil education programme for future Indonesian leaders (CEFIL) supported by KAS and implemented by SATUNAMA indirectly contributes to voice and accountability. This intensive capacity building programme covers a vast range of issues from leadership, communication, conflict management, decision making, and organisational management to the history of political thinking. It aims to contribute to building a new generation of civil society leaders with the ability for critical thinking. They in turn are expected to be-

come actors to contribute to a lively democratic society. Similar courses are also on offer for religious leaders as well as village-level leaders.

#### 4.4 Changes in policy practice, behaviour and power relations

Table 4.3 presents an assessment of the changes brought about by the evaluated interventions. The first four changes are of rather qualitative nature, whereas the last two changes are concrete implications of the change. Most projects showed good results in achieving change in voice and accountability issues. The interventions were most effective in positively changing state responsiveness (i.e. willingness to respond to demands/actions), but not all interventions were successful in improving accountability (ability and willingness to be kept accountable). Due to the bias in selection of interventions (i.e. those that explicitly aimed at strengthening CV&A, as well as poverty alleviation) the evaluated interventions obtained good results in changing inequality and discrimination, and to a lesser extent to changing power relations between the state and government organisations and citizens. But, when it comes to concrete implementation of agreements and regulations (providing pro-poor budgets and better/more services), the expectations were often only partially met. This shows that constraints and adverse interests in the executive powers to maintain the status quo are still strong, even within reform-minded institutions and local governments.

**Table 4.3: Changes brought about by the evaluated interventions**

Changes	At the level of nine interventions <sup>(1)</sup>				
	Good results		No good results		N.A, unknown (5)
Contribution to change <sup>(2)</sup>	Very much, above expectation	Sufficient, according expectation	Below expectation	Far below expectation	
1. State responsiveness <sup>(3)</sup>	*	****			****
2. State accountability <sup>(4)</sup>	*	**	**		****
3. Power relation		***	***		***
4. Inequality, discrimination	*	*****		*	**
5. Budget reallocation		**	***		****
6. More, better services	*	**	****		**

Source: CCS-Indonesia Team, based on interviews with project staff, conducted field visits, consultation of project and related documentation.

Notes:

(1) Interventions are represented by an \*

(2) The six contributions to change are mentioned in the ODI Evaluation Framework, Section D, page 19.

(3) and (4) Responsiveness is defined as the ability and willingness of the state to respond and act on the demand of its citizens. Accountability is defined as the ability and willingness of state institutions and actors to be accountable for their decisions and actions and for those decisions to be scrutinised by citizens.<sup>45</sup>

(5) Not all interventions address all six contributions to change as for some this was difficult to assess.

Some interventions had an explicit objective to formulate new laws (i.e. ASSD - revised law on decentralisation, SfGG-Administrative Procedure Act, civil service reform). Therefore they had or will have a direct output and outcome in policy making. For instance, a draft bill (the Administrative Procedure Act, SfGG) has been approved by the Cabinet and is ready to be sent to the Parliament by the President. Other evaluated interventions were able to contribute indirectly and directly to policy making and law making, both at the national and local level : (i) a national institutional framework and policy on social forestry was a necessary condition for making successful progress at the local level (MFP); (ii) the experiences of PROMIS in participatory planning at local level, involving the village level and NGOs, universities and the private sector and combining planning with the budgeting process formed an important input<sup>46</sup> for the design of the revised national Law on National Development Planning, (Law No. 25/2004) that institutionalises the creation of multi-stakeholder consultation forums (*Musrenbang*) at all levels of government over several timeframes, annual, medium-term and long-term, aiming at synchronising top-down and bottom-up, sectoral and geographical planning.<sup>47</sup> Based on an intensive and year-long work of MFP-supported intermediate NGOs and CSOs working with local communities and local governments<sup>48</sup> important contributions were made in the policy making and formulation of national laws and local regulations on social forestry.<sup>49</sup> People living around state forests were given for the first time ever user-rights of state forest land (in commercial and protected forests<sup>50</sup>) for a period of 35 years<sup>51</sup>. Albeit still in relatively small areas of Java, Lampung and Nusa Tenggara, this is an important step in many years of multi-stakeholder forums and policy advocacy at the central level. An important scaling-up has been planned. This is an indicator for increased state responsiveness and accountability.

Furthermore, a considerable number of local regulations significantly contributed to secure the rights of small farmers to use state-owned land which ultimately alters power

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<sup>45</sup> In the ODI Literature Review, p 8, para 2.17 instead of these two changes, "receptivity" and "responsiveness" are referred to: "Receptivity refers to the extent to which the state hears the voices of those expressing their opinions and preferences. Responsiveness - a form of behaviour - refers to the extent to which the state, having heard the voices of its citizens, responds to their demands and concerns", e.g. by providing more transparency or better services (ODI Literature review, p. 8, para 2.17).

<sup>46</sup> Among contributions from other donors working on decentralisation.

<sup>47</sup> Another milestone has been the Decree of the MOHA No 71/2005 on allocations to the Village Allocation Fund (*Alokasi Dana Desa*, ADD, the block grant system with full authority of villages to decide on its use. Funds increased ten-fold from Rp 10 to Rp 100 million per village.

<sup>48</sup> The MFP built on earlier work done in this field, in particular by the Ford Foundation in Java and the NGO Transform and WWF in Lombok, NTB, so the support was strengthening ongoing local initiatives.

<sup>49</sup> Most notable are contributions to the Government Regulation No. 6/2007 and the related Ministerial Decree 34/2007 on Social Forestry.

<sup>50</sup> Certain restrictions apply for protected forests: timber has to be planted, but may not be harvested.

<sup>51</sup> So far only temporary permits were given, usually for a period of 5 years.

relationships. They are not open to arbitrary action by the state or security forces anymore, and are in the position to plan land-use with a long term perspective, allowing, for example, investment to plant perennial crops which could ultimately – if managed well (and accompanied by the right capacities) – lead to improvements in livelihoods. However, there has, so far, not been enough effort to establish effective complaint mechanisms in order to ensure that regulations are implemented accordingly.

#### **MFP- not only success stories**

Bringing about changes in the management of natural resources requires a cautious formation of alliances and strategies from the lowest to the highest level:

The multi-stakeholder process in the District of Wonosobo on forestry land managed by the State Forest Company resulted in the issuing of Bylaw No 22/2001 on community-based forestry management. It included a very progressive scheme of profit-sharing of timber income with farmers, giving real decision-making powers to local communities and being accommodative towards their demands for change in species and planting density (less pines which are considered to dry out the soil). Farmers were well organised and mobilised political support (a lot of demonstrations emphasised their demands). After ratification of the bylaw, the Ministry of Forestry pressed the Ministry of Home Affairs to cancel the bylaw as they were considered too community-friendly and contradictory to national-level legislation, apparently taking sides with conservative rent-seeking interests in the State Forestry Company. The NGOs and communities had relied too much on reform-minded parliamentarians and their initiative right, not having built up enough support within the local executive administration. This led to the demoralisation of farmers' organisations. The supporting NGOs shifted their attention to protected forestry land and forestry outside the control of the State Forestry Company, particularly in Yogyakarta, where the management of state-owned forests is within the authority of the local government (dating back to the Dutch colonial times).

“Public hearing” and “public forum” instruments are encouraged, but they are not well-defined, and usually refer to participatory processes where non-governmental actors are involved in discussing priorities and budgets. This was unthinkable in Indonesia less than ten years ago.

The use of the participatory planning and budgeting process developed by PROMIS had an influence on budget allocation in the districts they were developed. The process became much more transparent and government staff used to involve other stakeholders. For instance, in Bima District the number of proposals from the village level being accommodated in the Regional Budget has increased significantly from 4% in the year 2001 to 41% in the year 2005<sup>52</sup>. The amount of budget allocations for development-related expenditure also appears to have increased, though to a much lesser extent, by an estimated 10-15%.

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<sup>52</sup> But this is still a small percentage of all village proposals that could be accommodated in the district budget (yearly about 200 out of 2,000 proposals or 10%), against 25-35% of district proposals, in the period 2001-2005, source: Arif Roesmann, 2007.

A number of stakeholder forums were conducted and outcomes found their way into the five-year development plan. Nevertheless, this is still a very general policy document that is not being translated directly into respective budget allocations. As these stakeholder forums were one-time events which were not continued by the local government, the question remains how effective they were – besides providing an important learning opportunity in regions that so far had little experience with direct dialogue between government and civil society. In these stakeholder forums there was no inclusion of self-help group members or other acknowledged representatives of the poor. PROMIS also initiated a number of public hearings to facilitate civil society input towards the formulation of local by-laws, for instance regarding the introduction of new local taxes and levies or the revision of district policies on village administration. As the subject of these consultations were concrete and clearly outlined and participants selected on the basis that they would be affected by these by-laws, civil society input was clear and tangible and the instrument “Public Hearing” as such was more effective.

It was found, that despite numerous local regulations<sup>53</sup>, Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or Government Decrees signed by Local Government Heads resulting from multi-stakeholder processes and forums, a higher budget needed to implement the agreements made was often not or only partially effectuated (evidence of SfGG, PROMIS, MFP). This slows down the process of change, and/or limited the change to a few actors and institutions. For instance, the Customer Complaints Survey, however innovative and instrumental in bringing about better services, had been piloted in Solok (Sumatra) and Bima. Given the time frame, a more widespread outcome would have been expected in Bima. Already in 2002, the first trials of the customer survey took place in two health centres (*Puskesmas*), whereas actually only in four other *Puskesmas* a similar exercise is planned, resulting in a total of six out of the 24 *Puskesmas* in the district. Furthermore, for lack of budget, the customer survey planned for primary schools in Bima already stretches out over two years, with the survey having been tried out in a few schools and the full survey expected to take place in 2008.<sup>54</sup>

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) resulting from the Participatory Action Research (PAR) in the communities surrounding Mount Rinjani in Lombok (MFP), praised as a high quality outcome containing a comprehensive strategy and plan of action, was partly left without implementation. Not enough funds were allocated and the follow-up process came to a halt due to a lack of ownership on the side of the provincial and local government administration. This makes the process cumbersome and much less effective. The multifunctional teams in Bima on local economic development (*Team*

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<sup>53</sup> Local level legislation in areas visited: draft Perda West Lombok on Recognition of Adat Communities in the Management of Adat Forests, SK Bupati in Central Lombok on Permits for Social Forestry, Perda 10/1005 West Lombok on Social Forestry, Perda 04/2007 West Lombok on Environmental Services, NTB Moratorium 2006 on Illegal Logging, Perda 11/2006 Province of NTB on Spatial Planning banning mining on the island of Lombok (MFP).

<sup>54</sup> The SfGG approach has been applied or is in the process of application in 10 districts/municipalities, and the situation in Bima is not representative for the overall effectiveness of the programme. The Bima case is illustrative of local conditions, but not representative for the overall effectiveness of the programme. As reasons for delay was reported by the project (i) a controversial electoral campaign stalling government activities in 2004, and flooding in 2006 absorbing a large share of district funds.

*Prospek*) and the Good Governance Team<sup>55</sup> established during the implementation of PROMIS were found to be virtually non-functioning<sup>56</sup> due to lack of incentives, rotation of members and a lack of local political support.

The first achievement of the ASSD is the involvement of an NGO in its work with the Ministry of Home Affairs, facilitating public participation. Support to Minimum Service Standards is expected to improve accountability

So far, the results of CSIAP-NTB are rather limited. This is not surprising, given the short period of the project (two one-year contracts), the local political context and the working methodology followed (see the previous section on CV&A channels). Due to increased pressure involving local NGOs in cooperation with Islamic leaders (especially after they had exposed irregularities in the 2006 provincial budget), the government of West Lombok agreed to increase health-related budget allocations. However, it is not clear if this is a one-off or a permanent increase. Village health cadres obtained some training on tracking and following-up on cases of malnutrition.

Overall, the government of NTB has so far not shown much willingness to respond to demands of the pro-poor budgeting initiative (except for West Lombok). The DPA has also not yet developed clear indicators for measuring 'pro-poor budget allocations', making it difficult to judge if additional allocations would bring benefits for the poor. The District Secretary (*Sekda*) is of the opinion that the government should be accountable towards the parliament instead of the general public, and therefore sees the role of the DPA in advising and lobbying the local parliament. The coalition with Islamic mass-based organisations gives more weight to the issue of pro-poor budgeting and makes the voice of citizens stronger, but it does not ultimately alter power relations between the state and its citizens.

CSIAP-PATTIRO has achieved a number of substantial results in a short time. Amongst these are: (i) a module developed to monitor the process of the development planning consultative meetings at the local level; (ii) an increase in health spending by more than 60% of the local budget compared to the year before intervention (however, budget allocations are still very low and disproportionate to fulfil the actual health needs) and; (iii) increased transparency in the budget of the City of Solo, by opening access to information on draft budget plans and publishing the yearly budget through newspapers and posters.

The CSIAP-ALIT intervention is an excellent example of how CV&A interventions can effectively work. Poor people living on the streets of Indonesia's second largest city Surabaya, who generally do not possess any official identity documents (therefore being termed "stateless" by Indonesian authorities), have usually no access at all to public ser-

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<sup>55</sup> The composition of the teams is changing yearly by Bupati's Decree, and each year a (small) budget for its functioning has to come from the Local Budget (APBD).

<sup>56</sup> Field trip to BIMA district.

vices, in particular health services. The local NGO ALIT effectively mobilised and channelled the voice of these marginalised poor citizens in demanding their rights for public services and finally secured their access to them.

The CB KADES capacity building programme impacted positively on the abilities of the respective village heads. Anecdotal evidence suggests that participatory elements in planning processes have become more prominent, particularly with regard to budgeting (i.e. decisions on how to spend major parts of the village block grant are now made in village assemblies). In at least some cases, the village head has used the knowledge acquired in workshops to train members of his village administration. The training may encourage village heads to understand the necessity of - and create opportunities for - improved participation of the village community in decision-making. However, as decision-making at village level has traditionally been dominated by village-level elites and the intervention was limited to addressing village heads only, it is unlikely that basic relationships of accountability between village governments and villagers as well as persisting power relationships have been altered.

But in the absence of systematic approaches to the monitoring and evaluation of the capacity building, robust empirical findings on the overall effectiveness of the training are not available.

CEFIL- SATUNAMA is praised for its high quality courses and is generally perceived as the leading “political education training centre” in Indonesia, employing about 60 well-qualified staff. Informal feedback from participants (alumni networks, blogs, mailing lists, alumni reunions and a workshop on experiences of CEFIL in June 2007) suggest that CEFIL has achieved its objectives of strengthening the capabilities and knowledge of key NGO personnel and thereby empowering their organisations and the Civil Society sector in general.

The evaluation did not identify unexpected outcomes.

## 4.5 Pathways to development objectives

While it is possible to make some quality assessments on the overall impacts of interventions in terms of actual or realistically achievable impact on CV&A (see below), the differences between “development outcomes” and “intermediate outcomes” or “outcomes” and “outputs”, as well as the link between CV&A outcomes and broader development outcomes remain fuzzy. None of the programmes’ designs and implementations allow for a sound empirical-analytical construction of *linear* pathways leading from direct results, particularly the strengthened capacity of non-state actors to participate in policy-making processes, to intermediate outcomes, especially changes in power, policy practise of institutions, to the broader development outcomes of poverty reduction, democracy and economic growth. Most interventions claim the existence of such pathways and work towards the achievement of broader development goals. However, due to the multi-donor setting that is characterised by partly complementary, partly overlapping or com-

peting programme agendas and strategies with regard to key reform arenas in Indonesia, it is ultimately impossible to isolate the specific long-term impact of a single intervention from other factors that contribute to the consolidation of democracy or poverty alleviation. This is also the case for interventions in specific localised settings. Nevertheless, gradual and sectoral achievements towards development objectives can be identified in all cases.

ASSD aims at enhancing the consistency of the various decentralisation policies. This is supposed to improve the effect of reforms on poverty reduction and political stabilisation in Indonesia. The intervention thus operates in an important activity area of the Action Programme 2015 (Objective 3.9: Ensure participation of the poor, strengthen responsible governance), which the German Government is committed to. In its objective and approach it makes a contribution to the activity areas “Democracy and Good Governance”, as well as to “Political Participation”, identified in the Millennium Declaration as prerequisites for achieving the MDGs.

ASSD support for the implementation of Minimum Service Standards (MSS) – one of the most prominent processes supported by ASSD, involving four main ministries and 11 sectors – can be regarded an important pathway for pro-poor budget allocations at the local level as major determinants of vulnerability and poverty (e.g. health, education) are directly addressed. This regulation states, *inter alia*, that MSS are a tool to help the local governments in the execution of their compulsory functions (*urusan wajib*). They are a means to guarantee all citizens equal access to, and a minimum quality of, basic services. MSS will increase accountability of local governments, most importantly in the sectors of health and education.<sup>57</sup>

Impact indicators set by the BMZ have been assessed for ASSD. Studies carried out by the Gadjadara University and the University of Indonesia show – according to project documentation – that the majority of indicators for the first phase of the project have been achieved beyond target. Beyond this specific finding, the work of the two universities is important in a more fundamental sense: the participatory involvement of civil society actors not only as a project target group but also as an independent evaluator of interventions and their achievements can be considered good practise for the advancement of CV&A and, ultimately, the strengthening of core democratic principles.

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<sup>57</sup> So far the budget allocation for local services has been done without needs analysis and works on the basis of proportional funding (each sector, for example, education, health etc. receives roughly the same sum regardless of specific needs). The legal framework for MSS has made progress, since the introduction of Law 22/1999 (and GR 25/2000) of the introduction of obligatory functions and associated MSS. Following some modelling/piloting activities in 2002-2004, the government called for a “phased approach” to the introduction of MSS in Law 32/2004, and explained in more detail the MSS concept in the GR 65/2005. The regulation which introduces compulsory minimum budget allocations for key sectors – education, health and basic infrastructure - is viewed by donors to be generally well crafted and with sound directions for the MSS efforts. “The introduction of MSS should embolden the public to make some claims on regional government, and give guidance and adequate resources to regional government as it pursues basic service improvements” (USAID. Decentralisation 2006. Stock Taking on Indonesia’s Recent Decentralisation Reforms. Summary of Findings, August 2006 p. 23)

SfGG directly contributes to overall development outcomes.<sup>58</sup> The intervention has contributed to the awareness among government staff that they need to enter into an open dialogue with the wider public and that they have to involve watchdog organisations. Hereby a contribution is made to the democratic process and attention is rendered to good services to citizens. The guidelines and methodology developed have a country-wide application and are expected to increase the quality of public services. The methodology has been tested in the health, education, agriculture and transport sector, as well as for village governments. It has a wide applicability. The intervention can be expected to have impacts on the decentralisation process, local good governance and administrative reforms in Indonesia.

The impacts of PROMIS are less clear by comparison. Poverty alleviation is not only the overriding goal, but also the direct programme objective. The programme explicitly refers to the poor as well as to poor villages and claims that poverty has been reduced due to project activities. But it is not known by what extent and most self-help groups are still in the lower phases of acting as social safeguards and as community micro-credit institutions. While the field visits revealed limited self-reliance of supported groups in Bima District, more positive impact was found in Alor: village kiosks and small trade businesses run by women certainly have experienced improvements in their standard of living. But even here, no joint group marketing and agro-processing activities were taking place, despite numerous conceptual papers and recommendations on how to support the groups. The activities of the self help groups appear to have slowed down after PROMIS ended in 2005. Regarding good governance activities, while the intermediate outcomes (for results see previous section) will continue to have an impact on improved responsiveness of local governance practices, it cannot be assumed that this automatically leads to a clearer pro-poor orientation of the pilot districts. Continuing demands from NGOs and CSOs are needed to sustain results.

MFP has been very clearly aiming at reducing poverty, improving the environment and reducing social conflicts. Pathways towards poverty reduction are visible. At the moment, due to improved rights, there is predominantly no immediate change in practice (and thus in income) as farmers were already “illegally” making use of (mainly non-timber) forest products before. However, capacity building by NGOs has probably contributed to slight improvements in income. In the medium-term, the “social forestry dividend” will partly depend on capacities to adapt farming technologies and marketing capacities (especially in Java) as young trees in reforested areas will grow and not allow continuation of typical cash crop planting anymore. Thus, alternative products are needed. In the long run with the new legislation on Social Forestry there has a very good potential for significant increases in incomes, as the farmers can also earn the right to use some of the timber of the plots assigned to them – which would make a huge difference. But this will also depend on the quality of their organisations (cooperatives) as this

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<sup>58</sup> The intervention is also likely to contribute to the MDG No. 1. Poverty Reduction. MDG No.3. Gender Equality and MDG No. 8. Sustainable Economy.

is the main eligibility criteria for future use of timber– and thus in many cases on the continuous support by local NGOs to make sure they will meet this criterion.

A mid-term impact assessment concluded that the MFP had not targeted the marginalised (poorest farmers, among them women) clearly enough and thus might even have contributed to a consolidation of social and economic exclusion.<sup>59</sup> Consequently, in the last years of the first phase, the programme put considerable effort in conceptualising and strengthening its poverty focus. The outcome of these efforts will probably only be felt in its new three-year programme phase.

Pathways towards environmental protection are particularly evident with regard to forest managed by communities who have a right to get a share in the profits. These forests are very clearly being protected and well maintained. In certain regions, a reduction of forest fires is already visible. In the case of NTB, in 2006, the Governor issued a Moratorium on illegal logging and communities are also working on community regulations sanctioning illegal logging which increases the likelihood of improved forest protection.

It is not easy to assess what has been (will be) the factual impact of the interventions of CSIAP supported by the Asia Foundation. These interventions are small-scale and designed to improve the framework conditions for CV&A in very specific settings. However, the pathways are clear and convincing. PATTIRO's activities in Solo may lead to a continued increase in local budgets for community health posts that has the potential for reducing social inequality. This also applies for the ALIT intervention: Free of charge access for the poor contributes to decreased health-related spending and better health, thus better living conditions for the poor. It is obvious that the overall situation of the target group has changed from “no access at all”, to the possibility of getting access to health services delivered legally from a public institution. An increase in pro-poor budgeting in NTB over time will very much depend on the local political dynamics. So far, positive impacts still seem to be far away. However, for the upcoming provincial elections, for example, an agreement with the local election committee has been made that candidates who run as governors will have to conduct a hearing with the DPA, which in turn will increase public pressure to increase pro-poor budget allocations.

Direct pathways to broader development objectives in the cases of CEFIL and CB CADES are not immediately obvious and visible.<sup>60</sup> CEFIL intended to increase the voice of NGOs and thereby, indirectly, reduce the gap in citizens-state relations. Explicit pathways cannot be identified as there is no systematic impact monitoring and evaluation. CB KADES does not directly address broader development outcomes but is generally directed at the promotion of good governance and the strengthening of democratic procedures.

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<sup>59</sup> Brocklesby, Mary Ann; Crawford, Sheena, Assessing the Poverty and Governance Impacts of MFP's Multi-Stakeholder Forestry Processes on Forest-Dependant People, February 2007.

<sup>60</sup> Evaluations of CEFIL took place in 2000 and 2005 without, however, elaborating on the programme's impact with regard to increased citizens' voice.

## 4.6 DAC evaluation criteria

Table 4.4 presents the summary of the scoring on DAC criteria of the evaluated interventions. The scoring is indicative. The Summary Sheets (Appendix D) contain the evidence on which the assessment has been based.

**Table 4.4: Overview of scoring on DAC criteria for the evaluated interventions**

Interventions	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact (*)	Sustainability
MFP	++	+	+	++/+	+
PROMIS	+	+/-	+	-	-
SfGG	++	+	++/+	+	+
ASSD	++	+	+	+	+
CSIAP-NTB	+/-	+	+/-	+/-	+
CSIAP-PAT	+	+	++	+	+
CSIAP-ALI	++	++	++	+	+
CB KADES	+	+	+	+	+
CEFIL	+	+	+	+	+

Note (\*) Impact is based on the specific part of the intervention dealing with CV&A and does not address the complete project they form part of. In a number of cases impact studies have been made (i.e. PROMIS, MFP), whereas in other cases impact is rather assessed qualitatively or as 'potential' impact (ASSD, CSIAP, CB KADES, CEFIL).

Used codes for scoring:

Very good/above expectations: ++

Below expectations, some deficiencies: -

Sufficient, according to expectations: +

Far below expectations, major deficiencies: --

The score of +/- is an intermediate score between + and -

As can be concluded from the table, the evaluation has been overall very positive. All interventions are relevant and almost half of them very relevant for strengthening V&A. No serious shortcomings were identified in terms of efficiency but projects are usually good value for money (for some interventions no assessment could be made). Overall, all interventions obtained a satisfactory assessment for achieving their objectives (effectiveness). Overall, interventions have been assessed as having impact but compared to the other DAC criteria this criterion does not come out as very strong: only satisfactory scores (or + mixed +/- scores) and none had a very high score (++). This is explained by many constraints (see section 4.1) that are mainly outside the control of the interventions. With the exception of PROMIS, no serious concerns related to sustainability have been detected.

## 5. Conclusions and lessons learned

### 5.1 Channels, mechanisms and processes

Quite a number of interventions address both the ‘supply’ and ‘demand side’. However, donors seem to predominantly perceive themselves either as a partner of civil society actors or as a partner of government institutions. Both types of interventions may involve government or civil society, respectively, but if so, then their role is limited. Therefore, equal engagement of both state and non-state actors is still rare. This can, to a certain extent, be attributed to dominant trends in aid delivery. When donors refrain from having their own implementation structures they cannot play the role of an independent facilitator between both sides. Regarding the demand side, funding is often channelled through international NGOs that predominantly play the role of a financing agency for local NGOs with little direct involvement in programme implementation. In part, funding is directly given to existing NGOs. The third option is that new structures of cooperation between civil society and the government are being set up. Projects focusing on policy advice at national level (supply side) have the potential of engaging with both state and non-state actors, but sometimes still have to deal with strong reservations of government officials to engage with civil society actors that limit them in turn to engage equally with both sides.

Public dialogue and consultation forums were found to be major channels developed and applied by donors in Indonesia. It became clear, though, that the understanding of “public hearing” or “public consultation” in the Indonesian context is mostly a limited one. In general, these events rather resemble larger workshops in closed locations like meeting rooms of hotels. Participation is generally based on written invitations, with the definition and selection of participants being left to the organisers. The evaluation team has not come across one initiative that would have been truly open for the general public and information, for example, being disseminated through public media. The fact that without explicit invitation there is rather a cultural barrier to attending meetings or gatherings, especially for marginalised people, is usually commented upon by both Indonesians and foreign observers. With the exception of the CSIAP-ALIT intervention, pronounced efforts to especially include marginalised groups into public forums were not found.

In general, participation in channels for citizens’ voice is based on representation. However, the validity of representation is seldom questioned and donors predominantly do not differentiate enough between civil society organisations and their respective constituencies. In general, participation in channels for citizens’ voice is based on representation. As marginalised people are rarely in the position to organise themselves to express their voice, it is generally difficult to find representatives who can rightfully speak on their behalf.

The varied Indonesian cultural conditions also play an important role. Especially in more traditional rural areas strong patron-and-client relations still persist. In a relationship of mutual social and economic dependency poor people have always relied on “their patrons” (be it village or sub-village officials, religious leaders, economically more well-off villagers etc.) to take decisions on their behalf. But also among urban marginalized people efforts of empowerment are needed before they are ready to participate in channeling their voices.

An effective channelling of citizen’s voice into local-level and national-level policy making in a meaningful way needs, firstly, a very clear definition of the target group (whose voice is being represented) and, secondly, a strong engagement at grassroots level as a precondition for having a valid mandate and legitimacy. If this bottom-up legitimacy is lacking, access to decision-making becomes vulnerable to bias or exploitation, due to shifts in power relations. In extreme cases, this can even result in the exclusion of marginalised voices being reinforced.

Collaboration with non-traditional organisations is still rather underdeveloped in Indonesia, except with Islamic organisations. Engaging with Islamic mass-based organisations, which is so far systematically only being done by the Asia Foundation<sup>61</sup>, is generally considered a very innovative approach by development practitioners. In the context of contributing to a well-developed and active civil society that expresses its voice and demands accountability, these organisations still have great potential to become partners for donor initiatives. It needs to be kept in mind though, that their traditional base does not extend to the whole of Indonesia. Exemptions are found especially in Christian areas, but also in those regions dominated by customary law and traditional socio-cultural norms.

Interventions aimed at strengthening accountability seem to have more potential to be accessible to the wider public and thus also for more marginalised segments in society. Whereas the facilitation of “voice interventions” rely more on pre-definitions of whose voice is going to be engaged and accountability mechanisms on the side of the government seem to define the target groups and engaged stakeholders to a lesser extent. Here, there is still more potential for accountability channels to be explored and developed by donors, especially in order to reach and engage disempowered community members.

The establishment of effective channels for citizens’ voice and accountability is generally a time-intensive process – and even more so if they aim at including marginalised groups. If directly initiated by an international donor, considerable time is needed for the institutionalisation of these channels and preparation of support phase-out. If facilitated

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<sup>61</sup> The *Partnership for Governance Reforms* back in 2004 also attempted to engage with Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in the fight against corruption. These two organisations at that time issued a joint declaration and NU even a *fatwa* against corruption. This initiative rather forged at an elite level with little rooting in their mass base seem to have been faded away until now due to little further facilitation and ownership. (see: Transparency International, Global Corruption Report, 2005 and personal communication with lecturer for Islamic teaching, Mataram)

by local actors, capacity-building and trust-building is required in order to shape a new relationship between state and non-state actors. This usually exceeds the limited time frames of donor interventions (on average about three years), which are programmed to achieve quick tangible results. Effective donor coordination and collaboration with a variety of implementing and funding organisations can contribute to overcoming time restraints.

## 5.2 Results and outcomes

### *Capacity building*

Capacity building is an important part of donor support in strengthening citizens' voice and accountability in Indonesia. The lack of mechanisms for CV&A is partly due to a lack of capacities, especially at local level, both on the government's side as well as on civil society's. Donors' capacity building activities are widely spread. Capacity building for government partners related to strengthening citizen's voice includes: conducting public consultations, multi-stakeholder dialogue, participatory needs, planning and poverty assessments. Capacity building related to strengthening accountability was less frequent. It was mainly conducted by SfGG involving training modules for customer complaint surveys in public service delivery and advising on the drafting of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides for concrete accountability mechanisms in administrative procedures.

In general, capacity building for civil society actors is closely related to the immediate objectives and strategies of programme implementation. Donors are rarely willing to go further and invest in strengthening the general capacities of civil society actors as such (SfGG is an exception). Trainings usually target NGOs, whereas other actors such as communities are mostly indirectly addressed by way of NGOs (PROMIS is an exception). Few capacity building initiatives were found that specifically target marginalised people in order to prepare them for participation in voice channels or access to accountability mechanisms.

Even more so than in capacity building for state actors, donors barely try to understand the political economy of their local civil society partners. It is often overlooked that civil society actors are also affected by political and power dynamics, and that they have their own agendas and even political aspirations that might not only have the potential to reinforce programme strategies but also to negatively affect them.

Shared learning and exchange-visits are common capacity building strategies that are applied by a number of donors towards both state and non-state actors (e.g. ASSD, MFP and the Asia Foundation). Learning from the experiences of others in a similar situation is an effective approach for learning and changing attitudes among farmers, NGOs and government representatives.

### *Linkage between voice and accountability interventions*

Effectiveness with regard to strengthening CV&A is highest when issues of voice and accountability are addressed in direct and immediate ways. The best results are obtained when the 'supply side' and the 'demand side' are simultaneously addressed. This is increasingly being done but, as shown in the previous section, an equal balance is still to be achieved. The major role of donors has been to open up governments to civil society demands and accelerate ongoing processes of civil society empowerment.

The facilitation of previously non-existing public forums in relations between state and non-state actors and the introduction of customer service complaint surveys are effective means of improving the delivery of services to the poor (e.g. health, education, transport, etc.) and to increase the level of accountability of state agencies. However, it requires the right amount of local ownership and the commitment of both state and civil society actors to implement donors' strategies on CV&A.

Funds can be easily wasted if either state actors or civil society organisations lack the knowledge and capacity to engage in participatory consultative processes, underlining the importance of capacity building. Government officials are not yet sufficiently familiar with the role of steering and disseminating experience-based and knowledge-supported change and innovation. Their general scepticism vis-à-vis CSOs is still widespread.

Interventions were found to be most effective in strengthening CV&A when they:

- address both the supply and demand side;
- work effectively both at national level (policies) and at the local level;
- work with multi-stakeholder processes (partners need to see each other as constructive);
- are able to link grass-root engagement with advocacy at policy level as part of institutionalised mechanisms (should not be ad-hoc, related to individuals);
- work is undertaken with concrete examples, demonstrations, tested guidelines, pilots, combined with a good communication strategy that encourages multiplication and imitation;
- have specific issues (e.g. health) and target groups (e.g. urban homeless street people), instead of broad, undefined objectives (e.g. poverty reduction);
- are designed based on a thorough analysis of socio-political contexts (forming alliances).

## 5.3 Pathways to broader development objectives

There is no strong empirical evidence of a clear positive relationship between CV&A and development (especially poverty reduction) in Indonesia as in most democratising polities. It is a matter of the actual performance of a democratic system, the way that environmental opportunities are shaped and seized, and the actual interests and strategies of state and non-state actors (as well as formal and informal relationships between the two groups) that determine to what extent CV&A positively impacts on development. In this regard, all evaluated CV&A interventions in Indonesia ultimately focus, either directly

or indirectly, on the improvement of democracy and good governance, more sustainable use of natural resources and reduced conflicts on the one hand, and poverty alleviation (decreased vulnerability of poor, improved economic well-being, secured rights of the poor) on the other. In most cases there are clear explicit or implicit links to the MDGs.<sup>62</sup> Enhancing the consistency of the various decentralisation policies and improved citizens' participation are expected to increase the effect of reforms on poverty reduction and political stabilisation in Indonesia. Each intervention is designed and implemented in a way that it contributes towards overall change (examples are given in Section 4.5), while the impact is felt locally and in small segments of society, i.e. it is still "pocket-wise". Scaling-up is needed to really make a difference and many are needed to make it work. More creative strategies must also include the poor and especially women as in CV&A interventions in order to establish a clear linkage between CV&A and the reduction of vulnerability, exclusion and poverty.

## 5.4 Strengthening CV&A and aid effectiveness

In Indonesia, actors need an official mandate (i.e. invitation letter, local decree, etc.) to participate in dialogue processes between state and non-state actors. In this respect, suitable formal structural framework conditions for citizens' voice are essential and donors can play a role in helping to create these structures. Informal ad-hoc mechanisms are often a good and suitable starting point but they can only serve as transitional arrangements. Indonesia is still gripped by informal politics (that often override or simply ignore the formal rules of the game as established in the process of democratisation). It is, therefore, of particular importance that strong emphasis is placed on the formalisation of participatory arrangements in policy-making.

Although it might be difficult to accept at first glance, aid effectiveness is generally higher if donors go the seemingly easy way of working with reform-minded counterparts and partners rather than trying to convince reform-resistant actors to collaborate. Most interventions that the team looked at followed this logic (PROMIS and CSIAP-NTB are the major exception here), which reveals itself as the most appropriate and promising strategy. In an environment that is still characterised by the prevalence of reform-resistance in many policy areas (particularly decentralisation), it makes sense to further strengthen already reform-minded key actors so that they can act as multipliers. Successful projects that strengthen CV&A in reform-open districts and cities can work as a model for less reform-minded units. These projects are often characterised by a high degree of local ownership (including the willingness of state actors to co-fund the interventions). Ownership is a crucial factor when it comes to aid effectiveness. GTZ tries to make sure that national ownership over the decentralisation process is maintained and that the Indonesian government is "not pushed" in a way that it might block or even reverse the reform. At the same time, mutual accountability, i.e. making sure that the aid relationship is em-

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<sup>62</sup> "Democracy and Good Governance", as well as to "Political Participation" are identified in the Millennium Declaration as prerequisites for achieving the MDGs

bedded in an accountability mechanism that guarantees an adequate degree of monitoring of reciprocal commitments, is not well developed yet.

#### **A successful approach by the BMZ/GTZ**

The long-term involvement of the BMZ (donor) and the GTZ (implementer) in Indonesia and the way they work appears to be appreciated by their counterparts. As a former PROMIS team leader said: *“We had a completely different approach: we came to the district and said to the Bupati (Head of District) here we are, where can we help you, what do you want us to do? We did not bring money, cars and investment funds, but asked the local government to spend their own money differently”*. Where this was understood, important achievements were made. This varied among the districts the programme worked in, and not all were reform-minded and keen on accepting change.

The parallel GTZ programme on good urban governance, ‘Urban Quality’, went a step further: it brought together a group of initially 30 districts and explained the programme, inviting them to come with some good proposals for joint implementation<sup>63</sup> and indicating how the programme could assist them in carrying them out. The major share of the funding had to come from the districts. The programme offered to conduct a particular capacity building activity, provide technical assistance or co-funding to make things possible that they otherwise could not easily carry out by themselves. In several rounds, the number of districts in which actions were funded sunk by around 8-10. Some projects were not that successful, but most were and the approach, welcomed by the Indonesian partners, proved to be very effective.

In Indonesia, one has to build up credibility and trust. Claiming leverage simply does not work in Indonesia. Insisting on policy dialogue before disbursing funds is another example of something that does not work in Indonesia.

Donor harmonisation and collaboration, an important indicator for aid effectiveness according to the Paris Declaration of 2005, work well among the large bilateral donors. However, most of the evaluated interventions do not directly contribute to overall donor harmonisation. Donor harmonisation works well among GTZ projects and, as far as it is possible to make this judgement, between GTZ and other donors who are active in the sector of the promotion of good governance and decentralisation (participation and taking the lead in donor working groups, liaison between GOI partners and other donors). But as explained in the section on the aid environment (Section 3.4 and Appendix C2), joint donor-GOI coordination became much less intense over the past few years (disbanding of CGI, lack of commitment and interest in sector-wide approaches from GOI side).

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<sup>63</sup> Examples are improvement of markets, waste systems, transport systems etc,

Although most of the evaluated interventions do not directly contribute to a policy dialogue with the GOI, in the Indonesian context, bilaterally funded interventions may well impact on policy formulation and legislation, or may even be in a better position than multilateral aid initiatives.

The Decentralisation Support Facility (DSF) may be one example: It is a multi-donor platform to improve donor harmonisation in the light of the commitments made in the Paris Declaration. But there is little ownership of the Indonesian Government towards the DSF yet since well-established working relationships at an institutional level are still lacking and concrete outcomes in terms of jointly implemented programmes and coordinated policy advice are very limited.

The Indonesian Government admits that there is still a lot of work to be done in terms of further developing and implementing reforms and tackling poverty in the country. It therefore continues to value foreign assistance. However, currently, there is no clear plan or seemingly little interest on the side of the Indonesian government to harness those mechanisms of donor coordination or multi-donor policy dialogue already in place. Indonesia is not in a dependent position and does not have the need to accept preconditions set by donor organisations for qualifying their support.

Realistically speaking, foreign donors can only play a catalytic role by bringing up innovative ideas, facilitating the implementation of interesting pilots and involving Indonesian partner agencies and civil society agents alike into learning exercises.

## 6. Recommendations

In line with the approach of this evaluation, recommendations put forward are directed towards the donors. For interventions that aim at strengthening citizens' voice and accountability to be most successful, donors should preferably:

### *On the overall approach*

- address both the supply and demand side;
- work effectively both at national level (policies) and at the local level;
- work with multi-stakeholder processes (partners need to see each other as constructive);
- explore and tap the potential for accountability channels, especially in order to reach and engage disempowered community members; an example is the creation of mechanisms for direct accountability between governments (mostly at local level) and citizens, such as citizen's juries (it was shown that even when government responsiveness (receptiveness) was good, citizens lack formal means to keep them accountable);
- pay more attention to mechanisms for improving the accountability of parliamentarians towards their electorate;
- in strengthening CSOs, improve their legitimacy and outreach towards the community (their constituency), i.e. improve CSO transparency and accountability, and in particular their engagement with marginalised groups;
- develop a much clearer pro-poor approach; empower communities to increase their access to services and decision-making at village level, with a special focus on marginalised people, such as women and the poor;
- not rely exclusively on setting up dialogue forums based only on representation, but ensure that marginalised people themselves also get a chance to participate.

### *On operational issues*

- build trust through long-lasting relationships (even in times when other donors withdraw due to resistance against reform and participatory approaches);
- take sufficient time to understand local socio-political dynamics in order to select adequate partners and devise effective strategies;
- pay more attention to empowering partners to take over donor roles (exit strategies);
- conceptualise a poverty-focus in interventions aiming to improve governance and service delivery;
- put better monitoring and evaluation systems in place that include updates on local socio-political developments and allow a continuous learning process for local partners themselves;
- undertake more efforts in terms of quality control, especially when donors operate through intermediate organisation.

### *On policy dialogue*

- not advocate too openly for political reforms; donors should combine technical capacity building requested by government partners with the facilitation of participation and citizens' feedback in service delivery or decision making;
- taking the above into account, continue contributing to structural reforms at national level, such as regarding the judicial system, civil service reform, tackling corruption as well as electoral reforms;
- directly link empowerment of excluded and marginalised groups with interventions aiming to influence policy decisions;
- address political will and support local governments in the implementation of reforms by accompanying tangible benefits;
- work with reform-minded actors in order to strengthen change agents and foster role models (see box below).

#### **Work with reform-minded actors**

Donors should choose to work with those government institutions or local governments that have already demonstrated openness towards reform. In these locations, it is most likely that improved capacities will indeed contribute to improved government practices. In these cases, capacity building initiatives seem also to be more sustainable as local governments are usually more committed to allocating own funding for capacity building activities or have an interest to institutionalise newly acquired knowledge by having their own staff trained as trainers to further disseminate capacity building. Besides that, donor support to reform-minded state actors can be important to strengthen change agents vis-à-vis their less reform-minded apparatus or local councillors.

# Appendices

Appendix A: Terms of Reference

Appendix B: Methodology

Appendix C: Context analysis

Appendix D: Intervention Summary Sheets - Models of Change

Appendix E: Persons met, including group meetings

Appendix F: Summaries/decisions/outputs of stakeholder workshops

Appendix G: Documents consulted

# Appendix A: Terms of Reference

## Terms of Reference

### JOINT EVALUATION OF CITIZENS' VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY COUNTRY CASE STUDY INDONESIA

#### 1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

A core group of DAC partners<sup>64</sup> (Evaluation Core Group/ECG) agreed in 2006 to collaborate on a joint evaluation of development aid for strengthening Citizens' Voice and Accountability (CV&A). As an initial stage in this process, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) undertook development of an Evaluation Framework to assess CV&A interventions<sup>65</sup> and piloted the framework and methodology in two countries. The ECG now wishes to use this framework and its accompanying methodology<sup>66</sup> to evaluate interventions across a range of country types. At the end of this process, a synthesis report will be produced by a separate party, which will make recommendations for donors to consider. These will draw on lessons about CV&A interventions from the case studies and, importantly, place them within the broader context of existing literature on the subject and existant policy approaches.

These TOR outline the requirements for the country case study (CCS) in Indonesia commissioned by the BMZ. **It should be noted that although commissioned by the BMZ, the CCS will evaluate interventions across all ECG partners active in Indonesia**, namely (apart from German bilateral implementing agencies, particularly GTZ) DFID and – through national NGOs – SES. Additionally, in order to gain a holistic understanding of the scope of CV&A initiatives across the country, a minor mapping exercise to record other relevant donors and national interventions will be necessary.

The CCS will also cover selected activities by German political foundations in Indonesia (namely Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, possibly also Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung and Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, not only to obtain a comprehensive picture of BMZ-funded CV&A interventions through the incorporation of experiences and viewpoints of civil society actors, but also to draw lessons for the preparation of a compre-

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<sup>64</sup> The group comprises donor partners from the UK (DFID), Sweden (Sida), Denmark (Danida), Switzerland (SDC), Belgium (SES), Norway (Norad), and Germany (BMZ).

<sup>65</sup> It should be noted that donors are unable to work directly on voice (an action) or accountability (a relationship). In practice, donors strengthen CV&A by seeking to create or strengthen the preconditions for the exercise of CV&A and/or particular channels and mechanisms that underpin actions of CV&A relationships. In the context of this evaluation, such activities are referred to as 'CV&A interventions'.

<sup>66</sup> See Appendix 1. It is important to note that the Evaluation Framework and its accompanying methodological guidance is integral part of these TOR.

hensive evaluation of the work of political foundations under the BMZ Evaluation Programme.

## **2. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE OF THE JOINT EVALUATION**

There is an increasing emphasis on governance in development fora as the key dimension to addressing poverty reduction and inequality and promoting economic stability and growth. This goes beyond the institutional framework of government to the interaction between formal and informal actors, processes, customs and rules. It is a process of bargaining between those who hold power and those who seek to influence it. But only those who can convey their views have a “voice” and only governments or states that are accountable, and can be held so, will respond.

Good governance thus requires a just and responsive relationship between citizen and state. Development actors have long recognised this and worked on programmes to enhance the ability of the most vulnerable in society to articulate their needs, and with partner governments to provide the mechanisms and capacity to respond. Despite these efforts, there is a lack of evidence and real understanding of the dynamic and complex nature of factors influencing voice and accountability and there is thus a need to more systematically examine and evaluate current interventions.

This donor initiative seeks to identify both what works and what does not and why, and to identify gaps, overlaps and duplication in donor provision. By becoming more effective and transparent in our delivery of assistance to this vital area of both governance and social development aid provision, it also, as espoused by the Paris Declaration, seeks to improve donor coherence and accountability to those with whom, and on whose behalf, we work.

Quality of governance is recognised as a key factor correlated with poverty reduction and macroeconomic stability, and therefore influencing the achievement of the MDGs and preventing conflict.<sup>67</sup> Good governance is concerned with how citizens, public institutions, and leaders relate to each other, and whether these relationships lead to outcomes that reduce poverty.

Voice and accountability are concerned with the relationship between citizen and the state which is a core feature of the governance agenda. A large body of research and experience has demonstrated that active participation of citizens in the determination of policies and priorities can improve the commitment of government to reduce poverty and enhance the quality of aid and outcomes.

Similarly, it is increasingly recognised that government/state accountability, and the ability of citizens and the private sector to scrutinise public institutions and to hold them to account is an important facet of good governance. Failures of accountability can lead to

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<sup>67</sup> This association and the direction of causation is the subject of a significant body of research, for example many of the papers by KAUFMANN AND KRAAY, and discussion of this subject in the Global Monitoring Report 2006 (pp. 121-122).

pervasive corruption, poor and elite-biased decision-making, and unresponsive public actors.<sup>68</sup>

**Thus, citizens' voice and accountability<sup>69</sup> are important for developing more effective and responsive states and for enhancing the effectiveness and sustainability of aid, particularly in the context of country-led approaches.** The Paris Declaration includes specific commitments on these issues by development partners.<sup>70</sup>

There are many forms of accountability relationships (for example formal and informal accountabilities; social, political, and electoral accountabilities, accountabilities between different public institutions). This evaluation is focused on donors' support to the development of citizens' voice and accountability, focusing on downward or vertical accountability, i.e. that operating between the state and citizens.

Strengthening CV&A is pursued through a wide range of approaches. Examples include civic education, media strengthening, national and local policy and planning processes (including decentralisation), participatory budgeting and expenditure monitoring, social auditing and civil society and advocacy programmes. But the processes of empowerment and fostering an environment conducive to accountability and responsiveness are complex and dynamic as are the difficulties of attributing the factors that provoke change – both negative and positive. **Donors have thus recognised that there is a need to develop a more comprehensive understanding of this area by using a common framework to evaluate interventions in a number of different country contexts.**

### 3. OBJECTIVES AND USE

The objectives of the joint evaluation are twofold:

- a) To improve understanding of citizens' voice and accountability among development partners by mapping and documenting approaches and strategies of development partners for enhancing CV&A in a variety of developing country contexts; and to learn lessons on which approaches have worked best, where and why;
- b) To assess effects of a range of donor CV&A interventions on governance and on aid effectiveness, and whether these effects are sustainable.

In enhancing learning about CV&A interventions, the evaluation will make a contribution in an area of development co-operation which is allocated increasing resources but in

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<sup>68</sup> In development debates a stronger focus on participation emerged during the 1980s, in relation to projects, and has since been taken into the consultation of poor people on development priorities for Poverty Reduction Strategies, with varying degrees of success (see for example MCGEE, LEVENE, J. AND HUGHES, A., Assessing Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, IDS research report 52; WORLD BANK & IMF (2005), Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Approach). A range of information on the topic of voice and accountability will shortly be available from the Governance & Social Development Resource Centre website ([www.grc-dfid.org](http://www.grc-dfid.org)).

<sup>69</sup> The ODI Literature Review and intervention analysis of Donor Approaches on Citizens' Voice and Accountability" (see Appendix D) highlight the complexity of this subject and the various interpretations of what constitutes V and A in different contexts.

<sup>70</sup> Principally Sections: 14&15 on Ownership; 38 on Fragile States; and, 48 on Mutual Accountability.

which there is still little evidence on results. The evaluation also serves an important objective of enhancing the transparency and accountability of donors.

As an instrument of both learning and accountability, the evaluation of CV&A interventions will contribute to policy development, improved practices and understanding in an important aspect of governance, and be of use to a wide audience: policy makers, desk officers, country offices and implementing partners, and evaluators.

This multi-donor initiative will culminate in a synthesis report to be published in April 2008. It will analyse the lessons learned from the various case studies and make recommendations for donors to consider and implement. **The country case studies are thus a vital part of this process** and need to be reflective of different governance contexts and provide examples of the variety of approaches to citizens' voice and accountability.

#### 4. SCOPE AND TASKS OF THE COUNTRY CASE STUDY

Against the described background and objectives of the evaluation, the purpose of the country case study is to:

- a) Assess the selected interventions against their intended objectives, and on the basis of that draw conclusions on what works, and what does not, in relation to intervention programme theories.
- b) Assess the relevance of the interventions for strengthening CV&A in the Indonesian context.
- c) Provide an overall assessment/analysis of donors' role, success and failures in supporting CV&A in the Indonesian context.

##### Scope

In accomplishing the objectives of the assignment a thorough understanding of, and familiarity with, CV&A and the Evaluation Framework and associated documentation<sup>71</sup> will be necessary.

The evaluation of CV&A interventions will be based on the common framework (see Appendix A) and it will be carried out according to the processes/steps outlined in the methodological guidance attached as an annex to that document (see Appendix B), which provides references to a choice of methods and tools for the evaluation.

Prior to undertaking the evaluation phase itself, considerable work will be required by the consultancy team to finalise with donor partners in country those interventions selected for evaluation.<sup>72</sup> Critical to this process is gaining an understanding of the context against which CV&A interventions can be gauged and establishing a dialogue with key international and national actors to explore the various interpretations of "voice and accountability" and, in some contexts, "citizen".

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<sup>71</sup> See attached document. It is important to note that the Evaluation Framework and Methodology is integral part of the present TOR.

<sup>72</sup> For a menu of types of interventions to select from and a preliminary list of interventions see Appendix D.

## Tasks

Using the Evaluation Framework and methodology, and adapting it to the specific country and context and partner interventions, the consultancy team will provide answers to the following overarching CV&A evaluation questions:

- **Question 1: Channels, mechanisms and processes**  
What are the concrete channels, i.e. actors, spaces and mechanisms supported by donor-funded interventions for: (i) citizens' voice and empowerment; (ii) increased role of poor and excluded groups, and women or their representatives in governance processes; and (iii) accountability of governments to citizens?  
How do these channels work and how important are they to achieve CV&A outcomes?
- **Question 2: Results and outcomes**  
To what extent have the different approaches and strategies adopted by donors contributed to enhanced CV&A in partner countries?
- **Question 3: Pathways to broader development outcomes and impacts**  
In what ways are CV&A interventions contributing to broader development goals, such as poverty reduction and the MDGs? In particular, what are the main pathways leading from improved CV&A to such broader development outcomes?
- **Question 4: CV&A and aid effectiveness**  
What can we learn from experience to date of donors' effectiveness in supporting CV&A interventions with particular reference to the principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration?

## 5. PROCESS

Two pilot studies were conducted in Benin and Nicaragua. They indicated that there was insufficient mutual understanding of the meaning of "voice and accountability" among ECG donors and partners. Without such an understanding amongst donors, host nation and implementing partners it will be difficult to identify appropriate interventions for study. To overcome this, the country case study will consist of **two phases** and the BMZ (together with the relevant country offices) will play an active part in the first phase along with the consultancy team leader.

### First "Inception" Phase

The first phase will occur some weeks in advance of the second "main" phase. Initially, **desk-based research and work** will initiate the context analysis and identify, with "in country" donor partners, potential interventions for the evaluation. This will be followed by an **"in country" visit** (probably capital based) of 5-7 days to:

- Conduct introductory meetings and/or workshops to explain the Evaluation Framework and methodology, explore the different perceptions and interpretations of "voice and accountability", (and explain the added value of involving German political foundations);
- Finalise, in close consultation with relevant country offices, representatives of political foundations and the BMZ representative, the range of interventions to be

- evaluated ensuring balance between “supply and demand side” policies, programmes and projects and spread of rural/urban, formal/informal, empowered/disempowered actors;
- Determine the most appropriate evaluation methodology and tools (drawn from the options contained in the methodological guidance of the Evaluation Framework);
  - Arrange a programme of appointments and field visits in preparation for the full team’s visit;
  - Ensure that there is adequate background material and expert advice on the country context;<sup>73</sup>
  - Ensure logistics and accommodation arrangements are in hand; and
  - Report progress and observations in the form of an inception report to the BMZ and donor partner country offices (indicative length 4-6 pages).

### Second “Main” evaluation phase

The second main phase of the mission will involve all members of the consultancy team. The duration of the field study will not exceed three weeks. The team will conduct an evaluation of the interventions identified<sup>74</sup> based on – and drawing questions from – the Evaluation Framework and accompanying methodological guidance (see Annex 1).

At the end of the evaluation period the team will:

- Conduct an in-country debriefing seminar on the preliminary findings;
- Write the CCS evaluation report.

As the team will be using a new framework and approach for evaluating citizens’ voice and accountability, it will be important to note, throughout the evaluation exercise, aspects of the framework which proved of most value (and vice versa) and areas where additional guidance would have been of benefit.

Apart from the country mission, time should be also allocated for pre-reading, documenting and writing up the evaluation (CCS) report. A Quality Assurance (QA) panel for this process has been established and all CCS reports, in addition to being submitted to the BMZ, have to be copied to the QA Panel for their advice. The QA Panel will be available (by telephone) to the team leader for advice on standards and queries on methodological approaches.

A one-day workshop will be arranged on completion of all CCS (around the second weekend of February 2008) to further share experiences and comments on the CCS and

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<sup>73</sup> This knowledge may be available through the selection of consultants for the CCS team but it may also be necessary for the team to commission additional work (included within the terms of the consultancy contract) from a national expert.

<sup>74</sup> As stated earlier (on page 1 of these Terms of Reference), the evaluation will cover interventions across all ECG partners active in Indonesia plus selected interventions of German political foundations. As regards the precise number of interventions to be evaluated, the decision will be taken in close consultation with the BMZ, ECG partners, and their partners in Indonesia during the inception phase.

the framework and methodologies employed with other consultancy team leaders, ECG members, the QA panel and synthesis report authors. All of this is designed to contribute to a greater understanding of the issues involved and assist in the compilation of the synthesis report.

## **6. OUTPUTS AND DELIVERABLES**

The following specific outputs and reports are required over the period of the assignment:

- In country Introductory Workshop - CCS team leader;
- Inception report - CCS team leader (prior to initiation of second phase);
- Evaluation debriefing seminar (prior to end of “in country” mission);
- Debriefing note summarising the findings, conclusions and recommendations (to be presented at the end of the in country mission, max. five pages);
- Draft CCS report (indicative length 40 pages) to be delivered to the BMZ within three weeks of the end of the in-country mission;
- Revised CCS report to be delivered to the BMZ latest by **15 February 2008**;
- Attendance, as available by CCS team leader at a feedback workshop (probably around the second weekend of February 2008);
- A brief post-mortem note (maximum four pages) as a feed-back to the BMZ of the CV&A evaluation process as experienced by the team.
- Final CCS report to be delivered to the BMZ;
- A summary of the evaluation (maximum 5 pages) for publishing on the BMZ website.
- A summary of key donor-specific recommendations on German interventions as part of an implementation plan to be filled and followed-up upon by the BMZ.

### CCS report

The evaluation report is expected to adhere to DAC reporting standards and conventions but for ease of the synthesis report’s compilation and analysis the following layout is to be adopted:

- Executive Summary;
- Part 1: Introduction;
- Part 2: Process undertaken to complete the assignment: rationale for interventions selected and methodologies employed; challenges encountered in using the Evaluation Framework and methodological guidance; field trips undertaken, logistics challenges etc.;
- Part 3: Country context relevant to CV&A;
- Part 4 (MAIN): Interventions evaluated. Use the Evaluation Framework and describe the outputs, outcomes and impacts against the key questions and specific criteria and indicators used to answer them. Use specific interventions to illustrate key issues. Conclusions drawn and intervention-specific recommendations made.
- Part 5: Lessons learned and general recommendations.

The main report's indicative length is some 40 pages but annexes may be attached as required to cover, *inter alia*, TOR, inception report, context analysis, interviews/meetings conducted, etc.

#### Input to the evaluation of political foundations and their work

An additional task will be to identify, based on evaluation findings and/or discussions with relevant stakeholders in Indonesia, particular issues and challenges relevant for analysing and valuating the work of German political foundations and to summarise respective lessons learned in a separate input paper (indicative length: max. 15 pages). The paper should cover:

- The specific role and self-conception of German political foundations in development cooperation with Indonesia;
- Institutional settings, instruments and objectives of cooperation, esp. in the field of CV&A;
- Lessons learned regarding the evaluation process (stakeholder involvement, identification and contacting of target groups, etc.), if possible suggestions on appropriate data collection methods and ways to deal with problems of attribution and validation.
- Consequences for the design of an evaluation framework and necessary adaptations of the BMZ guidelines and criteria for evaluation.

A debriefing session at the BMZ will be arranged at the end of the assignment to present and discuss the lessons learned with representatives of political foundations.

### **7. TEAM COMPOSITION, CONTRACTING AND REPORTING ARRANGEMENTS**

#### Team composition:

The work should be conducted by a small independent and impartial team of four (4) consultants (including the nominated team leader). The consultancy team, at least one of whose consultants must be from/based in Indonesia should possess the following:

- Experience of complex evaluations;
- Experience and knowledge of participatory approaches to evaluation, and of joint evaluation (desirable);
- Expertise in governance, decentralisation / local self-government, social development and, as appropriate, conflict prevention issues;
- Knowledge and experience with German bilateral development organisations and their instruments and with the specifics of German political foundations and their development work (desirable);
- Knowledge and experience with other bilateral development agencies (desirable);
- Strong analytical, reasoning and writing skills;
- Experience of working in sensitive environments;

- Regional/country knowledge and expertise including awareness of the political context of development interventions in this area;
- Very good knowledge of English, orally and in writing (indispensable);
- Knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia and German (desirable).

All should be sensitive to issues relating to working with the poor, marginalised and vulnerable members of society.

Due consideration has to be given to appropriate gender balance within the team.

The consultants will be responsible for making their own logistics and accommodation arrangements in country but introductions to relevant development offices and embassies will be made.

#### Contracting:

A consultancy company or organisation will be appointed on the basis of the skills demonstrated in the team composition, costs, availability and access to in house expertise and reach back. The company or organisation should possess:

- Experience in the management of complex evaluations and plenty of experience of different governmental and non-governmental bilateral development organisations;
- Capacities for technical and methodological backstopping and quality management (the successful bidder is expected to assure the quality of its own work prior to submission to the BMZ and the QA Panel);
- Appropriate infrastructure to ensure professional handling of the evaluation within and outside Germany (communication, logistics, administration);
- Substantial country experience and good access to qualified local consultants.

#### Reporting arrangements:

The working language of the evaluation is English. Consideration will be given to translating the CV&A evaluation report into the most common languages used by donors and beneficiaries. All reports have to be submitted to BMZ per email (to christian.berg@bmz.bund.de, with copy to eval@bmz.bund.de).

## 8. TENTATIVE SCHEDULE

The start date for this work will be **01/11/2007** and the concluding date no later than **29/02/2008**. Current deadlines for delivery of the revised draft CCS report and the final CCS report are 15 and 25 February 2008, respectively. The tentative schedule (and responsibility) is as follows:

- 01/11 - 15/11/2007 Desk work (team)
- 07/11 - 13/11/2007: Preparatory visit to Indonesia (team leader, local team member)
- - 16/11/2007: Inception report (team leader)
- 26/11 - 16/12/2007: Field study (team)
- - 07/01/2008: Draft CCS report (team)
- - 18/01/2008: Draft input paper to the evaluation of political foundations (team)
- - 01/02/2008: Consolidated feedback to draft CCS report from the BMZ
- - 15/02/2008: Revised CCS Report and response grid (team leader)
- - **25/02/2008**: Final CCS report, summary, and implementation plan (team leader)
- - 29/02/2008: Feedback to input paper; consultation meeting (team leader/member)

The team leader should be prepared to attend an ECG meeting in Bonn scheduled for 22-23 October 2007, i.e. prior to commencement of the actual work.

## 9. MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION

The various roles of the ECG, the Evaluation Theme Leader, the BMZ, the QA Panel, and the local donor representatives, are as outlined below:

The Evaluation Core Group provides overall endorsement of, and direction to, the key components of this initiative e.g. Terms of Reference, timing, reports' publication and dissemination decisions etc. Chairmanship of the Group is shared, rotating as per the location of ECG meetings. ECG members are the key interlocutors between consultancy teams engaged in the work and donor colleagues in both capitals and country offices.

The Evaluation Theme Leader: DFID provides the management and administrative support for this initiative through its nominated Evaluation Theme Leader.

The BMZ evaluation division undertakes to commission, (co-)fund and manage a specific component of CV&A work, including this CCS. Sectoral and regional divisions, governmental implementing agencies and relevant civil society organisations will be involved in discussions and feedback to evaluation results, as required. The contact persons in the BMZ are: Christian Berg (Person in Charge, Division 120; christian.berg@bmz.bund.de) and Michaela Zintl (Head of Division 120; michaela.zintl@bmz.bund.de).

The Quality Assurance Panel has been commissioned by DFID on behalf of the ECG to ensure that the DAC Evaluation Quality Standards are adequately reflected in the final Evaluation Framework, methodological approach, country case studies and synthesis report; and, that reporting standards are uniformly observed as per this TOR. It is an advisory role and it reports through the Evaluation Theme Leader to the ECG.

Local donor representatives (BMZ, GTZ, DFID) assist in establishing required contacts to partners inside and outside government.

## 10. QUANTITY STRUCTURE

For this evaluation applies the following quantity structure (in person days, excluding travel):

First “inception” phase: Up to 40 days in total

Second “main” phase: Up to 124 days in total (without translation of reports), of which up to 84 days are allocated to the field study (excluding travel days).

The tentative breakdown is as follows:

Phase	Activities	Team leader	2 International <sup>75</sup> team members	National <sup>15</sup> team member	Sum
INCEPTION	Participation in ECG meeting	2	-	-	2
	Desk work	6	12	6	24
	Preparatory visit to Indonesia	6	-	6	12
	Coordination of inception phase	2	-	-	2
	<b>Sum</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>40</b>
MAIN	Field study in Indonesia	21	42	21	84
	Writing the CCS Report	6	12	6	24
	Writing the input paper	-	4	-	4
	Report coordination	6	-	-	2
	Participation in ECG meeting	(up to ) 2	(up to ) 2	-	≤ 4
	Participation in consultation meeting on input paper	1	1	-	2
	<b>Sum</b>	<b>(up to) 36</b>	<b>(up to) 61</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>≤ 124</b>

<sup>75</sup> Depending on the availability and qualification of international and national experts, the team (including the team leader) may also be composed of 2 international and 2 national team members.

# Appendix B: Methodology

## B.1 Introduction

The evaluation has followed the Evaluation Framework as developed by ODI. For terminology used and definitions the reader is referred to this Framework. In this appendix an overview is given of the selection process followed and the data collection methods and instruments used. First the profiles of the evaluation team are presented below.

**Team leader: Dr. Jan Douwe Meindertsma** has been working in development cooperation since 1978, with long-term assignments in Colombia, Tanzania and Indonesia, and over 50 short-term missions to around 30 countries, including Indonesia (1990-1992, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2006, 2007), during the past 15 years generally as team leader. With an MSc in Development Economics and Agricultural Economics, he obtained a PhD in Development Studies with a thesis on livelihood strategies of poor rural households on the island of Lombok, Indonesia. His fields of work include regional development, decentralisation, strengthening good governance and civil society, poverty reduction strategies, environmental management, donor harmonisation and aid delivery mechanisms.

Over the years, Dr. Meindertsma has gained considerable professional experience in the evaluation of individual projects, large and complex development programmes, donor country programmes, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes, and cross-country evaluations. He has successfully worked with Particip in 2006 to evaluate the monitoring and evaluation system of the Multi Donor Trust Fund for the reconstruction of Aceh and Nias. He also led the country level evaluation of EC support to Indonesia.

*Dr. Jan Douwe Meindertsma has had the overall technical responsibility for the evaluation, the coordination of team members' input and contributions, methodological guidance and briefing of all team members.*

**International governance expert: Dr. Jörn Dosch** is Professor of Southeast Asian Politics and Asia-Pacific Studies and currently Director of the Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Leeds.

He has 13 years of professional experience as a consultant and evaluator for German and multilateral development organisations. Over the past 20 years he has also worked extensively with the German political foundations, in various projects and training activities in Germany and throughout Asia, many of them in Indonesia. Dr. Dosch has led complex multi-level evaluations, such as a major evaluation of German and EU-contributions to the "promotion of democracy and good governance in Cambodia" for the BMZ in 2003. He has researched and published widely with regards to governance, decentralisation, social development, political liberalisation and democratisation, national and human security and economic transition in Southeast Asia. He has headed international research projects, most comprising cross-cultural teams, on these issues in Indo-

nesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam. Dr. Dosch's activities in Indonesia benefit from extensive research network and excellent contacts with a large numbers of state and non-state actors.

*Dr. Dosch joined the evaluation team as governance expert and has been the main resource person for issues regarding German political foundations.*

**International decentralisation and capacity building expert: Mrs. Joana Ebbinghaus** is an independent consultant specialised in local governance and community empowerment. She has worked for the last seven years in Indonesia on short and long-term assignments for different bilateral organisations as well as the World Bank, international NGOs and a German political foundation. She has an excellent insight into the country's political developments and instruments by the international community in support of the Indonesian democratisation and decentralisation process. She is fluent in Indonesian.

From 2000 onwards she worked in several GTZ projects, as well as for other donors in Indonesia, in areas such as civil society building, participatory planning, facilitating and training of self-assessments and revision of a country strategy in community empowerment. As a consultant for the World Bank-assisted large-scale community empowerment programme (KDP), she participated in a number of short evaluations on specific programme aspects. Recently, she worked for a USAID-funded project in support of exemplary democratic reforms at national level.

*Mrs. Ebbinghaus joined the team as decentralisation and capacity building expert. Being based in Indonesia, she provided local networking and facilitated the preparation process.*

**National expert: Mr. Faisal Djalal** has almost 20 years experience as a consultant for project management, a facilitator of development processes and a 'trainer of trainers' for community empowerment projects. He has worked for a wide variety of multilateral development organisations (including World Bank, ADB, FAO, UNDP, ILO) and bilateral donor agencies, NGOs and foundations (including GTZ, InWEnt, Diakonie and Oxfam), as well as Indonesian government agencies and private business.

Mr. Faisal Djalal has complemented his experience in Indonesia with an international education (Germany) and numerous assignments abroad (Mongolia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Pakistan, Egypt and Malaysia). He has participated in several large-scale stakeholder consultations and has been involved in a range of evaluation and assessment missions for various development organisations. Recently, Mr. Faisal Djalal has been active in assisting and facilitating the GTZ-AURA Impact Monitoring approach tool to a number of project/programme implementing agencies, including GTZ and the Aceh Local NGOs for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction programme supported by Diakonie, Germany.

*Mr. Djalal joined the team as national expert. As such, he assisted the team leader in preparation of the field study and conducted research on his own beforehand.*

**Project manager: Mr. Eric Sarvan** holds an MSc in Development Management (London School of Economics) and in Architecture and Urban Planning (University of Munich). As team leader at Particip, his focus is on team coordination, backstopping, quality assurance and business development. He joined Particip after two years with AEIDL (European Association for Information on Local Development), Brussels, as team leader of the LIFE programme's 10-person external communications team for the ASTRALE EEIG. He has also worked as project officer for ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability in Freiburg (Germany), as project assistant for the International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW) in London, and as project coordinator for the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA-FLACMA) in Quito, Ecuador. He has done consultancy work for various United Nations programmes (UN-Habitat, UNDP, UNV) in Ecuador and Germany in the fields of sustainable urban development.

*As Project Manager, Eric Sarvan has been in charge of all administrative and logistical issues related to the evaluation and has served as contact person for all contractual issues.*

## B.2 Preparation phase

During the preparation phase a context analysis was made, as well as an analysis of the aid environment. This has greatly helped to focus the evaluation as well as provided the opportunity to improve substantially upon the context analysis during the evaluation. The second main activity has been the selection of interventions, subject to this evaluation.

### *Selection of interventions*

During the inception phase a tentative selection was made of interventions subject to this evaluation. First a so-called long list, containing all interventions supported by the ECG members in Indonesia<sup>76</sup>, was prepared (this activity was already initiated before the preparation visit).

Two categories and levels of criteria were developed and applied to the long list.

1. Eligibility criteria, i.e. aspects that a particular intervention or the overall sample must have in order to qualify
  - A. Criteria for overall evaluation approach and number
  - B. Criteria for qualifying of a particular intervention
  
2. Criteria that were to maintain a balance in the overall sample
  - C. Substantial criteria
  - D. Non- substantial or logistical criteria

The four types of criteria are listed below.

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<sup>76</sup> For the long list see the Inception Report CCS Indonesia Strengthening Citizens' Voice and Accountability, Jakarta 9 December 2007

#### A.1 Focus on learning, less on being representative

Not representative of all what is being done (in terms of magnitude of funds, sectors and themes covered), but priority is given to interventions with potential for (potentially) interesting insights into what works and what not that are worth disseminating, addressing the thrust of the aim of the evaluation.

#### A.2 Exclude special and sensitive themes/areas.

We excluded tsunami struck areas (Banda Aceh and Nias), for being a very special case concerning donors and institutions politically. Moreover, these areas are already being flooded with supervision and evaluation missions, including cross country.

Conflict areas and extremely sensitive issues will also be excluded.

#### A.3 Depth versus breadth

The number of interventions: about 6-8. Not more than 10, not less than 6.

Limit total number of interventions to allow a meaningful evaluation of the individual interventions.

- Desk study research (local context, project design, approach, process achievements and monitoring);
- Discuss/interview implementing agency, beneficiaries and other stakeholders;
- Field visits;
- Triangulation and feed-back;
- Rule of thumb: on average 8-10 working days per intervention;

B.1 Mature interventions. Interventions that are well under way or recently completed, so as to assess if approach works or not, achievements being made and likelihood of impact.

Predecessor programmes to the ongoing programmes and recently started or newly designed programmes will be taken into account in the reconstruction/analysis of the intervention logic, and development of the “models of change”.

Reference will be made to interaction with the (changing) context

B.2 A strong V&A component in the intervention. In principle one could include all interventions, but we focus on those interventions that typically address V&A as a main objective, focal area, as a component or as an integrated element.

B.3 A substantial share of bilateral donor funding in the total funding of the intervention implemented by NGOs, multilateral donors.

No need for 100%, but should be significant to be able to “buy in”.

B.4 Size of project (in terms of funds, duration and number of beneficiaries).

Size is considered of less importance. Often there are many small projects and just a few large ones. The first category may easily overtake the last one. Projects with a

minimal size may still be included in connection with other larger ones (example work on trade unions of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)).

B.5 Willingness of financing and implementing agency to provide access to project documentation and facilitating contacts, interviews and visits (formulation document, progress reports, internal and external monitoring and evaluation reports, finalization reports). Needless to say, the evaluation team has its own budget for local expenditure and will not draw on external resources.

The above conditions must be met in order for an intervention to qualify (on its own strength). They will result in a larger number than can be taken on board. Which project will be included depends on the balance in a number of characteristics that condition the channels, mechanisms and actors of CV&A. These criteria are discussed briefly in the next sections.

#### C.1 Good balance between 'supply side' and 'demand side'

Include on the one hand, activities that address public accountability, putting capable institutions and mechanisms in place, and on the other hand, capacity building and empowerment of citizens to express their voice and holding the government answerable. Specifically look for interventions that link both type of actions and enable synergies.

#### C.2 A good coverage of V&A themes/sectors

Decentralisation, good governance (transparency and anti-corruption), civic education, democratisation (human rights and elections), access to justice, combating corruption and impunity.

#### C.3 Beneficiaries and disadvantaged (poor, women, children, minorities)

The latter should be given a specific importance, should be central in a significant number of interventions;

#### C.4 A good mix of implementing agencies, GOs (Government Organisations), NGOs, private sector, trade unions, etc.

Important for different approaches to be employed, channels, supply and demand interventions.

#### C.5 Different aid modalities

Focus will be on bilateral aid through various instruments, but it will be sought to include multilateral channelled aid, in case large share of funding from ECG members; donor trust funds to be referred to in aid mapping; Budget support and sector support is not being applied.

#### C.6 Different administrative levels

(i) national, (ii) district (Kabupaten); (iii) village-community

#### C.7 Geographical spread

(Urban/rural, central/remote)

### D.1 Coverage of ECG members (participating donors)

Do not necessarily try to cover the maximum number of ECG-donors (7). Instead, deal with a limited number of them, based on “interesting experiences” with a certain “critical mass”.

If a particular donor supports just some sporadic interventions, it may not make much sense to reconstruct the intervention logic or “models of change” and/or relate to the (wider) impact (overriding societal goals, MDGs).

Do not disperse attention to too many donors, as this complicates finding a common underlying pattern of particular donors and assumptions underlying their interventions.

If only a small part of interventions of a particular donor is assessed, the donor strategy may not come out clearly.

Makes it also easier to see possible coherence of bilateral interventions with other bilateral and multilateral interventions.

### D.2 Location

Find geographical clusters where multiple interventions take place. For example, do not go to Moluccas just for one project. The strategy is not to travel to many different locations, but include remote areas; i.e. prioritize interventions of various donors in the same location; we should be efficient with the time effectively available for field work.

The application of the selection criteria resulted in a tentative list of interventions subject to this evaluation, which was presented and discussed during the launching meeting. A number of question marks remained due to lack of detailed information on a number of interventions, particularly when the ECG donor had (co)-funded intermediaries to implement the intervention. This was done before and at the start of the field work period. The final result of the selected interventions is presented in Chapter 2 of the main report. At the start of the field work still some minor changes were made.

## B.3 Data Collection Methods used

### *Field visits*

The evaluation took a strategic decision to visit as many interventions as possible directly in the location where the actions took place. This meant that the time spent in Jakarta was kept to a minimum. Field visits were paid to several locations in Central and East Java, i.e. Yogyakarta, Gunung Kidul, Wonosobo and Surabaya involving shifting hotels and even taking local flights, also to the most poor and remote areas of Indonesia, i.e. West and East Nusa Tenggara (NTB and NTT), Mataram (Lombok), Bima (Sumbawa) and Alor.

Visiting offices in the capital would never have generated the richness of information and feeling of what is actually taking place. The practical disadvantage of travel time has been taken for granted. Spending more time in Jakarta would not have been much better, as it usually takes hours to visit offices, due to traffic conditions in this congested metropolis.

The field visits also showed how stakeholders react and interact with target groups and partners. This was also demonstrated for instance by meetings with government and watchdog organisation representatives, FNS staff and village officials and the Surabaya hospital, as well as with facilitators with self-help groups of PROMIS.

In addition to the above, some of the meetings were unexpectedly involving large numbers of people, not only including official representatives of project partners and counterparts but also the beneficiaries of interventions (the general public) like in the cases of the village meetings in Wonosobo (more than 100 participants in one case), the meeting with the street people as facilitated by ALIT and the very impressive turn-out of hospital officials in Surabaya.

An overview of meetings held, who where participating and specific interviews are listed extensively in Appendix E.

Another deliberate choice was to work in two sub-teams of two persons, which were changed so as to increase interaction within the team and share experience among the whole team. This contributed positively to internal evaluation team discussions and the formulation of general findings.

#### *Data collection methods used*

The main emphasis has clearly been focal group discussions, qualitative interviews and group discussions with project implementing agencies -certainly the most appropriate instruments for the purpose of the evaluation as those instruments generated a maximum of information in a short time.

It was the intention (see Inception Report) to conduct additional participatory approaches such as simplified versions of Most Significant Change, some Participatory Rural Approach elements (Venn Diagram) for specific projects. For instance, application of these instruments was foreseen in PROMIS areas, but given the fact that the intervention ended two years ago, and it would have required a long preparation period and intensive involvement of project staff it could not be realised.

Another instrument used in the evaluation was the so-called "Checklist", but it is actually much more than that. It concerns a format based on the Evaluation Framework of ODI prepared for the joint evaluation, including three major parts (i) project basic information; (ii) assessment of the five components, containing basic questions and indicators; (iii) the DAC criteria, and (iv) lessons learnt and additional information. The format is included at the end of this Appendix.

Additional Information. The format forced the team to collect the specific information needed to make assessments of the variables contained in the ODI Evaluation Framework. The information of the checklist was summarised and used as evidence for the findings in the Main Report. The information contained in the checklist was not trans-

ferred to the Summary Sheet, as such has not been requested (the preparation of the checklist was an initiative of the Indonesia evaluation team).

For each intervention essential project documentation was collected and consulted, i.e. project formulation document, progress and final reports, internal and external evaluation reports, if available. Availability of reports varied among the projects. Whereas GTZ projects and the MFP had rich information available<sup>77</sup>, the interventions of the political foundations and the Asian Foundation interventions were much less documented and lacked in general monitoring and evaluation tools and consequently outcomes.

## B. 4 Usefulness of ODI Evaluation Framework

Overall, the Evaluation Framework is considered useful by the Indonesia evaluation team:

- It focussed the team on the issues that the evaluation considered important. This holds particularly true for the overall framework and the five components, the first three of them interacting with the context.
- The Guidelines for Country Evaluations were of much less value, as they were too detailed and not country specific. For instance the numerous steps were not logic and some overlap took place. Assigning the context to one expert, i.e. the local expert is arbitrary, the team made use of all experts to make a comprehensive context analysis. Prescribing how workshops have to be done is country specific.
- The Literature Review was useful for the team members to come to grips with the substantive part of the evaluation and for internal group discussions.

However, some overall weaknesses were identified:

- No good match between all the requirements of the Evaluation Framework and Country Guidelines and the time available for the evaluation. The team had to make choices on where to put emphasis and where not. The initiation of team leaders to the Bonn meeting was very important to understand the priorities of the ECG members and the Synthesis Team. Which parts were seen to be essential, and which parts were optional, i.e. the numerous data collection techniques that were included. What does flexibility means? What are minimal standards? (these were developed along the way). Telephone discussions with PARC and ODI Synthesis Team helped to clarify specific issues (i.e. regarding needs of details on selection process of interventions and models of change).
- Whereas some parts of the framework were very specific (description of how workshops could be done, what should be the content of the context analysis), other parts were very vague and not well elaborated at all, for instance the kind of recommendations the evaluation was expected to generate.

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<sup>77</sup> Some essential documents were only available in German. This as such was not a problem for the evaluation team members, but it meant a restricted access for Indonesian counterparts. It decreases the transparency of the donor involved.

- There was not a good match between the five components of the Evaluation Framework with the respective sub-questions on the one hand, and the DAC criteria on the other hand. Particularly, the framework did not define results and outcomes in terms of the logical frameworks that underpin three of the five DAC criteria, i.e. efficiency, effectiveness and impact. An example is the use of results and outcomes that are used simultaneously. For the Indonesia evaluation team (expected) results are directly derived from the outputs and are within the control and realm of the interventions, therefore address to effectiveness. Outcomes on the other hand, are contributions to wider overall and social objectives, e.g. benefits that accrue to a wider group and assume a number of conditionalities that are outside the full control of the project. Outcomes are referred to as impact.
- The Models of Change did not work as a real tool of analysis, at least not as meant by the Evaluation Framework. It was found too simplistic, therefore additions were made by the team (and approved by the Synthesis Team who had the models of change proposed). They were filled in by the evaluation team and were not made in a joint exercise with major stakeholders of the respective interventions.
- The above shortcomings implied that the evaluation was much closer to a standard evaluation than a “theory-based evaluation” it claimed to be. Team members particularly felt that “there was not much theory in the methodology”.
  - There were no hypotheses to be tested.
  - There was not a prior categorisation of the five countries (ranking of context enabling CV&A) that could be tested in a comparative analysis.

The above may have contributed that the recommendations of the evaluation were considered by some stakeholders to be rather general and generic. Although the authors acknowledge that most recommendation are not new, they are relevant, based on findings and lesson learned that may provide guidelines for those donors that wish to engage in successful future interventions in CV&A.

## B.5 Checklist used by Indonesia Team

Indonesia Intervention	Nr .....	ACRONYM
Name Intervention	.....	
Component	Details	
<b>Component A; Entry Points, Opportunities and Constraints</b>		
	<i>At intervention level</i>	
A1. How has the context been taken care off in the design of the intervention?		
A2. What is the entry point for the intervention?		

A3. Who has shared/encouraged the entry point	
A4. Have all entry points/opportunities been taken up?	
A5. What are the constraints for implementing the intervention	
A6. To which extent addresses the intervention the constraints?	
A7. Are other interventions by the donor or other donors, national agencies being conducted that address the intervention, and may that enhance its results?	
	<i>At country level – for all donors – to be based on context and aid environment analysis; will be filled in on one form, after all intervention sheets have been completed</i>
A8. Are there entry points/ areas for strengthening CV&A in which donors are currently not engaged with which could be important for strengthening CV&A?	
A9. Any other important remarks on Component A, not covered above?	
EXTRA- POINTS THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE (NOT COVERED ABOVE)	
SUMMARY TEXT (TO BE USED FOR MAIN REPORT CHAPTER 4.1)	

	<i>At intervention level</i>		
<b>B. Institutional, organisational and individual capacities</b>			
B1. Has a needs assessment been done?			
	Type/Form of Capacity Building and Training provided	For what purpose	Recipient
B2. What kind of capacity building activities have been conducted, for what and for whom?			
B3. Was the CB effort sufficient for the different actors <i>for them to be able to</i> implement the interventions effectively and efficiently?	Recipient: -----		
	Recipient: -----		
	Recipient: -----		
	Recipient: -----		
B4. Where all important actors needed for obtaining the project results included or where some left out/could not be reached,			
B5. Are the most vulnerable groups addressed?			
B6. Was the increased capacity effectively translated into action?			
B7. What were the major obstacles faced in making effective use of increased capacity?			
B8. What have been the results of the actions/interventions?			
	<i>At national level</i>		
B9. Which issues are important to mention vis a vis capacity building activities in general?			
EXTRA- POINTS THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO			

INCLUDE (NOT COVERED ABOVE)	
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SUMMARY TEXT (TO BE USED FOR MAIN REPORT CHAPTER 4.2)		
<b>C. Channels; interaction CV (demand) and A (supply)</b>		
	<i>At the level of interventions</i>	
C1. Describe the channels that were used by the intervention and how effective were they?	Type channel	Effectiveness
	1.	
	2.	
	3.	
C2. To what extent were these channels formalised, informal, new, innovative, 'non-traditional', and what were their major constraints?	Characterisation	Major constraints
	1.	
	2.	
	3.	
C3. Did the intervention focus on demand or supply and did the intervention try to find a balance?	.....	
C4. Were potential synergies obtained; if not what were the major obstacles?	.....	
C5. Did the intervention channel used lead to increased tension or increased mutual understanding between the government and non-government groups?	.....	
C6. What was done in this particular intervention to ensure that the vulnerable and marginal groups were engaged?	1. donor.....	
	2. implementation agency national level	
	3. implementation agency local level	
C7. Did (or is it likely that) the marginal groups actually received benefits by the intervention?		
	<i>At the national level</i>	
C8. How do donors decide on which actors to		

involve?					
C9. Balance between demand and supply?					
C10. Synergy reached?					
C11. Important channels not being used in Indonesia					
EXTRA- POINTS THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE (NOT COVERED ABOVE)					
SUMMARY TEXT (TO BE USED FOR MAIN REPORT CHAPTER 4.3)					
<b>D. Changes</b>					
	<i>At the level of the intervention<sup>78</sup></i>				
To what extent did the intervention contribute to	Very much	Sufficient,	Little	Nothing	Not applicable
D1. State responsiveness (willingness of government/state institutions to respond to demands/actions)?					
D2. State accountability (ability and willingness to be kept accountable)?					
D3. Budget reallocated to citizens' needs/ poor groups?					
D4. Power relations between citizen and state have changed?					
D5. More services being delivered by government to poor segments of the population?					
D6. Inequality and discrimination have been decreased?					
D7. Any unanticipated outcomes, either negative or positive?					

<sup>78</sup> The same table could also be used to score the overall change in Indonesia in the post Suharto area.

What is the evidence that sustain the above scoring?	
EXTRA- POINTS THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE (NOT COVERED ABOVE)	
SUMMARY TEXT (TO BE USED FOR MAIN REPORT CHAPTER 4.3)	
<b>E. Pathways to development outcomes</b>	
	<i>At intervention level</i>
E1. To what extent is the intervention intended to contribute to overall development outcomes, such as poverty eradication, overall growth, improved environment, reduced social inequality etc?	
E2. Can pathways be identified that lead from intervention outputs and results, to these development outcomes/objectives?	

# Appendix C: Context analysis

## C.1 Political and socioeconomic context

### *Political and socioeconomic context*

The World Bank gives Indonesia special mentioning as one of only five countries worldwide that have achieved “significant improvements” with regard to voice and accountability.<sup>79</sup> These findings are not surprising as they mainly reflect formal institutional conditions, i.e. the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Indonesia has indeed made decisive progress in the structural context for CV&A, due to the relatively free and fair parliamentary elections of 1999 and 2004, local elections (since 2005) and constitutional amendments that strengthened participatory elements by facilitating the first direct election of the president in 2004, improving mechanisms of checks and balances in relations between the executive and legislative branches of government, reducing the political role of the armed forces and enhancing decentralisation. However, the latter also provides an example of the limits and obstacles to the qualitative advancement of CV&A.

### *Democratisation*

Despite the significant achievements in advancing democracy in Indonesia (the country is widely regarded as the regional primus inter pares and the most advanced democracy in Southeast Asia), for many Indonesians, democracy is merely a simple state of majority rule through a process of voting and elections. For others, democracy comes with upholding the rule of law, protecting civil liberties and the rights of minorities. A growing number of political and civil society actors perceive current attempts to formalise sharia-based laws as a threat to democratic values and Indonesia's culture of pluralism.

The Indonesian democracy is characterised by “elements of disloyalty” (those actors who strongly oppose and reject democracy) and “semi-disloyalty” (those who are still confused of what democracy is and unsure about democracy as the only game in town). While the strongest supporters of democracy may be growing from time to time, the existence of the hard-line militarists, religious extremists, and chauvinists can potentially bring democracy to a halt. Even though they are the minority, their tactics of combining persuasion and violence may be threatening. Even vice president Jusuf Kalla stated in a recent interview<sup>80</sup> that democracy was only a means to achieve more prosperity for the people without having a value in itself. The presence of semi-disloyalty – while they seem to be significant in number (the poor, the politically ignorant, etc.) – seems to be a challenge for Indonesia. If the loyalists can convince them, a consolidation in the country's democracy is possible. Or else, if the disloyalists get the upper hand, democratisa-

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<sup>79</sup> The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. *A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance* Governance Matters 2007 Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996–2006, Washington DC, 2007.

<sup>80</sup> See: Jakarta Post, January 16, 2008.

tion might reverse back to autocratic rule. This is highly relevant for CV&A because opposition to democracy is likely to be accompanied by a rejection of popular participation in politics. Hence veto powers might be able to work against a broadening and deepening of CV&A.

While the electoral democratic institutions seem to be working in Indonesia, the political system is still constrained by a high level of corruption, patronage politics and a lack of the rule of law. The independence of the judiciary branch has grown during the post-1998 transformation to democratic rule, and it is no longer directly dependent on the government's interests. At the same time, the judicial sector is considered to be the most corrupt in Southeast Asia.<sup>81</sup> Systematic corruption in Indonesian courts, including the Supreme Court has not improved but rather consolidated. The judiciary has regularly been influenced by the military, business interests and politicians outside of the legal system. Bribes have influenced prosecution, conviction, and sentencing in countless civil and criminal cases. Moreover, Indonesia's law enforcement agencies lack trained human resources capable of effectively managing their increasing responsibilities in a democratic society. A commercial court was created to enable foreigners to avoid the corrupt regular court system. However, its judges made allegedly corrupt rulings that favoured well-connected local debtors.<sup>82</sup>

### *Decentralisation*

The most significant political change that has taken place apart from the general democratisation drive is the decentralisation reform, which has found its legal framework in the promulgation of Laws No. 22/1999 and 32/2004 on regional government. The laws are based on the dual approach of democratising local governments and enhancing their autonomy from Jakarta.<sup>83</sup> The decentralisation process represents the most decisive transformation of the administrative infrastructure in the country's history. Central civil servants were reassigned, over 16,000 public service facilities were handed over to the regions, and a new intergovernmental fiscal system was put in place. The programme included the transfer of both fiscal and political responsibility from Jakarta to over 400 districts and municipalities. However, the legislation was drafted in haste and has significant shortcomings. For example, it bypassed the provinces and transferred authority from the central government directly to districts (*kabupaten*) and municipalities (*ko-tamadya*), the level of government directly below that of the province. Legislators hoped that transferring power to the districts and municipalities would make government more responsive to local communities and placate the critics of centralized rule. They also thought that bypassing the provincial level of government would curtail separatist tendencies that are more prominent at that level (particularly in places like Aceh and

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<sup>81</sup> See Asian Development Bank. Country Economic Review – Indonesia, Chapter III. Corruption as a Challenge to Development, <http://www.adb.org/Documents/CERs/INO/2002/ino0300.asp>

<sup>82</sup> Transparency International. Global Corruption Report 2007. Regional Highlights, Asia Pacific, <http://www.transparency.org/content/download/19338/267706>.

<sup>83</sup> The process initially centred around two pieces of legislation: Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance and Law 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions. However, the central government passed the laws so quickly that they lacked clarity and were rife with contradictions and inconsistencies. As a result, both laws were amended with the passage of two revised laws on regional autonomy in 2004. Law 32/2004 on Regional Administration replaced Law 22/1999, and Law 33/2004 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regional Governments replaced Law 25/1999.

Papua), something that had hindered earlier efforts at decentralisation. Furthermore, the government would have more control over the smaller districts than over larger, more powerful provinces.

A recent USAID study on decentralisation in Indonesia amplifies many stakeholders' voices, who note that "decentralisation reforms have been progressive in principle, but incomplete and not sufficiently realized on the ground. These general sentiments are not surprising; reform progress is not always linear, rapid, or sustained. However, the mixed feelings about decentralisation need to be seen against the widespread expectations that the 2004 revisions would truly 'consolidate' decentralisation, curbing excesses and addressing impediments".<sup>84</sup> This, however, has not been the case and the legal framework for decentralisation is currently being redrafted.

Overall, both national actors – state and non-state – and donors hoped that the process of decentralisation would allow for stronger local participation in government, increased opportunities for public scrutiny and feedback, better service delivery, and make regional leaders accountable to their constituents. Enhanced accountability was expected to lead to better policy and governance (including an improvement of natural resource management). The Governance and Decentralisation Survey II from 2005 conducted by World Bank suggests that decentralisation of government in Indonesia seems to have improved the quality of basic public services, but also confirmed large variations across sectors and regions. In the study, 32,000 people, including 13,000 households, were asked to rate services in sectors such as health, education, local administration and the police, over the past two years. Seven in 10 (70.4 per cent) of those polled said health services had improved. The results were even more positive - 72.6 per cent - for education, which included elements such as quality of classrooms and textbooks. Just over half (55.8 per cent) thought local administrative services had improved, compared with fewer than one in 10 who thought the opposite.<sup>85</sup> However, the World Bank survey is not widely seen as reliable as – particularly in the cultural context of Indonesia – respondents tend to give positive feedback on services when asked to rate services. There has been little systematic evaluation done to date of the actual change in quality and outreach of public service delivery, but case studies and anecdotal evidence suggest considerably uneven performances with a handful of regions realizing innovations in service improvements<sup>86</sup> whereas on average no significant improvements were made or the quality of service delivery even deteriorated.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> USAID. Decentralisation 2006. Stock Taking on Indonesia's Recent Decentralisation Reforms. Summary of Findings, August 2006.

<sup>85</sup> Cited in *The Business Times*, Singapore, 23 February 2007.

<sup>86</sup> E.g. the districts of Solok, Sragen, Jemberana with regard to health, educational and administrative services (e.g. one-stop service delivery).

<sup>87</sup> See: DRSP/USAID, Stock Taking on Indonesia's Recent Decentralisation Reforms, 2006, The World Bank Report, Drinking Water and Environmental Sanitation Service Provision in Post-Decentralisation Era, 2004, SMERU, Governance and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from Newly Decentralized Indonesia, Working Paper, March 2004, SMERU, Indonesia's Transition to Decentralisation Governance. An Evolution at the Local Level, Working Paper, June 2003 and von Luebke, C., Local Leadership in Transition: Explaining Variation in Indonesia Subnational Government, doctoral thesis, ANU, 2007.

Due to substantial weaknesses and shortcomings in the drafting and implementation of decentralisation laws, across the board the process has so far not resulted in better governance which, in turn, is expected to provide the impetus for poverty reduction. With some notable exceptions of some progressive cities and districts, decentralisation has not created new channels for CSOs to bring the concerns of the poor closer to the government in effective and efficient ways.

#### *The role of non-state actors*

Until the downfall of the Suharto regime civil society organisations in Indonesia consisted of strong religious organisations with nationwide connections between national and local levels, strong informal structures determined by customary law (*adat*) to promote traditional social and cultural values and generally weakly connected CBOs at local level (such as farmers groups, parents-teachers associations, funeral societies, groups with joint saving and lending activities, etc.).<sup>88</sup> Civil society organisations (CSO), especially NGOs and trade unions, had been considered as potentially subversive and were therefore subjected to strict surveillance and regular repressive state action. Professional associations and labour organisations had been limited to only one government-regulated body. By 1996 only about 600 CSOs were legally established. Between 1997 and 2002 the number of NGOs alone grew from a few (officially registered) hundreds to tens of thousands. The most significant growth in civil society organisations since 1997 has been among advocacy-based CSOs, but also the number of print media and national as well as local television stations increased exponentially. The number of labour organisations has increased considerably, but the scene has become fractious at the same time.

The proliferation of CSOs – which was even more pronounced outside of Java - can be attributed to several factors. On the one hand the new political and democratic freedom allowed for thriving political expression and involvement. Government regulation towards the establishment of non-profit organisations (*yayasan* in the Indonesian) was very lax at the time, with every three persons without clear membership requirements could register a *yayasan* with a notary. On the other hand the rampant unemployment combined with abundant availability of international funding sources encouraged a lot of people, especially with academic background who couldn't find decent jobs, to seek their luck in the purported 'non-profit' sector. This trend was even further boosted, in particular in the outer islands and more rural districts, when the international donor community in channelling their aid during the financial crisis demanded civil society involvement in the implementation of all so-called *Social Safety Net Programmes*. This, however, also inspired many local government officials to establish their own NGOs to siphon off funds, that were later branded as '*plat merah*' (red license plate, as government official's cars always have red license plates) NGOs.

The CSO and especially NGO scene has grown fragmented and even in clear subject-oriented alliances to a large extent fractious. Overarching goals and strategies, especially for lobbying at national level, are often not clearly enough visible. At local level

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<sup>88</sup> Clark, J., Overview of Civil Society in Indonesia, March 2003.

NGOs are still mainly led by antagonistic mindsets in dealing with the government and rather opt for confrontational lobbying tactics. Civil society at large has grown disenchanted and distrustful towards organisations speaking in their name. Among the variety of CSOs religious organisations enjoy the highest credibility among the people.<sup>89</sup> While civil society networks related to voter's education and election monitoring have for instance proved to be very effective in contributing significantly to the overall peaceful, well informed and well managed elections<sup>90</sup> as well as playing a crucial role in influencing public policies in the areas of democracy building and protection of human rights they ultimately haven't been able to challenge existing power relations, empowering communities or influencing public budget policies. This can partly be explained by still limited capacities of CSOs with language barriers further impeding the influx of state-of-the-art tools for social accountability (such as report cards, public expenditure tracking, etc.) or civic education. The fact that members of CSOs at local level usually still have kinship ties to local elites is a compounding factor to alter existing structures of disempowerment and exclusion.

In general terms, while the 'voice and demand' capabilities of CSOs, including Islamic organisations, trade unions, citizens' watchdog organisations and the media, have grown, it is important to differentiate between NGO and non-NGO actors, CSOs based in Java and other parts of the country, government co-opted and genuinely state-independent groups, moderate and radical faith organisations etc. in determining their specific potential in improving and strengthening CV&A.

#### *Corruption*

Whether or not decentralisation has resulted in more corruption across the nation remains contested and is ultimately difficult to investigate in an empirically sound way. There is no doubt about the fact that Indonesia is notorious for its corruption. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranks Indonesia as one of the most corrupt states in the world (rank 143 of 179), see Table C.1.

**Table C.1. Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International), selected Asian countries**

Country rank	Country	2007 CPI score	Surveys used	Confidence range
4	Singapore	9.3	9	9.0 - 9.5
43	Malaysia	5.1	9	4.5 - 5.7
72	China	3.5	9	3.0 - 4.2
72	India	3.5	10	3.3 - 3.7
84	Thailand	3.3	9	2.9 - 3.7

<sup>89</sup> McCarthy, P., *A Thousand Flowers Blooming: Indonesian Civil Society in the Post-New Order Era*, 2002.

<sup>90</sup> Douglas Ramage, *A Reformed Indonesia* in: *The Australian Financial Review*, October 12, 2007.

123	Timor-Leste	2.6	3	2.5 - 2.6
123	Viet Nam	2.6	9	2.4 - 2.9
131	Philippines	2.5	9	2.3 - 2.7
138	Pakistan	2.4	7	2.0 - 2.8
<b>143</b>	<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2.1 - 2.4</b>
162	Cambodia	2.0	7	1.8 - 2.1
168	Laos	1.9	6	1.7 - 2.2
179	Myanmar	1.4	4	1.1 - 1.7

Explanatory notes: **CPI Score** relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). **Confidence range** provides a range of possible values of the CPI score. This reflects how a country's score may vary, depending on measurement precision. Nominally, with 5 percent probability the score is above this range and with another 5 percent it is below. However, particularly when only few sources are available, an unbiased estimate of the mean coverage probability is lower than the nominal value of 90%. **Surveys used** refer to the number of surveys that assessed a country's performance. 14 surveys and expert assessments were used and at least 3 were required for a country to be included in the CPI.

Source: Transparency International, [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2007](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007)


Prior to regional autonomy, large-scale corruption was limited to small groups in Jakarta and in provincial capitals with access to patronage networks. In principle, decentralisation now provides local elites with access to these income flows. In nominal or total terms, corruption has probably not increased but the number of offenders has grown. Hence, decentralisation/diversification of corruption is possibly the case. The lack of accountability and transparency still enables corruption. The national government uses the anti-corruption card as an argument for attempts at re-centralisation. At the same time decentralisation has increased budget transparency and made it easier to detect corruption (in some prominent cases, some Bupatis and local councillors have been put on trial) but there are also side effects: sub-national governments have under-spent the resources at their disposal and have accumulated large reserves. At the start of decentralisation in 2001, sub-national governments held about Rp 7 trillion in reserve funds. By the end of March 2007 provinces and kabupaten/kota had accumulated over Rp 95 trillion in unspent balances. "The aggregate figure amounts to just over 3 percent of 2006 GDP. An accumulation of reserves of this magnitude is probably excessive and, as such, represents a significant forgone opportunity to increase spending to support service delivery and economic development". Furthermore, the spending that sub-national governments have carried out has been arguably inefficient. In 2004, provinces and kabupaten/kota spent 32 percent of their combined budgets on administrative activities. Best practices from other countries suggest that a figure of around 5 percent should be sufficient to cover administrative needs. By contrast sub-national governments spent only 29

percent of their budgets on education, just 17 percent on infrastructure and only 7 percent on health.<sup>91</sup>

There is fear of accusation of corruption among local politicians when it comes to big investment projects and in some cases the conclusion had been better not to invest at all. Furthermore, big investment projects normally require loans, something communes also shy away from, as, again, they are afraid of being seen as corrupt.

Prior to decentralisation, provincial and local government revenue averaged Rp 45 trillion<sup>92</sup>. In 2006, total regional revenues was over Rp. 175 trillion, most of which comes from growing DAU (Dana Alokasi Umum/General Allocation Fund), Rp. 84 trillion, and shared revenues, Rp. 34 trillion, mainly from oil and gas. More than Rp 50 trillion come from own revenue collection and other sources<sup>93</sup>. Figure C.1. presents the trends in revenue that accrued to regional governments from 2000-2006.

**Figure C.1: Indonesia Revenue Trends: Regional Governments**  
(Rp. Trillions in real terms, 2000 base year)



Source: Indonesian Ministry of Finance, World Bank

### *Socio-Economic Inequalities*

The sharp budget increase for local government has had a small effect on development and has not been translated into the reduction of poverty and inequality. A high degree of socio-economic inequality, rising unemployment (11.2% in 2005 compared to 8.1% in 2001, according to official Indonesian statistics), serious limitations to the rule of law, questions over citizenship (despite formal guarantees of equal rights for Indonesia's several hundred ethnic groups) and ongoing violence due to secessionist movements and ethnic or religious conflicts negatively impact on the framework conditions for CV&A.

<sup>91</sup> Blane D. Lewis. Indonesian Intergovernmental Framework: Incentives, Mandates, Restrictions, and Sanctions. Decentralisation Support Facility, Draft 21 June 2007.

<sup>92</sup> All values are real values (2000 base year).

<sup>93</sup> Bill Wallace, Wolfgang Fengler, and Bastian Zaini. Increasing sub-national government resources: magnitude and implications, draft paper, 2006.

The overall successful peace-building process in Aceh cannot hide the fact that conflicts in other parts of the nation, particularly in Kalimantan, Papua, Sulawesi and the Moluccas persist. State institutions have been equally unsuccessful in reducing gender-based exclusion. In Indonesia's paternalistic culture, it is still difficult for women to gain access to public office and the political will to introduce comprehensive gender-based reforms is lacking. Women in general remain marginalized in various sectors.

The Human Development Index (HDI) for Indonesia is 0.728, which gives the country a rank of 107<sup>th</sup> out of 177 countries with data, see Table C.1.2.

**Table C.1.2: Indonesia's human development index 2005**

HDI value	Life expectancy at birth (years)	Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and older)	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%)	GDP per capita (PPP US)
1. Iceland (0.968)	1. Japan (82.3)	1. Georgia (100.0)	1. Australia (113.0)	1. Luxembourg (60,228)
105. Viet Nam (0.733)	98. Saint Kitts and Nevis (70.0)	54. China (90.9)	108. Turkey (68.7)	111. Egypt (4,337)
106. Occupied Palestinian Territories (0.731)	99. Guatemala (69.7)	55. Sri Lanka (90.7)	109. Albania (68.6)	112. Jamaica (4,291)
<b>107. Indonesia (0.728)</b>	<b>100. Indonesia (69.7)</b>	<b>56. Indonesia (90.4)</b>	<b>110. Indonesia (68.2)</b>	<b>113. Indonesia (3,843)</b>
108. Syrian Arab Republic (0.724)	101. Suriname (69.6)	57. Viet Nam (90.3)	111. Guatemala (67.3)	114. Turkmenistan (3,838)
109. Turkmenistan (0.713)	102. Thailand (69.6)	58. Myanmar (89.9)	112. Azerbaijan (67.1)	115. Syrian Arab Republic (3,808)
177. Sierra Leone (0.336)	177. Zambia (40.5)	139. Burkina Faso (23.6)	172. Niger (22.7)	174. Malawi (667)

Source: HDI, UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Factsheet Indonesia. [http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_IDN.html](http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_IDN.html)

The Human Poverty Index for developing countries (HPI-1), focuses on the proportion of people below a threshold level in the same dimensions of human development as the human development index - living a long and healthy life, having access to education, and a decent standard of living. By looking beyond income deprivation, the HPI-1 represents a multi-dimensional alternative to the \$1 a day (PPP US) poverty measure.

The HPI-1 value of 18.2 for Indonesia ranks 47<sup>th</sup> among 108 developing countries for which the index has been calculated.

The HPI-1 measures severe deprivation in health by the proportion of people who are not expected to survive age 40. Education is measured by the adult illiteracy rate. And a decent standard of living is measured by the average of people without access to an im-

proved water source and the proportion of children under age 5 who are underweight for their age. Table C.1.3 shows the values for these variables for Indonesia and compares them to other countries.

**Table C.1.3: Selected indicators of human poverty for Indonesia**

Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) 2004	Probability of not surviving past age 40 (%) 2004	Adult illiteracy rate (%ages 15 and older) 2004	People without access to an improved water source (%) 2004	Children underweight for age (% ages 0-5) 2004
1. Chad (56.9)	1. Zimbabwe (57.4)	1. Burkina Faso (76.4)	1. Ethiopia (78)	1. Nepal (48)
60. Gabon (20.4)	81. Trinidad and Tobago (9.1)	82. Myanmar (10.1)	49. China (23)	25. Sri Lanka (29)
61. Egypt (20.0)	82. Vanuatu (8.8)	83. Viet Nam (9.7)	50. Kyrgyzstan (23)	26. Philippines (28)
<b>62. Indonesia (18.2)</b>	<b>83. Indonesia (8.7)</b>	<b>84. Indonesia (9.6)</b>	<b>51. Indonesia (23)</b>	<b>27. Indonesia (28)</b>
63. Nicaragua (17.9)	84. Jamaica (8.3)	85. Sri Lanka (9.3)	52. Myanmar (22)	28. Djibouti (27)
64. Tunisia (17.9)	85. Morocco (8.2)	86. China (9.1)	53. Nicaragua (21)	29. Sierra Leone (27)
108. Barbados (3.0)	173. Iceland (1.4)	164. Estonia (0.2)	125. Hungary (1)	134. Chile (1)

Source: HDI, UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Factsheet Indonesia.  
[http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_IDN.html](http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_IDN.html)

Indonesia's Gender Development Index (GDI) value, 0.721 should be compared to its HDI value of 0.728. Its GDI value is 99.0% of its HDI value. Out of the 156 countries with both HDI and GDI values, 79 countries have a better ratio than Indonesia's, showing that Indonesia ranks low in terms of gender equality.

Table C.1.4 shows how Indonesia's ratio of GDI to HDI compares to other countries, and also shows its values for selected underlying values in the calculation of the GDI.

**Table C.1.4: The GDI compared to the HDI – a measure of gender disparity**

GDI as % of HDI	Life expectancy at birth(years) 2004	Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and older) 2004	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio 2004
	Female as % male	Female as % male	Female as % male
1. Maldives (100.4%)	1. Russian Federation (123.1%)	1. Lesotho (122.5%)	1. United Arab Emirates (126.0%)

78. Honduras (99.1%)	129. Chad (105.7%)	86. Malaysia (92.8%)	135. Cayman Islands (96.1%)
79. Brunei Darussalam (99.1%)	130. Macao, China (SAR) (105.7%)	87. Viet Nam (92.5%)	136. Mauritania (95.8%)
<b>80. Indonesia (99.1%)</b>	<b>131. Indonesia (105.7%)</b>	<b>88. Indonesia (92.3%)</b>	<b>137. Indonesia (95.5%)</b>
81. Guyana (99.1%)	132. Sweden (105.6%)	89. Macao, China (SAR) (92.1%)	138. Madagascar (95.4%)
82. Mauritius (99.0%)	133. Malta (105.6%)	90. Myanmar (92.0%)	139. Zimbabwe (95.4%)
156. Yemen (92.7%)	194. Niger (96.9%)	152. Afghanistan (29.2%)	194. Afghanistan (55.3%)

Source: HDI, UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fact sheet Indonesia.  
[http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_IDN.html](http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_IDN.html)

#### *Degeneration of natural resources*

The detrimental effects of regional autonomy on natural resource management have been examined in-depth in the forestry sector. In general, the process of decentralisation has led to an increase in illegal logging. Local officials, unconcerned with the long-term forestry planning undertaken in Jakarta, may seek to exploit this illegal logging as a source of income rather than attempting to control it.

Before the economic crisis the Indonesian government made serious efforts in the area of environment by requiring every construction project to fulfil an environmental impact assessment administered by the Ministry of Environment in cooperation with NGOs. However, after the 1997-1998 crisis the government seemed to have lost interest in pursuing such assessments. This has generated concern among environmentalists of the seriousness of the post-Suharto governments to pursue the principle of sustainable development.

Environmental sustainability takes a back seat to the pursuit of growth and it is barely institutionally anchored. The massive forest fires of 1997-1998, which covered Indonesia and its neighbours in a cloud of smog for months and were the worst environmental catastrophe of the decade, were started by illegal but officially tolerated slash-and-burn forest fires set by large landowners in Indonesia. In addition, 2.5 to 3 million hectares of rain forest are cleared in Indonesia every year, approximately 70% of them illegally.

According to estimates, currently over 500,000 hectares of rainforest have been logged illegally each year. Only about half of Indonesia's 162 million hectares of rain forest in 1950 still exists today. This illegal clearing is a result of the lucrative palm oil business and the building of too many large paper and cellulose factories, also supported by international development aid, the operation of which can be maintained only with the massive exploitation of even larger areas of forest. The implementation of new environmental regulations regularly comes up against problems caused by lack of money, envi-

ronmental consciousness and trained personnel. Related massive environmental challenges include the loss of biodiversity, conflicts on water use and soil erosion.

Overall, natural and man-made disasters, such as tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides (as many as 800 over the past decade – almost all the result of deforestation and illegal logging), and forest fires have all taken a significant human and economic toll on the country and its people and further increased the level of difficulty for governance. At least 5,800 people died and 36,000 injured on May 27, 2006 during a 6.3-magnitude earthquake, which hit central Java. Since December 2004, Indonesia has lost around 200,000 people in various disasters.

#### *Conclusion: Implications for CV&A*

The structural conditions that govern power relations and forms of inclusion and exclusion in general and, in particular, the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media have seen significant qualitative advances since the transition from authoritarian to formally democratic rule in 1998. Indonesia has made decisive progress on most if not all key elements of the structural context for CV&A due to the relatively free and fair parliamentary elections of 1999 and 2004, local elections (since 2005) and constitutional amendments that strengthened participatory elements by facilitating the first direct election of the president in 2004, improving checks and balances mechanisms in relations between the executive and legislative branches of government, reducing the political role of the armed forces and enhancing decentralisation.

While the electoral democratic institutions seem to be working in Indonesia, all main political actors have accepted elections as the only 'game in town' and – as the result of the ambitious decentralisation programme - local communities now have an opportunity to play a larger role in shaping and implementing policy that directly affects them, the political system is still gripped by a high level of corruption, patronage politics and other informal institutions. These limits to the general opportunities that democratisation offers for CV&A interventions are directly related to the survival of oligarchic networks. Notwithstanding the collapse of centralised authoritarianism and – as the result of the economic crisis of 1997-98 – the withdrawal of foreign capital from which they had earlier drawn sustenance, favoured families and conglomerates have managed to outlast the New Order. Faced with democratic transition, they have reorganised their alliances, shifting their efforts from the office of the president to the political parties and parliament that have offered a new lifeline to state power.

## C.2 Aid architecture

### *Donor Presence and Priorities*

Indonesia is not an aid-dependent country. In 2005 it reached the status of a Middle Income country according to OECD categories. Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2005 reached USD 2.5 Billion, but it was exceptionally high that year due to the response to the humanitarian disaster following the tsunami on Dec 26, 2004. In terms of development-related loans JBIC, ADB and World Bank are the most important lending institutions. On average ODA to Indonesia is about USD 1.46 Billion yearly (see table C.2.1), which is about 0.5% of the GDP. In percentage of public expenditure the total

ODA spending amounts about 4,3%<sup>94</sup> Net private flows in comparison amount about USD 7.15 Billion with overseas workers remittances alone reaching USD 1.9 Billion<sup>95</sup>.

**Table C.2.1.: Major Donors of Gross ODA (2000-2005 average)<sup>96</sup>**

	Country	Mio. US (current prices)
1	Japan	735.81
2	United States	163.58
3	Netherlands	107.21
4	Australia	96.61
5	IDA (World Bank)	50.65
6	EC	38.78
7	Canada	30.59
8	Germany	29.95
9	AsDF (ADB)	26.46
10	France	25.12
11	United Kingdom	21.49
12	UNICEF	5.74
13	UNDP	5.49
14	Other Donors	127.59
	Total	1,465.05

Source: OECD International Development Statistics online at [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)

The table clearly shows the first rank of Japan, followed by the United States, the Netherlands and Australia. Other donors follow with much lower contributions.

Table C.2.2 gives an indication of sector priorities of ODA grants.

**Table C.2.2: Sector Priorities for ODA Grants (2003)**

Sector	In €1,000
Education	500,900
Transport	471,532
Health	237,571
Governance	236,495

<sup>94</sup> World Bank, Spending for Development: Making the Most of Indonesia's New Opportunities. Indonesia Public Expenditure Review 2007.

<sup>95</sup> OECD Recipient Aid Charts at [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)

<sup>96</sup> Note: This also includes Humanitarian Aid

Agriculture, Environment and Forestry	209,945
Water and Sanitation	144,180
Decentralisation	50,360
Energy	27,526
Gender	21,740
Monetary Policy	8,774
Rural Development	6,093
Total	1,915,116

Source: EC, Country Strategy, 2007-2013

For none of the smaller ECG donors, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium or Switzerland Indonesia is one of their priority countries. Thus, in comparison to the major donors outlined above – and certainly comparing the huge size of Indonesia- the volume of their bilateral development assistance to Indonesia is very small, see Table C.2.3.

**Table C.2.3: ODA by ECG members**

ECG member	Total aid 2005 in € Million
Norway	2.0
Sweden	1.7
Belgium	3.33
Denmark	2.5 -3.0
Switzerland	0.815

Estimates based on information found at: [www.Sida.se](http://www.Sida.se); [www.regjeringen.no](http://www.regjeringen.no); [www.dgos.be](http://www.dgos.be); [www.ambjakarta.um.dk](http://www.ambjakarta.um.dk); and [www.deza.ch](http://www.deza.ch)

Supporting the overall reform process in Indonesia and specifically contributing to improved governance is a priority reflected in all country strategies and programme outlines of the major donor organisations. Donor interventions contribute to structural reforms and to capacity building of state and non-state actors and are to be found at all levels, the national, provincial, district as well as the community level. An overview of the major donor strategies related to government reforms are presented in Table C.2.4.

**Table C.2.4: Main Donor Strategies Related to Governance Reforms**

Donor	Overall Country Strategy	Aspects of CV&A covered in Country Strategy
Japan	Building a fair and democratic society by way of poverty reduction, support to governance reform and environmental protection. Support to governance reforms include establishing and operating a fair and efficient judicial system, developing human resources in the legal field, democratizing and building the capacity of the police, strengthening the maritime security	Strong focus on accountability, community empowerment within civil society programme rather aiming at reducing poverty and vulnerability than in the context of improving governance

Donor	Overall Country Strategy	Aspects of CV&A covered in Country Strategy
	system, improving the administrative systems and building the capacity of regional governments as well as nurturing civil society.	
United States	Consolidate national-level democratic reforms and support to effective and accountable local governance: Support for independent, transparent and accountable judicial branch by way of technical assistance; institutional support to National House of Representatives, National Regional Representative Council and to district-level legislative councils, with focus on constituency and media outreach, capacity building for legal drafting and budgeting, assistance to legislative commissions; technical assistance and capacity building to more than 60 local governments with regard to participatory planning, budgeting, accounting and management systems for service delivery; capacity building to local media and civil society organisations; strengthening democratic civic culture by working with CSOs, traditional leaders and other networks.	Balanced Voice and Accountability approach: support to vertical and horizontal accountability (legislative and judicial sector support), professional media, participatory decision- and policy-making, civil society strengthening in terms of voice and demanding accountability, human rights work and improving the enabling environment (civic education, gender)
Netherlands	Supporting government reforms (through cooperation with World Bank), local government capacity building for decentralisation (cooperation with ADB), legal and judicial reforms, civil service reform, security sector reform, decentralisation, democratisation and anti-corruption (through <i>Partnership for Governance Reforms</i> ); media development and access to justice for the poor (including assistance to legal aid organisations).	Stronger focus on Accountability and government assistance and capacity building. Strengthening Voice especially by way of public media and through different activities of <i>Partnership for Governance Reforms</i> .
Australia	Expanding assistance for strengthening governance through support for economic reform, legal and judicial reform, the promotion and protection of human rights, enhancing public accountability, support for electoral and parliamentary processes, supporting decentralized and participatory decision-making and strengthening civil society with particular focus on women and the poor.	Balanced Voice and Accountability approach
World Bank	Making development planning more responsive to constituents. Improving public financial management; strengthening the accountability of local governments under a more coherent decentralisation framework; enhancing public credibility, impartiality and accessibility of the justice sector,;	Balanced Voice and Accountability approach: Assisting the development of the legal framework for local governance; support to Anti-Corruption Commission and Public Audit Commission; enhancing voice and demand for account-

Donor	Overall Country Strategy	Aspects of CV&A covered in Country Strategy
	Community-Driven Development inter-linked with efforts to enhance local governance;	ability directly at community level not by way of CSOs; access to justice for the poor
EC	Supporting judiciary reforms and anticorruption measures, empowerment of local parliaments and civil society, especially in the field of human rights promotion, competition policy, and corporate governance; election support.	Stronger focus on Accountability; only in the field of human rights promotion complementary interventions on voice and accountability side.
Canada	Supporting reform of the financial management system fiscal framework, and decentralized administration (in the selected regions of Sulawesi and Aceh); empowering communities and strengthening CSO capacities; promotion of women's political and economic rights.	Voice and Accountability approach, especially at local level complementing each other; focus on accountability at national policy level.
Germany	Providing advisory services on decentralisation and good governance to create the conditions for stable political, economic and social development aimed at reducing poverty	Strong focus on Accountability and capacity building of government actors; support to Anti-Corruption Commission and participatory policy-making processes
ADB	Support to the Government's decentralisation agenda by remaining focused on policy reforms and capacity development; with regard to governance reforms focus on sustainable, transparent and equitable fiscal decentralisation to provide local governments with the means to improve the quality and volume of public service delivery	Strong focus on Accountability
United Kingdom	Strengthening development effectiveness through harmonisation. This priority focuses on decentralisation through programmes relating to decentralized governance, civil society mobilization, and poverty reduction. Supporting the <i>Partnership for Governance Reform</i> to promote and support reform initiatives	In current strategy stronger focus on Accountability; strengthening Voice through cooperation with Asia Foundation and <i>Partnership for Governance Reforms</i> .
UNDP	Promoting good governance in all its aspects, including ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and eliminating corrupt practices is an essential element to the achievement of sustainable development. Improving the management of public resources and enhancing public sector accountability and transparency and developing greater public awareness about the need for and requirements of good governance; strengthening legislative institutions and election processes, capacity	Balanced Voice and Accountability approach: capacity building for a variety of state and non-state actors (legislative institutions at national and local level, local governments, electoral bodies, media, etc.), but also assistance to improve mechanisms and channels for voice and accountability

Donor	Overall Country Strategy	Aspects of CV&A covered in Country Strategy
	building for Election Commissions; civic education and capacity development for broadcast media; e-governance	

Based on Table C.2.4 it can be concluded that interventions more or less address the whole spectrum of CV&A aspects as well as aiming to improve the enabling environment. Support to non-traditional actors, though, is less prominent on the civil society side (e.g. trade unions, professional associations, community-based organisations). The majority of donors have designed their support to voice and accountability as two complementary approaches in order to contribute to the overall goals of democratisation and good governance, but to a lesser extent do interventions on the voice and accountability side directly complementing each other.

From the onset of decentralisation the GTZ, the World Bank (through the Dutch Trust Fund), JICA, CIDA, UNDP and USAID provided assistance to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) as the major actors in developing the regulatory framework for decentralisation and democratic reforms. Assistance to the Ministry of Home Affairs in terms of policy development became less in the subsequent years with more donors attaching themselves instead to the National Planning Board (*Bappenas*) as the central government institutions responsible for the overall donor coordination. The Ministry of Home Affairs is generally considered as a somewhat more difficult partner for international donor assistance as it is more sensitive to political currents such as increasing nationalist sentiments and also has a stronger politically based recruitment system and thus less internationally educated staff than for example *Bappenas*<sup>97</sup>.

Whereas policy dialogue at the early days of the decentralisation process was largely dominated by bilateral donor organisations with GTZ being one of the major advisors involved in the drafting of the decentralisation legislation in 1999, since 2000 the International Finance Institutions (World Bank, IMF, ADB) as well as JICA have started providing substantial policy development-related and especially World Bank focussing its advisory support on the Ministry of Finance.

Whereas policy dialogue at the early days of the decentralisation process was largely dominated by bilateral donor organisations with GTZ being one of the major advisors involved in the drafting of the decentralisation legislation in 1999, after 2000 the International Finance Institutions (World Bank, IMF, ADB) have become more dominant as substantial loans are provided to support policy development and reform initiatives.

Besides the World Bank, the IMF, ADB and JICA are major contributors to these Policy Reform Support Loans. DFID in the meantime has chosen to rather link closely with the

<sup>97</sup> DRSP, Donor Working Group on Decentralisation, 2006, Stock Taking on Indonesia's Recent Decentralisation Reforms).

World Bank and ADB instead of bilateral implementation of projects in order to influence the poverty policies of these major lending institutions. CIDA, USAID and AusAID are other bilateral donors that are still engaged in policy advice at national level with CIDA focusing especially at public financial management, USAID at general democratic reforms and AusAID at capacity building.

Support to justice sector reforms also ranks high on donor agendas as it is seen essential for the overall reform process and especially for curbing corruption. Examples are ADB and the EC that assist the Supreme Court of Indonesia in improving the administration of justice, developing a case-tracking mechanism and case classification system. Furthermore it aims at improving public dissemination of Supreme Court judgments and building the capacity of administrative staff in the court system. UNDP assists reform efforts within the Office of the Attorney General, Supreme Court, Department of Law and Human Rights and the Anti-Corruption Commission.

In recent years, more and more donor-funded projects also engage directly at local level providing capacity building to district government units or strengthening civil society institutions including media. As of 2004 the share of donor funded projects providing capacity building at district level accounted for about one third of all donor projects<sup>98</sup>. Prominent examples for capacity building initiatives include the USAID-funded *Local Governance Support Programme* (LGSP) that works in more than 100 districts in seven provinces or the UNDP-supported Building and Reinventing Decentralized Governance (BRIDGE) focusing on capacity building for local governments, parliaments and civil society in 4 provinces in Sulawesi. World Bank with its Initiative for Local Governance Reform Programme (ILGR) has chosen local PRSP processes as entry point to support general governance reforms at district level.

This strong focus on capacity building for government actors at national and local level is complemented by considerable efforts to directly empower and give voice to communities. This is mostly done by involving communities in participatory planning processes related to basic government services including the provision of rural infrastructure. Whereas these programmes were conceived as poverty alleviation programmes they increasingly made use of the opportunities provided by the democratic reform process including more and more aspects of civil society strengthening. Most prominent examples are the World Bank supported *Kecamatan Development Programme* (KDP) and its urban equivalent Urban Poverty Programme (UPP) which have as of January 2007 been integrated into the National Community Empowerment Programme (PNPM) to be implemented by the Indonesian Government up until 2009 in the whole of Indonesia. SPADA, a third World Bank supported programme follows a similar approach on participatory planning, but is especially implemented in conflict-affected regions. Others include the "Community and Local Governance Support Sector Development Programme" (CLGS) which was funded by an ADB loan or the AusAID ACCESS Programme (Australian Community Development and Civil Society Strengthening Scheme).

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<sup>98</sup> World Bank, 2004, Indonesia: Towards a Marketplace for Capacity Building at Local Level.

Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Belgium have less elaborated country strategies due to their comparably limited engagement and refrain therefore also from own implementation structures. They share the main entry points on environmental protection and Good Governance, Anti-Corruption and Human Rights. Switzerland decided already by the early 1990s to slowly withdraw its aid from Indonesia. Its limited funding is especially directed towards the promotion of peace (previously especially support to the peace process in Aceh) and Human Rights. All of these ECG donors predominantly support non-state actors. They either channel their funding through large national NGOs (such as Tifa Foundation, SATUNAMA), through research institutes (e.g. Demos) or contribute to basket funding of *The Partnership for Governance Reform* (Sida, Danida) and UNDP-managed programmes. Norway intends to provide considerable co-funding for the second 3-years phase of the previously DFID-funded *Multi-stakeholder Forestry Programme* (which is part of this evaluation). Sida stands out by having a visible focus on justice with co-funding for the LEAD Access to Justice Programme (UNDP administered) and a collaboration with Tifa Foundation on a legal aid programme at community level.

#### *Main instruments and modalities for aid delivery*

Modalities for aid delivery in Indonesia can mainly be attributed to three different categories: Direct implementation, outsourcing and basket funding. Sector-wide approaches, common instruments of donors in other parts of the world, are not being implemented in Indonesia.

The majority of bilateral donor agencies is either commissioning international consulting agencies with the implementation of programmes on their behalf (USAID, AusAID) who set up their own regional implementation structures, partly cooperate with Indonesian NGOs as sub-contractors of project components or directly provide funding to Indonesian NGOs for programme implementation.

Direct implementation as the classic mode of delivery traditionally done by bilateral donor organisations is on the wane. GTZ is one of the few organisations for development cooperation that still maintains its own implementation structures from national level down to the district level and funds for technical assistance are being complemented by counterpart budgets at all operational levels.

In the recent years there has been considerable effort of donors to improve coordination among them and harmonise their approaches. This is mainly being done through basket funding or by setting up joint platforms for donor harmonisation. Most common in Indonesia is the establishment of Trust Funds that are usually administered by a multilateral agency such as the World Bank or UNDP. Extensive experience has been collected by donor organisations to pool their resources for example in the Multi Donor Trust Fund in support of the reconstruction process in Aceh. But even beyond this extraordinary situation donor organisations increasingly decide to refrain from own funding and implementation mechanisms and entrust the Multilaterals with programme implementation. Examples are the Dutch Trust Fund for governance policy development or the Japan Social Development Fund intended for innovative social programmes in the context of poverty

alleviation where funding was used to set up a special programme targeting widows under the wider umbrella of KDP or implementing a pilot on arts-related community initiatives to be integrated into KDP/PNPM.

Most of the Trust Funds in Indonesia are managed by the World Bank as their administration and procurement procedures are seen as bearing low risks in terms of possible fraud. Some donors on the other hand complain that administration procedures are too inflexible and time consuming that they actually hamper flexible implementation of activities in the field.

Joint platforms for donor harmonisation and strategic dialogue with the Indonesian government are the Decentralisation Support Facility (DSF) and the Partnership for Governance Reform, both outlined in more detail below.

Among donors there are generally diverging views on the opportunities and constraints related to basket funding in Indonesia. Pooling of resource in Trust Funds is generally seen by contributing donors as an effective approach towards donor harmonisation and the reduction of transaction costs. UNDP for example argues that trust funds give more flexibility as they allow for experimentation and innovation.<sup>99</sup> General perceptions among donors are that pooling of resources at a very early stage can help reduce duplications and ultimately improve programme delivery. On the other hand there has been little systematic evaluation if quality in implementation can generally be maintained or even improved. It is also felt by some that contributors to Trust Funds tend to loose influence on how the money is spent. In contrast, the Netherlands Development Cooperation argues that Trust Funds especially allow smaller donors a greater say as they are involved from the beginning in programme preparation.

DFID in turn justified its decision to move away from a direct facilitating role and own implementation structures (as was still in the case of the Multistakeholder Forestry Programme) to rather using multi-donor instruments to channel its funds by being better positioned to influence the overall aid agenda while at the same time securing long-term funding. International Finance Institutions are generally not so well equipped to engage with civil society. Therefore, DFID structured a range of different basket funds for its civil society support in Indonesia (e.g. the DSF, Partnership for Governance Reforms, UNDP-managed LEAD Programme on access to justice).

Sector-wide approaches including either untied or earmarked budget support do not play a role in Indonesia. One of the main reasons from the donor perspective has been the lack of direction and commitment by the Indonesian Government for active donor coordination<sup>100</sup>, (see also following chapter). Indonesia is not dependant on international funding to finance major public services.

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<sup>99</sup> Walsh, 2005, Perceptions of Development Partners and Evidence of Aid Effectiveness in Indonesia.

<sup>100</sup> UNICEF, Potential for Education Sector Wide Approaches in East Asia, Proceeding Document, Hanoi, November 2007

Conflicts of interests between sector departments also negatively affect GOI taking the lead in active donor coordination. Individual government departments seem to have an interest to maintain project approaches in order to strengthen their own position and role. Donors in part do aim at aligning their policies to Indonesian sector strategies as, for instance, DFID and the World Health Organization (WHO) strongly state in their country strategies.<sup>101</sup> The WHO takes note of the fact that donor grants do not play a significant role anymore for health spending as national health budgets have increased over the recent years and major credit lines are also provided for the health sector. WHO therefore sees its own role rather in providing policy advice in line with health priorities reflected in the medium-term expenditure framework.

*Platforms for strategic dialogue on poverty reduction and governance*

The Indonesian administrative set-up is known for its high number of institutions and frequently overlapping and unclear mandates making governance reform and democratisation that cuts across all sectors a complex undertaking. The Indonesian government has for long struggled to come up with a coherent overall legislative framework which also gives evidence of the diverging agendas and interests of related ministries. Consequently, the establishment of effective mechanisms and platforms for dialogue and coordination with donors is an equally difficult challenge. Donors have found themselves often enough supporting different government agencies in the elaboration of overlapping policies, partly leading to duplication of donor efforts or even contradictory interventions. But it is also believed that government agencies take advantage of the non-transparent situation playing donors off against each other in an effort to get the best deal in terms of benefits for the respective counterpart department.<sup>102</sup>

For long the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) was the major platform for dialogue between donors and the Indonesian government on development priorities and external funding needs as well as for coordination among donors themselves. The CGI was established in 1992 by the World Bank and the Indonesian Government and consisted of 30 bilateral and multilateral creditors in order to replace the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia that used to be chaired by the Netherlands. Due to strong lobbying of the *International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development* INFID a number of NGOs were also allowed to attend the CGI as observers and frequently entered into dialogue with donors during pre-CGI meetings. Attached to the CGI were a number of thematic working groups. The Joint Donor Working Group on Decentralisation particularly was used by donors in order to promote a discourse on governance and democratic reforms. A separate sub-committee on poverty reduction was chaired by ADB who also was the initiator of the PRSP process in Indonesia. The World Bank, ADB and Japan were by far the biggest creditors with their pledges accounting generally for almost 90% of the total pledge (although a member of the CGI the IMF is not calculated here as it doesn't lend directly to the Indonesian government, but to the Indonesian Central Bank). In January

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<sup>101</sup> Barnett, Christ; Bennet, Jon et.al, Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes. Country Study: Indonesia. Final Report, 2007).

<sup>102</sup> Walsh, 2005, Perceptions of Development Partners and Evidence on Aid Effectiveness in Indonesia.

2007 the Indonesian government decided to no longer seek financial assistance through the CGI which was, in turn, dissolved. Background of the disbandment of the CGI is the significantly reduced foreign debt service, but also increased self-confidence on the Indonesian side not to be exposed to foreign pressure anymore. According to Sri Mulyani, Minister of Finance, the Government of Indonesia would rather conduct bilateral debt negotiations with the three main creditors World Bank, ADB and Japan in a business-like way “without political cost and stigma”<sup>103</sup> and with supervision and control functions exerted by the Indonesian House of Representatives rather than by international donors. According to analysis by INFID the Indonesian government had always been troubled by critical inquiries particularly by the Scandinavian countries that “...lent insignificant loans but were very fussy toward political issues.”<sup>104</sup> The CGI had also been considered by wide sections of the Indonesian public as a neo-colonialist tool to impose conditions on the Indonesian government.

#### *Joint Donor Working Group on Decentralisation (JWGD)*

The Joint Donor Working Group on Decentralisation chaired by the Ministry of Home Affairs and co-chaired by a donor based on rotation continues to exist after the disbandment of the CGI. For long the JWGD had been chaired by GTZ as the GTZ-SfDM project being involved in the drafting of the decentralisation legislation had become the major resource of information for the donor community on decentralisation-related issues. Currently it is co-chaired by CIDA. After 2003 the role of the JWGD with regard to pushing the reform agenda had been on the decline. In recent years, but even more pronounced since the dissolution of the CGI the Joint Donor Working Group is struggling to find mechanisms to become more active and effective again. In 2006 MoHA facilitated the formation of the Permanent Secretariat consisting of officials from key ministries involved in decentralisation, such as Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Bappenas and Ministry for Administrative Reforms as a focal point for donor coordination. It was seen as a promising sign that GOI finally took the lead in donor coordination. But so far the Permanent Secretariat has little staff and resources to match this mandate. On the side of the donor community there is also concern the Joint Donor Working Group on Decentralisation together with the Permanent Secretariat are too dominated by the Ministry of Home Affairs ultimately curbing the commitment of other Ministries to become fully involved. In the meantime other technical working groups on specific issues such as participatory planning, support to local government associations or village governance were formed by donors on an ad-hoc basis. These were partly also more successful in involving non-governmental stakeholders into discussions how to set out pathways for further reforms. But involvement with government agencies is more based on individual contacts or non-formalized working relationships.

#### *Decentralisation Support Facility (DSF) and Support Office for Eastern Indonesia (Sofei)*

The Decentralisation Support Facility (DSF) in Jakarta was established in February 2005 evolving out of the commitments made during the 2003 Rome High Level Forum on

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<sup>103</sup> Antara News, 25 January 2007.

<sup>104</sup> See: [www.infid.org](http://www.infid.org).

Harmonisation and in the lead up to the Paris Declaration of 2005. At the initiative of the five donors World Bank, DFID, ADB, Netherlands and UNDP the DSF was designed as a multi-donor harmonisation facility. More specifically the main functions were laid out as follows:

- Improving the quality of existing donor programmes
- Sharing research and knowledge related to decentralisation amongst various stakeholders
- Developing common platforms for policy engagement with GOI
- Designing and contributing to multi donor programmes in support of decentralisation

Distinct policy platforms were outlined for the national level, district level service delivery and community-driven development. In the meantime the DSF was drawing on inputs from a larger group of donors, currently including the World Bank, ADB, DFID, the Netherlands, GTZ, AusAID, CIDA, USAID and UNDP. But the major funding organisation is DFID who provided about USD 8 Million during the pilot 1-year phase and USD 45 Million in the current phase from 2006 until 2009 which is managed by the World Bank in form of a Trust Fund.

The initial mandate of the DSF was seen to analyse, simplify and facilitate innovative interactions between the donor community, GOI and appropriate civil society stakeholders. This approach sought to shape and influence, as well as support government policies. In this sense major achievements up to now were strategic advice provided to the Indonesian government on fuel subsidies and the related piloting of compensating conditional cash transfer schemes.

The DSF is seen by many as a work in progress with experimentation as well as trial and error approaches towards streamlining different agencies' management systems and funding procedures. Considering the complex and challenging environment in Indonesia the donor commitment to coordinate and harmonise their engagement earned appreciation both on the side of the government and other donors. At the same time there is considerable criticism being voiced towards the DSF, mainly pointing to the fact that it has failed to strongly anchor its mandate in a continuous dialogue with Indonesian Government partners, for example by including GOI stakeholders in strategic decision-making in terms of management and operation of the DSF. Progress had been slow and concrete output in terms of joint donor activities and programmes have been limited, whereas the costs of this exercise have been significant. DSF also still has to define its role and position in relation to existing platforms for donor coordination and policy dialogue such as the Joint Donor Working Group on Decentralisation. Criticism has been voiced that the formation of the DSF together with the alignment with Bappenas could even undermine the Joint Donor Working Group on Decentralisation that together with the Permanent Secretariat have been envisaged by the Indonesian Government as the main platform for donor coordination and dialogue.

The *Support Office for Eastern Indonesia* (Sofei) located in Makassar, Sulawesi, was already launched in September 2004 with major funding from AusAID, DFID and Nether-

lands Development Cooperation. The funds are administered by the World Bank office in Jakarta and Sofei is in the meantime also closely linked with the DSF. As a platform for donor harmonisation it was especially designed to support developments in Eastern Indonesia by enhancing the sensitivity of donor interventions to local conditions and aspirations. Sofei provides services to donors and projects, such as implementing pilot activities, preparing project implementation, conducting research and supporting other learning exercises. On the other hand, it strongly involves with change agents at local level, be it within local governments, the private sector or civil society by facilitating the exchange of knowledge, providing capacity building and supporting networking and the development of strategic partnerships. This is mainly being done through the *Eastern Indonesia Forum* which represents a broad cross-section of stakeholders in Eastern Indonesia and provides guidance to the strategic programme of Sofei.

Under the umbrella of Sofei a knowledge exchange platform accessible to the wider public was also set-up. BaKTI, as it is named, has its own premises that include an extensive library, internet and meeting facilities and is meant to become a resource centre, meeting place and networking hub for the region. It especially targets Eastern Indonesian NGOs, local governments, academic institutions, religious groups and associations who mostly lack the access to information relevant for development practitioners.

#### *Partnership for Governance Reform*

The Partnership for Governance Reform was set up in 2000 as a vehicle for coordinated international support to the Indonesian reform process with national ownership. It has been conceived as cooperation between the Indonesian Government, civil society organisations, the private sector and a number of donor organisations (EU, Netherlands, UK, Sweden, Norway, and Canada). The Governing Board consists of respected Indonesian leaders as well as representatives from donor organisations or embassies. It consists of the Partnership Facility – engaging different stakeholders into dialogue on governance issues as well as analysis and strategy development – and the Indonesian Governance Trust Fund that supports activities that directly or indirectly promote good governance reforms. It started off as a UNDP project to allow for the establishment of administrative arrangements and accountability to funding donors. But since 2003 it assumed the legal status of an independent association. However, the Trust Fund is up to now still administered by UNDP.

Initially four priority sectors were identified: i) Legal and Judicial Reform; ii) Representation Reform; iii) Security and Police Reform; and iv) Civil Service Reform. Decentralisation and anti-corruption, as well as gender mainstreaming and support for marginalized groups are seen as crosscutting themes.

The largest donor is the Netherlands (USD 12,915,000 between 2000 and 2004), followed by the UK (USD 5,308,000) and the European Commission (USD 3,165,000). Germany seconded one integrated expert (CIM) who is placed since May 2005 in the office of the Partnership. Donors had committed themselves to a total of USD 28,473,000 with USD 2,958,000 actually having been paid until 2004. Anti-Corruption activities by Norway and Sweden in Indonesia have been mostly channelled through the Partnership.

The Partnership's goal is to become a vehicle and door-opener for governance reforms, instigating public discussions and dialogue on critical issues. The fact that well-known and trusted Indonesian individuals are represented both in the Board and executive level make it easier to touch on sensitive issues than if ownership purely laid with foreign donors. During its first years the focus was on diagnostic work on corruption which was fed into a public discourse. Through a series of public consultations a national strategy to fight corruption was developed. Since 2003 the Partnership proceeded with the implementation of this strategy, partly by devising its own activities, but mostly by supporting selected partners and projects whose agendas are in line with the anti-corruption strategy. Grantees include CSOs, universities, central or local government agencies or mass organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah. As of January 2007 the Partnership has started to design its own programmes and as far as possible former grantees are invited to be involved in the implementation of sub-projects.

Whereas during the early stage of the Partnership it had followed a sector approach under the broad umbrella of governance reforms, in its new strategy from 2007 until 2011 a multi-tiered approach is being taken with enhanced vertical and horizontal integration across the three major clusters of Public Service Governance, Democratic Governance and Security and Justice Governance. Regional focus for programme implementation is Jakarta, Yogyakarta, West Nusa Tenggara, Aceh and Papua.

Representatives from CSOs criticize the Partnership of not being a window for strengthening civil society at large. Funding seems to be extremely difficult to access and CSOs involved in the implementation of the new programme have now rather turned into sub-contractors than civil society partners with their own programmes.

Embarking on strategic dialogue on poverty reduction and governance issues, as well as overall donor coordination is so far mainly donor-driven. The Consultative Group on Indonesia with its working groups was a World Bank initiative and dialogue between the Government of Indonesia and donor organisations closely linked to the quest for financial assistance. The Decentralisation Support Facility again is a multi-donor initiative to improve donor harmonisation in the light of the commitments made in the Paris Declaration. There is little ownership of the Indonesian Government towards the DSF yet and well established working relationships at an institutional level are still lacking. The Indonesian Government on the other hand admits there is still a lot of work to be done in terms of further developing and implementing reforms and tackling poverty in the country and continues to value foreign assistance. But as of now there is no clear plan or seemingly little interest on the side of the Indonesian government to harness those mechanisms of donor coordination or multi-donor policy dialogue already in place. Indonesia is not in the position anymore to accept dictations by donor organisations on necessary reform steps. Realistically foreign donors can only play a catalytic role by bringing up innovative ideas, facilitating the implementation of interesting pilots and involve Indonesian partner agencies and civil society agents alike into learning exercises.

### *Mechanisms for civil society support*

Since the onset of the reform era in Indonesia in 1998 donor support to civil society has increased significantly. Civil society support can be categorized in terms of support provided to civil society organisations such as NGOs, CBOs, religious organisations and so forth as representing the voice of citizens and in terms of direct community empowerment which has generally been done in the context of small or larger poverty alleviation programmes.

Donors have especially emphasized the important role of NGOs in the context of democratic reforms as helping to fight corruption, supporting the decentralisation process, strengthening civil society in general, conducting voter's and civic education, conducting election monitoring and supporting community development. Assistance has been predominantly provided through special civil society components of broader projects cooperating with government agencies that are based on government-to-government agreements.

Support to locally-based Civil Society Organisations does not mean that a strong link to the community level can be taken for granted. CSOs especially outside of Java highly depend in their funding on taking up implementing functions for foreign donor programmes and thus rather align with donors priorities than develop their own agenda and constituencies. Very limited strategies and mechanisms exist for alternative sources of income. Even in cases where CSOs receive funding for their own programmes it is usually in the form of small grant schemes for short-term project implementation rather than long-term institutional support that would also take realistic overhead costs into account. NGO observers have, thus, voiced their concerns that the civil society organisational landscape has become too "projectized" and CSOs rather becoming sub-contractors than beneficiaries or strategic partners of donor initiatives which in turn leads to little sustainability in terms of enhanced capacities, CSO programmes and institutional arrangements.

Donors or international NGOs wanting to strengthen CSOs as more independent service providers to communities have found that they have to invest considerable long-time efforts and resources to develop the individual and organisational capacities of local CSOs.

Donors still predominantly strengthen CSOs in the context of achieving larger programme objectives. Some exemptions are the already concluded Civil Society Strengthening Programme of USAID (2001-2004) or the AusAID-funded Australian Community Development and Civil Society Strengthening Scheme in Eastern Indonesia that will soon go into its second five-year phase. Some of the larger international foundations such as Ford Foundation, Asia Foundation or Open Society Institute have focused more on the strengthening of civil society organisations in general through capacity building and organisational support. Whereas the Ford Foundation has over the years contributed to strengthen larger, Java-based NGOs, but in the recent years also younger NGOs at local level, the Asia Foundation has specialized in working with the mass-based reli-

gious organisations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah and their respective affiliated think tanks on civic education and access to policy making.

Whereas in the past bilateral donor organisations were directly involved in providing capacity building to civil society organisations or brokering relations between civil society and the state there is also a trend to rather leave civil society support to intermediaries such as Multilaterals, the international NGOs and foundations or long-established national NGOs with the bilateral donors acting as the funding partner. But especially the channelling of bilateral funding through World Bank, ADB or the UN Agencies is seen as very critical by CSO activists. While it is a given fact that the large World Bank and ADB community development initiatives have significantly contributed to strengthening grassroots village-level networks, their commitment and capacity to also strengthen CSOs at higher level is largely seen as lip service.<sup>105</sup>

A number of large national NGOs that had initially been set up with the support of foreign funding and facilitation have in the meantime become independent or diversified their funding and have taken on effectively the role as service providers to local NGOs, other CSOs or even government representatives (for instance SATUNAMA, Yappika, Bina Desa).

CSOs' perspectives on the role of donor support are somewhat critical and identify a number of major shortcomings. Among those is a considerable short-sightedness in not being ready to enter long-term relationships with grantees but rather expect short-term impacts. CSOs also feel that outside of Java there is little access to information about funding opportunities within civil society strengthening schemes as bilateral donor staff hardly take the time to familiarise themselves with the situation in the field and actively approach less established CSOs especially on the outer islands. Both on the side of donors as well as CSOs a certain competition among donors is felt to pick "the best" CSOs as implementation partners. This leaves little room and opportunity for more isolated and less established CSOs to improve their capacities and track records through experience and exposure. Furthermore, in their efforts to strengthen civil society donors rarely look beyond the classical NGOs, whereas Indonesian civil society is organized in a wide range of associations or less formalized groups and networks. Whereas there is increasing discourse and initiative among donors to coordinate and harmonise their technical and financial assistance towards government agencies there is little commitment of donors yet to coordinate in a similar way about their support for civil society.

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<sup>105</sup> McCarthy, Kirana, 2006, *The Long and Still Winding Road: A Study of Donor Support to Civil Society in Indonesia*.

# Appendix D: Intervention Summary Sheets- Models of Change

## CVA Joint Evaluation Intervention Summary Sheet

### I: Profile of the Intervention

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 1	MFP
Name Intervention	Multi stakeholder Forestry Programme	
1. Donor agency	DFID	
2. Implementing agency/ies and partners	DFID and Min of Forestry. DFID co-director at DFID Office, other co-director from Ministry of Forestry. National-level coordinators give grants to national-level partners related to research and international as well as national-level advocacy, through regional coordinators in six regional offices (Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi and Papua) grants to partners at local level.	
3. Project/intervention objectives	1 Pro-poor policies and accountable institutions and processes for sustainable and equitable forest management (pro-poor policy environment, supportive national and local regulations, rights, rules, roles and responsibilities agreed by stakeholder, legitimate policy-making process)	
	2 Voice of the poor finds its way into forestry policy-making	
	3. Accountability established in processes and institutions related to forestry governance	
4. Main CVA activities (stand alone or within component of programme)	<p><i>DFID coordinators:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Grants to NGOs, national and local governments, researchers, media or other CSOs; support to less experienced NGOs for proposal writing (in the beginning partly by giving small planning grants so to allow them writing up a comprehensive proposals, direct facilitation and support)</li> <li>-Facilitation of policy analysis, shared learning, communication and advocacy</li> <li>-Regional facilitator rather focussing to identify and support eligible partners at local level, national facilitator more issue-focussed (community-based forest management, poverty, shared learning, communication, national policy reform, restructuring of forestry industries)</li> <li>-In a nutshell: role is coordination, facilitation and grants management, but not direct policy dialogue</li> <li>- support to consultations and dialogues on national and local forestry policies</li> </ul>	

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 1	MFP
Name Intervention	Multi stakeholder Forestry Programme	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- improve and disseminate participatory policy tools</li> <li>- support recognized forestry complaint mechanisms</li> <li>- strengthening capacities for independent inspection of good and bad forest practices</li> <li>- strengthening capacities of stakeholders to advocate best practices, due diligence and business standards amongst the private sector</li> <li>- capacity building for civil society stakeholders (forest users and service providers) with regard to awareness building, advocacy, networking, communication, documentation and dissemination of good practices, facilitation of shared learning</li> <li>- Facilitation of horizontal advocacy networks to work towards change and “encourage governments to learn how to listen and respond”</li> <li>-support to farmers for agroforestry product development (not obvious in the field) to help directly improving livelihoods,</li> <li>- support to local media aiming at improving dissemination of information with regard to forest management, later decision to set up regional information centres (managed by local NGO to serve as an information platform, also feeding information to local media</li> <li>- Concrete accountability mechanisms (by way of capacity building) seen as one output only</li> </ul>	
5. Target Group/Beneficiaries	Poor farmers living in and around forests	
6. Key linkages of intervention with other programmes	<p>Initially designed as major practical contribution to poverty alleviation. Complemented by other DFID support for improved governance (especially Partnership for Governance Reform and most prominently DSF), but direct links not visible.</p> <p>Much of the groundwork has been done by Ford Foundation, MFP benefits in making use of already increased capacities, awareness and networks, in national advocacy on</p>	
7. Duration	6 years	
8. Starting date	2000	
9. Total budget	£ 25.1 Million; £ 14 Mio into direct grants NGOs/CSOs/local governments; block grant amounting £ 2 Mio to Ministry of Forestry to help implementation of MoU on illegal logging, training and supervision. Partnership grants with facilitation and capacity building on net-	

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 1	MFP
Name Intervention	Multi stakeholder Forestry Programme	
	working, communication, policy analysis and advocacy (5 Mio £).	

## II: Overall Assessment of Intervention using DAC Criteria

### Relevance

<p>Overall judgment: ++</p> <p>MFP was a very timely measure in terms of meeting the needs of the situation after the initial years of reformasi (forest degradation on the one hand, room for altering power relations with regard to forest management) and especially coinciding with the onset of the decentralization process (starting 1.1.2000). Also timely in their initial distance to government to win trust of civil society and flexibility to support all kinds of different local initiatives of partly very young and inexperienced CSOs.</p> <p>To combine very strong support for CV&amp;A through multi-stakeholder dialogue processes with sectoral, namely forestry, issues (CBFM) very relevant. Access to forest resources very significant for livelihood of poor farmers and very much determined by uneven power-relationships. Tackling those contributes to a change of overall power relationships. High legitimacy of civil society networks in national-level policy process.</p> <p>Mainstreaming of gender and anti-corruption would be important</p> <p>Access to forest resources outside of Java and Nusa Tenggara (especially Sumatra, Kalimantan, Papua) is closely connected with rights issues, law enforcement, access to justice, etc. this didn't play enough role in the programme design yet.</p>
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### Efficiency

<p>Overall judgment: +</p> <p>Overhead costs (staff salaries and running costs) 19% of expenditure (about 5 Mio £) few long-term expat staff(except for co-director and communication/advocacy advisor)</p> <p>Good value for money in terms of incredible amount of initiatives spread over almost whole of Indonesia (from beginning on real effort for scale-up, not satisfied with the development of a nice boutique-type pilot), immediately aiming at and achieving changes at local as well as at national-level addressing a lot of aspects of a very complex problem. But what has been widely criticized is the fact that in the beginning not enough partner selection was made and a lot of grants given to local organizations with which collaboration was later on discontinued. Where possible MFP also cooperated with other internationally-funded programmes or institutions and thus pooled funding and achieved synergies (e.g. CIFOR, ICRAF – for example acting as mediator in Rinjani-related conflicts, ....)</p>
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## Effectiveness

Overall judgment: +

Especially a lot of achievements with regard to pro-poor policies. Accountability mechanisms still underrepresented though. Mechanisms for access to justice should be included as not all problems can be solved by political decisions or policy-making

## Impact

Overall judgment: ++/+

Policy-makers more accommodative towards civil society inputs, sometimes already institutionalized; more secured rights of farmers for using forestry products at local and national level, but no guarantee yet for allocation of sufficient funds and commitment for coherent follow-up implementation

Improved protection of natural resources at local level

So far significant impact in terms of poverty reduction still dependent on continuous support by NGOs, but actual period of implementation also not too long due to initial 'trial-out' phase and temporary halt of programme activities during times of crisis with Ministry of Forestry.

## Sustainability

Overall judgment: +

With the ratification of major national-level regulations on social forestry and numerous other local decrees and by-laws the foundation has been laid in securing community rights in forest management that will help farmers to sustain the improvements of their livelihoods. On the other hand continuous support by NGOs and agricultural authorities (extension services) will still be needed to develop alternative non-timber forestry products once newly planted trees in reforested state forest will grow bigger (and will not allow planting of cash crops anymore), to support them in their access to markets and also in terms of their organizational development (solid farmers cooperatives precondition to be granted right in the future to also partly use timber).

The Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue processes to the extent initiated by MFP are unlikely to be continued as major channels for CV&A as the role to become a moderator and initiator is unlikely to be played by local NGOs only without the backing of a donor-funded program. Local governments on the other hand seem to have adopted a more open approach for inclusive decision-making having seen the benefits of involving a variety of stakeholders into dialogue processes. But genuine dialogue can be a tedious and costly process with a lot of set-backs and obstacles to be overcome. Without outside facilitation there is a high risk of processes halting half way.

The major exist strategy by MFP was to establish Community Foundations in every region as service providers and major networking platforms that can access other funding sources, channel it to the NGO partners supporting farmer groups and provide further capacity building. This strategy seems to be drawn a bit hastily as – for example the

Community Foundation in Nusa Tenggara (Mataram) – has been only newly formed with so far seemingly little legitimacy to really act as a spokesperson for other local NGOs or further provide them with capacity building. Becoming an intermediary for other local NGOs is always a sensitive issue and strongly depends on the trust other NGOs grant the intermediary. If it is too much donor-driven and too little support for their organizational development these organizations will very likely not survive or at least to perform the role they were envisaged to play.

2007 was a critical moment in achieving some major successes in terms of ratifying legislation concerning community-based forestry management - but it will need further facilitation to support their effective implementation. - it is fortunate that the Norwegian Embassy continues to provide further funding to MFP for another 3 years after DFID has decided to discontinue bilateral programmes.

Sustainability of capacity building: yes at community and NGO level, but difficult at government level due to constant rotation to different positions, knowledge and commitment gets often lost.

## Lessons Learned

On design and overall approaches applied by the intervention

If impact at national-level policy level envisaged, intervention cannot rely on civil society network advocacy only, but has to be supported (at a certain stage at least) by involvement of national-level into intervention, learning process, monitoring, etc, ownership is essential. This includes collaboration with state-owned companies – if applicable

Donor or programme management should also play a more active role to develop an overall capacity building strategy (what is it that capacity building initiatives want and need to achieve?) and ensure quality standards for capacity building efforts.

Most donors assume strengthening CV&A improves governance which is a prerequisite for effective poverty alleviation. A lack of voice at the same time is seen as a major aspect of poverty. These general underlying assumptions seem to not be enough for the design of interventions in order to make them ultimately contribute to poverty reduction in a meaningful way. Poverty needs to be clearly conceptualized and understood by all parties involved. At the same time stakeholders (project management as well as partners) need to be equipped with tools that guide them in making programme design and implementation poverty-sensitive.

On implementation issues (constraints, risks, opportunities, synergies)

Effective implementation in terms of CV&A requires a thorough and continuous analysis of local socio-political context and specifically of who are the drivers of change. Even reform blockers (e.g. within certain sections of the executive, or if it is the legislative) should be as far as possible involved in order to at least being able to assess their action and prevent boycott. This means that cooperation between civil society and government need to be build on a broad institutional basis and not only on individual per-

sonalized relationships.

Monitoring systems should not only serve the primary purpose to collect data for accountability reasons, but also feeding into a continuous learning process (on context situation, effectiveness of approach, constraints, partners chosen etc.) as strengthening CV&A is a highly political and fluid process requiring locally adapted approaches and solutions. This learning process should not only take place at donor-level, but especially involving local partners as a means of further capacity building and institutional empowerment.

If support for CV&A is supposed to contribute to overall goals such as poverty reduction a thorough analysis of target groups and power relations is required, who are the poor why and how are they so far excluded (even within their own communities)

#### On policy dialogue

Aid effectiveness shouldn't mean to move completely away from actual target groups and loose control over important design and strategy decisions. Especially World Bank in Indonesia is a partly problematic partner in strengthening certain channels for CV&A as they are still highly distrusted by a lot of civil society organization. Alignment with partner countries' own policies and priorities can also hamper effective strengthening of CV&A as this is rarely an objective in itself for them. Donors allocating considerable resources on strengthening CV&A from the grassroots level up become on the other hand more acceptable for national governments if incorporated in strategies to achieve rather sectoral goals and outputs (improvement of health, environment, poverty reduction etc.). Whereas for example DSF developing a window especially for civil society support has been highly rejected by national government representative!

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
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## Model of Change: Multi-Stakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP)



The Multistakeholder Forestry Programme was designed against the background of vanishing forestry resource due to inequitable and unsustainable forest management and a lack of legal security for the forest-dependent poor to utilize forest resources. Major problems were identified at the policy level (especially Government Regulation No. 34/2002 on “Forestry Management Planning and Utilization of Forestry Resources), in the political sphere (decentralization-related policies and practices) and in the field of law enforcement (illegal logging). As a major entry point and strategy MFP initiated a variety of multi-stakeholder processes – consisting of dialogue platforms, joint action research and joint conflict management processes. Furthermore, MFP gave grants to local NGOs and research institutions to provide capacity building and shared learning among farmers for improved use of forest resources (including marketing of forest products), for developing demo sites on community-based forest management as well as for research on forest-related issues, especially illegal logging. These interventions led to a number of significant local as well as national-level policies, that integrated inputs generated during the multi-stakeholder processes guaranteeing farmers the access and use of forest resources. Taking part in shared learning events among farmers and visiting the demo sites for community-based forest management (CBFM) served as an important eye-opener for political decision-makers about the importance and benefits of CBFM for poverty reduction and sustainable forest management. Farmer groups in turn were able to expand their economic basis, mainly through intercropping systems in state-owned forests. There is also evidence that the multi-stakeholder processes had a positive impact on the reduction of forest-related conflicts, as in the case of the “Participatory Action Research” around Gunung Rinjani in Lombok. Impacts in terms of significantly improved livelihoods of the forest-dependent poor and thus overall poverty alleviation can so far not be accounted for. Reasons are, among others, that MFP only in the last years improved their poverty targeting, whereas during the early stages of the program involved farmer groups not necessarily included the poorest farmers. Secondly, the impact of an expanded use of forest products will only realize its economic potential in mid- to long-term perspective and combined with improved marketing strategies, an aspect that so far hasn’t been given enough attention by assisting NGOs.

Research, investigations and networking of civil society organizations in the context of combating illegal logging so far has also not led to a visible reduction of forest destruction as illegal logging is a highly political and multi-faceted problem needing first of all political commitment for law enforcement and a conducive regulatory environment at national and local level – two aspects the programme has not clearly worked on as its focus was to build up capacities, networks and advocacy strategy from the civil society upwards. In those areas where farmers have already been granted the official rights for the management and sustainable use of state-owned forest a more sustainable management of natural resource is visible.

## CVA Joint Evaluation Intervention Summary Sheet

### I: Profile of the Intervention

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 2	<b>PROMIS</b>
Name Intervention	<b>Poverty Alleviation and Support to Local Governance in NTB and NTT</b>	
1. Donor agency	BMZ	
2. Implementing agency/ies and partners	<p>PROMIS is directly implemented by GTZ. The partner organisation for the MOU is the Ministry of Home Affairs, particularly (<i>Direktorat Jenderal Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Desa PMD</i>) and the <i>Direktorat Jenderal Bina Pembangunan Daerah, Bangda</i>). Partners are the District government in six selected districts in NTB and NTT. The Local Planning Board (Bappeda) is a major partner/beneficiary. PROMIS also involves local NGOs in the implementation of the programme (to keep government accountable through policy advocacy)</p> <p>PROMIS is a merger of two earlier programmes that were running in a number of districts in NTB and NTB One was the PNT (working with self-help groups, from 1998-2002) and PRODA that worked on good governance at district level 2000-2002. During implementation PROMIS conducted also activities with additional funds of other programmes (Food for Work), and AGROPRO (Agroprocessing) in support of self help groups.</p>	
3. 1 Project/intervention objectives (specific objectives) of CVA and wider objectives in case CVA is component of broader intervention	Overall: The ability of the rural population and their institutions to utilize their development potential and expand their economic activities.	
	Indicator: The living conditions have been substantially improved, especially through business-oriented services by Government institutions, NGOs and other CSOs with participation of the local population.	
	<p>Two component objectives have been formulated:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. the ability of the village population to plan, implement and control village development activities that are poverty-oriented;</li> <li>2. The potential of institutions of local government to increasingly fulfil their tasks in the field</li> </ol>	

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 2	<b>PROMIS</b>
Name Intervention	<b>Poverty Alleviation and Support to Local Governance in NTB and NTT</b>	
	of poverty alleviation;	
4.1.Main CVA activities (stand alone or within component of programme)	<p>Capability Building to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local government in participatory process and planning;</li> <li>• Local parliament (village and district council)</li> <li>• NGOs supporting CV&amp;O activities</li> <li>• To motivators of self-help groups;</li> </ul> <p>Strategy development of local economic development;</p> <p>A minor part was used for revolving funds to self-help groups (repayment to other members or new activities).</p>	
5. Target Group/Beneficiaries	The beneficiaries are the rural and small town population in six districts in NTB and NTB.	
6. Key linkages of intervention with other programmes.	GTZ projects SfGG, SfDM (at national level at the same Ministry), Food for Work Component, AGROPRO (Agroprocessing). In the districts there were dozens of development programmes, still PROMIS was unique in combining poverty with good governance	
7. Duration	According to the Project Proposal the duration is from 08.2002 – 07.2005, but as recommended total duration is mentioned 08.2002 - 07.2008; The project was ended in (month-year), but the GTZ programme GLG (Good local Governance is building on earlier results);	
8. Starting date	Augustus 2002, ended in December 2005, the three year period was not extended to the five year period initially envisaged.	
9. Total budget	The total budget is €9.345, 000= share of MBZ €8,545,000, for the first phase €4,545,000. € 4, 4100,000 has been disbursed. Major costs are personal costs € 2,706.940 local and international), there is a very small part of equipments etc (285,270 and 100,000 €); it is not clear to me how much has been allocated for direct support to self-help groups.	

## II: Overall Assessment of Intervention using DAC Criteria

### Relevance

Overall judgment: + (not ++ due to unrealistic assumptions, premature ending of the project)

There is certainly a high level of potential relevance, as it addressed the main development objectives of both the Government of Indonesia and Germany, both in the field of poverty alleviation as in good local governance, and the entry points for providing support are convincing. However, a number of design elements reduce its potential relevance:

Trying to achieve poverty alleviation with micro measures without structural changing the productive environment is not expected to lift the poor groups out of the poverty trap, the programme would have gained much in relevance if productive innovations were not only identified, but also being explored and implemented at a large scale afterwards. The shortening of the project period without clear indications how a successor programme would take up essential elements had greatly reduced its relevance (and of course its effectiveness).

### Efficiency

Overall judgment: +/-

There is not much to say about this criterion. The programme was a TA project with very little accompanied physical elements (equipment, means of transport, etc.). The share of the budget that directly benefited the target group (the rural poor) was relatively very small, and not conversant with the ambitious objectives.

### Effectiveness

Overall judgment: +

The achievements of the project are relatively small in poverty alleviation, but nevertheless important for the self-help groups (wide variation among districts, with little progress in Bima and much more in Alor). According to project targets according to expectation, however the objective of self-reliance or self-sustaining groups in terms of claiming their rights and well-being has not been achieved. No umbrella organisation has been developed. The poor farmers and fishermen were not linked to the developed local economic strategy. A structural lifting out of poverty did not take place.

Regarding the second component, good governance, interesting results have been attained in terms of development of participatory planning and budgeting processes, (feeding in National Regulation), the use of public hearings (Alor: for all by-laws that affect civil society a two step public hearing process (sub-district and district level) is imperative by own district regulation).

## Impact

Overall judgment: +/-

The impact of the programme is could have been much larger if the programme was not prematurely ended, particularly in poverty alleviation implementing the local economic development strategy developed. There was not sufficient dissemination of project results and no communication strategy developed. The project was finalized due to considerations of the donor that may be valid for them, but were not well explained to local counterparts that -combined with a rotation of government staff and leadership- is likely to result in reduced interest and commitment to continue the road taken.

## Sustainability

Overall judgment:

The assumptions of PROMIS that by the time the project will be ended the self help groups would be fully self reliant and the government would be fully capable of continuing the participatory and pro-poor development process were not fulfilled.

The integrated development approach is not easily adopted and implemented due the sectoral orientation of the executive and the lack of motivation at the legislative (DPRD -local councillors)

GTZ changed the intervention approach from working at all levels, including the grass root level to a higher policy and strategic level at province and district level. This was not well prepared and actions taken to prepare the districts for the new approach, as well as NGOs and CSOs that could take over the former GTZ role in the districts.

The ex-PROMIS staff and those involve in the project of Bima district maintain that it is difficult to maintain the results of the project, i.e. the participatory planning approach, the multi-level platforms and teams for good governance, due to changed leadership and rotation of personnel in a number of districts. The district of ALOR continues with enthusiasm with the participatory planning and budgeting approach. With the taking over of motivators of self-help groups as government staff in various departments, the activities of self-help groups went down, and further development towards economic development (marketing, processing) stagnated.

## Lessons Learned

On design and overall approaches applied by the intervention

PROMIS has been an intermediate programme that did not reach maturity, particularly in the area of poverty alleviation, local economic development. Nevertheless, the programme was finalised as the intervention approach was adapted: i.e. directly working at the community level was no longer seen as strategic in the GTZ development cooperation approach with Indonesia, as GTZ decided to move to a level of concept and policy

making at the national, provincial and district level.

There is a similarity with other donors that closed down rural development projects at the earliest possible time (without really looking if the objectives already had been met) in the eagerness of starting with the Sector Wide Approach. The continuation of the MFP- although not fitting anymore in the DFID development strategy- appears to be a positive exemption.

By the closure of the PROMIS project the stakeholders in Alor District were told that GLG would be the follow-up project, raising expectations that activities for the self-help groups and local economic development (processing) would continue. However, this did not happen due to the new intervention approach. However, this was communicated to the Alor stakeholders, it created a sense of disappointment that is threatening earlier efforts made.

The lesson learnt here is that, a donor should not close down a project when a direct follow-up cannot be guaranteed, that there should be flexibility to continue an intervention, albeit it does not fit in a new strategy to consolidate and obtain the required results.

On implementation issues (constraints, risks, opportunities, synergy)

On policy dialogue

What can we learn from the experience to date of donors' effectiveness in supporting CV&A interventions with a particular reference to the principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration?

There is no direct relation of PROMIS to a policy dialogue with GOI. The programme has provided concrete experience at the district level and below (sub-district and village) in participatory planning and budgeting that was useful for national policy making. However, results were presented in donor working groups on decentralisation and therefore, indirectly contributed to new legislation on participatory planning.

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
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## Model of Change: PROMIS



**Assumptions (most which are not valid):**

- self help groups are the major vehicle for income generation;
- that poverty alleviation in poor rural communities can be achieved without a major innovation, change in access to productive resources, or improvement in the supply chain;
- that strategy development would automatically lead to a better situation for the target group;
- self help groups can and will be institutionalized in an umbrella organization (is not done, not realistic given lack of juridical basis);
- that a systematic approach and synergy between the activities of predecessor projects (PNT, PRODA) would be achieved by merging them into one programme;
- no need for exit strategy as major beneficiary will be self –reliant by the end of the project, and the intermediaries (local government) are fully capable and possess the political will to continue project activities, this is found to overambitious (= false);
- Advocacy and Capacity building fulfilling the needs for strengthening local economy of the region in term of quality and quantity.

## CVA Joint Evaluation Intervention Summary Sheet

### I: Profile of the Intervention

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 3	SfGG
Name Intervention	Support for Good Governance	
1. Donor agency	BMZ	
2. Implementing agency/ies and partners	<p>GTZ and the Ministry of Administrative reform (<i>Menpan</i>). MenPan has the role to assist the President in formulating policy concerning the empowerment of public servants, as well as coordinating the implementation of the policy. This includes among others form late policies on administration and procedures of public services, on accountability of public servants, developing standards of service delivery, etc. The National Administrative Agency (LAN) is in charge of implementation (and takes a larger role in the SfGG).</p> <p>But the central regulatory environment is characterised by a large number of agency that partly share responsibility for managing the national and regional civil services they are not well defined and making the regulatory framework fragmented and blurred (WB, 2006): i.e. besides Menpan and LAN, BKN (National Civil Service Agency), Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Finance, but also sectoral ministries and local government have responsibilities for oversight/regulation, management, TA and training.</p>	
3. Project/intervention objectives	<p>Overall goal: The reform of the Indonesian administration in the sense of strengthening the principles of the rule of law, verifiability and predictability of the public administrations; action is supported.</p> <p>The four formulated specific objectives are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-(1) institutions of the public sector avail of knowledge and innovative instruments for improving internal administration and are increasingly enabled to cooperate with citizens in a more consumer oriented way;</li> <li>(2) selected NGOs as important intermediaries of civil society are able to effectively support (female and male) users of public services in organizing themselves and furthering their abilities to express their needs;</li> <li>(3) Mechanisms of cooperation between public administration and civil society are introduced and practiced in a sustainable way;</li> <li>(4) The responsible Indonesian authorities and NGOs being active in the area of anti-corruption are equipped with knowledge and capabilities to develop and implement anti-</li> </ul>	

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 3	SfGG
Name Intervention	Support for Good Governance	
	corruption measures.	
4. Description of the intervention conducted (s)	<p>Programme activities concern TA, training, on the job training, workshops, capability building for government and NGO staff in drafting regulations and rules, design and test customer complaints surveys, preparation of guidebooks, CDs, instruction materials, train facilitators, preparation of training materials, training of trainers to conduct complaint surveys with government institutions in various sectors.</p> <p>Activities have to lead to the following outputs:</p> <p>1.1. The Min of Administrative reform has forwarded to the Indonesian Parliament the draft of the Administrative Procedure Act which considers international experiences and the principle of transparency, predictability and accountability;</p> <p>1.2 Regulations and procedures for recruitment and assessment of government staff are implemented by the Min of Administrative reform, considering the principles of transparency (job descriptions, requirements, and tender) and performance orientation;</p> <p>1.3 Capacities for national application of laws and regulations are made available by the Min of Administrative reform, The National Administrative Agency (LAN, this is the implementation arm of the Ministry)/ (Guidebooks, trained facilitators, budget available);</p> <p>2.1 Guidelines for complaint mechanisms, people's participation and control by civil society are jointly developed and tested in 3 locations and are ready for country-wide dissemination;</p> <p>2.2 Applicability of the instrument of the Administrative Procedure Act is tested in one region.</p> <p>2.3 Facilitation capacities are made available by the Min of Administrative reform and LAN (training modules, trained facilitators, budget available);</p> <p>3.1 Government and non government organizations exchange information about successful experiences of participation and control by civil society through internet and at least two workshops per year</p>	
5. Target Group/Beneficiaries	Ministry of Administrative Reform and the National Administrative Board (LAN); regional and local governments, NGO and citizens.	
6. Key linkages of inter-	Related GTZ projects are PRODA, PROMIS, SISKES,	

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 3	SfGG
Name Intervention	Support for Good Governance	
vention with other programmes	ASSD, Other donors USAID Initiative for Local Government Reform, the EB KDP,	
7. Duration	From July 2000 to June 2009. First phase 200-2003, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Phase 2003-end of 2007 (extended from July to 31 December), 3 <sup>rd</sup> Phase 2008-2010.	
8. Starting date	07/2000; Activities actually started later with the long term TA arriving in 2001 and 2002. The first preparation mission took place in 1999.	
9. Total budget	Total period allocated € 7 million. Spent from July 2003 to June 2007 (4 years) € 2,950,000. By 1 January the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Phase will start with a budget of € 2.5 million and will test out and prepare training and training materials for the wide spread implementation of the Administrative Procedure Act.	

## II: Overall Assessment of Intervention using DAC Criteria

### Relevance

Overall judgment: ++  
The project is very relevant as it addresses a main concern the low quality of services to citizens in general and to the poor in particularly. The programme directly refers to one of the main objectives of the national 5 year Development Plan (2004-2009) to create a state apparatus that is professional, efficient, productive, transparent and free of corruption, collusion and nepotism so that all citizens' receive excellent services. The programme approach clearly indicates a strong interaction between a more capable government administration (accountability- supply side) with a civil society that demands for high quality services that are corruption-free (voice and demand-side).

### Efficiency

Overall judgment: ++/+  
It was not possible to look into the project detailed account, but given the fact that the majority of technical assistance has been conducted by nationals and cost-effective training has been conducted, and a valuable and high quality product has been produced that has a country-wide application, the project is considered to have a good value for money. There have been several delays in implementation but these were often outside the control of the project.

## Effectiveness

Overall judgment: ++/+

The project has achieved very tangible output and results, i.e. the set of Guidelines, the Draft Administrative Law, trained facilitators, and a number of regulations and bylaws in the pilot districts<sup>106</sup>. The implementation of the citizens' complaint survey has been rather slow, due to the few funds that were made available by the local governments (the project provide the training material and the facilitators only), and the commitment of the government departmental staff (outside the control of the project). In 2004 the SfGG received a reward of excellent performance of the President and this has given a high credibility to the produced outputs.

## Impact

Overall judgment: +

The impact has been judged taking into account the potential impact the project is expected to have. So far, the impact has been on a very minor scale. However, there is an increasing demand for the products, the citizens' complaint survey by regional and local governments, but also by other national government agencies. The product is relatively cheap compared to other forms such as involving experts, and is most effective as it is done by a participatory approach involving own staff.

## Sustainability

Overall judgment: +

The sustainability is good, the project did not fund the implementation of the products it produced, just its development and testing, as well as the facilitators. The application will depend on the funds made available by the recipient governmental administrations. Civil society is expected to demand further implementation.

## Lessons Learned

On design and overall approaches applied by the intervention

The long term commitment of 8 years for a project along with a wide flexibility in the direct objectives and work programme was instrumental for its success. Would the project have been designed for short periods, changes are high that it would have been ended prematurely, without having reached any tangible result.

<sup>106</sup> Since 2002, SfGG has made efforts to develop a method on project implementation and financial management towards transparency and accountability. Regional partners of SfGG for developing and testing the methods and manual have been the District of Solok, West Sumatra, with a focus on the village administrations as well as the district and the Municipality of Bima, Sumbawa (NTB) with a focus on public health centres ( Puskesmas). After having tested in SfGG pilot areas (Solok, Bima), as well as with partners such as Konmawas kota Salatiga, Kawaal Bima, LPPI kabupaten Solok, Transparency International Indonesia, Indonesian Procurement Watch, Komwas PBB. Manuals for the improvement of civil service, accountability, public service delivery, and civil society participation are developed, published and will be disseminated to all districts and municipality in Indonesia.

On implementation issues (constraints, risks, opportunities, synergy)

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On policy dialogue

What can we learn from the experience to date of donors' effectiveness in supporting CV&A interventions with a particular reference to the principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration?

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
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## Model of Change: SfGG



**Assumptions:**

- Improvement of Public service Delivery by conducting Customer complaint survey approach accepted by Indonesians
- Promoting Good practices and successful examples for Governance in selected regions
- Models of Improvement of Public Service Delivery by conducting Customer complaint survey is accepted and make used by related Sectors and Government Institutions

\* Ministry of Administrative reform of the Republic of Indonesia

## CVA Joint Evaluation Intervention Summary Sheet

### I: Profile of the Intervention

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 4	ASSD
Name Intervention	Advisory Services Support for Decentralization	
1. Donor agency	BMZ	
2. Implementing agency/ies and partners	<p>GTZ supports the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) in formulating policies on the basis of domestic coordination with relevant ministries and sub-national governments, as well as consultations with non-governmental actors. The distribution of roles and tasks between government and administration levels is to be set out in concrete terms and capacities are to be developed. The implementing agencies are six Directorates General of MoHA and the Regional Autonomy Advisory Council (DPOD), the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice</p> <p>A permanent secretariat facilitates coordination between the Indonesian government and donor organisations.</p> <p>ASSD also involves intermediary organisations, such as universities, think tanks and civil society organisations, in the policy-making processes of the government.</p>	
3. Project/intervention objectives	1 Overall objective: Sub-national regional authorities improve their performance of planning, budgeting and service functions;	
	2 Overall phase objective (2006-2009): The political process for shaping decentralisation and its statutory framework reflects proposals of various stakeholders in society based on their needs and experience;	
	3 The consistency of the legal framework of decentralization is improved and public participation in the political decision-making process is strengthened	
4. Main CVA activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Public consultation on policy-making processes (public forums);</li> <li>- Participation of non-state actors in policy-making process;</li> <li>- New legislation;</li> <li>- Dissemination of information on policy making processes related to decentralisation</li> </ul>	
5. Target Group/Beneficiaries	<p>Target group: the entire population of Indonesia with disadvantaged population groups being taken in account when identifying measures.</p> <p>Intermediaries: sectoral and managerial staff of ministerial administrations and downstream authorities, members of the national parliament and regional chambers, represen-</p>	

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 4	ASSD
Name Intervention	Advisory Services Support for Decentralization	
	tatives and staff of local authority associations and staff of civil society organisations and academia.	
6. Key linkages of intervention with other programmes	<p>The intervention is directly linked to three related GTZ interventions:</p> <p>Supporting good local governance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Good Local Governance (GLG) in NTT, NTB, Central Java, Yogyakarta, Implementing Agency: MoHA</li> <li>b) Capacity Building – CB in East Kalimantan, Implementing Agency: MoHA</li> </ul> <p>Promotion control and accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c) Support for Good Governance (SfGG), Implementing Agency: MenPaN</li> <li>d) Anti Corruption Clearing House (KPK)</li> </ul> <p>Strengthening Statehood</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>e) Good Governance on Population Administration (GG-PAS), Implementing Agency: MoHA</li> <li>f) Funds Security and Development (SSR), Implementing Agency: Bappenas</li> </ul> <p>Through the cooperation with GLG, cooperative relations exist with DED (municipal advisory services), CIM (advisory services to local authority associations) and InWEnt (advanced training in municipal financial management). Donors that strengthen capacities of local government units at sub-national level (USAid, AusAid), offer experience that is introduced into the national reform process via ASSD. Conversely, ASSD processes findings from sub-national measures and makes them available to donors who provide advisory services solely at national level (World Bank; UNDP; DIFD, CIDA). Consultation processes are conducted in various workgroups, especially in the <i>Decentralization Support Facility (DSF)</i> and the <i>Permanent Secretariat (GOI)</i>.</p>	
7. Duration	1 January 2006 to 31 December 2015 (phase 1: January 2006 to 31 December 2009)	
8. Starting date	1 January 2006	
9. Total budget	EURO 11,500,000 (phase 1: EURO 3,650,000)	

## Section II: Overall Assessment of Intervention using DAC Criteria

### Relevance

<p>Overall judgment: ++</p> <p>The process of decentralisation is one of the most pressing political and socio-economic issues in the democratisation process and with regard to good governance.</p>
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The existing legislation on decentralisation (law 32/2004) is seen as insufficient and even. While the Decentralisation Act of 2004 introduced the direct election of sub-national political office holders and the principle of accountability vis-à-vis citizens and improved financial resources at the local level, the respective roles and functions at national, province and district levels are not defined distinctly. This situation is exacerbated by contradictions between decentralisation and sectoral legislation. As a consequence of this lack of clarity, sub-national local government units are not in a position to perform all their tasks in keeping with circumstances and requirements. This reinforces the still widespread, non-transparent governance that has a negative effect on the development of democratic rule of law. The design of the intervention identifies these core problems and shortcomings of the decentralisation process.

### **Efficiency**

Overall judgment:  
The project inputs (policy consulting, participatory processes) are consistent with the efficient achievement of outputs and outcomes (pro-poor legislation, strengthening of the decentralisation process, and empowerment of non-state actors in policy-making processes). The expenditure concerning the ASSD project is sensible and in line with the overall budget.

### **Effectiveness**

Overall judgment: (+, tentatively)  
The effectiveness of ASSD benefits from GTZ's long-standing relationship with MoHA (as the only donor GTZ has an office in the ministry and maintained it for 10 years); MoHA trust GTZ more than other donors. According to a senior official in MoHA, "GTZ has developed a system to ask the government what it needs. We don't want to be pushed by the donors. Other donors should learn from GTZ." Key objectives have been reached (or in the process of being achieved), mainly the implementation of the regulation of financially feasible Minimum Service Standards (MSS) (objective: Sub-national regional authorities improve their performance of planning, budgeting and service functions) and the introduction of (so far informal) mechanisms for citizens' participation in policy-making processes (objective: the political process for shaping decentralisation and its statutory framework reflects proposals of various stakeholders in society based on their needs and experience).

### **Impact**

Overall judgment: +, tentatively  
While it is too early to come to empirically sound judgements on the overall impact of the intervention (given that ASSD began only in 2006), the intervention has already resulted in a greater openness of the government (especially MoHA) towards citizen's participation in the drafting of new legislation. It is highly probable that the implementation of MSS will result in better governance and poverty reduction.

## Sustainability

Overall judgment: +

Due to the embeddedness of ASSD within the broader context of GTZ's promotion of good governance and decentralisation, its explicit link with other GTZ interventions (GLG, SfGG), GTZ's long-standing relationship with MoHA, which is built on mutual trust, and the fact that a main emphasis of the intervention is on the strengthening of stakeholders' capacities and political roles in policy making processes, the project can be considered sustainable. It is likely that Indonesian stakeholders will be able to continue with the empowerment of local governance structures and work further towards good local governance, once GTZ phases out ASSD.

### III B. Lessons Learned

On design and overall approaches applied by the intervention

The intervention is well designed and the overall approaches applied are appropriate. As the intervention mainly focuses at the policy-making process at the national level, there are no real alternative approaches to those applied by ASSD.

On implementation issues (constraints, risks, opportunities, synergies)

- MoHA staff are not yet sufficiently familiar with the role of steering and disseminating experience-based and knowledge-supported change and innovation
- The general scepticism of government officials vis-à-vis CSO is still widespread.
- Ability and capacity of CS actors to participate in policy-making processes varies significantly: while the participation of universities and local government organisations works well, the NGO sectors generally lacks the capacity. It is important that three steps (information, consultation, participation) are explicitly and clearly distinct and that clear rules exist for all three steps. This is not the case yet and rules will have to be established; i.e. actors need an official mandate to participate and an official harmonisation of these processes (work plan) is necessary.
- Better coordination between MoHA, Ministry of Finance, MenPan and Bappenas is necessary to increase opportunities and reduce constraints in the policy-making process
- The participation of NGOs requires their empowerment, capacity-building in multi-stakeholder processes to increase their capacity as new actors in policy-making processes. However, this requires a certain degree of 'social engineering'
- No institutionalised mechanism yet for state-non state consultations.
- Gender inequality is a major problem that has not been sufficiently addressed by legislative processes. It would be important to strengthen the analytical capabilities of stakeholders to identify the needs for a more gender-focussed legislation.

On policy dialogue

What can we learn from the experience to date of donors' effectiveness in supporting CV&A interventions with a particular reference to the principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration?

ASSD promotes cooperation of German DC/TC between international and national actors in accordance with the Paris Agenda, and it aims to improve coordination and cooperation between the Ministry of Home Affairs and other national key actors (Ministries of Planning, Justice and Finance) in the decentralisation process.

Donor harmonisation works well among GTZ projects and, as far as it is possible to make this judgement, between GTZ and other donors (for example USAID, AusAid, World Bank; UNDP; DIFD, CIDA) who are active in the sector of the promotion of good governance and decentralisation. However, according to the German political foundation, there is room for improvement in donor-harmonisation (the political foundations, GTZ and InWent) all try to strengthen political reform processes.

ASSD makes sure that national ownership over the decentralisation process is maintained and that the Indonesian government is “not pushed” in a way that it might block or even reverse the reform. Mutual accountability, i.e. making sure that the aid relationship is embedded in an accountability mechanism that guarantees an adequate degree of monitoring of reciprocal commitments, is not well developed yet. The reasons

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
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### Model of Change: GTZ-ASSD



**Assumptions:**

1. Sub-national regional authorities improve their performance of planning, budgeting and service functions
2. The political process for shaping decentralisation and its statutory framework reflects proposals of various stakeholders in society based on their needs and experience
3. The consistency of the legal framework of decentralization is improved and public participation in the political decision-making process is strengthened

**Analysis:**

The intervention clearly works towards these three objectives and has already achieved some of its projected outputs but it is too early to establish a definite connectedness between assumptions and impacts. However, expected results, sector-specific impacts and broader development goals take shape even in the early days of this intervention and the programme logic as such does not reveal any mismatches between GTZ's assumptions, the activities supported by the intervention and the expected results and outcomes.

## CVA Joint Evaluation Intervention Summary Sheet

### I: Profile of the Intervention

The interventions 5A, 5B and 5C are different grantees of the Asia Foundations in different regions with their specific local focus. They share the same general strategy of pro-poor budget advocacy, but they are not directly interlinked or relate to each other.

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 5A	CSIAP-NTB
Name Intervention	<b>Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty – Pro-Poor Budget Advocacy in NTB</b>	
1. Donor agency	DFID	
2. Implementing agency/ies and partners	<p>The Asia Foundation, Indonesia. The Asia Foundation works to promote participatory, accountable, and transparent governance and strengthen the rule of law. In general support for 3 major clusters: Governance (including legal reforms, elections, human rights, conflict management, countering corruption and support for local governance), Women’s Empowerment and Economic Reform and Development</p> <p>Partners: local NGOs in Lombok and Dompu: YKSSI (Yayasan Keluarga Sehat dan Sejahtera Indonesia) and YPKM (Yayasan Pemberdayaan utk Kesejahteraan Masyarakat) doing budget advocacy on health (YKSSI) and education (YPKM) – and SOLUD, SUAKA and LSBH conduct generally promotion of pro-poor budgeting in East Lombok, and Lensa in Dompu.</p>	
3. Project/intervention objectives	<p>Overall objectives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Influence policymakers to adopt pro-poor regulatory frameworks to increase access of the poor to services, resources and economic opportunities.</li> <li>2. Improve governance, law and civil society; women’s empowerment; economic reform and development, and international relation.</li> </ol> <p>Specific objectives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Increase public awareness about budget issues and especially how government budget allocations affect the quality of people’s life;</li> <li>2. Formation of a civil society movement channelling the needs and demands regarding pro-poor budgeting (mobilization of communities)</li> <li>3. Enhance inclusive, transparent and accountable decision-making in budgeting process at district and provincial level</li> </ol>	
4. Main CVA activities	This coalition of NGOs approached the major Islamic Mass-Based Organizations in Lombok ( <i>PB Nahdlatul Wa-</i>	

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 5A	CSIAP-NTB
Name Intervention	<b>Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty – Pro-Poor Budget Advocacy in NTB</b>	
	<p>than, PW Nadhlatul Ulama NTB, PW Muhammadiyah NTB, Forum Komunikasi dan Silaturahmi Pondok Pesantren NTB and Pondok Pesantren Darul Muhajirin Praya), to form together the so-called “Dewan Peduli Anggaran” (DPA)(Board concerned with Budget Issues). DPA has not a legal status, but is rather a forum of cooperation. It consists of a Presidium made up of representatives of the different Islamic organizations and a Secretariat which is made up of the coalition of local NGOs. They have no statutes for their mode of work yet. The activities are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Advocacy on pro-poor budgets</li> <li>- Doing budget analysis (whereas individual NGO partners do it at district level the DPA concentrates on provincial level), detecting and highlighting irregularities and inconsistencies, assess appropriateness of existing allocations, making recommendations for reallocation of funds, lobbying for increased budget allocations for health (already in the 3<sup>rd</sup> year) and for the first time also for education, infrastructure and economic development</li> <li>- Based on findings of budget analysis organizing hearings with local parliament and executive</li> <li>- Creating more public awareness on budget issues by disseminating information through local media, during religious meetings</li> <li>- Contributing to more budget transparency by publishing posters informing about the provincial budget and its allocations</li> </ul>	
5. Target Group/Beneficiaries	Poor citizens who are the recipients of public services	
6. Key linkages of intervention with other programmes	At national level the Asia Foundation also cooperates with national-level NGO networks, such as FITRA (Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency) which amongst others also provides training and backstopping for their different grantees.	
7. Duration	1 year with possibility for extension	
8. Starting date	November 2007 until December 2008	
9. Total budget	About USD 100.000 for one year	

## II: Overall Assessment of Intervention using DAC Criteria

### Relevance

Overall judgment: +/-

In difficult political setting with little overall reform drive building up broad based coalitions with as many civil society actors as possible is most relevant. Besides collaborating with the Islamic organizations the NGO coalition also successfully cooperate with a wide range of other NGOs. An analysis of the socio-political setting, such as worst case scenarios in case the government doesn't want to collaborate or a clear mid-term strategy conceptualizing pro-poor budgets is not visible. Working with the Islamic organizations only to increase public pressure on government decisions is not enough. How to ensure common values, how to mobilize the basis of the Islamic Organizations are questions that still need to be answered.

The Partnership for Governance Reform a couple of years ago also took the initiative to facilitate a declaration by NU and Muhammadiyah expressing their commitment to fight corruption. This initiative died out as there was not further facilitation and too little involvement of the grassroots level

### Efficiency

Overall judgment:

Difficult to judge as no detailed budget figures available. The major funding is the salary of involved NGO staff.

### Effectiveness

Overall judgment: +/-

The approach to budget analysis seems not focused enough. Whereas before, when YKSSI only focused on health issues there was also a clear outreach to health service providers, now with 4 issues (health, education, infrastructure, economic development) it becomes very general, findings, lobby, recommendation and monitoring in the field probably not very effective (if envisaged at all) as also no contact to the beneficiary side, no strategy to mobilize communities.

On the other hand commitment to cooperate with as many as possible other civil society organizations to build broad alliance, mainly other local NGOs with different focus, that effectively complement each other.

### Impact

Overall judgment: +/-

Key achievement is probably that such a collaboration was formed involving all (conflicting) Islamic Organization, highlighting the urgency of a pro-poor budgeting process. It can be assumed that it contributed to significantly raise public awareness about budgeting problems. Even though so far no major policy or behaviour changes on the

side of the government can be stated, it is nevertheless an important work to be done. And sooner or later lobby work combined with creating pressure should bear some fruits.

## **Sustainability**

Overall judgment: +

The members of the coalition LSM stated clearly that they would continue their activities with or without funding from the Asia Foundation, being ready to contribute also own resource. Most of them also don't rely in their income on the NGO engagement and still have their own occupation. Tapping in the networks with the Islamic Organizations will also create certain sustainability as they even less will feel driven by a donor in their advocacy engagement and will also be able to access their own resources.

## **Lessons Learned**

On design and overall approaches applied by the intervention

Doing advocacy work – especially in a not very reform-minded environment is difficult to achieve under partnership agreements that have a very short time frame and offer very little certainty about continuity of funding,

On implementation issues

Alignment with local parliaments in pro-poor advocacy efforts very risky, thrust towards structural change in the budgeting process too little, whereas risk of loosing credibility too high.

On policy dialogue

Not applicable.

## **IV Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work**

Bpk Meth Kusumahadi, co-founder and member of Board of Directors of Satunama, when being asked to comment about the effectiveness of working with Islamic Mass-Based Organizations in budget advocacy and anti-corruption: "Not many people believe in the power of religion anymore, they are also corrupt. Corruption in Indonesia is a matter of the system, not of individuals. We believe in the power of systems, that's the way to fight it. And before you fight corruption in public you have to start with yourself."

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
Asia Foundation, Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty.Semi-Annual Report for DFID, July-December 2005, January 2006.

Asia Foundation, Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty. Semi-Annual Report for DFID, January-June 2006, July 2006

Asia Foundation, Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty.Semi-Annual Report for DFID, July- December 2006, January 2007.

Asia Foundation, Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty.Semi-Annual Report for DFID, January- July 2007, August 2007.

### Model of Change: Asia Foundation CSIAP – NTB



The situation in NTB is characterized by a high incidence of poverty and especially low quality and outreach of public services in health and education. There is at the same time a clear lack of government commitment especially at provincial, but largely also at district level towards budget transparency and a significant increase in allocation for development spending. *The Civil Society Initiative against Poverty* by Asia Foundation in NTB supported the formation of a formal partnership between local NGOs and Islamic mass-based organization for pro-poor budget advocacy. This partnership is to be seen against the background that traditionally Islamic teachers and leaders have a high social and political influence in Lombok with a high number of also local parliamentarians who have emerged from Islamic organizations. As part of this initiative the involved organizations conduct budget analysis, hearings with local parliaments and partly the executive on the findings of their analytical work and publish budget figures and other essential information in local media in order to inform the general public about budget-related problems and the importance of budgeting processes for the improvement of livelihoods and basic public services. In their budget analysis they were able to detect misallocation, insufficient budget allocations and irregularities throughout the budgeting process and brought these to the attention of local councillors and the wider public. As part of their advocacy process they also teamed up with a number of other local NGOs focusing on related issues such as combating corruption or community empowerment and thus effectively complement each other and develop an even broader basis to exert pressure on the local and provincial government. This engagement so far only led in one district (Central Lombok) to more budget transparency and a slightly increased budget allocation in the health sector, whereas other districts and particularly the provincial level is still reluctant to introduce budget-related reforms and change their practices. The coalition of Islamic organizations and local NGOs has so far also not made effective use of the mass base of the Islamic organizations that reaches out into all communities in Lombok by increasing awareness and budget-related knowledge on a broad basis. The advocacy work so far was confined to the level of the elite of these organizations only. Due to the general lack of reform-mindedness and the relatively short period of engagement so far no significant impacts have been made so far in terms of increased budget allocations for basic government services, quality improvement of public service delivery and thus ultimately poverty reduction.

## CVA Joint Evaluation Intervention Summary Sheet

### I: Profile of the Intervention

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 5B	CSIAP-PATTIRO
Name Intervention	Civil Society Against Poverty PATIRO Foundation Solo	
1. Donor agency	DFID	
2. Implementing agency	ASIA Foundation Indonesia (see 5A).	
3. Project/intervention objectives	<p>Overall objectives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Influence policymakers to adopt pro-poor regulatory frameworks to increase access of the poor to services, resources and economic opportunities.</li> <li>2. Improve governance, law and civil society; women's empowerment; economic reform and development, and international relation.</li> </ol> <p>Specific objectives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. subject local government budgets to public scrutiny ensuring that budget allocations are pro-poor and gender balanced</li> <li>2. increase citizens' participation in the formulation of pro-poor village budgets</li> </ol>	
4.1. Main CVA activities (stand alone or within component of programme)	<p>The rights for citizen to live healthy, especially in the era of decentralisation (Autonomy Law no.32), under-budget and disproportional for health sector were the main issue and entry points for designing the interventions.</p> <p>Increase effectiveness and improvement of the process of development planning consultative meeting (<i>Musyawahar perencanaan pembangunan, musrenbang</i>-as one of formal participatory bottom up budget planning tool of the government) at the local level, was the main focus of the interventions.</p> <p>Improvement of Gender mainstreaming and women equality issue to be more involve in strengthening citizen voice and advocacy for pro poor budget for public health services especially in Posyandu - community based health centre at Kelurahan (city-village) level was the main strategy of the intervention.</p>	
6. Key linkages of intervention with other programmes	<p>Capacity building for staffs of PATTIRO Solo by other donor agency.</p> <p>City council has asked PATTIRO Solo for advocacy of developing academic analysis (<i>naskah akademi</i>) as preparation for drafting regulation.</p>	
7. Duration	Ca. One year	
8. Starting date	2007	
9. Total budget	Ca. USD 30,000.-	

## II: Overall Assessment of Intervention using DAC Criteria

### Relevance

Overall judgment: +

The interventions addressed the following policy and constraints:

- The Autonomy Law no.32 which should put the regional government to give priority and be responsible for the health service for its citizens.
- Disproportional of budget allocation from Surakarta health office and Kelurahan block grand between overcapacity Posyandu at the city centre and under capacity Posyandu at the slum/poor area.
- Limited knowledge of posyandu cadres and volunteer, for community based baby health and motherhood care
- Limited knowledge and awareness of the civil society and CSO on the access to the health service, budget plan, budget advocacy etc.

### Efficiency

Overall judgment: +

Use of limited fund available is efficient compared to many activities being given by PATTIRO Solo in term of training, awareness raising, audience visit to the parliament and the executives, workshops, need assessment/preliminary study, placard design and publication, writing articles in local newspapers etc.

### Effectiveness

Overall judgment: ++

PATTIRO Solo has been effective.

PATTIRO Solo developed the module to monitor process of development planning consultative meeting (*Musyawarah perencanaan pembangunan, musrenbang*) at the local level.

Increase of more than 60% of the budget compare to the APBD of the year before interventions (the budget is still very low and disproportional to fulfil the needs)

Yearly Budget transparency has taken place in the city of Solo through opening access to the information of draft budget plan and publishing the yearly APBD budget plan through media such as newspapers and placard

Awareness of cadres/volunteers of the Posyandu on City budget allocation generally and specifically for health is improved. Increase awareness raising in rights for public health delivery, increase knowledge in budget mechanism for specific women group, publication and articles on health issue etc as factual outputs of the interventions proved

Better time management on the working days of the Posyandu.

Better communication of all key actors provided.

## Impact

Overall judgment: +  
First big step of main purpose has been achieved to the satisfactions of all key actors involved (direct increase of 60% Solo municipal budget for Posyandu in Solo and Publication of yearly budget plan and allocation to the public can be claimed as direct outcomes/ impact of the intervention

## Sustainability

Overall judgment: +  
Sustainability will be potentially appear as long as women CS initiatives is getting stronger and consistent in channelling their voice to be pro poor budget. Improvement of Posyandu service delivery is always considered as priority and important issue and always taken seriously by the government and the legislative.  
Despite that the budget available for the health sector is still very limited, there are willingness shown by all key stakeholders to take parts in improving the quality and quantity of health services especially for vulnerable groups.

## Lessons Learned

On design and overall approaches applied by the intervention

CV&A can be strengthened , success can be achieved if there are willingness of all key actors to changes  
CSO as Local Agent of change is very crucial and play an important role for achieving the success  
Change can take place within limitation of resources if local knowledge and local patriotism is used effectively

On implementation issues


On policy dialogue

Not applicable

**IV Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work**  
(including key documents consulted, quantitative data consulted and/or collected, quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants)

Space for evidence, and additional information.

## Model of Change: SCIAP-PATTIRO



**Assumptions:**

- Flexibility, tailor made, and responsive to local conditions are the approach strategy in mobilizing the poor and channelling the CV through partnership with local CSO
- Asia Foundation and its partners' central initiative work is mobilizing large numbers of poor citizen, especially in rural areas, and bringing their rarely- heard voices to bear on the political process.
- Asia Foundation has recognized and considered mass – based Islamic organization as key development partners supporting economic reform and democratization - The program builds strategic alliances between secular CSOs with technical advocacy experience, and Muslim mass-based organizations with political clout and geographic reach.

## CVA Joint Evaluation Intervention Summary Sheet

### I: Profile of the Intervention

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 5C	CSIAP-ALIT
Name Intervention	Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty- ALIT's Initiatives for the reform of legal frameworks to become more pro-poor in Surabaya urban city.	
<b>1. Donor agency</b>	DFID	
2. Implementing agency/ies and partners	ASIA Foundation Indonesia (see 5A). ALIT - Arek Lintang Foundation	
3. Project/intervention objectives	<p>Overall objective:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Influence policymakers to adopt pro-poor regulatory frameworks to increase access of the poor to services, resources and economic opportunities.</li> <li>2. Improve governance, law and civil society; women's empowerment; economic reform and development, and international relation.</li> </ol> <p>Specific objectives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) improve the access of poor urban poor to government-sponsored health services; ;</li> <li>(2) subject the regulatory framework on the district level to public scrutiny resulting in revisions that are pro-poor;</li> <li>(3) subject local government budgets to public scrutiny ensuring that budget allocations are pro-poor and gender balanced,;</li> </ol>	
4. Main CVA activities (stand alone or within component of programme)	Increase the access of urban poor to government-sponsored health services, in particular for street children by mobilizing and channelling the voice of marginalized poor citizen for the rights of public services (who cannot afford to have own identity paper, define as <i>stateless</i> ) in a second large Surabaya urban city of Indonesia.	
5. Target Group/Beneficiaries	<i>Street children and marginalized "stateless" people in Surabaya</i>	
6. Key linkages of intervention with other programmes	Alit as partner for health and social issues in urban Surabaya has received funding from Save the Children, Plan International and the Schmitz Hille Foundation	
7. Duration	10 months	
8. Starting date	2007	
9. Total budget	<b>Grant size:</b> Rp. 277.000.000	

## II: Overall Assessment of Intervention using DAC Criteria

### Relevance

Overall judgment: ++

The city of Surabaya provides government health services in cooperation with Pt. Askes. However, the urban poor have very often only limited access to the program: To use the services, citizens need a qualifying health registration card (*kartu kesehatan*), which is only issued after a complicated registration process. Among other documents, the procedure requires the birth certificate and a family card. Alit's research clearly shows that a majority of the very urban poor (up to 85%) do not possess the relevant documents and are therefore excluded from public services. Access for the poor remains limited with inconsistent policies on prices for services (e.g. vaccinations). Some health centres charge for syringes and fees for basic vaccinations for children, some in different locations provide the same services free of charge. Poor users are deterred by possible and unpredictable service contributions which are not based on a clear standard service provision.

### Efficiency

Overall judgment: ++

With the limited budget fund of IDR 277 Mio and period time of 10 months, ALIT has make use of resources available very efficient. No high cost international or national expert needed being used for the purpose.

It shows an outstanding example of good value for money.

### Effectiveness

Overall judgment: ++

Case study "ALIT" Asia Foundation shows an excellent example of how CV&A can effectively work as an accountable CSO for mobilizing and channelling the voice of marginalized poor citizen for the rights of public services (who cannot afford to have own identity paper, define as *stateless*) in a second large Surabaya urban city of Indonesia;

The main purpose has been achieved to the satisfactions of all key actors involved.

### Impact

Overall judgment: +

Positive change in policy, practice and behaviour of Dr.Sutomo public hospital to make optimal use of pro-poor budget available for health service delivery without discrimination.

## Sustainability

Overall judgment: +  
Sustainability is sufficient as the hospital staff is expected to remain motivated in pursuing a pro poor policy, and rendering services without discrimination of marginal groups

## Lessons Learned

On design and overall approaches applied by the intervention

CV&A can be strengthened , success can be achieved if there are willingness of all key actors to changes  
CSO as Local Agent of change is very crucial and play an important role for achieving the success  
Change can take place within limitation of resources if local knowledge and local patriotism is used effectively

On implementation issues

Constraints was only seen as challenge to ALIT


On policy dialogue

## IV Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work

(including key documents consulted, quantitative data consulted and/or collected, quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants)

Interviews, observations, group discussions.

## Model of Change: Asia Foundation CSIAP- ALIT



**Assumptions:**

- Flexibility, tailor made, and responsive to local conditions are the approach strategy in mobilizing the poor and channelling the CV through partnership with local CSO
- Asia Foundation and its partners' central initiative work is mobilizing large numbers of poor citizen, especially in rural areas, and bringing their rarely- heard voices to bear on the political process.
- Asia Foundation has recognized and considered mass – based Islamic organization as key development partners supporting economic reform and democratization - The program builds strategic alliances between secular CSOs with technical advocacy experience, and Muslim mass-based organizations with political clout and geographic reach.

## CVA Joint Evaluation Intervention Summary Sheet

### I: Profile of the Intervention

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 6	CB KADES
Name Intervention	Training and Capacity Building for Village Heads in Wonosobo District	
1. Donor agency	BMZ	
2. Implementing agency/ies and partners	<p>The German Political Foundations, the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS). FNS supports reform-minded actors and organisations in Indonesia that share similar liberal concepts in collaborative activities. Project partners include the political parties PDI-P and PKB, the NGO Institute for Research and Community Studies (IRCOS), the Freedom Institute and Network liberal Islam (JIL), Forum Politisi (a forum for reform-minded young politicians), selected local parliaments and local governments; it is important to note that FNS generally designs interventions in close cooperation with local partners. The latter often approach FNS with specific ideas (as in the case of CB KADES).</p>	
3. Project/intervention objectives	<p>Overall objective: Support of democracy, rule of law, pluralism and market economy in South East and East Asia; Strengthening freedom, liberalism and democracy.</p> <p>Specific objective: Strengthening of the capacity of newly elected village heads of Wonosobo district to provide a good level of public services delivery</p>	
4. Main CVA activities	<p><i>The intervention solely comprises training workshops for village heads; the trainers/facilitators are The trainers/Facilitator are employers or freelance contractors of FNS and local government officials who are supported by local resource persons, including the Bupati and specialists on regional autonomy and village governance, land administration and women empowerment:</i></p> <p>4 day workshops comprising units on regional autonomy, regional identity, village governance, land administration, village budget, leadership, conflict resolution.</p> <p>A total of 5 workshops have been organised, with 35-40 participants per workshop. A total of 169 village heads have been trained so far.</p> <p>Each subject area is introduced by a short power point presentation followed by intensive training comprising elements of group discussion and role play.</p>	
5. Target Group/Beneficiaries	<p>Village Heads in Wonosobo District in Central Java. The Bupati of Wonosobo has a reputation for being highly supportive of reforms and measures that strengthen good and</p>	

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 6	CB KADES
Name Intervention	Training and Capacity Building for Village Heads in Wonosobo District	
	clean local governance in the district.	
6. Key linkages of intervention with other programmes	The intervention builds on an earlier programme on capacity building for legislators and political decision-makers in Indonesia that was offered as a series of several workshops for local legislators (DPRD Municipality) in Wonosobo from 1999-2003.	
7. Duration	Ongoing since February 2007	
8. Starting date	February 2007	
9. Total budget	FNS only paid feed for workshop trainers, local costs (including accommodation and meals for workshop participants) were covered by Wonosobo District. The FNS total budget for activities in Indonesia is € 394,600 in 2008	

## II: Overall Assessment of Intervention using DAC Criteria

### Relevance

Overall judgment: +

The intervention is directly related to the decentralisation reform in general and the government regulation on village government (72/2005) with the aim of narrowing the existing knowledge and capacity cap of local government officials in the policy-making process and promoting good local governance. Decentralization gives increased authorities and funds to villages that are not matched by sufficient capacities, mechanisms for accountability and participation. The intervention is tailor-made for the specific requirements of the target group and was proposed by the District itself to address the capacity building needs of village heads. The specific entry point was a request from the Bupati to conduct a training activity for newly elected village heads modelled on the earlier capacity building programme for the legislature which was also funded by FNS. The key assumption is that improved knowledge of regional autonomy and village governance as well as strengthened capabilities for providing public services among village heads and other local government actors will open participatory channels in the development planning process and eventually result in good and clean village government and improved service delivery at village level.

### Efficiency

Overall judgment: +

As a political foundation FNS operate in other ways than governmental donors. FNS makes decisions on projects and selection of counterparts in an ad hoc process if the Foundation believes that the actor is reform-minded and is broadly supportive of FNS's core values in the promotion of freedom and political and economic liberalism. FNS is often approached by local actors with specific project ideas. FNS, like other political

foundations, do not plan their interventions within a strict framework of master plans, blueprints or long-term strategies but build their activities on long-term relationships with key actors and thereby take advantage of their decades-long presence in the country. FNS fund small projects which address a very specific demand (often training/capacity building) and make sure to maintain a high level of flexibility in the decision on what local actors (and in what way) should be involved. CB KADES is in line with this approach which can generally be considered as being efficient as it guarantees a high level of local ownership and commitment to the intervention. In the case of CB KADES, this commitment extends to core funding. FNS only pays fees for workshop trainers, local costs (including accommodation and meals for workshop participants) are covered by Wonosobo District. In this way, the intervention presents excellent value for money.

## **Effectiveness**

Overall judgment: +, tentatively  
As a training activity for capacity building the intervention has modest objectives as it is not directly aimed at the establishment of new and improved V&A channels and mechanisms. The latter is envisioned as an indirect result of trickle down and multi-level effects of training. It can be reasonably assumed that some changes in terms of qualitative improvements to the development planning process at the village level have taken place but the evidence is insufficient and inconclusive due to the lack of monitoring.

## **Impact**

Overall judgment: +, tentatively  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that participatory elements in planning processes have become more prominent following the training of the respective village head, particularly with regard to budgeting. The intervention seems to have related in greater budget transparency (but still to a limited extent) as village heads have extended participatory elements in the discussion and decision-making process on how to spend and invest major parts of the village block grants of up to Rp 120 million (in many cases the sole source of the village budget). In at least some cases, the village head has used the knowledge acquired in workshop to train members of his village administration (developed village training programme based on the FNS model). Although it is hoped that the training encourages village heads to understand the necessity - and create opportunities - for the participation of so far underrepresented groups in the policy making process, most importantly the poor and women, the intervention does not address vulnerable groups directly. In the absence of systematic approaches to the monitoring and evaluation of the impact of capacity building, robust empirical findings on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the training are not available. There is no empirical evidence that expected results, sector-specific impacts and broader development outcomes have been achieved as envisioned by the intervention because no systematic monitoring and evaluation of workshop outcomes was conducted. While anecdotal evidence (informal feedback from village heads) seems to suggest that village heads have

become more open to public participation/CV in local policy-making and village planning procedures and more accountable vis-à-vis local constituencies, conclusive findings on the intervention's impact on good and clean local governance are not available.

## Sustainability

Overall judgment: +

The Initiative was taken by the Kabupaten which also funds the workshops (FNS only pays the fees for the trainers). Hence, the local government owns the project, thereby increasing the probability of long-term positive impact on voice and accountability at the village level due to continuous support to village governance. There is a certain risk that the impact of workshops on capacity building remains small in terms of more open/transparent and participatory village government if they are not followed-up by regular training opportunities. FNS is interested in a long-term relationship with Wonosobo district, including follow-up interventions that address the training needs at the level of local government. The Kabupaten and even the villages themselves demonstrate commitment to its relations with FNS and further training activities by offering to part-fund these activities from their own budgets. There is a good chance that the training programme can be used a model in other district. FNS currently considers introducing it for capacity building of village heads in seven other districts and has applied for EU funding for this purpose.

## Lessons Learned

On design and overall approaches applied by the intervention

The German Political Foundations are unique in their institutional set-up, mission and approach to development cooperation and not comparable to any other non-state actors in other OECD countries. They do not perceive themselves as donors in a narrow sense but as actors that operate in both foreign policy arenas and development cooperation. Their interventions are usually embedded in their general long-term support of reform-minded actors and organisations. The foundations benefit from their long-term presence in the country (often many decades). Interventions are based on evolutionary relationship that addresses the training and capacity-building needs of important political actors on an ad hoc basis whenever such as training need is identified in a joint needs assessment by the foundations and local partners. As foundations of the German political parties they put a strong emphasis on cooperation with ideologically like-minded parties in the host country, workshops and seminars, training, capacity-building for key political actors, academic conferences, publications and use of mass media (radio and TV feature programmes) with the aim of strengthening the political system in general and secular, pro-reform political parties in particular as well as empowering civil society, NGOs, and generally reform processes directed at the promotion and sustainability of democracy and freedom. By that, the political foundations occupy an important niche sector within the system of bilateral development cooperation which allows them to be more flexible than governmental donors with regards to project design and selection of target groups and partners (often political decision makers at national and local

levels, parliamentarians, organisations with a broad political background, multipliers in NGOS, religious and academic institutions and media representatives). Overall, their interventions provide an important value-added to development cooperation as they often reach target groups that, for various reasons, are not directly addressed by large bilateral donors organisations.

#### On implementation issues

The political foundations generally maintain two kinds of projects in Indonesia, as in most other countries: a) partner projects which involve cooperation with national and local stakeholders with whom the respective foundation have been working together for a considerable time, often over many decades. These actors have a proven track record of implementing intervention (mostly training and capacity building) and are capable of developing high-quality programmes and managing the foundations' funds independently according to BMZ regulations. Such partners are given partner contracts specifying both the project objectives and the annual amount of financial support provided to the Indonesian partner on whom both sides jointly agree upon. In the relationship the country offices of the respective foundation play a supervisory and advisory role, while the partner organisation is largely responsible for the methodological planning and implementation of activities. b) single projects: educational, information, counselling, and capacity-building measures which are organised and conducted by the country offices either in their own responsibility or together with state and/or non-state actors. These collaborative activities normally focus on one event or project only, as they are also limited in terms of project duration and are not necessarily intended to lead to permanent joint activities.

In both cases the level of constraints and risks is low as the foundations usually only select partners with a proven track record of project implementation, build cooperation on long-term partnerships in which relations are characterised by mutual trust and only work together with stakeholders who are committed to reform and the core values the foundations stand for (democracy, freedom etc.). Risks are further reduced due to the fact that almost all the foundation's interventions are small scale and also require financial commitments from the partners. Opportunities and synergies arise from long-term partnerships with national and local partners that often allow for follow-up projects. However, while the coordination of the activities of the four political foundations in Indonesia works well, the same is not necessarily the case in the coordination of interventions initiated by the foundations on the one hand and bilateral donors, such as GTZ, on the other. As the foundations see themselves as traditionally operating in political spaces, there is the wide-spread perception that bilateral donors who have moved away from purely technical cooperation in a narrow sense by also addressing political reform processes, such as good governance and decentralisation, "are stepping on the foundations' turf". There is probably more need for more coordination to achieve a higher level of complementarity and synergies in donor activities.

## On policy dialogue

Donor harmonisation works well among and between the four political foundations in Indonesia, according to the Foundations, there seems to be room for improvement in donor-harmonisation (the political foundations, GTZ and InWent) all try to strengthen political reform processes.

Since the vast majority of the Foundation's projects are small-scale and a direct relationship is established between the Foundations and beneficiaries (mostly NGOs, CSO) – rather than going through intermediaries, such as the Asia Foundation, the degree of local ownership is high. The long-term relationship that the Foundations develop with their local partners further contributes to ownership. Mutual accountability is difficult to determine as the Foundation's interventions are not systematically monitored – apart from the occasional evaluation of country programmes.

### **IV Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work**

(including key documents consulted, quantitative data consulted and/or collected, quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants)

Beka Ulung Hapsara , Narration Report On Training and Workshop the Capacity Building Of the Village Chief Local Government Of Wonosobo, Batch II, Jakarta, February 16,2007.


Beka Ulung Hapsara, Narration Report On Training and Workshop the Capacity Building of the Village Chief Local Government of Wonosobo Batch I, Jakarta, February 16,2007.

Beka Ulung Hapsara, Narration Report On Training and Workshop the Capacity Building Of the Village Chief Local Government Of Wonosobo, Batch III, Jakarta, March 26,2007.

Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, Training and Workshop the Capacity Building of the Village Chief, Local Government of Wonosobo, various power point presentations and training material.

Kabupaten Wonosobo, Proposal. Pendidikan dan pelatihan bagi calon Kades Kabupaten Wonosobo, Nov. 2007.

## Model of Change: CB KADES



**Assumptions:**

The training assists the new village heads as well as other local government agencies in refining their basic knowledge of regional autonomy and village governance and strengthens their ability to provide a good level of public services delivery

There is only anecdotal evidence that this assumption materialised in at least some villages. There is no monitoring of training outcomes.

**Analysis:**

This is an example of a small scale intervention that is rather modest in what it claims to be able to achieve. The subsequent steps logically build on each other and are ultimately likely to lead to the expected broader development outcomes, i.e. (some) strengthening of governance and democratic principles. Since the programme logic is very general in outlining the intervention's expected impacts and in the absence of specifically defined development objectives, even the improvement of governance structures (more accountable and transparent local government) and improved channels for citizens' voice in local policymaking in just a small number of villages would mean that the intervention had indeed resulted in better local governance and democracy.

## CVA Joint Evaluation Intervention Summary Sheet

### I: Profile of the Intervention

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 7	CEFIL
Name Intervention	Civic Education for Future Indonesian Leaders	
1. Donor agency	BMZ	
2. Implementing agency/ies and partners	The German political foundation, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS). KAS' partner is SATUNAMA	
3. Project intervention objectives	<p>The overall objective of KAS development projects in Indonesia is to support the country's reform and transformation process with political consulting and education, to contribute to the stabilization of democracy, the rule of law, a just economic system as well as inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogue. KAS employs political education to promote peace, freedom, and justice. Key concerns include consolidating democracy.</p> <p>SATUNAMA provides the training. The NGO strives for the development of local resources and universal values through intercommunity partnerships at local, regional, national and international levels in democratic and non-violent ways. SATUNAMA emphasizes its commitment to the eradication of poverty and the attainment of an Indonesian society that is self-reliant, democratic, socially just, and upholds human rights.</p> <p>The two specific objectives are:</p> <p>1 to develop and implement an educational programme aimed at spreading information about democracy, the parliamentary system, the history of political thinking and economy, which also serves the improvement of knowledge and skills in leadership, organisation and communication techniques;</p> <p>2 to promote young leaders in civil society organisations, social and student organisations as well as future decision makers from government agencies, business and science.</p>	
4. Main CVA activities	Training for CS leaders (circa 10 training courses per year: 2 courses of one month duration, 8 units of up to 10 days duration). The training comprises the three modules on democratic leadership, civic education and social analysis. Training is provided by SATUNAMA.	
5. Target Group/Beneficiaries	NGO leaders	

Indonesia Intervention	Nr 7	CEFIL
Name Intervention	Civic Education for Future Indonesian Leaders	
6. Key linkages of intervention with other programmes	The intervention is embedded in the overall project work of KAS in Indonesia which is directed at the improvement of the rule of law (with special emphasis on decentralisation and parliamentary development and the strengthening of Civil Society)	
7. Duration	Ten years so far	
8. Starting date	1997	
9. Total budget	Circa Rp 7,488 million (1997-2006)	

## II: Overall Assessment of Intervention using DAC Criteria

### Relevance

Overall judgment: +

The intervention came into existence as a direct response to the socio-economic context, namely the economic crisis of 1997-98. The project was proposed in 1997 by SATUNAMA at the time of the economic crisis and was triggered by a concern over the real Indonesian conditions in terms of number of Indonesians living under the poverty line (30 millions at that point in time), increasing number and function of middle class, and poor quality of educational system. The intervention was based on three clearly formulated entry points: 1) the perception of a growing gap between state and society due to globalization, 2) related to the economic crisis: the perceived necessity of strengthening civil society vis a vis national government, and 3) a general lack of leadership skills and networks in the civil society sector. Overall the project design and development was based on the key assumption that limited voice of CSO at local levels was due to a lack of leadership skills, management skills and communication skills and a lack of ability to analyse socio economic contexts among key NGO actors.

### Efficiency

Overall judgment: +

SATUNAMA has a high quality standard in its approach to training. Is CEFIL likely to have resulted in strengthened capacity of civil society actors to play active role in the development of local democratic processes among progressive, reform-oriented key non-state actors, most probably enhanced CV in policy-making processes, yet, this is not based on empirical findings as the training focuses on the overall *enhancement* of leadership skills, not explicitly on capacity-building in civil society-state relationships. As one of only a few remaining donors (and the only one in the case of SATUNAMA), SATUNAMA deals directly with KAS without having to go through intermediary organisations (“brokers”) as in the case of DFID and Danida, for example. The direct approach of KAS is appreciated by SATUNAMA as “more money goes directly to the people”

## Effectiveness

Overall judgment: +

Informal feedback from workshop participants as collected by SATUNAMA (alumni networks, blogs, mailing lists, alumni reunions and a workshop on experiences of CEFIL in June 2007) and an independent evaluation of KAS's cooperation with SATUNAMA of 2005 suggest that a higher degree of professionalism in the organisation, management and with regard to the advocacy work of NGOs has been achieved among those who underwent training. This in turn has had a positive impact on the empowerment of the civil society. The spread of norms and values have taken place in a multi-level, trickle down processes as the training has led to the empowerment of NGOs to conduct CEFIL training themselves; some SATUNAMA alumni have established new organisations as the result of training.

## Impact

Overall judgment: +

The facilitation of civic education for CS leaders has a potentially positive impact on the strengthening of democracy. However, in the absence of systematic monitoring of specific impact of training activities it is not possible to establish an empirically sound link between training activities and the strengthening of democracy (an evaluation of CEFIL in 2000 suggested "training should be followed by continuous evaluation and monitoring" but has not been implemented). SATUNAMA would like to introduce a formal approach to monitoring but lacks the funds to do so.

## Sustainability

Overall judgment: ++

Participation in training has generated networks of reform-minded civil society leaders (several alumni networks). The spread of norms and values takes place in a snow-ball effect: the programme has resulted in the empowerment of NGOs to conduct CEFIL training themselves. SATUNAMA has a proven track-record for the delivery of high quality training programmes and looks back on a long partnership with KAS (10 years). The programme has continuously been improved since it first started in 1998.

## Lessons Learned

See CB KADES (general lessons learned from projects of political foundations)


On design and overall approaches applied by the intervention

On implementation issues (constraints, risks, opportunities, synergies)

## On policy dialogue



Diagram: Materials and the logic of reasoning of the training



### **IV Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work**

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Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Annual Report 2006, submitted to the Sekretariat Negara Republic Indonesia, Jakarta, January 2007.

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
SATUNAMA, CEFIL Training Manual: General Objectives of CEFIL and Module Building Process, Yogyakarta, no year.

SATUNAMA, Funds received from Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Period 1997-2006, Yogyakarta 2007.

SATUNAMA, List of KAS Supported Projects, Period: 1997-2005, Yogyakarta 2006.

SATUNAMA, various programme brochures, Yogyakarta, 2005-2007.

## Model of Change: CEFIL



**Assumptions:**

- 1 Participants realise the urgency of the practice of democracy, Human Rights, and strengthening civil society in Indonesia
- 2 Participants conduct and facilitate analysis on economy, politics, and cultural conditions to formulate their respective organisation's programs effectively
- 3 Participants develop the knowledge and skill of participants in strengthening their organisation for people empowerment
- 4 Participants develop the skills of participants in managing problem and conflicts in communities

**Analysis**

The subsequent steps from context to expected results are logically connected and well matched. The expected results have been achieved and, in turn, feed back into the structural context in which CSO operate. This context has likely been improved due to the intervention. In other words, context and expected results are inter-linked in a reciprocal relationship. However, this logical chain of inter-related steps is potentially broken with regard to the impact level. Whether or not sector specific impacts and broader development goals have been or will be achieved as outlined by the programme logic is anyone's guess. There is no empirical proof that the intervention's assumptions have led to the desired higher level impacts – due to a lack of monitoring and evaluation of the outcomes of training activities.

## Appendix E: Persons met, including group meetings

Name	Position	Institution	Location
<b>General</b>			
Michaela Zintl	Head Evaluation and Audit Division	BMZ	Bonn
Christian Berg	Advisor	BMZ	Bonn
Dr. Bob Hadiwinata	Professor of Political Science, Consultant to the Indonesian Government	University of Parahyangan, Bandung (UNPAR)	Jakarta
Dr. Christoph Schuck	Director, Indonesia Research Unit	University of Gießen, Germany	Jakarta
<b>ECG members, Synthesis Group and Quality Control members</b>			Bonn
Barbara Garbe-Hansen	Counsellor for Development Cooperation	BMZ	Jakarta
Marianne Weinbach	Attaché for Development Co-operation	BMZ	Jakarta
Joel Hellman	Chief Governance Advisor	World Bank	Jakarta
Mette Kottman	Counsellor	Norwegian Embassy	Jakarta
Caroline Aberg	Advisor Good Governance	UNDP	Jakarta
Pak Henry	Coordinator Good Governance	UNDP	Jakarta
D.r Bagus	Professor	Gadja Mada University	Yogyakarta
Christian J. Hegemer	Director	Hanns Seidel Foundation	Jakarta
<b>ASSD</b>			
Martha Gutierrez	Chief Technical Adviser (ASSD)	GTZ	Jakarta
Dr. Manfred Poppe	Chief Technical Advisor (Good Local Governance/GLG)	GTZ	Jakarta
Dr. R. Ziti Zuhro	Research Manager	The Habibie Centre	Jakarta
Hetifah Sj. Sumarto	Public Policy Advisor	Bandung Trust Advisory Group (B-Trust)	Jakarta
Bonar F. Sihite	Head of Subdirector of Capacity Building and Regional Government Performance Evaluation, Region IV	Directorate General of regional Autonomy, Ministry of Home Affairs	Jakarta
<b>CSIAP- Asia Foundation – DPA NTB (Dewan Peduli Anggaran)</b>			
Alam Surya Putra	Programme Officer	Asia Foundation	Jakarta
Ir. Nanang Samodra K.A.	Regional Secretary	Provincial Government of West Nusa Tenggara	Mataram
Milita Priatna Utami	Director	LSBH	Mataram
Elly Mah Mudah	Coordinator	YKSSI	Mataram
Jumarim	Director	YPKM	Mataram

Name	Position	Institution	Location
Hendriyadi	Deputy Coordinator	SOMASI NTB	Mataram
Nafrulah	Head	NU West Lombok	Mataram
Halikusabri	Head Member DPRD West Lombok	Yayasan Darul Quran	Mataram
Muchtasar	Secretary	Syariah NU West Lombok	Mataram
Ibu Roesmini	Village Cadre		West Lombok
30 persons	Public Hearing Budget NTB	Representatives of NGOs. Labour unions, SMEs, By invitation	Mataram
10 persons	Coordination Meeting DPR	Islamic institutions and coordinating NGOs supported by the Asia Foundation	Mataram
<b>CSIAP-Asia Foundation- PATTIRO Foundation Solo, Central Java</b>			
Setyo	Former Director	PATTIRO Solo	PATTIRO office, Solo, Central Java
Maghfur Mubarak	Director	PATTIRO Foundation Solo	PATTIRO office, Solo, Central Java
Ketty Ristini	Posyandu Cadre	Posyandu of Solo	PATTIRO office, Solo, Central Java
Syamsuddin	Parliament member	House of representative of Solo municipality	Solo, Central Java
Mohammad Rodi	Parliament member	PKS party of Solo municipality	Solo, Central Java
Final meeting with staff members of PATTIRO Foundation	Executives and staffs of PATTIRO Foundation	PATTIRO Foundation Solo	PATTIRO office, Solo, Central Java
<b>CSIAP-Asia Foundation - ALIT Foundation Surabaya, East Java</b>			
Yuliati Umrah	Director	Alit Foundation Surabaya	Surabaya, Central Java
Focus Group Discussion with ca.15 members of parents of, cadres/volunteers for street children (selected by invitation but also random drop-ins)	Beneficiaries/ target group A		ALIT clinic, Surabaya. East Java
Roundtable meeting with the management of Dr. Sutomo regional Public hospital	-15 Executives and Senior staffs of Dr. Sutomo hospital -Program coordinator of Asia Foundation - Executives and staffs of ALIT Foundation (all selected by invitation – almost all hospital and ALIT executives senior staff members present)	-Dr. Sutomo Regional Public Hospital -Asia Foundation Indonesia -ALIT Foundation Surabaya	Dr. Sutomo Public Hospital, Surabaya
Final meeting with Executive and senior staffs of ALIT foundation	-Director of ALIT foundation -Senior staffs	ALIT foundation Surabaya	Majapahit Hotel, Surabaya

Name	Position	Institution	Location
<b>Multistakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP)</b>			
Mette Kottmann	Counsellor	Norwegian Embassy	Jakarta
Dwi Sudarsono	Coordinator	Samanta Foundation (Community Foundation)	Mataram
Sulistiyono	Head	Koslata (NGO)	Mataram
Markum		Transform (NGO)	Mataram
Riddho Hakim		WWF Indonesia, NTB	Mataram
Budi	Chairman	Gumpar (CSO)	Mataram
Marwi	Local Coordinator	Gumpar	Village of Aikberik, Sub-District of Batu Klian, East Lombok
About 15 members	Members	<i>Tunas Sari Untas Malam</i> Farmer Group	Village of Aikberik, Sub-District of Batu Klian, East Lombok
Exwan	Local facilitator	Shorea Foundation, member of Java Learning Centre (Javlec)	Yogyakarta
Irfan Bakhtiar	Programme Manager	Multi-Stakeholder Forestry Programme	Yogyakarta
Drs. Sutapa	Chairman	Social Forestry Farmer Group "Ngudirejeki"	Village of Karangduwet, Sub-District Paliyan, Gunung Kidul
Darmiyanto	Chairman	Farmers Group "Dempol"	Village Girisuko, Sub-District Panggang, Gunung Kidul
Upik Rosalina Wasrin	Production Director	Perum Perhutani	Jakarta
<b>Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, CB KADES</b>			
Rainer Heufers	Project Director FNS	Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung	Wonosobo and Jakarta
Warsito Elwein	Programme Assistant	Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung	Wonosobo
Muhammad Husni Thamrin	Programme Assistant	Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung	Wonosobo
Ida Sakwan	Member of Parliament and Executive Director IRCOS	IRCOS	Wonosobo
H. M. Kholiq Arif	Bupati	Kabupaten Wonosobo	Wonosobo
Agus Purnomo	Senior Official	District Administration	Wonosobo
Tri Priarmodjo	Senior Official	Bappeda	Wonosobo
Karyoto	Senior Official	Bappeda	Wonosobo
Roundtable Discussion with six senior officials at Bappeda, Kabupaten Wonosobo			Wonosobo
Roundtable Discussion with the Bupati, Vice Bupati and 20 senior officials of Kabupaten Wonosobo			Wonosobo
Roundtable discussion with 15 members of the local parliament (DPRD), Kabupaten Wonosobo			Wonosobo
Roundtable discussion with 5 senior officials at <i>Pemdes</i> and <i>Tatapem</i> , Kabupaten Wonosobo			Wonosobo
Village meeting in Desa Ngalian Wadaslintang with village head Slamet Tionio, village authorities and citizens (more than 100 people in attendance – meeting was open to all members of the village apparatus and citizens)			Kabupaten Wonosobo
Village meeting in Desa Serang with village head Sugino, village authorities and citizens (some 30 people in attendance (meeting was open to all members of the village apparatus and citizens)			Kabupaten Wonosobo

Name	Position	Institution	Location
<b>KAS-SATUNAMA (CEFIL)</b>			
Winfried Weck	Representative to Indonesia	KAS	Jakarta
Simon Bunjamin	Assistant to the Representative	KAS	Jakarta
Dr. P. Hardono Hadi	Head of Capacity Building Division	SATUNAMA	Yogyakarta
A. R. Laksmi Lastari	Public Relation Officer	SATUNAMA	Yogyakarta
Metta Yanti	Watch Terminal Coordinator	SATUNAMA	Yogyakarta
B. Esti Sumarah	Resource Mobilization Officer	SATUNAMA	Yogyakarta
Roundtable discussion with 15 senior members of staff (inclusive meeting - all senior members of staff present)		SATUNAMA	Yogyakarta
<b>SfGG- Jakarta</b>			
Tumpal MS Simanjuntak	Senior Advisor	GTZ- SfGG Jakarta	Jakarta
Louis Susanty	Senior Advisor, Support for Good Governance (SfGG)	GTZ	Jakarta
Hoky Siregar	Senior Advisor	GTZ- SfGG Jakarta	Jakarta
<b>SfGG- &amp; PROMIS- NT,Bima District, NTB</b>			
I Made Sugiana and staffs	Head of Puskesmas	Sub- District Belo Utara Puskesmas Health Centre	Bima
Aida Fauziah	Senior Officer	KAAWAL Watch CSO	Bima
Arief Rachman		CEDES Foundation	Bima
Arief Rustam		CEDES Foundation	Bima
H.A. Muchlis HMA	Sekretaris Daerah/ District Secretary	Bupati Office	Bima
Ibnu Hadjar	Head of Health office	Bima district health office	Bima
Suryani Eka	Staff	Bappeda District Development Agency	Bima
Muchlis Iskandar	Head of GG Committee	Good Governance Committee	Bima
Syafuddin	Bagian Organisasi	Bupati Office	Bima
Masykur	Bina Program	Bupati office	Bima
Darayata	Head of Livestock Office	Livestock Office	Bima
Jafar	Former PROMIS- SfGG partner senior staff	Bappeda of Bima District	Bima
12 persons	Local government staff meeting chaired by First Secretary	Organised for evaluation mission, by invitation Secretary; discussion of two GTZ supported programmes	Bima
40 persons	Beneficiaries/ Target groups	Focus Group meeting with 6 Pokmas/ Self-help Groups and its members	Nangarewa village, Bima District,
Nur Farhaty	Former member of PROSPEK	PROSPEK economic development Forum	Bima
Moh. Nasir	member	PROSPEK economic development Forum	Bima
Jefries	member	PROSPEK economic development Forum	Bima

Name	Position	Institution	Location
4 persons	Members of Multi Stakeholder Platform on Local Economic Development	Meeting invited by former GTZ coordinator to discuss state of art	Bima
<b>PROMIS- NT, Alor District, NTT</b>			
Raymundus Mela	Former PROMIS- NT Kupang	Bappeda Kupang, NTT	Kupang, NTT
Aba Maulaka	Vice District Head	Kantor Bupati Alor District	Office of Vice Head of Alor District
Alex Makim SH	Head of Bappeda	Bappeda of District Alor, NTT	Bappeda office of District Alor, Kalabahi, NTT
Melson Berry	Head of Law division	Bappeda of District Alor, NTT	Bappeda office of District Alor, Kalabahi, NTT
Yulius Mantaan	Head of PMD	PMD office of Alor District	PMD office of Alor District, Kalabahi, NTT
N.N	Head of Selma Self help group	PMD office of Alor District	PMD office of Alor District, Kalabahi, NTT
N.N	Head of Pintu Mas Self Help group	PMD office of Alor District	PMD office of Alor District, Kalabahi, NTT
Johanna	Pokmas/ Self help group supervisor	PMD/ LED forum	Wulwal Village, Alor, NTT
Hosia Lapaibola	Wulwal Head village	Wulwal village government	Wulwal Village, Alor, NTT
12 persons	Meeting with Pokmas/ Self-help group of Micro Economy	Invited for this evaluation	Wulwal Village, Alor, NTT
6 persons	Boards and members of the Agro processing group (coffee and fruits)	Meeting organised for this meeting	Wulwal village, Alor, NTT
Lukman	PPMD staff		Kalabahi
Ermias and members of Doorbang self help group		Pokmas Doorbang Self Help group	Kalabahi,
Ambrosius Mifa	Former local senior staff	GTZ- PNT- PROMIS NT- Alor District	Kalabahi
Machrismau	Former LED local senior staff of PROMIS NT- Alor District	GTZ- PNT- PROMIS NT- Alor District	Kalabahi

# Appendix F: Summaries/decisions/outputs of stakeholder workshops

## Report on Launching Meeting, Jakarta 8<sup>th</sup> November, 2007

The Launching Meeting on the CV&A Evaluation was attended by 16 participants representing the German Embassy, GTZ, The National Planning Board (*Bappenas*), the EC, UNDP, DFID, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Indonesian Corruption Watch, Tifa Foundation (grantee by Sida) and two other Indonesian NGOs active in civil society strengthening and support for local governance (YIPD, Sanggar Bandung). PowerPoint presentations were given on the background of the evaluation and basic concepts about CV&A (by Christian Berg, advisor to the BMZ-Bonn) and on the selection criteria developed for selecting a number of interventions for the evaluation, as well as the first round of projects to be evaluated (by Jan Douwe Meindertsma, Team Leader CCS Indonesia). Feedback by participants concerned the general concept and outline of the evaluation, as well as the proposed selection of projects.

### *Feedback on presentation on CV&A*

The representative from Bappenas asked in the discussion if there is a reason why the CV&A evaluation was being undertaken at this particular moment, and if the donor community or OECD/DAC felt particularly alarmed about the state of CV&A in the country. It was explained that the evaluation is an initiative that evolved in relation to the impact of the Paris Declaration and the commitments of donors to intensify their engagement to strengthen CV&A. So, there is no direct link to the situation in Indonesia.

Further questions and feedback included the following:

- Participants felt that the issue of transparency and other good governance principles were not sufficiently reflected in the methodological framework.
- A major aspect of voice should be the effective work of local parliaments as they are the elected, formal representatives of citizens' voice.
- CV&A are actually often interlinked and inseparable and should therefore not be dealt with as two separate pillars.
- How do you measure 'strong civil society' in relation to exercising the channel?
- How do you attribute changed behaviour to a certain intervention as there are usually numerous factors influencing the change of behaviour?
- On the situation in Indonesia: Although there are a lot of examples of citizen's participation that can be found in Indonesia, its level of institutionalisation is still very low. Annual participatory development planning (Musrenbang) is one of the major institutionalised forms of participation and should therefore be further looked at during this evaluation. The team should be careful to not only look at process-oriented projects, but keep the issue of institutionalisation in mind. Since formal channels of people's voice are mostly blocked, it will be useful to identify innovations in terms of new channels / interventions in order to improve CV&A.
- It would be valuable to assess the effectiveness of channels such as 'Community Action Planning' as a demand-side intervention in its relationship to the wider planning framework (supply side).

- It was suggested by one of the participants to reorganize the evaluation question as follows: Assessment of 1. Channels, mechanisms and process; 2. Actors (resource and interest); 3. Institutionalisation level; 4. Type of expression of voice and accountability; 5. CV&A strategy used by actors; 6. Enabling environment determined by government, donors, etc. While looking at each of these parameters, the evaluation should differentiate between 'regulation' and 'practice'.
- A discussion took place on how to cope with the broad CV&A experiences that cannot be covered in this evaluation: It may be valuable to arrange an FGD especially with established NGOs working in the field of CV&A to access their knowledge and experience that cannot be included in the evaluation sample.
- It will be helpful if recommendations could be included in the report on how Indonesia and development partners can continue the learning of strengthening CV&A, possibly by more systematic evaluations on specific "channels".

*Feedback on selection criteria:*

- Would the selection of projects have been different if the themes to be looked at had been defined first (e.g. independent media, judiciary reform, community empowerment) and then projects attributed to different themes, rather than taking projects and applying a set of criteria? It was explained that the Evaluation Team has to base the evaluation on existing interventions, and that out of the long list, interventions were selected taking into account several themes, but also other criteria, as agreed in the ECG Meeting held in Bonn in October 2007.
- Why was the Partnership for Governance Reform (major funding from DFID) not included? Answer: There have recently already been a number of evaluations, which will be taking into account. It is also difficult to assess the contribution of the Partnership as a whole to CV&A as it consists of several individual projects that are supported by the Partnership.
- When evaluating donor interventions on CV&A, the Team should not stop at the life of one single project, but rather look at a continuum of prior support up to now. A lot of achievements of projects working on long-term changes in governance practices and reforms could not be understood without taking predecessor projects into account. In terms of the GTZ PROMIS Program it could also be interesting to take a closer look at its urban counterpart, the Urban Quality project as it worked complementarily to PROMIS.
- Integrated modes of delivery, e.g. on civic education/media work by KAS/CIM/GTZ/SATUNAMA should be included as well.
- How is the criterion "Disadvantaged Groups" defined in the context of this evaluation? If it refers to those excluded in terms of voice and accountability, radical or fundamentalist religious groups should actually also be included as they feel they do not have a voice and thus turn to violence. It could be very interesting for this evaluation to look at approaches on also including radical groups into discourse and political dialogue. Furthermore, in the Indonesian context "disadvantaged groups" should also involve indigenous groups and minority ethnic and religious groups. There is a need to map whether there are proportionally sufficient channels for the disadvantaged groups to express their demand, as well as how the state responds to their demands.
- Considering the current stage of Indonesia's civil society, the tentative selection of projects to be evaluated might seem a bit too focused on disadvantaged groups.
- One project should also be selected in the field of development planning as this is one of the few fields for institutionalised participation in Indonesia
- Why was the issue of electoral reforms not included? Answer: None of the core group members explicitly works on electoral reforms.

- Attention should be given to some of the key opportunities for strengthening CV&A in Indonesia: 1. Musrenbang (bottom-up development planning) and how it can be improved; 2. Regulatory framework on local parliaments (who are they really accountable to); 3. How to make the justice system in Indonesia just (maybe lessons learnt from the LEAD project?).
- Judicial Reform is one of the hot issues in Indonesia at the moment, especially in regard to anti-corruption efforts. A lot of donors are supporting the Supreme Court, although it is clear that the Supreme Court doesn't play a real role in curbing corruption, but rather the opposite.
- The UNDP BRIDGE project would be worthwhile including in the evaluation, or at least in the mapping exercise, since the project is said to have a lot of good practices and also had a good geographic spread.
- Consider including any project aiming at supporting and promoting media institutions. Media has played a critical role during the transition and lessons from media liberalization are interesting to be analyzed.
- It is a very worthwhile exercise to try to learn from existing experience of interventions strengthening CV&A, but the evaluation is very much limited by the fact that it has to stick to a set of projects supported by certain donors rather than agreeing on key issues and selecting any related projects accordingly.

### *Conclusions*

The participants were in agreement with the suggested sample of projects subject to the evaluation, but requested that other interesting interventions (not necessarily supported by the ECG donors) be taken into account to obtain a wider coverage. Besides the above-mentioned examples, another suggestion was to consider the UNDP-implemented project "Peace through Development" that receives funding from DFID. One focus of this project is to use participatory planning as a tool for mitigating conflicts.

The Evaluation Team will explore if the project that is implemented in North Maluku may be taken into account, alongside the LEAD project (access to justice for disadvantaged groups) that is also being implemented in the same area.

Besides an extensive donor mapping, the Evaluation Team decided to also document experiences of programmes that were not selected for in-depth selection. Possibly, the Team will make use of email questionnaire that will be sent to these projects, so more will be known on what is being done in Indonesia on CV&A.

## Report on the Debriefing Meeting, Jakarta, December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2007

Participants: Martha Gutierrez (GTZ-ASSD), Sabine Markert (GTZ-Country Director), Barbara Garbe-Hansen (German Embassy), Hetifah (B-Trust), Manfred Poppe (GTZ-GLG), Hoky Siregar (GTZ – SfGG), Riza Tadjoedin (GTZ Country Office), Simon Bunyamin (KAS), Alam Surya Putra (Asia Foundation)

### *Feedback and discussion on presentation*

On SfGG: Implementation of customer complaint survey is financed from local budgets, thus application is very much dependant on reform-mindedness of local government/Bupati. Originally project was designed in the context of fighting corruption, but such a contribution cannot

be substantiated. Ultimately, it rather contributes to Good Governance. Limited effectiveness based on what? What is the indicator? Just based on findings in Bima? Clarification: More implementation is based on demand by local government. The training of the National Administration Agency (LAN<sup>107</sup>) is just finalized, now there will be MoU, so no application on wider scale was expected at this stage. Replication of model in 4 sub-districts should rather be considered as a success, that it is not in more is due to context situation, capacities etc, that is outside of the control of the project.

On ASSD: Ministry of Home Affairs very careful and prejudiced to involve NGOs, so trust is an important factor for the Ministry. Martha: there is a problem with institutionalisation of participation, still reluctance. There is participation, but rather on an ad hoc basis. It seems easier to agree with government partners on mechanisms of accountability than on meaningful institutionalised participation. It was very difficult to convince the Ministry of Home Affairs to accept a NGO member in the advisory team. The conditions at local level differ, with a constructive pressure the openness of local government for public participation in decision-making is usually stronger.

On the Asia Foundation funded project implemented by PATTIRO Solo: Local Government of Solo bought itself into an increase of transparency and accountability, a poster on budget transparency was developed by PATTIRO, then it was financed and distributed by local government.

What have been the findings on CEDES, a local NGO was formed by former GTZ programme PROMIS staff? Have they been able to establish themselves as long-term advisors to the local government, do they get financing, are they important civil society stakeholders? It seems that this is not the case, most of the people involved have become civil servants and engage themselves in NGO in free time. There is cooperation with local government and partly with the GTZ GLG, but no funding. One staff saw his NGO involvement rather as a long-term political investment.

A clarification was made, that the self-help groups (SHG) not owned by GTZ, but actually by the government, so there should be in the interest of the local government to use existing SHG previously supported by GTZ for the implementation of other programs. But in fact this is not happening. There is still a lot of overlap of different government and as many donor programmes set up different community organisations.

KAS: It was reconfirmed that they are very satisfied with the training provided by the Yogyakarta-based NGO SATUNAMA. SATUNAMA is well aware of M&E needs and they constantly assessing them. KAS wants to support them to expand their activities

A participant mentioned that what was still missing in the 'lessons learnt' is the link to the specific context of Indonesia: Young democracy, no social contracts established, still high level of distrust between state and civil society actors.

Question: Any findings especially on women, how effectively supporting their voice? Women still highly underrepresented as actors, still sidelined, gender mainstreaming is not a major issue in those project that were evaluated, in the project design of PROMIS strengthening of voice of

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<sup>107</sup> This organisation is linked to the Ministry of Home Affairs and is involved in implementation of laws and procedures, and guidelines issues by the Ministry.

women was included (stakeholder forum for women in the context of mid-term development planning), but it was not continued for internal and political reasons.

*Final comments and recommendations*

Appreciating the findings and conclusions presented, the final comments and recommendations of the participants for the Evaluation Team were the following:

- Customer Complaint Survey: It's most convincing and unique as the government pays to be criticized.
- More findings and analysis on the linkage between civil society and government needed, so far rather focus on CS as entry point, but how are opportunities and windows within government for more accountability and supporting citizens' voice?
- More about obstacles should be said
- Give more attention to the current legislative framework for citizens voice and accountability, and more contextualizing of the findings would be useful
- More context, more information on GTZ projects needed
- Not always civil society voice is real civic voice, request for improved services rather real civic voice, voice can also be lead by self-interest or political interests; on the other hand political voice and channel is necessary and cannot be separated from civic voice.

## Appendix G: Documents consulted

In this Appendix documents of general nature are listed. The specific documentation consulted for the specific interventions are included in the respective summary sheets.

ADB, Aid Effectiveness Case Study: Decentralisation Support Facility Indonesia, August 2006.

ADB, Country Governance Assessment Report, Republic of Indonesia, 2004.

Aniruddha Dasgupta and Victoria A. Beard. "Community Driven Development, Collective Action and Elite Capture in Indonesia". *Development and Change* 38(2), 2007, pp. 229–249.

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BMZ, Kerja Sama Republik Indonesia-Republik Federal Jerman, German - Indonesian Development Cooperation, Strategy for the Cross-cutting Area of Decentralisation, Final draft: 26<sup>th</sup> November 2002.

Clark, John, Overview of Civil Society in Indonesia, study commissioned by DFID Multi-stakeholder Forestry Programme, 2003.

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
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